The Grand Alliance (142 page)

— Rommel’s Stubborn Resistance and Retardation of North African Plans
—
Need to Wear Down
the German Air Power by Continuous Engagement
—
Relief Afforded by the Successful
Russian Resistance in the South — Potential
Dangers to the Caucasus
—
The War Against
Japan
—
Our Need to Regain the Initiative
—

Mobile Striking Force to Attack Japanese Conquests
—
Final Conference at the White House on
January
12
— Complete Anglo-American Agreement
—
General Marshall’s Question
—
We Start
for Home
—
The President’s Apprehensions
—

The Boeing Clipper — My Wish to Use Her —

Expert Advice of Portal and Pound — I Address
the Bermuda Assembly — The Decision to go by
Air Instead of in the “Duke of York”
—
A Very
Long Flight
—
A Critical Moment at Dawn —

Arrival at Plymouth, January
17.

D
URING MY REST in Florida I prepared a fourth memorandum in two parts addressed to the Chiefs of Staff Committee and for the Defence Committee of the War Cabinet. This was written also for American eyes. It differed The Grand Alliance

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from the three previous papers in that it was composed after the opening discussions in Washington between me and the President and his advisers and between the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Subsequently on my return to London I circulated all these papers to the War Cabinet for information. A very large measure of agreement had already been reached between our two countries, and the War Cabinet accorded in effect a very wide degree of approval to the direction which had been given to our affairs. I present only the more general aspects here.
1

Prime

Minister

to

10 Jan. 42

General Ismay, for C.

O.S. Committee and

Defence Committee

I have availed myself of a few days’ quiet and
seclusion to review the salients of the war as they
appear after my discussions here.

The United States has been attacked and become
at war with the three Axis Powers, and desires to
engage her trained troops as soon and as effectively as
possible on fighting fronts. Owing to the shipping
stringency this will not be possible on any very large
scale during 1942. Meanwhile the United States Army
is being raised from a strength of a little over thirty
divisions and five armoured divisions to a total strength
of about sixty divisions and ten armoured divisions.

About 3,750,000 men are at present held or about to be
called up for the Army and Air Force (over a million).

Reserves of man-power are practically unlimited, but it
would be a misdirection of war effort to call larger
numbers to the armed forces in the present phase.

2. It does not seem likely that more than between a
quarter and a third of the above American forces can
be transported to actual fighting fronts during the year
1942. In 1943 however the great increases in shipping
tonnage resulting from former and recent shipping
programmes should enable much larger bodies to be
moved across the oceans, and the summer of 1943

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may be marked by large offensive operations, which
should be carefully studied meanwhile.

3. The United States Air Force, already powerful and
rapidly increasing, can be brought into heavy action
during 1942. Already it is proposed that strong bomber
forces, based on the British Isles, should attack Germany and the invasion ports. American fighter
squadrons can participate in the defence of Great
Britain and the domination of such parts of the French
shore as are within fighter reach.

4. The declaration by the President to Congress of
the enormous increases in United States output of
munitions and shipping to proceed during 1942, and
reach full flow in 1943, makes it more than ever necessary for Hitler to bring the war to a decision in 1942,
before the power of the United States can be fully
brought to bear.

5. Hitler has had the time to prepare, perhaps in very
great numbers, tank-transporting vehicles capable of
landing on any beach. He has no doubt developed
airborne attack by parachutes, and still more by gliders,
to an extent which cannot easily be measured. The
President, expressing views shared by the leading
American strategists, has declared Great Britain an
essential fortress of the United Nations. It is indeed the
only place where the war an be lost in the critical
campaign of 1942 about to open. It would be most
imprudent to allow the successful defence of the British
Isles to be hazarded….

6. The sending of four United States divisions (one
armoured) into Northern Ireland is therefore a most
necessary war measure, which nothing should be
allowed to prevent. The replacing of the British troops in
Iceland (C) liberates an additional British division. It is
suggested however that the United States authorities
should be asked to consider the training in Iceland (C)
of as many troops as possible to work on mountains
and under snow conditions, as only the possession of
such trained mountain and ski troops in considerable
numbers can enable a liberating operation in Scandi-navia to be prepared for the future….

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7. The stubborn resistance of the enemy in Cyrenaica, the possibilities of General Rommel withdrawing,
or of being able to escape with a portion of his troops,
the reinforcements which have probably reached
Tripoli, and others which must be expected during the
delay, and above all the difficulties of supply for our
advancing troops – all will retard, or may even prevent,
the full completion of “Acrobat” [the clearance of
Tripoli]. We are therefore in a position to study “Super-Gymnast” [the Anglo-American occupation of French
North Africa], more thoroughly, and to proceed with

“Magnet” [the movement of American troops to
Northern Ireland], with the utmost speed.

8. … The German front-line air force is already less
strong numerically than the British. A considerable
portion of it must now be left opposite Russia. But the
bulk of the British Air Force has to be tied up at home,
facing, at the present time, a much smaller concentration of German bombers and fighters, and yet not able
to be moved because of the good interior communications possessed by the enemy and his power of rapid
transference. In addition, there is the Italian Air Force to
consider.

11. The object we should set before ourselves is the
wearing-down by continuous engagement of the
German air power. This is being done on the Russian
front. On the British front it can only be done to a limited
extent, unless the enemy resumes his bombing or
daylight offensive. But in the Mediterranean the enemy
shows an inclination to develop a front, and we should
meet him there with the superior strength which the
arrival of American air forces can alone give. It is of the
utmost importance to make the German Air Force fight
continuously on every possible occasion, and at every
point of attack. We can afford the drain far better than
they can. Indeed, like General Grant in his last campaign, we can almost afford to lose two for one, having
regard to the immense supplies now coming forward in
the future. Every German aircraft or pilot put out of
action in 1942 is worth two of them in 1943. It is only by
the strain of constant air battle that we shall be able to
force his consumption of air power to levels which are
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beyond the capacity of his air plants and air schools. In
this way the initiative may be regained by us, as the
enemy will be fully occupied, as we have been hitherto,
in meeting day-to-day needs and keeping his head
above water.

12. We must acclaim the very great deliverance
afforded to us by the successful Russian resistance
along the Don and in the Crimea, carrying with it the
continued Russian command of the Black Sea. Three
months ago we were forced to expect a German
advance through the Caucasus to the Caspian and the
Baku oilfields. That danger is almost certainly staved off
for perhaps four or five months till the winter is over,
and of course continued successful Russian resistance
in the South would give complete protection to us.

13. The danger may however recur in the late
spring. The oil stringency, which is already serious in
Germany and the German-conquered countries, makes
the seizure of the Baku and Persian oilfields objects of
vital consequence to Germany, second only to the need
of successfully invading the British Isles…. The enormous power of the German Army may be able to
reassert itself as soon as weather conditions improve.

In this case they might well be content to adopt a
defensive attitude along the northern and central
sectors of the Russo-German front, and thrust an
offensive spearhead southeast through the Caucasus
to the oilfields which lie beyond.

THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

17. It is generally agreed that the defeat of
Germany, entailing a collapse, will leave Japan
exposed to overwhelming force, whereas the defeat of
Japan would not by any means bring the World War to
an end. Moreover, the vast distances in the Pacific and
the advantageous forward key points already seized or
likely to be seized by the Japanese will make the
serious invasion of the homelands of Japan a very
lengthy business. Not less lengthy will be the piecemeal
recovery, by armies based mainly on Australia and
India, of the islands, airfields, and naval bases in the
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Southwest Pacific area now confided to General
Wavell. It seems indeed more probable that a decision
can be reached sooner against Germany than against
Japan. In any case, we cannot expect to develop
adequate naval, air, and military superiority in the
aforesaid area for a considerable time, having regard to
other calls made upon us and the limitation of shipping.

18. While therefore it is right to assign primacy to the
war against Germany, it would be wrong to speak of
our “standing on the defensive” against Japan; on the
contrary, the only way in which we can live through the
intervening period in the Far East before Germany is
defeated is by regaining the initiative, albeit on a minor
scale.

19. In a theatre of a thousand islands, many capable
of being converted into makeshift air and naval bases,
insoluble problems are set to purely passive defence.

The Japanese having obtained temporary command of
the sea, and air predominance over considerable
areas, it is within their power to take almost any point
they wish, apart, it is hoped, from the fortress of Singapore. They can go round with a circus force and clean
up any local garrisons we or the Dutch have been able
so far to hold. They will seek to secure their hold by a
well-conceived network of air bases, and they no doubt
hope to secure, in a certain number of months, the
possession of the fortress of Singapore. Once in
possession of this as well as Manila, with their air
bases established at focal points, they will have built up
a system of air and naval defence capable of prolonged
resistance…. The naval superiority of the United
States, to which Great Britain will contribute to the best
of her ability, ought to be regained by the summer of
1942.

20. Thereupon, or at least as soon as possible, raids
should be organised upon islands or seaports which the
Japanese have seized. The President has, I understand, ordered the formation of a force on the west
coast of America akin to the commandos. Such a force,
on account of its individual qualities, will be exceptionally valuable by gaining key points and lodgments in
amphibious operations. It would require to be supported