The Grand Alliance (96 page)

585

facilitate this it must be made to give way to one which
will. To this end the strongest possible pressure should
be applied forthwith while issue of German-Russian
struggle is in doubt….

On the 21st I replied to General Wavell:
Prime

Minister

to

21 July 41

General Wavell

Cabinet will consider Persian situation tomorrow. I
am in general agreement with your view, and would like
to give Persians an ultimatum from Britain and Russia
to clear out the Germans without delay or take the
consequences. Question is what forces we have
available in case of refusal.

The Chiefs of Staff advised that action should be confined to the South, and that we should need at least one division, supported by a small air component, to secure the oilfields.

This force would have to come from Iraq, where we had already insufficient troops even for internal security. They concluded that if a force had to be sent into Persia during the next three months it would have to be replaced from the Middle East.

In a minute of July 22 the Foreign Secretary sent me his view of the situation:

Foreign Secretary to

22 July 41

Prime Minister

I have been giving further consideration this morning
to the problem of pressure upon Iran [Persia]. The more
I examine the possibilities of doing this, the clearer it
becomes that all depends upon our ability to concentrate a sufficient force in Iraq to protect the Iranian
oilfields. It would be highly dangerous even to begin
economic pressure until we were militarily in a position
to do this, for the Shah is fully conscious of the value of

The Grand Alliance

586

the oilfields to us, and if he sees trouble with us
brewing he is likely to take the first step.

Reports, apparently reliable, have reached us of
Iranian concentrations on the Russian frontier, on the
Iraqi frontier, and in the area of the oilfields. I hope that
every effort will be made to strengthen our forces in
Iraq at the earliest moment. If we can do this before the
Russians suffer a severe reverse in the south there is a
reasonable chance of imposing our will on the Iranians
without resort to force. But we must not move diplomatically ahead of our military strength or we shall court
disaster.

There is a further factor which increases the need
for the early reinforcement of Iraq. Should Russia be
defeated we shall have to be ready to occupy the
Iranian oilfields ourselves; for in such an eventuality
German pressure on the Iranians to attempt to turn us
out would be irresistible.

I was not satisfied that this Persian operation had received the co-ordinated planning essential to its eventual success.

On July 31 therefore on the eve of my voyage to Placentia I gave instructions that a special committee should be set up under the Lord President for this purpose.

I cannot feel that this operation, involving war with Persia in the event of non-compliance, has been studied with the attention which its far-reaching character requires. While agreeing to its necessity, I consider that the whole business requires exploring, concerting, and clamping together, as between the Foreign Office and the War Office, and between the Middle East Command and the Government of India. We must not take such grave steps without having clear-cut plans for the various eventualities. For instance, what happens if the Persian troops around and about the The Grand Alliance

587

Ahwaz oilfields seize all Anglo-Persian Oil Company employees and hold them as hostages? What attitude is expected from the Bahktiari and the local inhabitants? What happens to British residents in Teheran? Is there any danger of the oilwells being destroyed rather than that they should fall into our possession? We must be very careful not to commit an atrocity by bombing Teheran. Are our available forces strong enough to occupy the Ahwaz oilfields in the lace of local and official Persian opposition?

How far north do we propose to go? What aerodromes are available? How is the railway to be worked if the Persians refuse to help?

These and many other questions require to be thought out.

It would be well if the Lord President with the Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs, War, and India reviewed the whole matter and reported to the War Cabinet during the early part of next week. Meanwhile all necessary action of a preparatory character should proceed. I am in favour of the policy, but it is of a very serious character, and should not be undertaken until the possible consequences and alternative situations have been thoroughly surveyed and careful, detailed plans made and approved.

I was sure that the similarity of the names, Iran and Iraq, would lead to confusion.

Prime

Minister

to

2 Aug. 41

Foreign Secretary, Sir

Edward Bridges and

General Ismay

In all correspondence, it would be more convenient
to use the word “Persia” instead of “Iran,” as otherwise
dangerous mistakes may easily occur through the
similarity of Iran and Iraq. In any cases where convenient, the word “Iran” may follow in brackets after
Persia.

The Grand Alliance

588

Formal correspondence with the Persian Government should of course be conducted in the form they
like.

And later:

Prime

Minister

to

29 Aug. 41

Minister

of

Information

Do try to blend in without causing trouble the word
Persia instead of Iran.

I am indeed glad to learn that the Persian Government have now (1949) adopted officially this change.

During my absence at sea this Committee reported to me by telegram the results of their work, which had meanwhile been approved by the War Cabinet. It was clear from their message of August 6 that the Persians would not meet our wishes regarding the expulsion of German agents and residents from their country, and that we should have to resort to force. The next stage was to co-ordinate our plans, diplomatic and military, with those of the Russians. On August 13 Mr. Eden received Mr. Maisky at the Foreign Office, and the terms of our respective Notes to Teheran were agreed. This diplomatic move was to be our final word. Mr. Maisky told the Foreign Secretary that “after the presentation of the memoranda the Soviet Government would be ready to take military action, but they would not take such action except in conjunction with us.” On receiving this news I minuted (August 19), “I think the Russian view is reasonable, and we ought to move with them while there is time.”

We were now committed to action. In the event of stronger Persian resistance than had been anticipated, we had to consider the possibility of further reinforcement of the The Grand Alliance

589

Middle East area. On August 24, on the eve of our planned advance into Persia, I sent the following minute to the Chiefs of Staff:

Prime

Minister

to

24 Aug. 41

Chiefs of Staff

It is essential that more reinforcements should be
set in motion eastwards at once. Is it true that the 10th
Indian Division has not got a British battalion to each
brigade? If so, three battalions of British troops should
be sent to join General Quinan by the fastest possible
route. As General Auchinleck proposes to remain
inactive in the Western Desert for many weeks, he
should be directed to move larger forces eastwards
than are at present arranged. At least the equivalent of
one extra division, including the three British battalions
aforesaid, should be set in motion now. If all goes well
they can easily be countermanded. Let me know what
forces are likely to be available in Egypt. Where is the
last brigade of the 50th Division? Surely Cyprus is in no
immediate danger.

In view of the recalcitrance of the Persian Government, General Quinan, who was commanding in Iraq, had been ordered on July 22 to be ready to occupy the oil refinery at Abadan and the oilfields, together with those two hundred and fifty miles farther north near Khanaqin. The joint Anglo-Soviet Note of August 17 met with an unsatisfactory reply, and the date for the entry of British and Russian forces into Persia was fixed for the 25th. The Imperial forces in the Abadan sector, under General Harvey, comprised the 8th Indian Infantry Division; in the Khanaqin sector, under General Slim, the 9th Armoured Brigade, one Indian regiment of tanks, four British battalions, and one regiment of British artillery. The supporting air forces consisted of one Army Co-operation, one fighter, and one bomber squadron.

The first objective was the capture of the oilfields; the The Grand Alliance

590

second, to advance into Persia and, with Russian cooperation, to control Persian communications, and secure a through route to the Caspian. Opposition on the southern front could be expected from two Persian divisions, with sixteen light tanks, and in the north from three divisions.

The capture of the Abadan refinery was made by an infantry brigade, which embarked in naval craft at Basra and landed at dawn on August 25. The majority of the Persian forces were surprised but escaped in lorries. Some street fighting took place and a few Persian naval craft were captured. At the same time other troops of the 8th Division captured the port of Khurramshahr from the landward side, and a force was sent north toward Ahwaz. As our troops were approaching Ahwaz news of the Shah’s “Cease fire”

order was received, and the Persian general ordered his troops back to barracks. In the north the oilfields were easily captured, and General Slim’s force pushed thirty miles along the road toward Kermanshah. They were now faced however with the formidable Pai-tak Pass, which if held by determined troops would have been a definite obstacle. To deal with this a column was sent to turn the position from the south. After overcoming some opposition these troops reached Shahabad, behind the Persian defence, on August 27. This movement, combined with some bombing, proved too much for the defenders of the pass, who abandoned their positions hastily. The advance on Kermanshah was resumed, and on the 28th the enemy were found again to be drawn up on a position across the road. But just as the attack was about to be launched, a Persian officer arrived with a white flag and the campaign was over. Our casualties were twenty-two killed and forty-two wounded.