The Grand Alliance (99 page)

Besides this there is the importance of encouraging
Turkey to stand as a solid block against a German
passage to Syria and Palestine. In view of both these
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important objectives, I wish to reinforce the Middle East
armies with two regular British divisions, 40,000 men, in
addition to the 150,000 drafts and units which we are
carrying ourselves between now and Christmas. We
cannot however manage to find the whole of the
shipping by ourselves. Would it be possible for you to
lend us twelve United States liners and twenty United
States cargo ships manned by American crews from
early October till February? These would come carrying
cargo to United Kingdom ports under any flag arrangement convenient. If they could arrive here early in
October we would send them forward as additions to
our October and November convoys to the Middle East.

2. I know, Mr. President, from our talks that this will
be difficult to do, but there is a great need for more
British troops in the Middle East, and it will be an
enormous advantage if we can hold Turkey and sustain
Russia, and by so doing bar further advance eastward
by Hitler. It is quite true that the loan of these liners
would hamper any large dispatch of United States
forces to Europe or Africa, but, as you know, I have
never asked for this in any period we can reasonably
foresee in the near future.

3. It is for you to say what you would require in
replacements of ships sunk by enemy action. Hitherto
we have lost hardly anything in our well-guarded troop
convoys. I am sure this would be a wise and practical
step to take at the present juncture, and I shall be very
grateful if you can make it possible.

This produced a most helpful and generous response. “I am sure,” said the President on the 6th, “we can help with your project to reinforce the Middle East army. At any rate I can now assure you that we can provide transport for twenty thousand men.” He said that these ships would be United States naval transports manned by Navy crews, and that the American Neutrality Act permitted public ships of the Navy to go to any port. The United States Maritime Commission would besides this arrange to place ten or twelve additional ships in the North Atlantic to run between

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American ports and Great Britain, so that we could release ten or twelve of our British cargo ships for the voyage to the Middle East. “I am loaning you,” he said, “our best transport ships. Incidentally I am delighted you are going to reinforce the Middle East.”

Former Naval Person

7 Sept. 41

to

President

Roosevelt

I am indeed grateful for your prompt response to my
appeal about Middle East shipping, and very glad you
like the policy. I am also planning to send seventeen
more squadrons of fighter aircraft to the same theatre.

2. In my telegram about supply help for Russia, I
meant to add: “If they keep fighting it is worth it; if they
don’t we don’t have to send it.” We are hitting ourselves
very hard in tanks, but this argument decided me.

3. We all await with profound interest your promised
statement for Monday. I am speaking Tuesday in the
House.

At the same time the President brought into operation the agreements which he had made with me at Placentia to intervene more directly in the Atlantic.

I now proceeded to use the President’s invaluable gift of transports to the best advantage.

Prime

Minister

to

17 Sept. 41

Colonel Hollis, for C.

O.S. Committee

All possible must be done to accelerate the movement and turn-round of the fast American transports in
order to secure to us the benefits of a second trip. The
sailing of these transports from America must not be
delayed for the sake of carrying the Canadian
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armoured troops. To carry them is convenient, but not
essential. The delay of reloading of these ships in U.K.

ports from October 23 to November 15 cannot be
accepted. An evolution should be made of putting
Number 1 extra division on board in the shortest time.

At least a fortnight should be saved on this if it can be
reconciled with convoy movements.

2. The field state of the Army of the Nile is good.

This is not surprising considering they are taking nearly
five months’ rest from all fighting. The 60 British battalions average 880, and the 45 artillery regiments are
only short by 9 per cent. It is inconceivable that more
than a quarter of this artillery can be heavily engaged in
continuous bombardment during the next four months.

Drafts for the artillery cannot therefore have high
priority. The 6 Tank Transporter and 16 Standard M.T.

companies deserve a high place. This applies also to
the naval relief, to the Indian reinforcements and to the
artillery, etc., for the two new Indian divisions in Iraq.

Ten thousand to twenty thousand drafts for the infantry
can be worked in as convenient, and there may be
some specialist items in the R.A.S.C. [Royal Army
Service Corps] field which are urgently needed. Let us
remember however that nothing can now get there
before “Crusader.” Malaya can wait, and West Africa
can be fitted in or not as convenient. The problem we
have to settle is one of priority.

3. The supreme object to be aimed at is to send
British divisions Numbers 1 and 2 to the Middle East in
accordance with the proposal made to President
Roosevelt. Spreading the movements over another
month or two, especially if we get the American second
trip, will surely provide for all the desiderata. There is no
question of saying that anything never goes.

4. I look to the Air Ministry to make the existing
squadrons in Middle East go forward with their expansion to sixty-two and a half squadrons.

5. I should be grateful if these points could be woven
into a revised programme of reinforcements for the
Middle East, and I shall be very glad to discuss any

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difficulties outstanding with the C.O.S. Committee
tonight or tomorrow night.

Although the Chiefs of Staff had agreed to the dispatch of the two additional divisions to the East, there were misgivings. Various dangers were pressed upon me. I still assigned priority to Auchinleck’s offensive.

Prime

Minister

to

18 Sept. 41

Colonel Hollis, for C.

O.S. Committee

It is our duty to take a view about whether serious
fighting will take place or not in the interval before all
convoys arrive. It should not be assumed that the risk
of this is evenly spread over the whole period, and that
at any given moment we must provide the maximum
addition of effective fighting strength. It would seem
that the only serious fighting to be expected is our long-delayed offensive in the Western Desert, for which
nothing more [i.e., not yet dispatched] can now arrive in
time. However, should this offensive succeed, very
great strain will be thrown upon the transport (R.A.S.C.)
services, including specialised units, either to hold the
ground gained or to make an ambitious leap forward to
the west. In these circumstances I am disposed to
meet, if possible, the R.A.S.C. requirements, which at
first I thought excessive. Thirteen thousand five
hundred are provided in the C.O.S. minute; four thousand more could be obtained by delaying the five
infantry battalions promised to India in the October
convoy. There seems more urgency in the former than
in the latter case. India is no doubt very thin, but on this
new showing they will still receive seventy-nine hundred, namely, three battalions plus drafts for expansion.

This is a considerable infusion of British troops. Therefore I wish the five battalions, four thousand, to be
delayed till the New Year, and the lour thousand
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passages saved devoted to reinforcement of the R.A.S.

C. for Middle East. It should be explained to India at
Headquarters that the delay is only a short one and that
the expansion programme should proceed.

2. It is difficult to see from what quarter and by what
line of advance other “serious fighting” will develop in
the period covered by our convoys to the end of 1941

and their arrival by the end of February, 1942. In this
five-month period it is not likely that Turkey will open
the door to a German invasion of Syria, and still less
likely that, if she refuses, a way through Asia Minor can
be forced by the enemy. Unless there is a complete
collapse of Russia, the Germans will be chary of
embarking on a major war with Turkey, costing perhaps
another million men. Therefore, I cannot see the risk of
invasion of Syria, Palestine, etc., from the north as
likely to be operative before the winter is over – say,
March. This is also the view which has been taken in
various C.O.S. papers.

3. The only other route by which serious attack can
fall upon us is through the Caucasus and across the
Caspian. This presupposes the mastery of the Black
Sea, in which the Russians have at present an overwhelming naval superiority, involving the capture of
Sebastopol and also of Novorossisk, the subsequent
traversing of the Caucasus from Batum to Baku, or
alternatively a movement north of the Black Sea and
through the Caucasus from north to south. This would
be a prohibitive winter operation. A third possibility
would be a German march round the Caspian, forcing
the line of the Volga and destroying the last reserve
armies of Russia. This is plainly an operation
impossible to complete within the next six months,
unless we assume the surrender or collapse of Russia.

Unless this happens, the Caspian, strongly held by
Russian naval forces, must remain a great shield to the
northward.

4. Therefore, in order to bring about the “serious
fighting” suggested, Turkey and/or Russia must yield in
the period mentioned, or the Germans must force their
way from Anatolia or through the Caucasus or round
the north of the Caspian. A sensible, practical view of
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