The Rise and Fall of a Palestinian Dynasty (13 page)

Qasim al-Ahmad was captured a few days after the Husaynis, and his fate remains unknown. Having reconquered Jerusalem, Ibrahim punished the city by sealing up the Mughrabi Gate (also known as the
Dung Gate), near the quarter inhabited by a North African community that had supported the revolt. (It would be reopened in 1841, after the Egyptians had been driven out.) This was not merely a symbolic gesture. It was the nearest gate to the spring of Silwan, and sealing it made it harder for the townspeople to fetch water. Also, a large jail was built near the fortress – Jerusalem’s famous Kishleh – and anyone who dared to resist the ruler was thrown into one of its tiny cells. The Ottomans, when they returned, and later the British, Jordanians and Israelis, all kept up this institution and its practices.

In the latter days of Egyptian rule, the Husaynis made their peace with Ibrahim and even agreed to help administer the city on his behalf. The rulers were willing to forgive Tahir, due to the high regard in which he was held by the scholars at al-Azhar in Cairo, but Umar was not so fortunate. The Husaynis had to agree to let Umar’s son, Muhammad Ali (whose name no doubt appealed to the Pasha), fill his father’s post as
naqib al-ashraf
of Jerusalem. He retained the position after Umar returned from exile in 1836. But the Egyptian authorities, who wished to be reconciled with the family, did not cancel any of Umar’s honorary titles or the stipends that went with his former position. Thus the Husaynis grew still stronger despite the unfortunate gamble they had taken in the final stages of the revolt. Their reconciliation came just in time, because by then the standing of the Khalidis had surpassed theirs, and good relations with the powers that be were, as always, translated into important posts and rich emoluments.

Muhammad Ali al-Husayni played an active part in the creation of the first representative and constitutional body in the district of Jerusalem – namely, the
Majlis al-Shura
(the general council of Jerusalem). It was set up as an advisory council to the Egyptian ruler and represented the leading groups in local society. The council was headed by Mahmud Abu al-Saud; Muhammad Ali al-Husayni was a member by virtue of his position as
naqib al-ashraf
, and from the beginning so was Tahir al-Husayni as the
mufti
.

Curiously, Tahir al-Husayni, whose political instincts were generally acute, failed to discern the approaching end of Egyptian rule in Palestine and chose to steer close to the Pasha. This was not a minor matter in those days, least of all for a
sheikh
who had been out of favor and even exiled for his part in the revolt. In recognition of his belated loyalty to the regime, Tahir received the title
nazir al-diwan
(chairman of the city council). In this way the Husaynis were associated with the cancellation of the special taxes imposed on the Christians and Jews,
though apparently they were able to restrict the scope of the reforms.
⁴³
Led by Tahir, the city council forbade the Jews to engage in agriculture, buy grazing land or deal in soap (which the Husaynis manufactured); Jews retained their right to engage in commerce. In Egypt, Muhammad Ali Pasha ratified the resolution: ‘We shall not allow the Jews to purchase land in Jerusalem and its environs, as this would constitute a legal precedent.’
⁴⁴
Nor did the
majlis
accede to the Jews’ request to be allowed to pray aloud; they stated that the old arrangements on this matter remained in force. Likewise, the question of the status of the Western (‘Wailing’) Wall – which would be a major bone of contention between future Husayni generations and the Zionist movement – came up in the last days of Muhammad Ali’s rule in Jerusalem. The Jewish community hoped to gain from the Pasha’s lenience towards non-Muslim minorities and asked permission to build a structure near the Wall and to pray aloud. But the
majlis
decreed that since the Wall adjoined the Haram al-Sharif the Jews could have no legal right to it or to the road leading to it, which passed through the Mughrabi quarter.

In its final stages Egyptian rule created some new facts that displeased the Husayni family. For example, Muhammad Ali permitted the foreign consuls in Jerusalem to build business premises, though in response to the protest of the Husaynis on behalf of the populace, he did not allow the American consul to fly his country’s flag. Pieces of colored cloth were important symbols of presence and dominance long before the country was caught up in the heady mood of nationalism.
⁴⁵
The Pasha also permitted foreign merchants to trade in the city and canceled the tax that had been paid by the guardians of the churches since the time of Saladin, as well as the tithe paid by the
fellahin
.

Ibrahim also left his imprint on the city’s architecture and introduced some technological innovations. Historians theorizing about the rise of nationalism argue that such innovations induce a new attitude to the environment, which in turn enhances the development of a national identity.
⁴⁶
Among the new structures were a windmill and the first flour mill of its type, both built in 1831.

In 1839 Muhammad Ali was driven out of Syria and the familiar Ottoman rule returned. These changes of government frayed the people’s nerves. Muhammad Ali left Jericho first, and rumors spread in Jerusalem that he had destroyed it. People feared that he would do the same to their city. Tahir and Umar called for the city gates to be closed, and recommended that the people hide their money in the cemeteries and shut themselves up inside their shops. The Ottoman forces, backed
by the navies of the European powers, had already landed in Jaffa, but by the time they reached Jerusalem Muhammad Ali had already left. Later it transpired that he had not harmed Jericho.
⁴⁷

The old rulers returned to Palestine bursting with a new resolve: the empire was to be turned into a modern state capable of standing up to Europe, which was eager to grab any part of it that seemed attainable. At the same time, Istanbul was anxious to nip in the bud the ambitions of the various communities that drew inspiration from the Greek revolution of 1821 and from Muhammad Ali’s relative success.

The Ottomans also had to contend with a European ‘fifth column’ – namely, the European consulates that Ibrahim had permitted to be established in the imperial provinces, many of which were set up in Jerusalem. These consulates changed the city: European buildings housing foreign families that, as the foreign powers consolidated their presence in the city, gradually became regular ports of call for all the socialites in town. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the Husaynis would be among the regular guests of these foreign representatives.

This was the dawn of the Tanzimat – the reforms loathed by the Husaynis. The winds of change tended to weaken the power of the local notables, to grant positions of power to those who were willing to relearn the rules of Ottoman administration and to replace lineage with a diploma from one of the new schools of administration that had opened in Istanbul. The Khalidis were quick to take up this proposition, but the Husaynis lagged behind. It would be some years before the family regained its prominence in the city and its environs.

Success in the local political arena was of prime importance. Before the reforms, Jerusalem had been a small Ottoman district between Gaza and Nablus administered from Damascus. At the end of the period it would be an autonomous district that encompassed a large part of Palestine. It would become a strong economic and political entity led by a substantial city, not a small town as it had been when Muhammad Ali retreated from it. Before the reforms, the city’s population had been about 12,000; twenty years later it had grown to 20,000.
⁴⁸
The district, which before the reforms had been mainly rural and dominated by mountain potentates like Mustafa Abu Ghosh, became more urban in character, and the Husaynis were at its social and political center.

CHAPTER 3

Struggling with Reform, 1840–76

REDEFINING JERUSALEM AND PALESTINE

The return of Ottoman rule to Jerusalem in the winter of 1840 was a noisy affair. The old-new rulers immediately began to reconstruct the city and to reinforce its walls for fear of the rural
sheikhs
whose power had noticeably increased under the Egyptians. The walls surrounding the city were made higher, and it looked as if the division between the townspeople and the surrounding villages would continue unchanged. Hoping to assuage the angry authorities, the Jerusalem notables joined a petition sent by the notables of Syria to the young sultan, Abdul Macid (Majjid) II, describing the wrongs suffered under Muhammad Ali’s rule and begging to be taken back into the imperial fold.

They were indeed looking at a new order once the power of the empire was reasserted. New, smaller districts were decreed, and a government representative was stationed in every administrative unit down to the village. Jerusalem, which had been sidelined for years, was made the capital of the southern sub-region of the
vilayet
of Sidon. Not only was Jerusalem detached from Damascus, the districts of Gaza, Jaffa and Nablus were placed under it (in 1858 Nablus would become a separate district). The
sanjaq
of Jerusalem, defined by the reformers as a sub-region of a
vilayet
, spread from the Marj ibn Amar (Jezreel Valley) in the north to Rafah in the south (a large portion of what is Palestine and Israel today). The Ottoman rulers hoped to end the situation in which large tracts of southern Syria were not subordinated to the empire, and wished to weaken Damascus’ influence on the Mediterranean coast. Trade with Europe became one of Istanbul’s prime objectives, and under the new order all the port cities began to enjoy a prominence
they had not experienced since the Roman Empire.

Even though Jaffa and Gaza were on the coast, Jerusalem was more important, possibly because it was the most populous of the three – with some 20,000 inhabitants (about half of them non-Muslim) at the start of the reform period and 68,000 at its end.
¹
Moreover, Jaffa and Gaza were more vulnerable, as history had shown. Above all, Jerusalem’s primacy was reinforced by the high regard in which it was held by the European nations, whose consuls in the holy city would become a major factor in local politics. The European interest in Jerusalem forced the sultan to show his commitment, as the head of the Muslim nation, to the third holiest city in Islam.
²

But the governor of Damascus was still a post to reckon with, and during the Tanzimat period his influence was still felt in Palestine as well in Jerusalem.
³
It was only in 1872, when the administrative map was yet again redrawn, that Damascus’ role weakened considerably. In that year, Jerusalem became a separate district of equal standing to Damascus, and it incorporated the districts of Nablus and Acre. The British consul in Jerusalem reported to his government: ‘Palestine has become a separate district’ – it was called the District of Holy Jerusalem. A new governor, Mustafa Surayya Pasha, arrived to rule over it, but he was soon cut down to size.

‘Holy Jerusalem’ became an ordinary district, no different from the district of Mount Lebanon. It was shorn of Nablus and Acre but retained Gaza, Hebron and Jaffa. Nonetheless, Jerusalem had a higher status than these sub-provinces as it reported directly to Istanbul. This state of affairs persisted right up to the First World War – the northern part of Palestine, the districts of Nablus and Acre, were ruled from Beirut, and the southern part from Jerusalem (in this period, Vilayet Sidon was renamed Vilayet Beirut).
⁴

EARLY BIDS FOR NATIONALISM

Western historians ascribe this important Ottoman reorganization in 1872 to the growing influence of Western powers that wanted to raise the status of the holy city. But Palestinian and Turkish historians argue that the reformulation was an internal Ottoman initiative and only partly shaped by European pressure. Behind this debate lies a more substantive one about timing, or more precisely about the exact date of the birth of Palestinian nationalism. A clear definition of geopolitical units in a
proto-nationalist era is quite often mentioned as a precursor of modern nationalism; hence the importance attributed to this particular act by the Ottoman government in 1872.
⁵

Indeed, though updated scholarship on the birth of a modern nation requires other ingredients to detect a clear emergence, this particular criterion – a well-defined space – is crucial. During the same period, another ingredient was thrown into the national pot: a transformation in the conceptual perceptions of space and time amongst the local elites. Simultaneous with the local elite constructing, devising or inventing (depending on the scholar’s point of view) the idea of nationhood, the society as a whole developed a new perception of the space in which it lived. This was a perception triggered by administrative changes such as the one that occurred in 1872 – the creation of a new district, regardless of whose initiative it was – as well as by economic, social and cultural processes.

The economy of the new district became linked to that of Europe, leading to an influx of Europeans – merchants, speculators, medical men, tourists, missionaries and Zionists. The Western powers followed, greatly enlarging their influence in the region, affecting the local society and its culture.

As the geopolitical entity they were living in increased in size, it was given clearer definitions by Ottoman reformers, visitors, geographers and various interested Europeans. This is how ‘Palestine’ was defined for the first time in a British travelers’ guide from the late reign of Muhammad Ali: