The Rise and Fall of a Palestinian Dynasty (14 page)

Palestine is the name by which the ‘moderns’ designate that part of the Ottoman Empire in Asia that lies between latitudes 31 and 34, extending from the River Jordan in the east to the Mediterranean in the west.
⁶

Here, as Benedict Anderson puts it, was a fusion of discrete processes that gave rise to a new conception, a new vision, of the region inhabited by people who had formerly been the subjects of a small district in the
vilayet
of Damascus. At some indefinable stage – this being a collective process that affected individuals at different times – the
shamis
(the inhabitants of the Syrian districts) living in the newly created district began to think of themselves as Palestinians.
⁷
At some point in time, the Husaynis too changed their self-reference in a similar way.

A TEMPORARY DECLINE, 1840–56

The Ottomans assigned the notable families to an important position in the management of the renewed government by inviting them to take part in the council of the
sanjaq
, called
Majlis al-Idara
in Arabic or
Mecelis-i-idari
in Turkish, as well as the council of the city. The Husaynis aspired to add the city council to the other three major centers of power they controlled – the
niqaba
, the
ifta
and the position of Sheikh al-Haram – but did not always succeed. The struggle to win the new post was still carried out by the old rules and tactics. And while the new council had a democratic element that the city’s government had previously lacked, it nevertheless granted primacy to the notables. The new situation actually suited the Husaynis’ slow adjustment to the dramatic changes wrought by the Tanzimat.

Only the
mufti
and the
naqib al-ashraf
did not have to be elected to their posts, as they were appointed on the basis of social standing; all the other positions required a run for office. Thus Tahir al-Husayni and Muhammad Ali al-Husayni retained considerable power so long as they filled their posts. Tahir headed the council in the final year of Egyptian rule, but apparently not for long; having started with a flourish, he soon declined. Muhammad Ali al-Husayni’s position was also precarious. At first he lost the post of
naqib
, which was given to the al-Alamis. But before long he regained the position and managed to keep it until shortly before his death in 1869.
⁸

The temporary decline in the family’s standing lasted from 1840 to 1856. Rival families such as the Khalidis and the Alamis benefited from this and for a while took over some of the Husaynis’ positions.
⁹
Losing a position such as the
naqib
or
mufti
quite often resulted in short-term, forced or voluntary exiles in Damascus or Istanbul.

Tahir al-Husayni effectively used his forced stay in the capital to retain the good connections that would return his family to power despite the relative decline in the period mentioned.
¹⁰
The most precious position lost to the Alamis in 1856 was that of the
mufti
, but it was returned as a result of Tahir’s efforts and remained in the hands of the Husaynis until 1948.

ECONOMIC COMPENSATIONS

The temporary waning of the Husayni family’s political standing did not affect its economic welfare. On the contrary, it seemed to provide an
impetus for growing richer. Generous governmental compensations for positions lost during Egyptian rule and the expansion of the family’s profitable soap factory and flour mill provided the necessary security.
¹¹
Though properties were usually confiscated when their owner was deported, Umar was actually paid compensation, thanks to his excellent contacts in Damascus and Istanbul. He was therefore able to leave a rich estate that would consolidate the prosperity of the Umari branch of the family. Even in his old age, he engaged in commercial transactions that extended beyond the city or even the district and enlarged the family fortune.
¹²

The Tahiri branch of the family did not do badly either, and Muhammad Ali al-Husayni – who had at one time been both
naqib
and
mufti
– showed business acumen. He was also exiled at the time of the rift with the Alamis. After his return from exile, he took advantage of his position and began to develop the religious properties his family managed. On certain properties near the village of Sarafend, he built a new village named Fuja. This investment would pay off in later years and benefit his descendants.
¹³

Once all the deportees returned home – except Tahir, who remained in Istanbul to the end of his life – the family could regroup and prepare for future challenges. They faced the hostility of various governors, representatives of the Ottoman reforms, who believed that it was their duty to reduce the power of notable families and did all they could to stir up enmities among them. The family dealt with this policy with a dual tactic. On the one hand, they created new matrimonial ties – most importantly with the Darwish family, which held several important positions in the city – thus neutralizing some of the rivalries. And on the other hand, they used past alliances to overcome the power of opposing clans (primarily the Alamis and the Khalidis). In fact, the Husaynis were becoming so powerful that marrying into them became a goal for former rivals such as the Alamis and the Nashashibis.
¹⁴

THE END OF COUNTRYSIDE RULE AND ITS EFFECT ON THE HUSAYNIS

Rural chieftains were the main victims of the new centralization and taxation policies in the age of reform. In the greater Jerusalem area, the decline in the fortunes of such families between 1840 and the mid-1870s benefited the urban elite of Jerusalem as a whole and the Husaynis, as its leading family, in particular.
¹⁵

These policies in greater Jerusalem were challenged by the Abu Ghosh family, and for a while the protests turned into a series of insurrections beyond Jerusalem and throughout the countryside. However, this time the Abu Ghoshes could not rely on the urban families, and the Ottomans succeeded in enlisting other strongmen in the mountains who had been antagonized by the Abu Ghosh family in the past over issues of taxation and territory. It would not be an exaggeration to claim that urban families such as the Husaynis helped implement the centralized Ottoman policy and benefited from it.
¹⁶

The younger generation of Husaynis was initially enthused by the rebellious mood. And thus we find Muhammad Ali al-Husayni joining the Abu Ghosh insurrection in the 1840s.
¹⁷
He was arrested and exiled for this role, but when released in 1847 he was reinstated as
naqib al-ashraf
. This was due not to any change of policy in Istanbul but to the family’s friendship with the Grand Mufti in Istanbul from 1846 to 1854, Arif Hikmet, who time and again came to the Husaynis’ aid. After this incident, the family kept out of the conflict and did not support the Abu Ghoshes, while sensibly refraining from voicing loyalty either to their enemies or to the government.
¹⁸

BACK IN POWER

At the start of the sixth decade of the century, the Husaynis could congratulate themselves on having survived the severe tests of the previous decade. They retained the post of
naqib
, though that of
mufti
was less secure. Until 1856 the latter was periodically filled by Muhammad Fadhl Jarallah instead of Mustafa al-Husayni. But after Jarallah’s death that year, the government stopped playing divide-and-rule, at least with regard to the post of
mufti
of Jerusalem. Yet government policy did not cause the change so much as marriage connections with the Jarallah family that ensured it would no longer compete for the post of
mufti
. That is, until 1949, when King Abdullah of Jordan appointed a Jarallah to the post in place of al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni.
¹⁹
Mustafa remained in the post with the approval of the Jarallahs until 1893, the year of his death.

Two decades after the return of Ottoman rule, the Husaynis were once again at the political and social hub of Jerusalem. This was not blind fortune’s doing – the family’s skillful use of such traditional means as prudent matrimonial and other social ties, as well as more modern ones like economic power, restored their preeminence. Even before the
passing of Tahir and Umar, both of whom died at a ripe old age in the 1850s, the family was guided by the younger men: Muhammad Ali, who would be either
naqib al-ashraf
or a serious contender for the post throughout most of the time of reform, and Mustafa, who was
mufti
for much of that period or likewise a strong candidate for the post. Umar and Tahir remained official heads of the family but had not been involved in the cardinal decisions taken during the very difficult times.

Once they felt secure in their relations with the governor and the other notables, and even in the face of the authorities’ centralizing drive, the heads of the Husayni clan turned their attention to the increasingly problematic presence of foreign consuls in Jerusalem. This was particularly true of their relationship with the British consuls, with whom the Husaynis were in constant, bitter conflict.

The first British consul, William Tanner Young, arrived in Jerusalem in 1838 and perceived the city notables to be a group hostile to his country’s interests and to himself personally. It seems he failed to understand their world and mindset. While they certainly resented the consuls’ intervention in city affairs, they were not a dynamic or a conspiratorial group and rarely tackled diplomats head-on. Only when the latter went so far as to intervene in judicial matters or the status of the notables did disagreements rise to the surface.

After some time, the notables realized that every such incident ended with the consuls’ position becoming stronger. Within a decade of coming to Jerusalem in the late 1830s, they had grown into a force to contend with.

More than any of them, British consul James Finn personified the disturbing effect of the European presence. Stationed in Jerusalem between 1845 and 1863, he has been lauded by Israeli historians for helping Jews to settle in their ‘ancestral land’, and his memoirs have been translated into Hebrew. He is not the only historical figure who appears in one nation’s pantheon and in the rogues’ gallery of another. Finn detested Islam as a whole and the notables of Jerusalem in particular. He never learned to speak Arabic and communicated via an interpreter, which did nothing to smooth relations.

He was especially hostile to the Husaynis, whose main seat of influence, the Haram al-Sharif, he dubbed ‘a site of special fanaticism’.
²⁰
Probably his worst offense in the eyes of the family was his repeated attempts to smuggle foreigners into the Haram. The place had been out of bounds for non-Muslims for more than five centuries, and those who tried to get in were stopped by the Sudanese guards who were the
principal defenders of the shrines.
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Finn tried for some time to change this custom, at first without success. But slowly the prohibition began to weaken, and Sheikh al-Haram Mustafa al-Husayni was unable to prevent it.

In general, it seemed to the Husaynis that Finn was working more eagerly than any other European to establish a permanent Western presence in Jerusalem, mainly through the purchase of lands and real estate for missionary and, later, commercial groups.
²²

THE CRIMEAN WAR AND ITS IMPACT

Although a minor incident in Jerusalem served as a pretext for the Crimean War, which embroiled many of Europe’s powers, the conflict did not have an immediate impact on Jerusalem or its people’s lives. Politically, the crisis exposed the weakness of the central government – since the war was fought in the capital’s vicinity. The temporary vacuum was not filled by one particular group but rather increased tensions between the foreign consuls and the notables over issues of honor and control.

As far as the Husaynis were concerned, the years of the war were the last phase of the serious inter-clan feuds that had threatened their grip on the powerful positions in the city. The next fifty-two years – 1856 to 1908 – would favor the family as a social and political force in the Ottoman world.

The signing of the Treaty of Paris, which ended the war in March 1856, had important implications for the political life of Jerusalem. Britain and France used their wartime assistance to the Ottoman Empire to obtain further privileges for its Christian subjects and greatly strengthened the position of their consuls.

The consuls were influential in other ways as well. They gave the city a more cosmopolitan look, but the process entailed various humiliations of the local inhabitants. For example, Ottoman soldiers and guards had to stand in the presence of a consul’s son, a gesture of respect that had never been accorded even to the notables.
²³
Eventually the Husaynis were able to cope with this challenge too.

The family’s ability to contend with the power of the consuls after the Crimean War was due to their greatly increased wealth as well as their political standing. One of their financial resources was the money paid by the various Christian denominations fighting amongst themselves for possession and management of their sacred sites. Their
political rise was due to frequent changes of governors in Jerusalem, much as it had been in Damascus. As each new man came in, he had to quickly establish a
modus vivendi
with the notables, whose power and self-esteem grew accordingly. Their principal field of operations was the city council, whose composition had hardly changed since the days of Egyptian rule, and this continuity gave it added power.