Authors: Timothy H. Parsons
Tags: #Oxford University Press, #9780195304312, #Inc
substantially. There were more than fi fteen thousand miles of roads
in the Andes that the Inkas, like the Romans, reserved for nobles, soldiers, and imperial messengers. The
qollqa
warehouses were both an
economic asset and a strategic one in that they stored tribute and supplied Inkan armies. In Peru’s Mantaro Valley alone there were 2,753
of these stone structures, with a storage capacity of over half a million square feet. The warehouses also underpinned Inkan authority
by serving as collection and redistribution points for royal tribute.21
Although the Inkans rewarded their allies with the accumulated
wealth of the
qollqas
, their commitment to reciprocity had its limits.
There is no evidence that they had a formal legal code or police system, but they, like all imperial rulers, developed ruthless institutions
of domination. Special offi cials known as
tokoyrikoq
(those who see
all) were the eyes and ears of the Inka state in the provinces. If they
uncovered disobedience or subversion, the penalties ranged from fl ogging for shirking work to capital punishment for speaking against the
empire. The Inkas punished armed revolts or collective disobedience
with wholesale slaughter. They seized the lands of rebellious communities, destroyed their shrines and
wakas
, and resettled the survivors
as bound laborers on imperial estates. They made an example of disloyal
kurakas
by fl aying them to death and making drums from their
skin and cups from their skulls.
As in Roman Britain and Al-Andalus, subject Andean labor was
the true imperial prize. The Inkas claimed ownership of all property
by right of conquest and required communities to supply tribute in
the form of labor to gain access to arable land. Under the
mit’a
system (
mit’a
means “to take a turn”), in which
ayllus
sent colonists
to exploit distant resources, communities had to furnish the Inkan
Empire with miners, soldiers, porters, craftsmen, and laborers. This
was in addition to sending a portion of their produce and crafts to
the
qollqa
warehouses. In most cases, the
kurakas
based these assessments on long-standing reciprocal obligations in the
ayllus
.
It also seems likely that the Inkas were in the process of developing new strategies of extraction at the time of the Spanish conquest.
Their primary goal was to cut through the reciprocal institutions
of authority and exchange to make empire building more lucrative.
They had begun to make heavy use of
yanaconas
, men who had
138 THE RULE OF EMPIRES
become divorced from their
ayllus
, in a variety of roles ranging from
simple laborers to trusted imperial retainers. The Inkas’ main goal in
promoting this individuality over communalism was to restructure
Andean society. Using careful censuses, they began to organize conquered communities for military and labor service by dividing them
into units of ten, fi fty, one hundred, fi ve hundred, one thousand, fi ve
thousand, and ten thousand people. The Pizarrists interrupted this
experiment, but it is clear that the enormous wealth and impressive
monumental architecture of the Inkas refl ected their well-honed ability to wring labor tribute from their subjects.
Competition to control these vast riches probably sparked the
fratricidal civil war between Atawallpa and Waskar. Their father,
Wayna Qhapaq, was pushing the Inkan borders northward into
Ecuador in the 1520s when he died so unexpectedly. With the imperial inheritance uncertain, the Cuzco bureaucracy and the Inkan
high command each backed a different son. As the military candidate, Atawallpa had the advantage over his half-brother, and his
professional forces killed approximately sixty thousand of Waskar’s
Cuzco militiamen in a series of bloody battles as Pizarro and his
men marched up from the coast.22 Unaware of the true nature of the
Spanish threat, Atawallpa was brutal even by Inka standards in his
treatment of his brother’s vanquished supporters. His men executed
Waskar’s wives and children after capturing Cuzco and took their
revenge on
ayllus
and subject states that had unwisely taken his
side in the confl ict.
Atawallpa’s faction justifi ed their bloodshed and looting on the
grounds that it was part of a cosmic cataclysm (
pachakuti
) that would
usher in a new age. This had occurred four times in the Inkan past,
and Pachakutiq Yupanki, the founder of the Inkan Empire, took his
name from this “turning over of time and space.”23 In 1532, however,
pachakuti
set the stage for Pizarro and new kind of empire.
The Pizarrists did not really conquer Peru; rather, they hijacked
the Inkan imperial state. For the most part, the war-weary Inkan military and bureaucracy were paralyzed for the six months the Spanish
kept Atawallpa alive as a hostage in Cajamarca. Waskar’s partisans
foolishly but understandably hoped to use the invaders against
Atawallpa’s men, particularly after Pizarro installed Waskar’s brother
Manqu as the puppet Sapa Inka. On the other hand, many Inkan subjects similarly hoped that the Spaniards would free them from impe-Spanish
Peru 139
rial servitude. Their assistance was invaluable to the undermanned
and undersupplied conquistadors. Andeans tending the vast network
of
qollqa
warehouses in the Mantaro Valley supplied and equipped
the roughly thirty-fi ve thousand auxiliaries, most of whom were
Waskar’s men, which rounded out the Spanish forces. The Pizarrists
used this local support to root out and destroy the remnants of
Atawallpa’s army.
The Spanish relied on Andean military assistance to fi nish the
work they began at Cajamarca, but Pizarro and his men lacked the
ability and patience to maintain the Inkas’ fi nely tuned systems of
imperial extraction. Having risked their lives to topple a great empire,
they expected immediate rewards. The conquistadors therefore
embarked on a frenzied orgy of plunder when they took possession
of Inkan shrines and cities. Waskar’s supporters in Cuzco originally
welcomed them as saviors, but they quickly grew disgusted as the
Spaniards began to loot. Mocking Inkan traditions and customs, the
Pizarrists pried hundreds of golden plaques from the Temple of the
Sun and carried off its golden sacrifi cial altar. Nor did they confi ne
themselves to confi scating moveable precious metals. Ill-disciplined
conquistadors slaughtered the royal llama herds for their tongues,
which they apparently considered a delicacy, and took
aclla
women
as concubines. Rampaging conquistadors repeated this scene at every
major Inkan settlement in the highlands.
The Pizarrists’ relentless campaign of imperial plunder had a devastating impact on Andean society. Two centuries of Inkan rule had
introduced Andeans to the realities of subjecthood, but the Spanish
conquest appeared to bring the very world to an end. Established values and institutions lost their meaning as powerful cults such as Pacha
Kamaq failed to predict the catastrophe or stop the looting. The Inkan
priest of Apurimac, affl icted with the despair that seized the former
imperial ruling class, jumped to his death in a deep river gorge as the
Spanish pillaged his shrine. Similarly, the chronicler Pedro Cieza de
León reported that royal women hung themselves with their own
hair to escape the conquistadors, and an entire village committed suicide after falling to a Spanish attack. Gathering their wives and children with them as they fl ung themselves over a cliff, the village men
declared: “It is better to die in freedom than to live in servitude of
such cruel people.”24 The myth of Wayna Qhapaq’s pestilential butterfl ies was surely born of this desperation.
140 THE RULE OF EMPIRES
The Pizarrists themselves faced the challenge of constructing a
new world in the Andes after they had fi nished stripping the Inkan
Empire of its lootable treasure. For the next two decades, Francisco
Pizarro and his followers built a rudimentary conquistador state that
was focused primarily on extorting tribute from defeated Andeans.
The arrival of the fi rst precious metal shipments in Spain in 1534
sparked a rush to the Andes that brought desperately needed reinforcements, but the fl ood of speculators and fortune hunters caused
signifi cant problems. Pizzaro had diffi culty controlling the masses of
would-be conquistadors whose main goal was to replicate his feat at
Cajamarca by fi nding new Andean empires to overthrow. In 1535, he
cleverly distracted his Spanish and Inkan rivals by encouraging his
onetime partner Almagro to go on an ill-fated expedition to conquer
Chile at the head of an army of twelve thousand Andean auxiliaries
led by Paullu Inka, the brother of the new Sapa Inka, Manqu.
This diversion gave the Pizarrists time to solidify their hold
on power. Their fi rst priority was to force back under the imperial
umbrella the subject Andean communities that had used the collapse
of Inkan power to reassert their autonomy. Anchoring his regime in
urban centers, Pizarro founded Lima as his capital and reorganized
Cuzco along the lines of a European city. He turned the Temple of the
Sun into a Dominican monastery, divided the Inkan palaces among
his followers, and forbade them from settling more than one league
from the city because their control over the Andean majority was still
precarious.
The Pizarrists further staked their claim to the remnants of the
Inkan Empire by seizing Inka noblewomen as their concubines.
Although it might appear at fi rst glance that they were continuing the Inkan practice of using intermarriage to build alliances with
defeated elites, the Spanish rarely married the women they treated
as imperial plunder. Instead, they formed informal conjugal relations
with the wives and daughters of Inkan nobles and
kurakas
, many of
whom Cieza described as “very lovely and beautiful,” to claim the
legitimacy and wealth of their families.25
Some of these women may have entered into these relationships
willingly, but it is hard to see how Atawallpa’s widow, Doña Angelina
Yupanqui, would have welcomed the embrace of Francisco Pizarro, the
man who had her husband garroted. Yet she bore him two children.
Similarly, Pizarro had two children by one of Atawallpa’s daughters,
Spanish
Peru 141
Doña Inés Huaylas Yupanqui, before he married her off to one of his
employees. This is why the Jesuit mestizo priest Blas Valera charged
that the conquistadors pushed Inkan women into prostitution: “They
counseled wives to leave their husbands, virgin daughters [to leave]
their parents, and they gave [these women] over to public lewdness,
a thing that had not been seen in the [Inka] kingdom for over two
thousand years.”26 Without question, the most repulsive example of
this sexual imperial exploitation was Cristobal Maldonado’s attempt
to force a nine-year-old Inkan heiress into marriage by raping her.
Inkan aristocrats, who might well have been happy to give their
daughters or sisters to the conquistadors in marriage under the old
system, were humiliated by these unequal relationships. In keeping
with the nihilism of the times, a nobleman in Quito went so far as to
kill all of the women of his household to keep them out of Spanish
hands.27
On a much wider scale, the Pizarrists similarly co-opted and perverted Andean institutions of reciprocity through the
encomienda
system. Not only did the conquistadors loot Inkan shrines and cities, they treated the whole population of the Andes as an imperial
resource. Lacking the manpower to seize and exploit land, they
needed Andean labor to make their new empire pay on a long-term
basis. In his capacity as governor, Pizarro rewarded his followers with
encomienda
grants over entire
ayllus
. This brought the power to
demand tribute in labor, but the land itself was relatively unimportant. For example, in 1534 Pizarro awarded Juan de Barrios authority
over the subjects of a pair of
kurakas
and their
ayllus
near the coastal
town of Ica. The grant gave Barrios sanction to use approximately
1,300 Indians on farms, mines, or “other enterprises.” In return he
was obliged to “teach and indoctrinate the Indians in the matters
of our Holy Catholic Faith, giving them good treatment, and obey
the ordinances that have been drawn up for their welfare.”28 Most
encomienda
grants also required their holders to maintain a horse
and arms to deal with potential uprisings.
With Spanish military manpower stretched thin, the
encomien-
deros
obviously did not have the means to force hundreds of Andeans to work. They instead relied on the
kurakas
to mobilize their
followers to mine gold and silver, weave cloth, and grow cash crops.
The most successful
encomienderos
developed a working partnership
with their
kurakas
and cut them in on a share of the profi ts, but the