Authors: Timothy H. Parsons
Tags: #Oxford University Press, #9780195304312, #Inc
142 THE RULE OF EMPIRES
demands of the system put tremendous strain on
ayllu
leaders, whose
authority depended on reciprocity. The Spaniards would replace them
if they failed to deliver suffi cient labor tribute, but they risked their
positions and even their lives if they placed unreasonable demands
on their followers.
More grasping
encomienderos
made the
kurakas
’ situation even
more precarious by abusing their grants. Those who fulfi lled their
dream of acquiring large estates struggled to compete with independent Andeans who could produce crops and crafts more cheaply, and
so they assigned their Indians to work as domestic servants in Spanish homes or on labor gangs hired out to employers in Lima. Some
male
encomienda
holders also exploited their power over Andean
women, and it was not unusual for
encomienderos
to keep veritable
harems on their estates. Even common Spanish men exploited this
sexual perquisite of empire, and Don Felipe complained that innkeepers forced their female servants to work as prostitutes.29
The Inkan nobility found the Spanish behavior intolerable. Initially Manqu Inka took an oath of loyalty to the Spanish Crown in
the hope that the conquistadors would help him prevent his subjects
from reasserting their independence. But the Pizarrists’ behavior in
Cuzco demonstrated conclusively that they would never accept the
Inkas as equal imperial partners. Not only did they strip the city of its
moveable treasure, but Francisco’s brother Gonzalo seized Manqu’s
own wife. In a speech to the surviving nobles of Cuzco, the Sapa Inka
unknowingly echoed Boudicca’s condemnation of Roman imperialism some fourteen centuries earlier:
They preach one thing and do another, and they give so many admonitions, yet they do the opposite. They have no fear of God or shame,
and treating us like dogs, they call us no other names. Their greed
has been such that there is no temple or palace left that they have
not looted. Furthermore, even if all the snow turned to gold and silver, it would not satiate them. They keep the daughters of my and
other ladies, your sisters and kin, as concubines, behaving bestially in
this. . . . They strive to have us so subjected and enslaved that we have
no other care than to fi nd them metals and to provide them with our
women and livestock.30
Like the British Icenian queen, Manqu concluded that revolt
was the only option. With Francisco Pizarro occupied in Lima, the
Spanish
Peru 143
Spanish garrison in Cuzco under the command of his brothers consisted of only 196 conquistadors and fi ve hundred Andean auxiliaries.
The Inkan elites, who could still muster tens of thousands of soldiers, recognized that it was time to strike before the steady stream of
Spaniards into the highlands became a fl ood.
In 1535, Manqu escaped Cuzco by promising to retrieve an Inka
treasure buried in the hinterlands. Instead, he raised an army of one
hundred thousand men that besieged the Inkan capital while his allies
attacked Lima and the other urban centers in Peru. Francisco Pizarro
brushed aside the assault on Lima relatively easily, but Manqu’s troops
wiped out the forces he sent to relieve Cuzco. The Inkans’ enormous
advantage in numbers gave them control of the countryside, placing
the isolated
encomienderos
in the highlands in real jeopardy. Nevertheless, Manqu’s army could not overwhelm the tiny Cuzco garrison.
The Spaniards’ horses allowed them to forage for supplies and terrorize the Sapa Inka’s supporters, and intimidated common Andeans,
who had no love of the Inkas, gave the conquistadors food, military
intelligence, and even extra soldiers.
Most of Cuzco burned in the fi ghting, but Pizarrists broke the
back of the Inkan assault by boldly seizing a key fortress overlooking the city. Juan Pizarro died in the attack, but as the porous siege
dragged on, Manqu’s forces drifted away to plant crops and tend to
religious obligations. More signifi cantly, many Andeans remained
neutral in the hope that the Inkan and Spanish empire builders would
destroy each other. In 1537, Almagro returned from his aborted invasion of Chile and raised the siege of Cuzco. Manqu retreated with his
remaining forces to the remote fortress of Vilcabamba, where he held
out until Spanish agents murdered him in 1545. Pizarro chose his
more pliant half-brother Paullu to be the new puppet Sapa Inka, but
Manqu’s sons continued to reign in exile in Vilcabamba until the fi nal
demise of their neo-Inkan state in 1572.
The Spaniards put down the fi nal revolt of the old regime in the
Andes by exploiting tensions in the Inkan aristocracy, but in 1538
their own squabble over the division of imperial spoils fi nally turned
violent. The confl ict pitted the Pizarrist faction that claimed the bulk of
Atawallpa’s ransom and the choicest
encomiendas
against Almagro’s
disgruntled later arrivals. The privileges of early modern empire
meant that virtually every would-be conquistador felt entitled to a
personal fortune by sole virtue of his Spanishness, but even the vast
144 THE RULE OF EMPIRES
wealth of the Inkas was too fi nite to accommodate their lust for treasure. Rumors of another lootable Andean empire lured Almagro to
Chile, but when he found only aggressive Araucanian frontiersmen
he returned to demand a more equitable division of Peru. Claiming
that Cuzco actually fell within the
capitulación
that gave him authority over the lands south of Pizarro’s realm, he attempted a coup d’état
by arresting Gonzalo and Hernando Pizarro and taking control of the
garrison.
Francisco Pizarro’s position was initially precarious, but he prevailed because he had the authority of the Crown behind him. As
the legitimate governor of Peru, he had the means and the right to
destroy his treasonous rival. However, he had little time to savor his
victory. Three years later, his death at the hand of Almagro’s avenging son restarted the civil war. Fed up with the squabbling, Charles V
took a greater role in the imperial administration. The fi rst emissary
he sent to replace Pizzaro captured and executed the junior Almagro
but was too sympathetic to the conquistadors to actually reform the
Peruvian administration.
Vasco Núñez de la Vela, the fi rst true viceroy of Peru, was
more respectful of royal authority, but he provoked the remaining
Pizarrists by trying to enforce the provisions of the 1542 New Laws
that reformed the
encomienda
system. Led by Gonzalo Pizarro, they
murdered Vela and declared their independence. Yet although it was
in a separate hemisphere, Peru was not as far from Spain in political
terms as Al-Andalus was from the seat of Umayyad power in Damascus. Gonzalo could not emulate Emir Abd al-Rahman I by transforming an imperial province into an autonomous state. The Spanish
Crown would never surrender the Andean silver, and Charles’s next
viceroy, Pedro de la Gasca, arrived in Peru in 1547 at the head of a
royalist army that brought the Pizarrist era to an end by capturing
and killing Gonzalo one year later.
Thus, few of the Peruvian conquistador leaders lived long enough
to enjoy the fruits of empire. Hernando Pizarro consolidated his family’s wealth by marrying his niece Francisca, who was the daughter of
an Inkan princess and was his brother Francisco’s sole heir, and buying
land in Spain. But he spent most of his later life in a Spanish prison
for his role in the death of Almagro. The rest of his brothers all died
violently, as did most of the Almagrist faction. To an imperial critic
such as Cieza, the conquistadors had answered for their crimes: “God
Spanish
Peru 145
has punished our men, and most of these leaders have died miserably
in wretched deaths, a frightening thought to serve as a warning.”31
Cieza may have been grimily satisfi ed with Pizarro’s fate, but the
passing of the conquistador generation meant relatively little in Peru.
The populations of Britain and Iberia actually increased under the
Romans and Umayyads, but the fi rst century of Spanish rule was
devastating for the people of the Andes. The realities of virgin-soil
epidemics meant that there was no escaping Wayna Qhapaq’s poisonous butterfl ies, and the Pizarrists’ merciless imperial rule and the
exploitive
encomienda
system made things even worse. Their pillaging of the Inkan warehouses wiped out important food reserves, and
the sexual abuse of Andean women led to high rates of infant mortality. Early modern population estimates are notoriously unreliable,
and some regions were more hard hit than others, but it appears that
the Andean population fell from nine million to one million between
the 1520s and the fi rst Spanish census in 1569. In the seventeenth
century it reached a low point of approximately six hundred thousand people, and gradually recovered thereafter.32
The conquistadors certainly did not intend to cause this demographic disaster; their
encomiendas
depended on the exploitation of
Andean labor. Some
encomienderos
even promoted motherhood in a
vain effort to stem the decline of tributary populations, but the fact
remains that the Pizarrist conquest state was unsustainable because
it consumed people. The demise of so many Andean societies during this imperial catastrophe opened the way for the resettlement of
Peru by Spanish colonists, African slaves, and the offspring of unions
between members of these groups. The approximately 250,000 settlers of European descent in Peru in the mid-seventeenth century
were at the pinnacle of this new society.33 The surviving Andeans
became “Indians,” a misnomer originating from European explorers’ confusion of the Americas with Asia. Yet Indianism was far more
than a Spanish geographical mistake; it was a new subordinate identity that transformed Andeans into perpetually backward imperial
subjects with no rights as individuals under Spanish law.
The value of this Indian labor far outweighed the Crown’s initial
one-fi fth share of the Pizarrists’ plunder. Consequently, the emperors could not allow one of Spain’s richest overseas domains to be
run as a private enterprise. In the long term, silver production was
much more important than the conquistadors’ crude looting or the
146 THE RULE OF EMPIRES
encomienderos
’ fumbling efforts to monetize Andean tribute. Moreover, the growing Spanish colonial population of nobles, small farmers,
merchants, professionals, and craftsmen demanded access to Andean labor
and more representative and responsible government. Embarrassed by
the conquistador civil wars and
encomienda
scandals, the metropolitan
authorities sought to bring Peru under greater control.
Viceroy Pedro de la Gasca suspended the New Laws to undercut
popular support for Gonzalo Pizarro’s rebellion, but he also moved
against the most abusive
encomienderos
. His investigators uncovered
horrifi c stories of
encomienda
holders torturing their tributaries to
produce silver and brought the most fl agrant transgressors to trial.
It was much harder, however, for the Council of the Indies to reform
the overseas empire. Gasca’s crackdown was short-lived, and many of
his viceregal successors became enmeshed in embezzlement, bribery,
and smuggling scandals.
It fell to Don Francisco de Toledo, Philip II’s viceroy from 1569
to 1581, to stamp out the systematic corruption of the Pizarrist
era. The younger son of a Spanish noble family, he had the infl uence and authority to remake the original conquest state. Tellingly,
he and his successors made sense of the Inkan Empire by comparing it to ancient Rome and used Roman models in fashioning
an orderly and coherent system of imperial rule for the Andes.34
Toledo imposed a more regular administrative geography by dividing the region into eighty provinces encompassing 614 districts
(
repartimientos
). The
encomienderos
lost their political infl uence,
and Toledo used the segregated Republic of the Indians to rule the
surviving Andean population. To this end, the
corregidor de indios
,
who was the equivalent of a provincial governor, supervised the
kurakas
, collected tribute, organized tribute labor, and commanded
the provincial militia.
Even with these reforms, the Spaniards lacked the linguistic and
cultural understanding to rule the Indian republic directly. Toledo
therefore sought greater control at the local level by transforming
cooperative
kurakas
into a hereditary Indian nobility. Ignorant of the
reciprocal nature of authority in the Andes, Spanish offi cials imagined them as
caciques
with total power over their
ayllus
. By this
wishful thinking they hoped to turn the
kurakas
into minor imperial
functionaries that would extend Spain’s reach into local communities.
As such, these imperial allies acquired full individual legal status in
Spanish
Peru 147
the Spanish courts and rights to call themselves
don
, own horses and