Authors: Timothy H. Parsons
Tags: #Oxford University Press, #9780195304312, #Inc
manufactures and the fi ve-peso tribute obligation were not suffi cient
152 THE RULE OF EMPIRES
inducement to get Andeans to work for wages. Slaves offered only a
partial solution to the problem because they were too expensive to
be used on a grand scale, and the Christian legitimizing ideology of
the Spanish Empire was suffi ciently potent to protect Andeans from
enslavement or blatant forced labor. Spanish offi cials and settlers
predictably blamed their labor problems on immoral Indian laziness,
but it is worth recalling Viceroy Conde Nieva’s candid observation in
1560 that the Spanish in Peru would “rather die of hunger than take
a hoe in their hands.”39
Ultimately, Toledo had to use established Andean tribute systems to generate labor. The Spanish Crown’s addiction to New World
precious metals made increasing silver production his top priority.
The mines of Potosí, source of the greatest deposits of Andean silver, produced 7.6 million pesos worth of bullion per year between
1580 and 1650.40 Located within the borders of modern Bolivia, they
were Spain’s single most important source of revenue in all of South
America, but secondary mines scattered throughout the Andes were
also important.
The Inkas worked many of these deposits before the Spanish conquest by assigning subject
mit’a
laborers (
mitayos
) to the mines to
fulfi ll their tribute obligations. As unskilled workers, they collected
ore from surface veins under the supervision of their
kurakas
and
turned it over to smelters, most of whom were
yanacona
specialists, who refi ned it using furnaces fueled by llama dung. These skilled
workers were permanently detached from their
ayllus
and lived at
the mines. The system continued during the Pizarrist era, except that
encomienderos
sent tributaries to the mines and collected refi ned
ore from their
kuraka
supervisors. The work was not unacceptably
burdensome while the surface veins remained productive, and many
mitayos
chose to stay at Potosí as
yanaconas
to avoid the
encomien-
deros
’ increasingly heavy demands on their home
ayllus
.
The situation worsened as the accessible deposits played out and
production dropped. The Spaniards compensated by using mercury
to refi ne the low-grade ores they had previously discarded, but ultimately the necessity of digging deeper required considerably more
labor. One of Toledo’s greatest priorities as viceroy was to lower the
cost of Peruvian silver production by ensuring that the mines had a
steady supply of cheap Andean labor. Handcuffed by Andean resistance to joining the cash economy, he turned the preconquest
mit’a
Spanish
Peru 153
system into a form of state-sanctioned labor conscription that required
ayllus
in the districts accessible to Potosí to send roughly 15 percent
of their adult male population to work on the mines for four months.
This revision of the Inkan system generally meant that every man
would have to serve a tour in Potosí once every seven years. Toledo’s
scheme initially produced approximately thirteen thousand unskilled
laborers per year.41
The Spaniards justifi ed the revised
mit’a
system on the grounds
that Andeans were too ignorant to recognize the benefi ts of honest
labor. They were also careful to distinguish the
mit’a
from slavery by
paying the
mitayos
, but Spanish mine owners still bought and sold
these laborers when they arrived at Potosí. Most workers fell into
debt buying extra rations in addition to the mining equipment, candles, and coca leaves (for increased endurance) they needed to do their
jobs. Over time, mine owners became increasingly reliant on more
skilled paid laborers (
mingas
) who came to Potosí voluntarily, but
mitayos
remained at the core of the mining economy in the Andes
until the very end of Spanish rule.
The work itself was backbreaking and frequently lethal. With
skilled salaried miners working the silver veins, the
mitayos
’ main
job was to carry the raw ore up the mining shaft wrapped in wool
blankets knotted at their chests. They could be whipped or beaten for
failing to meet a weekly quota of loads carried to the smelters. Moreover, the workers frequently contracted pneumonia as they climbed
from the heat of the pits into the chilly mountain air of Potosí, which
is more than thirteen thousand feet above sea level. Silicosis and
mercury poisoning also killed large numbers of
mitayos
and other
miners. European inspectors and specially appointed
kurakas
were
supposed to ensure that conditions did not become too bad, but they
had no capacity to address the abuses that were built into Potosí’s
mining economy.42
The silver demands of the Crown required Toledo to give mine
owners fi rst call on the
mit’a
drafts, but the system was so effi cient
in getting Andeans to work that he and his successors frequently
assigned
mitayos
to their friends and allies as patronage. In the seventeenth century, enterprising Spaniards with access to
mit’a
labor
drafts set up sweatshops producing high-quality textiles for export.
As in Inkan times, the Andeans themselves remained the most
valuable resource in Peru. Tributary Indians consequently became
154 THE RULE OF EMPIRES
prendas con pies
(assets with feet) that Spaniards vied to control.
Corregidors
and priests hid “their Indians” from the
mit’a
draft to
ensure a steady fl ow of tribute, and ambitious
kurakas
poached the
constituents of neighboring rivals to build up their own tributary
populations.
Andeans sought to escape the imperial regime’s labor demands
by avoiding census takers, hiding their wealth, and hiring lawyers to
appeal excessive tribute obligations. If all else failed, they simply fl ed
the
mit’a
draft, particularly after the death toll at the mines began to
rise. Many became
forasteros
, a new category of rootless people who
permanently abandoned their home communities. Although it did
not entail the protection of reciprocity,
forastero
status exploited a
loophole in Spanish law that made only
ayllu
members liable for tax
and tribute. Other Andeans disappeared into Lima, Quito, and other
major urban centers, where they survived in the informal sector
working as peddlers and day laborers. Consequently, people seemed
to disappear from the Indian republic, and by the late seventeenth
century the population of the sixteen provinces supplying most of
Potosí’s labor had dropped by 50 percent.
The reach of the Peruvian imperial state was relatively short in the
fi rst centuries of Spanish rule, which allowed Andeans to protect many
of their preconquest institutions. But as the decades passed, the realities of subjecthood inevitably broke down some of this particularism
and reshaped the identities and culture of later generations, though not
always in the ways that the Spanish intended. Toledo’s administrative
reforms and
mit’a
labor demands steadily wore down the reciprocal
communal relationships central to the Andean political economy under
the Inkas. Spanish insistence on taxes in cash rather than produce and
mandatory purchases under the
repartimiento
system gradually forced
Andeans into the cash economy, which promoted private rather than
communal conceptions of property. Urbanization and the explosive
growth of the mining economy created new market opportunities for
those with the resources to sell crops, crafts, and services.
As the princes of the Indian republic, the
kurakas
acquired the
power to monopolize the resources of their
ayllus
. Some, particularly
those in more remote regions, tried to follow the old reciprocal ways
by using new forms of wealth to provide their
ayllus
with aid and
material goods. Other
kurakas
, however, were more entrepreneurial and self-interested. They hired out their constituents to private
Spanish
Peru 155
employers or put them to work weaving cloth under contract for
Spanish buyers. Those living within Potosí’s orbit made fortunes by
supplying the mines with food and wine. Bearing Hispanicized names
with the noble honorifi c
don
, they essentially became minor imperial
functionaries.
The
kurakas
often used this ability to earn cash to purchase land.
Theoretically,
ayllu
land belonged to the community, but the pressure of tribute and taxation led Andeans to rent and sometimes sell
land to generate currency. Spanish buyers acquired some of these
tracts, but they had diffi culty developing them because, under the law,
the Indian republic was technically closed to Europeans. The
kura-
kas
therefore were best positioned to take advantage of the new land
market, and several powerful Hispanicized
kuraka
families became
important landholders in the highland regions near Lima and other
urban centers. More remote
ayllus
proved more resilient, but over
time common Andeans had to sell their labor in ever larger numbers
as they lost access to land.
These profound economic changes gradually turned Andeans into
tribute-paying Indians as local identities lost their economic underpinnings and broke down over the course of the seventeenth century.
To a large extent these Indians were partially Hispanicized Christians, but this imperially driven cultural transformation rarely lived
up to Spanish expectations. The idealistic rhetoric that legitimized
Spanish rule obligated Peruvian administrators to make a good faith
effort to “civilize” highland populations, which meant becoming culturally Spanish. Initially, the imperial authorities did not fully appreciate that Hispanicizing their subjects would complicate their ability
to exploit them.
As in earlier empires, in the Andes elites were the most open to
assimilation. The sons of Inkan royals and powerful
kurakas
attended
Church-run boarding schools that aimed to create a Hispanicized
Christian nobility for the Indian republic. Many of these boys grew
up into loyal subjects, but Spanish offi cials often worried that they
were too European and unreliable. Bearing Spanish names and titles,
acculturated Andean aristocrats wore western clothing, owned slaves,
and invested in urban property. In the highlands, Hispanicized Andeans, known as Ladinos, staffed the Indian republic’s bureaucracy as
clerks and village scribes, but the Spanish authorities similarly distrusted them and never ceased to view them as Indians.
156 THE RULE OF EMPIRES
Peruvian offi cials and clergymen encountered even greater problems when they tried to provide the Indian nobility with obedient
Christian subjects. The lasting power of the
wakas
testifi ed to the
strength of localism and the ability of common Andeans to resist
Spain’s civilizing project. Priests and friars therefore struggled to
win converts because they could not articulate the central tenants of
Christianity in Andean terms. They made some headway by opening
parish schools and producing Quechua and Aymara dictionaries and
lexicons in the early seventeenth century, but they soon discovered
that many Andeans adopted baptism, saints, hymns, prayer, and other
trappings of Catholicism without actually internalizing their offi cial
meaning. To their horror, Spanish churchmen began to fear that the
new converts were following the mestizo priest Valera’s lead in Andeanizing Christianity instead of accepting the subordinate role that
Spanish Catholicism assigned them in imperial society. The panic and
vigor behind the Church’s ill-fated extirpation campaigns against the
wakas
thus echoed the Andalusi authorities’ desperate attempt to
defend the boundaries of subjecthood by preventing the Mozarabs
from blending Islam with Iberian Christianity.
As in Al-Andalus, gender further muddied the distinction between
citizen and subject in the Andes. Peruvian administrators initially
hoped to create a more comprehensible community of subjects by
promoting Spanish conceptions of paternal masculinity. Drawing
on their own gendered biases, they assumed that men had a natural
right and responsibility to control women. They brushed aside preconquest norms that had accorded women a parallel but equal role in
the Andean political economy, thereby ensuring that there would be
no more female
kurakas
under Spanish rule. Toledo denied Andean
women legal standing in the courts and required them to reside in
their husbands’
ayllus
.
Yet the viceroy’s tribute demands made a nonsense of his attempts
at imperial social engineering. Marriage was the primary marker of
adulthood for Andean males, which meant that taking a wife made