The Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Torture: Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program (111 page)

1905.
See
aforementioned CIA representations that: (1) “This is intelligence that cannot be found any other place. And our security depends on getting this kind of information,” and (2) “Most, if not all, of the intelligence acquired from high-value detainees in this [CIA] program would likely not have been discovered or reported in any other way.” As noted, the CIA’s June 2013 Response states that the CIA “agree[s] with the
Study
that [the CIA] had threat reporting against Camp Lemonier prior to the March 2004 detention and rendition” of Guleed.

1906.
See
intelligence chronology in Volume II for additional information.

1907.
HEADQUAR ███ ███████; ██ 1313 (041624Z MAR 04); HEADQUAR ███ (041935Z MAR 04).
See also
█████ 15623.

1908.
██ 93364 (January 8, 2008).

1909.
HEADQUAR ███ ███████; ██ 93364 (January 8, 2008).

1910.
██ 1329 ████████. The CIA’s June 2013 Response states: “In March 2004, █████████████, based [on] information from a clandestine source-detained and rendered to CIA custody the primary facilitator for al-Qa’ida’s Camp Lemonier plot, Guleed Hassan Ahmed, who had cased the Camp on behalf of al-Qa’ida. Guleed provided details about the plot and al-Qa’ida’s Somali support network, which drove CIA’s targeting efforts.” As described in this summary and in greater detail in Volume II, Guleed confirmed intelligence reporting already collected on his casing of Camp Lemonier prior to being rendered to CIA custody.
See
reference to material on recorded interrogations of Guleed Hassan Dourad in the cable, ██ 93364 (January 8, 2008).

1911.
███ 1543 █████.

1912.
███ 1573 (160217Z MAR 04), later reissued as CIA ███ (021549Z APR 04)/ ██████, and used to support the president’s speech on September 6, 2006.

1913.
████████. The CIA’s June 2013 Response links the “disrupt[ion]” of the Camp Lemonier plotting to the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program via the arrest of KSM, stating: “According to Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM), his arrest in March 2003 (which we note in Example 12 resulted in part from information provided by Ramzi Bin al-Shibh) prevented him from transferring 30,000 euros from al-Qa’ida in Pakistan to al-Qa’ida in East Africa leaders, some of whom were plotting the Camp Lemonier attack. Funding shortages were cited repeatedly by detainees and in ██████ [technical collection] as a reason for the Camp Lemonier plot’s delays.” Prior to the CIA’s June 2013 Response, there were no CIA records attributing the delay or disruption of the plotting to the capture or detention of KSM. While a body of intelligence reporting indicated that funding shortages contributed to delays in the targeting of Camp Lemonier, no CIA intelligence records were identified that cite any deficit of expected funds resulting from KSM’s capture. As detailed in this Study, KSM was captured on March 1, 2003. Intelligence reporting indicates that Abu Talha al-Sudani sent Guleed to case the security at Camp Lemonier more than six months later, in September 2003. In early March 2004, the CIA reported that █████ [technical collection] revealed that “Abu Talha and Guleed were working together in search of funding necessary to carry out planned operations.” In late March 2004, after Guleed’s detention, several associates were detained after an attack on a German aid delegation, which was suspected of being an attempt to kidnap individuals for ransom. A cable reporting this information stated that ██████ [technical collection] “indicated Abu Talha continues to press forward on plans to target Western interests in Djibouti.” Several days later, CIA officers surmised that the kidnapping attempt was likely an attempt” by Abu Talha to raise the operational funds for his plan to attack Camp Lemonier.” (
See
intelligence chronology in Volume II, including reporting referenced in HEADQUARTERS ███ (101756Z MAR 04) and connected to ████████████; ALEC ███ (222122Z MAR 04); and ALEC ███ (292353Z MAR 04)). As detailed in the section of this summary and Volume II on the Capture of Khalid Shaykh Mohammad (KSM), the capture of KSM did not result from information provided by Ramzi bin al-Shibh.

1914.
████████.

1915.
Draft cable in an email from: ██████; to: ███████ and ███████; subject: “███ DDO Approval to render Somali Jihadist and al-Qa’ida facilitator Ahmed Abdi Aw Mohammad to [CIA] control”; date: May 11, 2005, at 5:42:50 PM.

1916.
HEADQUARTERS ███ (252044Z OCT 05).

1917.
████ 10555 (101434Z APR 07).

1918.
See
“CIA Validation of Remarks on Detainee Policy,” drafts supporting the September 6, 2006, speech by President George W. Bush acknowledging and describing the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program, as well as an unclassified Office of the Director of National Intelligence release, entitled, “Summary of the High Value Terrorist Detainee Program.”

1919.
See
email from: ██████; to ████ and others; subject: “More on Camp Lemonier”; October 22, 2007, at 5:33 PM. In a reply email, a CIA officer wrote that Guleed’s statement was only “that the plan was suspended while Abu Talha tried to acquire the necessary funds,” and continued, “I don’t want anyone to walk away from this thinking that the POTUS speech from 2006 is the only language/view we are allowed to hold, especially since most or all of us were not involved in the original coordination” of the President’s September 6, 2006, speech.
See
email from: ████; to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]; cc: ███████; subject: “Camp Lemonier”; date: October 24, 2007, at 1:22:44 PM.

1920.
███ 1313 (041624Z MAR 04).

1921.
See
January 28, 2003, CIA Presidential Daily Brief, entitled, “Al-Qa’ida Planning Attack in Djibouti.” The CIA’s June 2013 Response states that the CIA “agree[s] with the
Study
that [the CIA] had threat reporting against Camp Lemonier prior to the March 2004 detention and rendition” of Guleed, but argues that the threat reporting provided to the President on January 28, 2003, had “no relation to [al-Sudani’s] plot,” and was “later recalled after being revealed to be a fabrication.” The CIA did not provide a date for the recall. The reporting, which indicated al-Qa’ida operatives were planning “to ram an explosives-laden truck into a military base, probably Camp Lemonier,” would later be corroborated by other intelligence reporting, including by Guleed in his description of al-Sudani’s plotting.
See
intelligence chronology in Volume II.

1922.
CIA WASHINGTON DC ███ (110056Z MAR 03).
See also
███ 17366 (121355Z MAR 03). The CIA’s June 2013 Response asserts that the March 2003 reporting was “an analytical assessment that Djibouti was a potential target given its US Military presence,” was “not based on specific intelligence,” and was analysis related to “a different al-Qa’ida cell.” The CIA’s June 2013 Response also disputes the relevance of the May 2003 reporting that al-Qa’ida affiliates were “waiting for the right time to carry out large-scale attacks, possibly involving suicide bombers, against a U.S. military base or U.S. naval ship in or near Djibouti.” The CIA’s June 2013 Response states that this threat reporting “was later found to be unrelated.” Notwithstanding these assertions, the CIA’s June 2013 Response states that the CIA “agree[s] with the
Study
that [the CIA] had threat reporting against Camp Lemonier prior to the March 2004 detention and rendition” of Guleed.

1923.
ALEC ███ (021825Z OCT 03).

1924.
Referenced in HEADQUAR ███ (101756Z MAR 04) and connected to ████████████.
See also
███████████.

1925.
CIA WASHINGTON DC ███ (302034Z DEC 03) / SERIAL: ██████.

1926.
████ 1313 (041624Z MAR 04).

1927.
CIA classified Statement for the Record, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, provided by General Michael V. Hayden, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, 12 April 2007; and accompanying Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing transcript for April 12, 2007, entitled, “Hearing on Central Intelligence Agency Detention and Interrogation Program” (DTS #2007-1563).
See also
CIA Intelligence Assessment, “Detainee Reporting Pivotal for the War Against Al-Qa’ida,” June 2005, which CIA records indicate was provided to White House officials on June 1, 2005, and was broadly disseminated on June 3, 2005, as an Intelligence Assessment. On March 31, 2009, former Vice President Cheney requested the declassification of this Intelligence Assessment, which was publicly released with redactions on August 24, 2009.

1928.
Italics in original. CIA Briefing for Obama National Security Team - “Renditions, Detentions, and Interrogations (RDI)” including “Tab 7,” named “RDG Copy- Briefing on RDI Program 09 Jan. 2009.” Referenced materials attached to cover memorandum with the title, “D/CIA Conference Room Seating Visit by President-elect Barrack [
sic
] Obama National Security Team Tuesday, 13 January 2009; 8:30 – 11:30 a.m.” Expected participants included, “Senator Boren, Mr. McDonough, Mr. Brennan, General Jones, Mr. Craig, Mr. Lippert, Mr. Smith, Senator Hagel,” as well as several CIA officials, including Director Hayden, █████████, John Rizzo, [REDACTED], and ███ CTC Legal █████████. The briefing book includes the document “Briefing Notes on the Value of Detainee Reporting,” dated 15 May 2006, which provided the same intelligence claims found in the document of the same name, but dated April 15, 2005. The “Briefing Notes” document was provided to the Department of Justice in April 2005, in the context of the Department’s analysis of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.

1929.
Italics added. CIA Briefing for Obama National Security Team - “Renditions, Detentions, and Interrogations (RDI)” including “Tab 7,” named “RDG Copy- Briefing on RDI Program 09 Jan. 2009.” Referenced materials attached to cover memorandum with the title, “D/CIA Conference Room Seating Visit by President-elect Barrack [sic] Obama National Security Team Tuesday, 13 January 2009; 8:30–11:30 a.m.” Expected participants included, “Senator Boren, Mr. McDonough, Mr. Brennan, General Jones, Mr. Craig, Mr. Lippert, Mr. Smith, Senator Hagel,” as well as several CIA officials, including Director Hayden, █████████, John Rizzo, [REDACTED], and ████ CTC Legal █████████. The briefing book includes the document “Briefing Notes on the Value of Detainee Reporting,” dated 15 May 2006, which provided the same intelligence claims found in the document of the same name, but dated April 15, 2005. The “Briefing Notes” document was provided to the Department of Justice in April 2005, in the context of the Department’s analysis of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.

1930.
CIA records provided to the Committee identify the pseudonym created by the CIA for the asset. The Study lists the asset as “ASSET Y” to further protect his identity.

1931.
WASHINGTON ███ ██████ 04); ██████ 19045 ████ MAR 04).

1932.
███████ 19045 █████MAR 04); ████ 3633 ██████ 04).

1933.
Email from: █████████; to: ██████████, ██████████, [REDACTED], ██████████, ██████████; subject: could AQ be testing [ASSET Y] and [Source Name REDACTED]?; date: March ██, 2004, at 06:55 AM.

1934.
Email from: █████████; to: ██████████, ██████████, [REDACTED], ██████████, ██████████; subject: could AQ be testing [ASSET Y] and [Source Name REDACTED]?; date: March ██, 2004, at 06:55 AM. The email references a March 17, 2004, al-Qa’ida statement. Speaking of a second source providing threat reporting, █████ noted that “i [sic] have always been concerned that [the asset] ███████████████████████████.”

1935.
Email from: ██████████; to: █████████; cc: ██████████, ██████████, [REDACTED], █████████; subject: Re: could AQ be testing [ASSET Y] and [Source Name REDACTED]?; date: March ██, 2004, at 7:52:32 AM.

1936.
██████ 3121 ████████; ██████ 3111 ███████.

1937.
See
██████ 3633 (█████ 04), which states “Gul is the source of [ASSET Y’s] pre-election threat information. This information forms a substantial part of the USG’s current pre-election threat assessment. Station believes that if Gul has pre-election threat information, we must exploit him using our best resources. Those resources do not exist in █████. Station has interrogated many al-Qa’ida members in █████ and while we have been successful at times, our best information is obtained when the detainee is interrogated in a CIA controlled facility ([DETENTION SITE COBALT] or blacksite).”

1938.
Memorandum for Deputy Director for Operations from Director of Central Intelligence, June 4, 2004, subject, “Suspension of Use of Interrogation Techniques.” Memorandum for the National Security Advisor from DCI George Tenet, June 4, 2004, re Review of CIA Interrogation Program.

1939.
Draft memorandum from George Tenet to National Security Advisor re Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques, attached to email from: ██████████: to John Moseman, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], Stanley Moskowitz, Scott Muller, John Rizzo, ████████ and ████████; subject: Draft Documents for Friday’s NSC Meeting; date: June 29, 2004.

1940.
Draft memorandum from George Tenet to National Security Advisor re Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques, attached to email from: █████████; to John Moseman, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], Stanley Moskowitz, Scott Muller, John Rizzo, ████████ and █████████; subject: Draft Documents for Friday’s NSC Meeting; date: June 29, 2004.

1941.
DIRECTOR ████ (022300Z JUL 04).

1942.
The CIA briefing slides further asserted that ███ debriefings of Janat Gul by █████ [foreign government] ████ officials were “not working.” (
See
CIA briefing slides, CIA Request for Guidance Regarding Interrogation of Janat Gul, July 2, 2004). National Security Advisor Rice later stated in a letter to the CIA Director that “CIA briefers informed us that Gul likely has information about preelection terrorist attacks against the United States as a result of Gul’s close ties to individuals involved in these alleged plots.”
See
July 6, 2004, Memorandum from Condoleezza Rice, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, to the Honorable George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, re Janat Gul.