The Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Torture: Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program (115 page)

2079.
Among other documents,
see
(1) CIA memorandum to “National Security Advisor,” from “Director of Central Intelligence,” Subject: Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques,” included in email from: ████████; to: ██████████, ██████████, and █████████; subject: “paper on value of interrogation techniques”; date; December 6, 2004, at 5:06:38 PM. The email references the attached “information paper to Dr. Rice explaining the value of the interrogation techniques,” (2) CIA Memorandum for Steve Bradbury at Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, dated March 2, 2005, from ██████████, ██████ Legal Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center, subject “Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques,” (3) CIA Talking Points entitled “Talking Points for 10 March 2005 DCI Meeting PC; Effectiveness of the High-Value Detainee Interrogation (HVDI) Techniques,” (4) CIA briefing document dated May 2, 2006, entitled, “BRIEFING FOR CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT 2 May 2006 Briefing for Chief of Staff to the President Josh Bolten: CIA Rendition, Detention and Interrogation Programs,” (5) CIA classified Statement for the Record, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, provided by General Michael V. Hayden, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, 12 April 2007 (DTS #2007-1563), and accompanying Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing transcript for April 12, 2007, entitled, “Hearing on Central Intelligence Agency Detention and Interrogation Program” (DTS #2007-3158), and (6) CIA Briefing for Obama National Security Team - “Renditions, Detentions, and Interrogations (RDI)” including “Tab 7,” named “RDG Copy- Briefing on RDI Program 09 Jan. 2009,” prepared “13 January 2009.”

2080.
Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; subject: Re: Detainee Profile on Hassan Ghul for coord; date: December 30, 2005, at 8:14:04 AM.

2081.
Italics in original document. CIA Memorandum for Steve Bradbury at Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, dated March 2, 2005, from ███████████, ███████ Legal Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center, subject “Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques.”

2082.
CIA Memorandum for Steve Bradbury at Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, dated March 2, 2005, from ███████████, ███████ Legal Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center, subject “Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques.” In its June 2013 Response, the CIA states: “We never represented that Shkai was previously unknown to us or that Gul only told us about it after he was subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques. We said that after these techniques were used, Gul provided ‘detailed tactical intelligence.’ That intelligence differed significantly in granularity and operational utility from what he provided before enhanced techniques.” As described in this summary, CIA representations about intelligence on Shkai were used as evidence of the necessity and effectiveness of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. The CIA did not inform policymakers or the Department of Justice about the extensive information provided by Hassan Ghul on Shkai prior to the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.

2083.
See, for example, CIA memorandum to “National Security Advisor,” from “Director of Central Intelligence,” Subject: ”Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques,” included in email from: ███████; to: ██████████, █████████, and ██████████; subject: “paper on value of interrogation techniques”; date December 6, 2004, at 5:06:38 PM; CIA Memorandum for Steve Bradbury at Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, dated March 2, 2005, from ███████████, ███████ Legal Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center, subject “Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques.”

2084.
███████████ 21753 ███████████ HEADQUARTERS ████ ███████ JAN 04).

2085.
On April 16, 2013, the Council on Foreign Relations hosted a forum in relation to the screening of the film, “Manhunt.” The forum included former CIA officer Nada Bakos, who states in the film that Hassan Ghul provided critical information on Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti’s connection to UBL to Kurdish officials prior to entering CIA custody. When asked about the interrogation techniques used by the Kurds, Bakos stated: “…honestly, Hassan Ghul . . . when he was being debriefed by the Kurdish government, he literally was sitting there having tea. He was in a safe house. He wasn’t locked up in a cell. He wasn’t handcuffed to anything. He was—he was having a free flowing conversation. And there’s—you know, there’s articles in Kurdish papers about sort of their interpretation of the story and how forthcoming he was.”
See
www.cfr.org/counterterrorism/film-screening-manhunt/p30560.

2086.
███████████ 21815 ███████████; ███████████ 21753 ███████████; HEADQUARTERS ██████ ███████ JAN 04); █████████████ 1642 ███████ JAN 04); DIRECTOR █████ ███████ JAN 04).

2087.
███████ 1308 (███████ JAN 04); ███████ 1299 (███████ JAN 04); ██████████ 1308 (███████ JAN 04); ███████ 1313 (███████ JAN 04): ███████ 1320 (███████ FEB 04).

2088.
████████ 1642 ██████ JAN 04).

2089.
████████ 54195 ███████ JAN 04). CIA records state that Hassan Ghul was removed from DETENTION SITE COBALT to a ████████ █ facility for portions of his interrogations.

2090.
████████ 54194 ███████ JAN 04); █████████ 1644 ██████ JAN04), later released as HEADQUARTERS ██████ ██████ JAN 04); ██████████ 1645 ██████ JAN 04), later released as HEADQUARTERS ██████ ██████ JAN 04); ██████████ 1646 ██████ JAN 04); later released as HEADQUARTERS ██████ ██████ JAN 04); ██████████ 1647 ██████ JAN 04), later released as HEADQUARTERS ██████ ██████ JAN 04); ████████ CIA ██████ JAN 04), later released as HEADQUARTERS ██████ █████ JAN 04); CIA █████████ FEB 04); ████████ 1650 █████ JAN 04); █████████ 1651 ████ ██████ JAN 04); █████████ 1652 ██████ JAN 04), later released as ███████████ DIRECTOR █████ ██████ JAN 04); █████████████ 1654 ██████ JAN 04); ████████████ 1655 ███████ JAN 04), later released as ███████████ CIA █████ █████ FEB 04); ███████████ 1657 ██████ JAN 04); ███████████ 1677 ███████ JAN 04); ███████████ 1681 ███████ JAN 04); later released as ███████████ CIA ██████ FEB 04); ████████████ 1685 ███████ JAN 04), later released as █████████████████; ████████████ 1687 ███████ JAN 04), later released as ███████ CIA █████ ██████ FEB 04); ████████████ 1688 ███████ JAN 04); later released as ███████ CIA ████████ FEB 04); ███████████ 1690 ███████ JAN 04); ████████████ 1656 ███████ JAN 04); ████████████ 1678 ███████ JAN 04). As the dissemination of 21 intelligence reports suggests, information in CIA records indicates Hassan Ghul was cooperative with CIA personnel prior to being subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. In an interview with the CIA OIG, a CIA officer familiar with Ghul stated, “He sang like a tweetie bird. He opened up right away and was cooperative from the outset.”
See
December 2, 2004, interview with [REDACTED], Chief, DO, CTC UBL Department, ████████████████.

2091.
████████████████ 54194 ███████ JAN 04); ████████████████ 1644 ███████ JAN 04; ████████████████ 1646 ███████ JAN 04); ████████████████ 1647 ███████ JAN 04); ████████████████ 1654 ███████ JAN 04); ████████████████ 1655 ███████ JAN 04); ████████████████ 1677 ███████ JAN 04); ████████████████ 1679 ███████ JAN 04); ████████████████ 1685 ███████ JAN 04); ████████████████ 1656 ███████ JAN 04); ████████████████ 1678 ███████ JAN 04); ████████████████ 1650 ███████ JAN 04); ████████████████ 1651 ███████ JAN 04); ████████████████ 1657 ███████ JAN 04); ████████████████ 1687 ███████ JAN 04); ████████████████ 1690 ███████ JAN 04).

2092.
███████████████ 1685 ███████ JAN 04).

2093.
Hassan Ghul also described the roles of ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Kanadi, aka Ahmed Sai’d al-Khadr, and Abu Hamza al-Jawfi ████████████████ 1685 ███████ JAN 04)).

2094.
████████████████ 1685 ███████ JAN 04).

2095.
████████████████ 1677 ███████ JAN 04).

2096.
Hassan Gul stated that Abu Faraj was with his associate, Mansur Khan, aka Hassan. (
See
█████████████████ 1654 ███████ JAN 04)). Hassan Ghul’s reporting on Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi and Abu Faraj al-Libi included discussion of Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti’s links to UBL. According to Ghul, during his time in Shkai in 2003, al-Hadi would periodically receive brief handwritten messages from UBL via Abu Faraj, which he would share with their group. Ghul stated that this did not necessarily mean that Abu Faraj knew the location of UBL, but rather that he had a window into UBL’s courier network. It was at this point that Hassan Ghul described the role of Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti and his connections to UBL.
See
██████████████████ 1679 ██████ JAN 04).

2097.
████████████████ 1654 ███████ JAN 04). Hassan Ghul stated ██████████████████ ████████████████████████████████████ ██████████████████ ██████████████████ ██████████████████ ██████████████████ ██████████████████ ██████████████████ ██████████████████ ██████████████████ ██████████████████ ██████████████████.”
See
██████████████████ 1679 █████ JAN 04).

2098.
Hassan Ghul stated that al-Hadi, who did not travel with a security detail, visited the
madrassa
every few days, but less frequently of late due to the deteriorating security condition in Waziristan for Arabs. Ghul stated that when he last saw al-Hadi, he was accompanied by an Afghan assistant named Sidri, aka S’aid al-Rahman. He also identified Osaid al-Yemeni as an individual who assisted al-Hadi.
See
███████████████████ 1654 ███████ JAN 04).

2099.
Hassan Ghul identified Yusif al-Baluchi, Mu’awiyya-Baluchi, a Kurd named Qassam al-Surri, Usama al-Filistini, and Khatal al-Uzbeki as living in the “bachelor house.”
See
███████████████████ 1654 ███████ JAN 04). The CIA’s June 2013 Response states: “After being subjected to enhanced techniques, [Hassan Ghul] provided more granular information.” According to the CIA Response, it was in this context that Hassan Ghul identified the “bachelor house,” where he had met al-Hadi, and where “several unmarried men associated with al-Qai’da” lived, including ████████. A review of CIA records found that Hassan Ghul provided this information prior to the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.

2100.
Hassan Ghul identified a phone number in his phone book that he said had been provided to him by Hamza al-Jawfi to pass messages to al-Hadi in emergencies. The phone number was under the name Baba Jan, aka Ida Khan. Ghul also identified a number for Major, aka Ridwan, aka Bilal, who, he said, brought equipment to Pakistan.
See
███████████████████ 1654 ███████ JAN 04); ███████████████████ 1646 ███████ JAN 04)).

2101.
███████████████████ 1655 ███████ JAN 04).

2102.
Hassan Ghul stated that Abu Jandal and another Saudi of African descent took part in the electronics course. (
See
███████████████████ 1654 ███████ JAN 04); ███████████████████ 1655 ███████ JAN 04).) As described in a separate cable, Ghul stated that he had seen 10-15 Pakistanis training with Rabi’a and Abu Bakr al-Suri, whom he described as an al-Qa’ida explosives expert, in early to mid-October 2003. (
See
███████████████████ 1656 ███████ JAN 04).) The CIA’s June 2013 response states that Hassan Ghul reported that Hamza Rabi’a “was using facilities in Shkai to train operatives for attacks outside Pakistan,” without noting Ghul’s reporting, prior to the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, on Rabi’a’s training of operatives.

2103.
Ghul explained that he was in Shkai following a previous assassination attempt, in early December 2003, when there was “frequent talk among the brothers” about who might have been responsible. When Ghul asked around, “there was a lot of talk” that Rabi’a was involved in planning a subsequent operation. Rubi’a’s statement that there would be an unspecified operation soon, combined with the training conducted by Rabi’a and al-Suri, led Ghul to believe that the second assassination attempt was conducted by al-Qa’ida.
See
███████████████████ 1656 ███████ JAN 04).

2104.
Hassan Ghul stated that it was unlikely that Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi had any planned operations, although al-Hadi would likely assist if there were any.
See
███████████████████ 1654 ███████ JAN 04).

2105.
Hassan Ghul stated that Shaikh Sa’id al-Masri, aka Mustafa Ahmad (Abu al-Yazid), came to Shkai around November 2003 and currently resided there. Ghul stated that Shaikh Sa’id’s son, Abdullah, travelled between Shkai and a location in the greater Dera Ismail Khan area, where the rest of Shaikh Sa’id’s family lived.
See
███████████████████ 1679 ███████ JAN 04).

2106.
Hassan Ghul stated that Sharif al-Masri, who came to Shkai around October/November 2003 for a brief visit, was handling operations in Qandahar while living just outside Quetta. Ghul identified two of Sharif al-Masri’s assistants.
See
███████████████████ 1679 ███████ JAN 04).

2107.
Hassan Ghul was asked about Tariq Mahmoud, whom he thought might be Abu Maryam, a British citizen of Pakistani descent whom Ghul met in Pakistan. According to Ghul, Maryam had been inside Afghanistan and had participated in training in Shkai, but was apprehended in Islamabad. (
See
███████████████████ 1679 ███████ JAN 04).) Ghul identified a phone number for Abu Maryam.
See
███████████████████ 1646 ███████ JAN 04).

2108.
Hassan Ghul stated that he last saw Janat Gul in December 2003 in Shkai, when Janat Gul was delivering three Arabs who had come from Iran. Janat Gul came to the “bachelor house” accompanied by Khatal. Ghul also described a discussion from September/October 2003 at Hamza al-Jawfi’s house in Shkai with al-Hadi and Abu ‘Abd al-Rahman BM in which Janat Gul claimed to know Russians who could provide anti-aircraft missiles. Gul asked for money, but al-Hadi was reluctant to make the commitment and did not want to work with Gul. According to Hassan Ghul, Janat Gul left and subsequent conversations revealed that Janat Gul likely made the story up. Hassan Ghul provided a phone number for Janat Gul.
See
███████████████████ 1679 ███████ JAN 04); ███████████████████ 1646 ███████ JAN 04).