The Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Torture: Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program (117 page)

2139.
Testimony from the CIA to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Armed Services Committee on May 4, 2011. In testimony, CIA Director Leon Panetta referenced CIA “interviews” with 12 CIA detainees, and stated that “I want to be able to get back to you with specifics. . . But clearly the tipoff on the couriers came from those interviews.” The CIA’s June 2013 Response states: “CIA has never represented that information acquired through its interrogations of detainees was either the first or the only information that we had on Abu Ahmad.” Former CIA Director Michael Hayden provided similar public statements.
See
transcript of Scott Hennen talk-radio show, dated May 3, 2011. Hayden: “What we got, the
original lead information
—and frankly it was incomplete identity information on the couriers—
began with information from CIA detainees at the black sites
. And let me just leave it at that” (italics added).

2140.
See
CIA letter to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence dated May 5, 2011, which includes a document entitled, “Background Detainee Information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti,” with an accompanying six-page chart entitled, “Detainee Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti” (DTS #2011-2004).

2141.
The CIA’s June 2013 Response states that the December 13, 2012, Committee Study “incorrectly characterizes the intelligence we had on Abu Ahmad before acquiring information on him from detainees in CIA custody as ‘critical.’” This is incorrect. The Committee uses the CIA’s own definition of what information was important and critical, as conveyed to the Committee by the CIA. In documents and testimony to the Committee, the CIA highlighted specific information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti that the CIA viewed as especially valuable or critical to the identification and tracking of Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti. For example, in May 4, 2011, CIA testimony, a CIA officer explained how “a couple of early detainees” “identi[fied]” Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti as someone close to UBL. The CIA officer stated: “I think the clearest way to think about this is, in 2002 a couple of early detainees, Abu Zubaydah and an individual, Riyadh the Facilitator, talked about the activities of an Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti. At this point we don’t have his true name. And they identify him as somebody involved with AQ and facilitation and some potential ties to bin Ladin.” As detailed in this summary, CIA records confirm that Riyadh the Facilitator provided information in 2002 closely linking al-Kuwaiti to UBL, but these records confirm that this information was acquired prior to Riyadh the Facilitator being rendered to CIA custody (the transfer occurred more than a year later, in January 2004). Abu Zubaydah provided no information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti in 2002. According to CIA records, Abu Zubaydah was not asked about Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti until July 7, 2003, when he denied knowing the name. As an additional example,
see
CIA documents and charts provided to the Committee (DTS #2011-2004) and described in this summary, in which the CIA ascribes value to specific intelligence acquired on al-Kuwaiti.

2142.
In other words, the information the CIA cited was acquired from a detainee
not
in CIA custody, obtained from a CIA detainee who was not subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, obtained from a CIA detainee prior to the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, or acquired from a source unrelated to detainee reporting. As described, the information contained herein is based on a review of CIA Detention and Interrogation Program records. Although the CIA has produced more than six million pages of material associated with CIA detainees and the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program, the Committee did not have direct access to other, more traditional intelligence records, to include reporting from CIA HUMINT assets, foreign government assets, electronic intercepts, military detainee debriefings, law enforcement derived information, and other methods of collection. Based on the information found in the CIA detainee-related documents, it is likely there is significant intelligence on “Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti” acquired from a variety of intelligence collection platforms that the Committee did not have access to for this review.

2143.
CIA record (“Call Details Incoming and Outgoing”) relating to calling activity for ██████ phone number #█████ A CIA document provided to the Committee on October 25, 2013, (DTS #2013-3152), states that the CIA was collecting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti’s phone (#█████) early as November 2001, and that it was collection from this time that was used to make voice comparisons to later collection targeting Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti.

2144.
CIA ████ (03203IZ APR 02).

2145.
CIA ████ (102I58Z APR02).

2146.
Included in several cables and repeated in ALEC ████ █████ JUL 02).

2147.
███████████ 31049 (█████ 2002). The CIA’s June 2013 Response downplays the importance of the email address and phone numbers collected on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, stating that the accounts were later discontinued by Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti and were “never linked” to bin Ladin’s known locations. However, on October 25, 2013, the CIA (DTS #2013-3152) acknowledge that the “voice cuts” from Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti were acquired during this period (2001–2002) from the (███) phone number cited in the Committee Study. According to CIA records, in February 2009 and September 2009, the voice samples collected from the Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti (███) phone number (under collection in 2002) were compared to voice samples collected against ██████████████████, which led the Intelligence Community to assess that █████, who was geo-located to a specific area of Pakistan, was likely Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti. In August 2010, Abu Ahmad █████████████████ and tracked to the UBL compound.
See
intelligence chronology in Volume II for additional details.

2148.
ALEC ████ (240057Z AUG 02).

2149.
[REDACTED] 64883 (171346Z SEP 02). This information was repeated in ALEC (302244Z SEP 02).

2150.
ALEC █████ (102238Z MAR 03).

2151.
█████ 19448 (101509Z JUN 02).

2152.
DIRECTOR █████ (251833Z JUN 02).

2153.
[REDACTED] 65902 (080950Z AUG 02); ALEC ████ (092204Z AUG 02).

2154.
DIRECTOR █████ (202147Z OCT 02).

2155.
See
intelligence chronology in Volume II, specifically █████████, dated 17 September 2001, [REDACTED] 60077 (09/17/2001). See
also
foreign government reporting from September 27, 2002, describing information from a detainee who was
not
in CIA custody (CIA ████ (271730Z SEP02)). That reporting is also highlighted in a CIA document, entitled, “Background Detainee Information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti,” dated May 4, 2011 (DTS#2011-2004). The document highlights that “Detainee Abdallah Falah al-Dusari provided what he thought was a partial true name for Abu Ahmad—Habib al-Rahman—whom [CIA] ultimately identified as one of Abu Ahinad’s deceased brothers. However, this partial true name for his brother eventually helped [CIA] map out Abu Ahmad’s entire family, including the true name of Abu Ahmad himself.” The CIA document did not identify that Abdallali Falah al-Dusari was
not
a CIA detainee. In June 2002, the CIA also obtained another alias for Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti—“Hamad al-Kuwaiti”—that included a component of his true name. This information was provided by a foreign government and was unrelated to the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program.
See
DIRECTOR █████ (251833Z JUN 02).

2156.
See
intelligence chronology in Volume II, including ██████ 63211 (30 JAN 2002); DIRECTOR ████ (251833Z JUN 02); █████████ July 25, 2002; DIRECTOR ████ (221240Z AUG 02); CIA ████ (271730Z SEP 02); DIRECTOR ████ (171819Z OCT02); ███████████████.

2157.
In testimony on May 4, 2011, the CIA informed the Committee that “From the beginning, CIA focused on the inner circle around bin Ladin, the people that were around him, as a way to try and go after bin Laden.”
See
DTS #2011-2049.

2158.
CIA █████ (102158Z APR 02). Sa’ad bin Ladin was a known senior al-Qa’ida member and had been assorted with individuals engaged in operational planning targeting the United States. See, for example, ALEC █████ (062040Z MAR 02) for his association with KSM operative Masran bin Arshad, who was involved in KSM’s “Second Wave” plotting. Phone number(s) associated with Sa’ad bin Ladin were under intelligence collection and resulted in the identification of other al-Qa’ida targets.
See
█████████ 293363 (051121Z JUN 02) and ████████ 285184, as well as █████ 20306 (241945Z JAN 04). ██████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████.

2159.
██ [REDACTED] 11515, June 5, 2002. As detailed in this summary and in Volume III, Ridha al-Najjar was later rendered to CIA custody and subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.

2160.
See
intelligence chronology in Volume II, including DIRECTOR ████ (251833Z JUN 02). Riyadh the Facilitator was eventually rendered into the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program in January 2004. CIA records indicate he was not subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. The referenced information was provided while Riyadh the Facilitator was in foreign government custody.

2161.
CIA ████ (102158 APR 02).

2162.
DIRECTOR ████ (251833Z JUN 02).

2163.
DIRECTOR (221240Z AUG 02). Abu Zubair al-Ha’ili never entered the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program.

2164.
The CIA’s June 2013 Response ignores or minimizes the extensive reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti listed in the text of this summary (as well as additional reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti in the intelligence chronology in Volume 11), describing this intelligence as “insufficient to distinguish Abu Ahmad from many other Bin Ladin associates” before crediting CIA detainees with providing “additional information” that “put [the previously collected reporting] into context.” While the Committee could find no internal CIA records to support the assertion in the CIA’s June 2013 Response, as detailed, the most detailed and accurate intelligence collected from a CIA detainee on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti and his unique links to UBL was from Hassan Ghul, and was acquired prior to the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques against Ghul.

2165.
A series of public statements by members of Congress linking the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program and the UBL operation appeared in the media during the time of the congressional briefings. The statements reflect the inaccurate briefings provided by the CIA.

2166.
Italics added. CIA testimony of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence briefing on May 2, 2011 (DTS #2011-1941).

2167.
See
intelligence chronology in Volume II.

2168.
See
intelligence chronology in Volume II, including ALEC ████ (240057Z AUG 02) CIA record (“Call Details Incoming and Outgoing”) relating to calling activity for █████ phone number #█████; [REDACTED] 65902 (080950Z AUG 02); ALEC ████ (092204Z AUG 02); ███████, dated 17 September 2001; [REDACTED] 60077 (09/17/2001); DIRECTOR █████ (221240Z AUG 02); and DIRECTOR ████ (251833Z JUN 02).

2169.
See
HEADQUARTERS ████ █████ JAN 04) and intelligence chronology in Volume II for additional details.

2170.
█████████████ 1679 █████ JAN 04).

2171.
HEADQUARTERS ████ █████ JAN 04).

2172.
████████████ 1679 █████ JAN 04).

2173.
HEADQUARTERS ████ █████ JAN 04).

2174.
HEADQUARTERS ████ █████ JAN 04). UBL was eventually located in a home with a family in Pakistan with minimal security.

2175.
See
May 2, 2011, 12:03AM, White House “Press Briefing by Senior Administration Officials on the Killing of Osama bin Laden.” The transcript, posted on the White House website (www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/5/02/press-briefing-senior-administration-officials-killing-osama-bin-laden).

2176.
Italics added. Testimony of CIA Director Panetta, transcript of the May 4, 2011, briefing of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Armed Services Committee (DTS #2011-2049).

2177.
As described in this summary, the CIA provided documents to the Committee indicating that individuals detained in 2002 provided “Tier One” information—linking “Abu Ahmad to Bin Ladin.” The document did not state when the information was provided, or when the detainee entered CIA custody. Internal CIA records indicate that no CIA detainee provided information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti in 2002.
See
CIA six-page chart entitled, “Detainee Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti,” which lists 12 detainees in “CIA Custody” (DTS #2011-2004).

2178.
CIA record (“Call Details Incoming and Outgoing”) relating to calling activity for █████ phone number #█████; ALEC ████ (240057Z AUG 02).

2179.
See
intelligence chronology in Volume II, including [REDACTED] 65902 (080950Z AUG 02); ALEC █████ (092204Z AUG 02); DIRECTOR █████ (221240Z AUG 02); and DIRECTOR █████ (251833Z JUN 02).

2180.
See
intelligence chronology in Volume II, including DIRECTOR ████ (251833Z JUN 02).

2181.
Italics added. CIA testimony from CIA officer [REDACTED] and transcript of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Armed Services Committee briefing on May 4, 2011. (
See
DTS #2011-2049.) As discussed in this summary and in greater detail in Volume II, the CIA provided additional information to the Committee on May 5, 2011, that listed Riyadh the Facilitator as a detainee in “CIA custody,” who was “detained February 2002,” and provided the referenced information. The CIA document omitted that Riyadh the Facilitator was not in CIA custody when he provided the referenced information in June 2002. Riyadh the Facilitator was not rendered to CIA custody until January 2004.
See
Volume III and DTS #2011-2004.