The Spanish Civil War (101 page)

Source: C. Delclaux,
La financiación de la cruzada
, University of Deusto thesis (1950, unpublished), p. 108.

It will have been obvious from this book that the efficacy and character of foreign help to one or other of the two Spains did not depend on numbers of aircraft or men. Nor did it depend on the amount that each side spent abroad or received from abroad as gifts (though the gifts were not enough to make very much difference: all the main intervening powers were paid in one way or another for their help in respect of war material).

A reckoning is nevertheless desirable. First, as regards money: broadly speaking, the republic spent everything which they had, and a little more. The nationalists had nothing to begin with, but obtained a lot on credit. The consequent bills were paid in full, though, in respect of Italy, final payment was not made till 1967.

Republican spending abroad was an intricate series of gambles, with Russia acting as the bank. The figures will probably never be sorted out until Russian archives are open. A tentative conclusion can, nevertheless, be reached. The Spanish gold reserve in July 1936 amounted to 700 tons of gold, much of it in coin (particularly sovereigns). This treasure was in the hands of the government, and was worth $788 million (£162 million).
¹
At the end of the war, all this had been spent, except for $48 million deposited in Mont de Marsan in France; while in addition to the gold actually sent to Russia—about $500 million worth (1,582 million gold pesetas or £100 million)—the Soviet government claimed that they were owed another $50 million.
²
Spanish exports from the republic probably brought in another $100 million, which was also consumed, largely on war supplies, and largely spent in Russia. Finally, the republic sent abroad a large quantity of confiscated jewels, gold, silver and other valuables, gaining thereby $14 million in the US alone in 1938.

All in all, it would seem likely that the republic may have spent abroad something over $900 million between 1936 and 1939, most of it on arms and most of it in Russia.
¹

The main suppliers to the nationalists were of course the Germans and the Italians, though the help of the Texas Oil Company and other oil companies should be taken into acount: the above Russian figures, after all, include the bills for Russian oil delivered to Spain.

German military aid to Franco was valued at 540 million reichsmarks, that is, £46¼ or $225 million (1,955 million pesetas by the 1939 exchange of 42¼ pesetas to the pound). Of this total, 88 million reichsmarks were spent on salaries and expenses, for which Germany did not ask the Spaniards to pay; 124 million was spent on direct deliveries to Spain; and 354 million spent on the Condor Legion.
²
The Spaniards later agreed to accept a debt of 378 million reichsmarks, along with a bill for compensation to Germans who suffered losses in Spain of 45 million reichsmarks. These debts were paid off in full between 1939 and 1945 by minerals, vegetables, fruit and other goods delivered to Germany in those years, by the costs of the Blue Division (a unit mainly of falangists sent to the Russian front in 1942 under General Muñoz Grandes), and by various settlements between Spain and the allies in 1945. Of the exports sent by Spain to Germany during the civil war itself, 48 per cent was food and vegetables, and only 27 per cent minerals.
³

Italian aid to Franco was estimated by Ciano in 1940 at 14,000 million lire (£157¼ million or $766 million—6,646 million pesetas).
⁴
But in the end Italy sent a bill for only about half that—7,500 million lire (£84¼ million, $410 million, or 3,560 million pesetas) which corresponds with other estimates in the course of the war. After further haggling, the Italian and Spanish governments
agreed in May 1940 on a figure of 5,000 million lire (£56¼ million, $273½ million, or 2,373½ million pesetas), the payment to be made over twenty-five years, beginning in 1942.
¹
The payments were to be by instalments, beginning with 80 million lire in 1942, and ending with 300 million lire in 1967, while the debt carried an interest at the beginning of 1/4 per cent, and at the end of 4 per cent.
²
These payments were made in full, the Italian government after 1945 being as good a creditor as its fascist predecessor, even when Togliatti and the communists were in the administration. No doubt the Italians were much the most generous of those who intervened in Spain, since the bill which was settled by Franco did not take into account a good deal of military activity by the Italian armed forces which was not charged for. Hence possibly Ciano’s originally much larger estimate, though probably that was inflated.

Nationalist expenses abroad should also take into account about $10 million spent in the US on oil, and perhaps another $10 million in that country and elsewhere on items such as buses or medical supplies, all of which, of course, have a military use.

Total nationalist spending abroad, all of it on credit, must thus have been about $635 million if the figure of 7,500 million lire is considered as representing a reasonable estimate of Italian aid rather than the sum eventually paid. If 14,000 million lire were accepted, then the nationalists would be said to have received $981 million.

It is naturally tempting to place these figures beside that of republican spending of $900 million and conclude that international involvement in Spain was at least as great on the side of the government as on that of the rebels—or even greater.
³
Such an account would, however, be misleading. The equation put in those simple terms does not take account of the differences between the Russian, German and Italian economies, nor the differences between the economies of the two Spains. It is not at all clear whether the Russians gave anything like value for money, and indeed the notion of value in considering Russian prices for items such as tanks and aircraft is somewhat farcical. The huge discrepancy in different estimates for what Italy made available merely points out the fact that this sort of sum will always leave room for speculation. Russian transport costs were high. Nor can the value of a gold reserve be precisely rendered in terms of ordinary money, particularly not one which was then one of the largest in the world. A more useful reckoning is that which is made possible by a rough knowledge of the numbers of different pieces of equipment, though even there a simple enumeration of numbers of aircraft does not tell anything like the whole story.

Nevertheless it is useful to know that Spain received from abroad something between $1,425 million and $1,900 million. It might also be pointed out that those who backed their side with credit—Germany and Italy—had that much more incentive to go on with their support of all kinds of order to recover payment eventually, while those who sold assistance for cash—Russia—could at least be content that they had received money for value. Some would also add that those who insisted on payment may have doubted the likely success of their side, whilst those on extended credit were confident of it.
¹

Germany

German strength in Spain reached about 10,000 at its maximum, though 14,000 veterans attended the Condor Legion parade in Berlin in May 1939. The Germans who helped the nationalists probably exceeded 16,000, of whom many were civilians and instructors.
²
About 300 Germans died in Spain. The Condor Legion numbered 5,000 men. This important, well-led, experimental tank and aircraft unit was accompanied by thirty anti-tank companies. Colonel von Thoma, who commanded the tank corps, told the Americans in 1945 that he took part in 192 tank engagements during the war.
³
These Panzer Mark I tanks were not effective against the larger Russian ones in 1936 and 1937. The total number sent to Spain was probably about 200. The German shipments were delivered in about 180 separate voyages. The Germans sent about 600 aircraft to Spain including 136 Messerschmitt 109s, 125 Heinkel 51s, 93 Heinkel 111s and 63 Junkers 52s.
⁴
Any reckoning of German help to Franco
should consider also the help given in military academies, signals equipment and training made available, as well as the advice given on a hundred small but crucial matters of military organization. The 88 millimetre anti-aircraft gun was also a major contribution by Germany and probably stopped the republic making use of their aerial superiority in the spring of 1937.

Italy

Italian forces in Spain at their maximum numbered between 40,000 and 50,000 and perhaps a total of 75,000 went to Spain altogether.
¹
The Italians lost more than 4,000 dead in Spain,
²
and perhaps a quarter of their effective military equipment there too.
³
For Italy sent to Spain about 660 aircraft, of which the most important were the 350 Fiat CR.32 fighters and the 100 Savoia 79s. There were also some 70 Romeo 37s and 64 Savoia 81s.
⁴
Perhaps 150 Italian tanks were sent to Spain, all either 3½-ton Fiat Ansaldos, armed with 7 millimetre machine guns, capable of a speed of twenty-five miles an hour, with two men on board; or heavier flame throwers, carrying 125 litres of petrol and able to throw them 60–70 yards.
⁵
Other equipment included about 800 pieces of artillery (the excellent 65/17 millimetre 1916 model),
⁶
which seem to have been all left in Spain. The Italian artillery was well directed by officers experienced in the First World War, headed by General Ettore Manca. The Italians probably also dispatched some 1,414 aircraft motors, 1,672 tons of bombs, 9 million rounds of ammunition, 10,000 machine-guns and automatic rifles, 240,000 rifles, seven million rounds of artillery ammunition, and 7,660 motor vehicles.
⁷
According to estimates in the Italian press in 1939, Italian pilots flew 135,265 hours in the war, participated in 5,318 air
raids, hit 224 ships, and engaged in 266 aerial combats, in which they brought down 903 aeroplanes; 5,699 officers and men and 312 civilians of the Italian air force were also allegedly engaged at different times. Ninety-one Italian warships and submarines are believed to have taken part in the civil war. The latter are said to have sunk 72,800 tons of shipping. Italian engineering, signalling and even cryptography did their bit, including schools of ‘Radio Transmission’ in Valladolid, Miranda de Ebro and Palencia.
¹
There were two large Italian military hospitals at Valladolid and at Saragossa, each with 1,000 beds or over, and some smaller hospitals, with three hospital trains. The general equipment and organization of the Italian units, bad in 1937, recovered in 1938 and the rations and conditions were probably superior to those of the Spaniards.
²

Portugal, Ireland, France, etc.

Other foreign governmental assistance included that of Portugal whose help was, at the beginning of the war at least, incalculable, for geographical rather than military reasons. Several thousand Portuguese volunteers fought in the Foreign Legion and in some other units.
³
Six hundred Irishmen fought for the nationalists under General O’Duffy. Their losses were negligible. Some right-wing Frenchmen volunteered for the
requetés
and the Legion—accorded the right to wear a thin tricolour ribbon across their shoulder strap, and commanded by a Colonel Courcier, of the Spahis
⁴
—as did some Latin Americans and White Russian exiles and others. The numbers could not have been more than 1,000 at most. Few Anglo-Saxons fought for Franco.
⁵

Other help to the Nationalists

At least 75,000 or so Moroccan ‘volunteers’, Spain’s sepoys, fought for Franco and played a very prominent part in the early days.
¹
The nationalists also bought some fifty or so aircraft from countries other than Germany or Italy (a few Dragons and Fokkers).

Russia

The republic bought about 1,000 aircraft from Russia, perhaps 300 from other sources, principally France.
²
Of these, almost 400 were Chato fighters, almost 300 Moscas, with perhaps 100 Katiuska bombers, 60 Rasantes and 113 Natasha bombers. From France, the principal items were the 42 Dewoitine 371s, the 40 Potez 54s and the 15 March Bloch 210s.
³
Total purchases of aircraft from France must have been anywhere between 100 and 150. Other purchases included 40 Aero 101s, 10 Letovs, 14 Vultee A1s, 11 Bristol Bulldogs, 20 De Havilland Dragons, and 28 Koolhoven FK51s from Holland, and a squadron of 40 Grumman fighters from the US: with good radios, otherwise unsatisfactory for war;
⁴
and certain aircraft engines enabling aircraft to fly at a great height. Total aircraft from countries other than Russia may have been about 320, giving a total of 1,320 aircraft in all.

It is less easy to make estimates of republican purchases of other items of equipment. According to the German military attaché’s reports from Istanbul on the basis of reports from agents in Istanbul, in some 165 shipments (71 Spanish, 39 British, 34 Russian, 17 Greek and 4 other), between September
1936 and March 1938, Russia sent by sea some 242 aircraft, 703 cannon, 27 anti-aircraft guns, 731 tanks, 1,386 lorries, 69,200 tons of war material and 29,125 tons of ammunition. In addition, 920 officers and men came that way, apparently, together with at least 28,000 tons of petrol and 32,000 of crude oil, 4,650 tons of lubricants, together with some other items, such as 450 tons of clothing, 325 of medical stores, 100 rifle machine-guns, 500 howitzers, and 187 tractors.
¹
Doubtless there were further shipments, though the blockade made the Mediterranean very difficult or even impossible in the next months. As for land shipments, the nationalist headquarters made various estimates: one, of October 1938, suggested that between July 1936 and July 1938, some 200 cannon, 200 tanks, 3,247 machine-guns, 4,000 lorries, 47 artillery units, 4,565 tons of ammunition, 9,579 vehicles and 14,889 tons of fuel had come in.
²
This aid was supplemented later. It came, no doubt, from the Comintern’s arms purchase agencies, the republic’s assessment commission in Paris and directly from Russia. In quantity, the republic’s foreign supplies were probably as great as those of the nationalists (in some items greater), but the quality was various. Furthermore, much was wasted or left behind on the battlefield. The variety of calibration of the rifles pinpointed the disadvantages of getting help from so many different places. The nationalist forces had a regiment of Russian tanks by the end of the war, along with a quantity of Russian machine-guns. Both sides were short of lorries; lack of transport may have been the deciding factor in the ultimate failure of the republic’s attack on the Ebro front.