Read The Sword And The Olive Online
Authors: Martin van Creveld
The Sword And The Olive (15 page)
These “modest”
9
forces were joined by several thousand more who had infiltrated from the neighboring countries—according to the British authorities, by March 1948 their number reached 5,000.
10
Known somewhat grandiloquently as the Arab Salvation Army, they were divided into several bands that are best described as paramilitary. The largest band was poised to enter Palestine from southern Syria. The troops were much better armed than their Palestinian brethren, being provided with militarytype vehicles as well as some artillery originating in the Arab armies and paid for by the Arab League. Their commander was Fauzi al Kauji, who gained fame during the 1936-1939 uprising. In May 1941 he had taken part in the abortive Rashid Ali uprising against the British; driven into exile, he had somehow contrived to reach Germany where he attended the Berlin war academy. He was also said to have done rather well out of the previous episode and may have hoped to repeat the experience.
9
forces were joined by several thousand more who had infiltrated from the neighboring countries—according to the British authorities, by March 1948 their number reached 5,000.
10
Known somewhat grandiloquently as the Arab Salvation Army, they were divided into several bands that are best described as paramilitary. The largest band was poised to enter Palestine from southern Syria. The troops were much better armed than their Palestinian brethren, being provided with militarytype vehicles as well as some artillery originating in the Arab armies and paid for by the Arab League. Their commander was Fauzi al Kauji, who gained fame during the 1936-1939 uprising. In May 1941 he had taken part in the abortive Rashid Ali uprising against the British; driven into exile, he had somehow contrived to reach Germany where he attended the Berlin war academy. He was also said to have done rather well out of the previous episode and may have hoped to repeat the experience.
Another force to reckon with was the Arab Legion, that strange amalgam of army cum police force that the British had established in Transjordan. During 1936-1939 some of its units had been sent to help put down the third Arab uprising, a task that they carried out with considerable brutality and also a certain gusto.
11
Paid for by the British Treasury and commanded by fifty or so British officers, during most of its history it took orders more from the British ambassador to Amman than from the Hassemite king, Abdullah. In 1946, Transjordan was granted its independence, however, and in any case bringing as much of Palestine as possible under the control of King Abdullah, as an imperial ally, was an objective over which he and his British paymasters could see eye to eye. Of its 20,000 men, slightly under half were available for duty in the war. Unlike the Palestinian levies, moreover, this was a regular force provided with a proper organization as well as artillery and armored cars. It also turned out to be better trained and motivated than all the rest.
12
11
Paid for by the British Treasury and commanded by fifty or so British officers, during most of its history it took orders more from the British ambassador to Amman than from the Hassemite king, Abdullah. In 1946, Transjordan was granted its independence, however, and in any case bringing as much of Palestine as possible under the control of King Abdullah, as an imperial ally, was an objective over which he and his British paymasters could see eye to eye. Of its 20,000 men, slightly under half were available for duty in the war. Unlike the Palestinian levies, moreover, this was a regular force provided with a proper organization as well as artillery and armored cars. It also turned out to be better trained and motivated than all the rest.
12
During the final months of the mandate some of the Arab Legion forces were already deployed in the Arab part of Palestine where they formed part of the British garrison. This fact may have encouraged King Abdullah of Transjordan to open negotiations with the
Yishuv.
Since Moshe Shertok (Sharet), the head of the Agency’s political department, was working with the United Nations at Lake Success, New York, the person on the spot was the formidable Ms. Meir. Trying to stop the authorities in Haifa from deporting illegal immigrants, she had once slapped a British officer in full view of the world press; in November 1947, dressed as a man, she went to Naharayim on the River Jordan. No written agreement was produced, but the Jewish side came away with the distinct impression that the king, who of all the Arab leaders was the most peacefully inclined (and also most in need of Jewish capital and know-how to develop his desert kingdom), agreed not to join an eventual Arab-Israeli war. In return, the agency promised to favor the king’s occupation of the Arab part of Palestine, that is, the area corresponding roughly to the West Bank.
13
Yishuv.
Since Moshe Shertok (Sharet), the head of the Agency’s political department, was working with the United Nations at Lake Success, New York, the person on the spot was the formidable Ms. Meir. Trying to stop the authorities in Haifa from deporting illegal immigrants, she had once slapped a British officer in full view of the world press; in November 1947, dressed as a man, she went to Naharayim on the River Jordan. No written agreement was produced, but the Jewish side came away with the distinct impression that the king, who of all the Arab leaders was the most peacefully inclined (and also most in need of Jewish capital and know-how to develop his desert kingdom), agreed not to join an eventual Arab-Israeli war. In return, the agency promised to favor the king’s occupation of the Arab part of Palestine, that is, the area corresponding roughly to the West Bank.
13
Assuming continued peaceful relations between the
Yishuv
and Abdullah, the agreement made excellent sense. Apart from the four villages composing Gush Etsion, about twelve miles southwest of Jerusalem, there were no Jewish settlements in this mountainous, densely inhabited, and, on the whole, not very fertile area. (Hence Hagana, whose strike forces were only just being formed, would probably have been unable to defend it anyhow.) But should war develop between the two sides then enemy troops would be positioned on the hills within a few miles of the Mediterranean, putting Israel in an impossible strategic situation. One way or another, probably no other single event did as much to shape the state’s borders and, with them, the fate of the holy land as a whole. Nevertheless all the negotiations were kept secret, to the point that they were still not mentioned when the IDF’s official history of the 1948 war was published in 1959 (not that this is unusual in a country where censorship serves mainly to prevent its own citizens from learning what everybody else already knows).
Yishuv
and Abdullah, the agreement made excellent sense. Apart from the four villages composing Gush Etsion, about twelve miles southwest of Jerusalem, there were no Jewish settlements in this mountainous, densely inhabited, and, on the whole, not very fertile area. (Hence Hagana, whose strike forces were only just being formed, would probably have been unable to defend it anyhow.) But should war develop between the two sides then enemy troops would be positioned on the hills within a few miles of the Mediterranean, putting Israel in an impossible strategic situation. One way or another, probably no other single event did as much to shape the state’s borders and, with them, the fate of the holy land as a whole. Nevertheless all the negotiations were kept secret, to the point that they were still not mentioned when the IDF’s official history of the 1948 war was published in 1959 (not that this is unusual in a country where censorship serves mainly to prevent its own citizens from learning what everybody else already knows).
With the stage thus set, the show could get under way. In its early phases it took the shape of riots (in Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, and Haifa during the first week of December). Whereas these outbreaks were easily met by the local Hagana organizations, their place was soon taken by less spectacular but more effective forms of attack such as car bombs, sniping, and small-scale assaults on outlying neighborhoods—a task made easier by the fact that all over the country Jews and Arabs often lived close to one another. As will happen when fighting is conducted at extremely close quarters, both sides soon found themselves wading in blood and gore; still, and thanks largely to small company-sized PALMACH and CHISH units being rushed about like firehoses, none seems to have led to the loss, on a temporary or permanent basis, of a Jewish neighborhood. From November to March, attacks were mounted against outlying settlements all over the country, which too held out and were not lost. They included, from north to south, Kfar Szold, Tirat Tsvi, and Gesher in the upper Jordan Valley (the latter two came under attack by Kauji and the Arab Salvation Army), Nve Yaakov and Har Tuv in the vicinity of Jerusalem, and Nistanim, Kfar Darom, Revivim, Nvatim, and others in the Negev (see Map 6.2).
From December 1947 on, LECHI, ETSEL, and Hagana responded in kind—as Israeli accounts have it—by raiding Arab neighborhoods throughout the country. The almost purely Arab town of Jaffa was attacked by ETSEL, Arab villages in Galilee by Hagana; the latter also blew up a number of bridges in the northern part of the country with the objective of slowing down the arrival of additional volunteers from the neighboring countries. Nor were the Jewish organizations less inclined than their enemies to bomb Arab civilian targets such as markets, movie theaters, buses, and the like. The largest “operation” of this kind took place in Haifa. On January 15 a party of Hagana members disguised themselves as British soldiers. They took a truck into a street described as housing “the headquarters of the local bands” and blew it up with great loss of life.
14
14
As would happen in other similar conflicts—Bosnia is a good recent example—these skirmishes resulted in heavy casualties. In the first four months 1,200 Jews lost their lives; the number of Arab dead is unknown but must have been at least as high and probably much higher. However, the skirmishes did little if anything to upset the balance or promote strategic objectives. Arab attacks on Jewish communications arteries, uncoordinated though they may have been, did threaten to gradually cut the
Yishuv
into several disparate parts. Then as now the real Jewish heartland was in the southern half of the Plain of Sharon between Tel Aviv and Chadera. Throughout winter 1948 the roads leading from there north to Haifa, northeast to Lake Tiberias and Galilee, and south toward the Negev Desert came under sporadic attack. In any event the northern part of the country was never completely cut off, there being always the alternative road or bypass. Not so in the south, where repeated attacks by bands centering on Majdal (modern Ashkelon) caused all traffic to be suspended from March 26 on and where communications with the settlements in the Negev could be maintained only by light aircraft.
Yishuv
into several disparate parts. Then as now the real Jewish heartland was in the southern half of the Plain of Sharon between Tel Aviv and Chadera. Throughout winter 1948 the roads leading from there north to Haifa, northeast to Lake Tiberias and Galilee, and south toward the Negev Desert came under sporadic attack. In any event the northern part of the country was never completely cut off, there being always the alternative road or bypass. Not so in the south, where repeated attacks by bands centering on Majdal (modern Ashkelon) caused all traffic to be suspended from March 26 on and where communications with the settlements in the Negev could be maintained only by light aircraft.
With or without strategic intent, from late January on, the Battle of the Roads, as it was later called, tended to coalesce along the highway from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Particularly vulnerable were the Ramla-Lyddia area, which, although almost purely Arab, could be bypassed to the south; and the fifteen-mile-long mountain stretch from Shaar Ha-gai to the city for which, as the name indicates, there was no alternative and which accordingly saw some of the heaviest fighting. Except for a handful of settlements—desperately poor
kibbutsim
and
moshavim—
Jerusalem itself was isolated in the hills. It was entirely dependent on outside supplies, having no agricultural hinterland to speak of and barely enough water to sustain the population. Moreover many of its almost 100,000 Jews were orthodox and thus all but useless for any purpose but praying. Hence the Hagana organization in the city was exceptionally weak—just a few dozen men, as the PALMACH operations officer responsible for the area, twenty-five-year-old Yitschak Rabin, bitterly wrote in his memoirs.
15
kibbutsim
and
moshavim—
Jerusalem itself was isolated in the hills. It was entirely dependent on outside supplies, having no agricultural hinterland to speak of and barely enough water to sustain the population. Moreover many of its almost 100,000 Jews were orthodox and thus all but useless for any purpose but praying. Hence the Hagana organization in the city was exceptionally weak—just a few dozen men, as the PALMACH operations officer responsible for the area, twenty-five-year-old Yitschak Rabin, bitterly wrote in his memoirs.
15
From January 1948 on, conditions along the road deteriorated to the point where Jerusalem could be accessed only by convoys of trucks—some of them with homemade armor—under armed escort provided by PALMACH. Climbing the hills of Judaea, the convoys were likely to encounter roadblocks made of stones, manned by hundreds of Arabs with rifles and grenades (and, later, also booby-trapped); the same applied to the return journey. Ben Gurion, who traveled the road on December 23, 1947, noted in his diary that they got through only at the cost of four wounded and a wrecked bus.
16
All this took place right under the noses of British garrisons that were using the road to evacuate Jerusalem. Depending on the whims of local commanders and the way they interpreted their instructions, British behavior was inconsistent. On some occasions they confiscated Hagana’s arms, leaving the escorts defenseless. On others they intervened and extricated the occupants of beleaguered convoys, albeit usually on condition that they surrender their armored cars.
16
All this took place right under the noses of British garrisons that were using the road to evacuate Jerusalem. Depending on the whims of local commanders and the way they interpreted their instructions, British behavior was inconsistent. On some occasions they confiscated Hagana’s arms, leaving the escorts defenseless. On others they intervened and extricated the occupants of beleaguered convoys, albeit usually on condition that they surrender their armored cars.
On February 23, 1948, the British withdrew from the area, leaving the two sides to fight it out. This is hardly the place to follow every twist and turn in the Battle for Bab al Wad (the Arab name for the road to Jerusalem), which lasted from late February to the end of April and has since given rise to much controversy in Israel.
17
Conducted almost solely with the aid of small arms—the heaviest weapons at Hagana’s disposal at this time were a number of self-manufactured 3-inch (81 mm) mortars—it claimed a comparatively large number of casualties; even worse, the armored cars were being lost at an unacceptable rate. An early attempt to temporarily occupy some villages near the road in order to secure it was made at the end of March but ended in failure owing to bad planning and insufficient coordination. By that time, one of the darkest periods in the entire war, it looked as if the battle was being lost as two large convoys tried to get through but failed.
17
Conducted almost solely with the aid of small arms—the heaviest weapons at Hagana’s disposal at this time were a number of self-manufactured 3-inch (81 mm) mortars—it claimed a comparatively large number of casualties; even worse, the armored cars were being lost at an unacceptable rate. An early attempt to temporarily occupy some villages near the road in order to secure it was made at the end of March but ended in failure owing to bad planning and insufficient coordination. By that time, one of the darkest periods in the entire war, it looked as if the battle was being lost as two large convoys tried to get through but failed.
Yet the continuing British evacuation finally enabled Hagana to start operating in the open. In the first days of April, three battalions totaling 1,500 men—an enormous force for an organization that had never used more than a company in action—were concentrated in
kibbutsim
to the south and west of Shaar Ha-gai. Since the
Yishuv
remained desperately short of arms, 200 rifles and four light machine guns were flown in from Czechoslovakia aboard an American-piloted Constellation aircraft that landed at an improvised airstrip. It was the kind of operation that, however primitive the conditions under which it took place, perfectly illustrates the
Yishuv
’s advantage over Palestine’s Arab population at the time: Here were two communities, one backward and one modern, locked in mortal combat. Economically speaking, the
Yishuv
, though small and poor by Western standards, was far ahead of the Arabs. For example, out of a total of 59.5 million pounds in bank deposits, 50.2 million belonged to Jews and only 9.3 million to Arabs.
18
A Jewish municipality of comparable size had ten times the budget of its Arab counterpart.
19
Man for man the Jews were better armed, better led, and, something that proved decisive, possessed countrywide organization, both political and military. Scant wonder they came out on top, albeit the price they paid for learning often proved exceptionally heavy both on individual occasions and for the war as a whole.
kibbutsim
to the south and west of Shaar Ha-gai. Since the
Yishuv
remained desperately short of arms, 200 rifles and four light machine guns were flown in from Czechoslovakia aboard an American-piloted Constellation aircraft that landed at an improvised airstrip. It was the kind of operation that, however primitive the conditions under which it took place, perfectly illustrates the
Yishuv
’s advantage over Palestine’s Arab population at the time: Here were two communities, one backward and one modern, locked in mortal combat. Economically speaking, the
Yishuv
, though small and poor by Western standards, was far ahead of the Arabs. For example, out of a total of 59.5 million pounds in bank deposits, 50.2 million belonged to Jews and only 9.3 million to Arabs.
18
A Jewish municipality of comparable size had ten times the budget of its Arab counterpart.
19
Man for man the Jews were better armed, better led, and, something that proved decisive, possessed countrywide organization, both political and military. Scant wonder they came out on top, albeit the price they paid for learning often proved exceptionally heavy both on individual occasions and for the war as a whole.
“Operation Nachshon” (named after a biblical hero) opened on April 6. Its commander was Shimon Avidan, who like the rest had been trained by Sadeh. Its objective was to permanently occupy the villages on both sides of the road—the first time such an objective had been set to any Hagana unit and thus representing a new phase in the war. Proceeding from west to east the troops easily took the hills flanking the first few miles of road, occupying villages (most were found empty) and blowing up the houses in them so as to open fields of fire for the subsequent defense. Farther along the road, however, heavy fighting developed. Attacks and counterattacks centered on Mount Kastel, a commanding position that blocked the road and passed from hand to hand several times. In one of those attacks the leader of the local band, Abd-al Kadr al Hussayni, was killed. His death signaled the end of the beginning. Whatever organization the Arabs possessed disintegrated (having occupied Kastel for the last time they simply went home in order to celebrate a wedding, as legend has it). From the middle of the month on, this final stretch of the road to Jerusalem was definitely open—no more convoys failed to get through—although much more fighting was needed to keep it open.
Around Jerusalem proper much had changed. On April 9 the local branch of ETSEL stormed Dir Yassin, an Arab village near the city’s western outskirts that had long served as a departure base for the local bands (from Dir Yassin to Mount Kastel it was less than three miles as the crow flies). As Begin later recounted the episode, a pickup truck carrying a loudspeaker went ahead of the troops to warn the population;
20
as at the King David Hotel, however, ETSEL’s warnings had a way of going unheeded. When the village was entered its houses were found to be occupied, the inhabitants ready for defense. In the subsequent heavy fighting, ETSEL men, penetrating the narrow alleyways, systematically demolished houses with explosives. When the day ended some 100-200 people, including many women and children, were dead. Four days later the Arabs committed their share of atrocities by attacking a Jewish convoy to Mount Scopus, Jerusalem. As the British troops in the area looked on, seventy-seven people were killed and another twenty wounded. Most of them were Hebrew University faculty and medical personnel on their way to work in the Hadassa hospital.
20
as at the King David Hotel, however, ETSEL’s warnings had a way of going unheeded. When the village was entered its houses were found to be occupied, the inhabitants ready for defense. In the subsequent heavy fighting, ETSEL men, penetrating the narrow alleyways, systematically demolished houses with explosives. When the day ended some 100-200 people, including many women and children, were dead. Four days later the Arabs committed their share of atrocities by attacking a Jewish convoy to Mount Scopus, Jerusalem. As the British troops in the area looked on, seventy-seven people were killed and another twenty wounded. Most of them were Hebrew University faculty and medical personnel on their way to work in the Hadassa hospital.
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