The Sword And The Olive (66 page)
Read The Sword And The Olive Online
Authors: Martin van Creveld
As the IDF’s own history illustrates so well, an army fighting an opponent as strong or stronger than itself will be able to suffer setbacks, take casualties, bite its lip, and carry on. As Vietnam veterans will recall, however, when an army that is ostensibly much stronger than its opponent takes casualties and suffers setbacks something must be wrong by definition, thereby causing people inside and outside the forces to start looking for an explanation. Investigations will be launched and, inevitably, culprits will be found. Once found they are blamed for
mechdalim
, negligence, lack of professionalism, or
fashla
. The upshot is that those who use “excessive” force and “unnecessarily” kill or wound Palestinian demonstrators find themselves at risk of being treated as criminals; those who did not use enough force and lost lives, as fools.
mechdalim
, negligence, lack of professionalism, or
fashla
. The upshot is that those who use “excessive” force and “unnecessarily” kill or wound Palestinian demonstrators find themselves at risk of being treated as criminals; those who did not use enough force and lost lives, as fools.
This dilemma is one that no armed force can withstand in the long run: “A sword, plunged into salt water, will rust”—Lao Tsu. In the IDF’s case it was made worse by Rabin’s policy of deliberately passing as many ground units through the Occupied Territories as possible, often on short notice and with little or no specialized training.
22
No wonder they often lost their heads: Between 1987 and the end of 1994 some three hundred officers and men have been investigated, subjected to disciplinary proceedings, or put on trial.
23
Of those found guilty, the vast majority were let off lightly with transfers, reprimands (which might or might not entail permanent damage to one’s career), deprivation of rank, and tiny, symbolic fines. A few were sentenced to prison, yet none seems to have actually served time, as sentences were either suspended or commuted.
24
At one time or another the list of implicated officers was tantamount to a
Who’s Who
of senior commanders of Northern Command.
25
No fewer than seven out of ten commanders of the two “Arabist” units have been put on trial.
26
22
No wonder they often lost their heads: Between 1987 and the end of 1994 some three hundred officers and men have been investigated, subjected to disciplinary proceedings, or put on trial.
23
Of those found guilty, the vast majority were let off lightly with transfers, reprimands (which might or might not entail permanent damage to one’s career), deprivation of rank, and tiny, symbolic fines. A few were sentenced to prison, yet none seems to have actually served time, as sentences were either suspended or commuted.
24
At one time or another the list of implicated officers was tantamount to a
Who’s Who
of senior commanders of Northern Command.
25
No fewer than seven out of ten commanders of the two “Arabist” units have been put on trial.
26
Seeking to defend themselves, the officers in question have hired civilian lawyers. The latter accused the IDF attorney general of acting with malicious intent and of violating their clients’ rights, threatening to take their cases to the High Court. In March 1997 the chain of accusations and counteraccusations became so bad that the former chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Moshe Levy, along with thirteen major generals on active duty, wrote the attorney general demanding that the IDF back up its officers and the trials be stopped (to no avail, as the attorney general also fears being taken to the High Court by various human rights groups and the relatives of IDF soldiers who were killed in accidents).
27
As always in Israel, a small and intimate society where most people listen to the news several times a day, a repertoire of would-be comic acronyms has sprung up out of nowhere to describe the situation. It opens with KASTACH (cover your...) and ends with ODATS (the lawyer who serves as the cover).
27
As always in Israel, a small and intimate society where most people listen to the news several times a day, a repertoire of would-be comic acronyms has sprung up out of nowhere to describe the situation. It opens with KASTACH (cover your...) and ends with ODATS (the lawyer who serves as the cover).
In theory
fashlot
that occur in the field should not necessarily affect the spirit and readiness of rear units engaged in training. In practice it has created a situation where serious training has become almost impossible for fear of committing errors that may lead to trials. At first it was curtailed by the
Intifada
as units constantly were alerted and had courses interrupted to act as firehoses whenever the territories “went up in flames.” For example, the period of officer training had to be cut; the system in which each member of a tank crew is trained to perform all functions was brought to an end.
28
Later training was made even more difficult when Chief of Staff Ehud Barak (himself present at and blamed for failing to participate in the evacuation of several soldiers who were killed in one major accident) put in place a new network of “safety officers.” Since then unit commanders have been obliged to submit plans in advance, and exercises are closely supervised at every step. The number of accidents has indeed dropped very sharply, as has the quality and quantity of training, according to those in the know.
fashlot
that occur in the field should not necessarily affect the spirit and readiness of rear units engaged in training. In practice it has created a situation where serious training has become almost impossible for fear of committing errors that may lead to trials. At first it was curtailed by the
Intifada
as units constantly were alerted and had courses interrupted to act as firehoses whenever the territories “went up in flames.” For example, the period of officer training had to be cut; the system in which each member of a tank crew is trained to perform all functions was brought to an end.
28
Later training was made even more difficult when Chief of Staff Ehud Barak (himself present at and blamed for failing to participate in the evacuation of several soldiers who were killed in one major accident) put in place a new network of “safety officers.” Since then unit commanders have been obliged to submit plans in advance, and exercises are closely supervised at every step. The number of accidents has indeed dropped very sharply, as has the quality and quantity of training, according to those in the know.
Amid the constant accusations and counteraccusations the various groups that during the later period of the Lebanese War had announced their refusal to serve reasserted themselves. By the end of 1992 almost two hundred soldiers
29
had done or were doing time, including a high percentage of officers. One reservist, Rami Chasson, was sentenced to four consecutive prison terms of thirty-five days each until Rabin, realizing that his victim was being turned into a hero, gave up. Constantly harassed by the media and occasionally by the courts, the IDF did not dare resort to harsher measures. Instead unit commanders were instructed to solve the problem without bothering superiors with statistics, which in practice meant that anyone could avoid serving in the Occupied Territories by inventing an excuse. Since the end of 1992 very few soldiers, almost all of them conscripts, have been sentenced for this offense. Thus Rabin’s directive swept under the carpet a problem that was literally beginning to tear the IDF apart. In an army that once prided itself on truthfulness, lying had become institutionalized.
29
had done or were doing time, including a high percentage of officers. One reservist, Rami Chasson, was sentenced to four consecutive prison terms of thirty-five days each until Rabin, realizing that his victim was being turned into a hero, gave up. Constantly harassed by the media and occasionally by the courts, the IDF did not dare resort to harsher measures. Instead unit commanders were instructed to solve the problem without bothering superiors with statistics, which in practice meant that anyone could avoid serving in the Occupied Territories by inventing an excuse. Since the end of 1992 very few soldiers, almost all of them conscripts, have been sentenced for this offense. Thus Rabin’s directive swept under the carpet a problem that was literally beginning to tear the IDF apart. In an army that once prided itself on truthfulness, lying had become institutionalized.
Owing to the IDF’s relative numerical weakness, for decades on end morale acted as the real engine behind the IDF’s outstanding performances, and now it began to crack. Surprisingly, surveys taken between 1988 and 1991 still showed that an overwhelming majority of youngsters trusted the IDF’s combat proficiency (87-90 percent), claimed that they would have been prepared to enlist voluntarily even if conscription had not existed (94 percent), and were willing to serve in elite units (78 percent).
30
Such attitudes did not by any means turn out to be
Intifada
-proof. As early as 1988 Chief of Staff Shomron is reported to have refused to meet with subordinates who had researched the problem and generated uncomplimentary findings concerning the uprising’s effects on unit morale and the men’s willingness to serve.
31
Later the IDF high command, feeling the ground under its feet slipping away, banned surveys and prevented those that may have been held from being published. Officers who looked facts in the face, such as a colonel in charge of manpower/behavioral science, were forbidden to speak up and relieved from their posts.
32
30
Such attitudes did not by any means turn out to be
Intifada
-proof. As early as 1988 Chief of Staff Shomron is reported to have refused to meet with subordinates who had researched the problem and generated uncomplimentary findings concerning the uprising’s effects on unit morale and the men’s willingness to serve.
31
Later the IDF high command, feeling the ground under its feet slipping away, banned surveys and prevented those that may have been held from being published. Officers who looked facts in the face, such as a colonel in charge of manpower/behavioral science, were forbidden to speak up and relieved from their posts.
32
Since systematic evidence has been deliberately suppressed for years
33
—as one former chief of manpower belatedly admitted
34
—spot reports will have to do. During the nineties the growing numbers of people in each age group caused rear-service units to be flooded with troops. Against a background of sharply rising living standards and steadily improving medical care, the conscripts ought to have been stronger and healthier than ever; yet the percentage of those examined and found fit for combat declined from 76 percent in 1986 to 64 percent a decade later.
35
Year after year, the IDF experienced great difficulty in finding sufficient “quality” manpower to fill its frontline units.
36
The paradox is explained by the fact that soldiers and their parents no longer trust the IDF to take care of any medical problems that may arise during the period of service.
37
As Chief of Staff Shachak told the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee,
38
many obtain doctored doctors’ reports concerning all kinds of imaginary and semi-imaginary diseases. What he failed to mention, or perhaps did not know, is that some doctors will gladly provide recruits with such reports without being asked.
33
—as one former chief of manpower belatedly admitted
34
—spot reports will have to do. During the nineties the growing numbers of people in each age group caused rear-service units to be flooded with troops. Against a background of sharply rising living standards and steadily improving medical care, the conscripts ought to have been stronger and healthier than ever; yet the percentage of those examined and found fit for combat declined from 76 percent in 1986 to 64 percent a decade later.
35
Year after year, the IDF experienced great difficulty in finding sufficient “quality” manpower to fill its frontline units.
36
The paradox is explained by the fact that soldiers and their parents no longer trust the IDF to take care of any medical problems that may arise during the period of service.
37
As Chief of Staff Shachak told the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee,
38
many obtain doctored doctors’ reports concerning all kinds of imaginary and semi-imaginary diseases. What he failed to mention, or perhaps did not know, is that some doctors will gladly provide recruits with such reports without being asked.
In 1995, according to one survey that was leaked to the press, 72 percent of troops interviewed felt that serving in the Occupied Territories was “very demoralizing”; no fewer than 46 percent had witnessed “inappropriate behavior” toward Palestinian civilians.
39
Visiting fresh recruits in the IDF’s central depot for newly conscripted manpower (BAKUM) in the summer of 1996, Minister of Defense Mordechai was taken aback when all but a handful told him that they did not want to serve in combat units;
40
by that time 10 percent of recruits destined for combat training had to be physically manhandled to get onto the transports, whereas another 4 percent were preferring imprisonment to service.
41
Furthermore, out of every hundred conscripts who enter the army, twenty are prematurely discharged either honorably or dishonorably.
42
According to the chief of manpower, 40 percent of those whose age and military background qualify them for reserve service do not even appear on the lists. Another 30 percent have succeeded in evading service by various means, so that only 30 percent actually serve.
43
Finally, among those who are called up, only about 50 percent bother to report.
44
As of late 1996, Chief of Staff Shachak described their morale as “critical.”
45
39
Visiting fresh recruits in the IDF’s central depot for newly conscripted manpower (BAKUM) in the summer of 1996, Minister of Defense Mordechai was taken aback when all but a handful told him that they did not want to serve in combat units;
40
by that time 10 percent of recruits destined for combat training had to be physically manhandled to get onto the transports, whereas another 4 percent were preferring imprisonment to service.
41
Furthermore, out of every hundred conscripts who enter the army, twenty are prematurely discharged either honorably or dishonorably.
42
According to the chief of manpower, 40 percent of those whose age and military background qualify them for reserve service do not even appear on the lists. Another 30 percent have succeeded in evading service by various means, so that only 30 percent actually serve.
43
Finally, among those who are called up, only about 50 percent bother to report.
44
As of late 1996, Chief of Staff Shachak described their morale as “critical.”
45
In response the IDF has placed greater reliance on conscripts rather than reservists. It has also increased the salaries of soldiers in combat units, although conscripts who risk their lives in Lebanon are still paid only about $180 per month and numerous forms of bureaucratic intimidation are used to deprive newly discharged conscripts of the grants to which they are formally entitled. Various schemes for bonuses, such as free enrollment in courses that prepare Israelis to enter the universities, have been proposed; some that are not too outrageous (one would have required the universities to pass students absent owing to military service) are actually being implemented.
46
As of early 1997 there also existed a scheme for reclassifying manpower so that personnel who had previously been exempt would be called up; to ensure that the mental cases among them would present no danger to themselves and to others, it was proposed to make them serve without arms.
47
Though the
Intifada
has abated to some extent, so far there is scant evidence of these measures having any effect. Judging by the experience of the U.S. armed forces in Vietnam,
48
as long as the army remains in the Occupied Territories and continues to conduct police operations against much weaker opponents, a fundamental change is not likely to take place.
46
As of early 1997 there also existed a scheme for reclassifying manpower so that personnel who had previously been exempt would be called up; to ensure that the mental cases among them would present no danger to themselves and to others, it was proposed to make them serve without arms.
47
Though the
Intifada
has abated to some extent, so far there is scant evidence of these measures having any effect. Judging by the experience of the U.S. armed forces in Vietnam,
48
as long as the army remains in the Occupied Territories and continues to conduct police operations against much weaker opponents, a fundamental change is not likely to take place.
War by definition is a two-sided activity. It is also an imitative activity in which, given sufficient time, the two sides will learn from each other and tend to resemble each other. Thus he who fights the weak will himself become weak; he who by “fighting” the weak behaves like a coward will end up turning into one, suffering one humiliation after another and losing the will to fight. From the beginning of the
Intifada
to the present day the number of Israeli soldiers killed by Palestinians during active counterinsurgency operations does not exceed a few dozen. Even including all civilians who lost their lives by stabbings, bomb explosions, and the like, during nine years the number of victims is only about 350, or forty per year, which equals the number of those killed on Israel’s roads in
three weeks
. For the overwhelming majority who do not live in the Occupied Territories—more than 95 percent—the impact on day-to-day life has been negligible.
Intifada
to the present day the number of Israeli soldiers killed by Palestinians during active counterinsurgency operations does not exceed a few dozen. Even including all civilians who lost their lives by stabbings, bomb explosions, and the like, during nine years the number of victims is only about 350, or forty per year, which equals the number of those killed on Israel’s roads in
three weeks
. For the overwhelming majority who do not live in the Occupied Territories—more than 95 percent—the impact on day-to-day life has been negligible.
By the mid-1990s the effect of trying to put down the
Intifada
had become plain for all to see. The fighting power of Israel’s once-heroic army steeply declined in front of opponents who are numerically and materially incomparably less powerful than itself but, as they have repeatedly proven, determined to the point that there is no shortage of volunteers ready to commit suicide for their cause. Given the lamentable state to which the army has been reduced, there is no prospect of the old fighting spirit reasserting itself.
Intifada
had become plain for all to see. The fighting power of Israel’s once-heroic army steeply declined in front of opponents who are numerically and materially incomparably less powerful than itself but, as they have repeatedly proven, determined to the point that there is no shortage of volunteers ready to commit suicide for their cause. Given the lamentable state to which the army has been reduced, there is no prospect of the old fighting spirit reasserting itself.
CHAPTER 21
THE BETRAYAL OF FAITH
H
IM WHOM THE gods wish to destroy they first strike blind.
IM WHOM THE gods wish to destroy they first strike blind.
From the day that Rabin ordered the IDF to put down the
Intifada
, possibly even from the day TSAHAL mounted “Operation Peace for Galilee,” the tragedy unfolded and the decline in its morale became inevitable. Worse still, in a country whose military consists very largely of conscripts and reservists the distrust eating it up from inside could not but spread to civilian society. Early on it was a question of a few dissenters who refused to go along, as well as relatives and friends standing by soldiers accused of using too much or not enough force. Later, growing distrust meant that with every incident the army found itself accused not only of negligence but also of deliberately covering up the truth; the number of cases it promised but failed to investigate must run into the thousands. Things have deteriorated so far that most of the Israeli written media will publish only negative stories about the IDF. Those who try to put in a word to the contrary risk having phone receivers slammed in their ears.
Intifada
, possibly even from the day TSAHAL mounted “Operation Peace for Galilee,” the tragedy unfolded and the decline in its morale became inevitable. Worse still, in a country whose military consists very largely of conscripts and reservists the distrust eating it up from inside could not but spread to civilian society. Early on it was a question of a few dissenters who refused to go along, as well as relatives and friends standing by soldiers accused of using too much or not enough force. Later, growing distrust meant that with every incident the army found itself accused not only of negligence but also of deliberately covering up the truth; the number of cases it promised but failed to investigate must run into the thousands. Things have deteriorated so far that most of the Israeli written media will publish only negative stories about the IDF. Those who try to put in a word to the contrary risk having phone receivers slammed in their ears.
It was not merely a question of isolated individuals venting frustration or of sensation-hungry journalists echoing their claims. The parents of many conscripts now see the army as a greater danger to their children’s welfare (including, specifically, their moral welfare) than are the Arabs. The result has been constant interference on their part,
1
culminating in one bizarre case in early 1997 when a mother was discovered hiding on base, having spent four days videotaping the activities of recruits to make sure her daughter came to no harm. To better allow parents to monitor their children Israeli technical ingenuity has come up with specially designed cellular telephones. Known as “mangos,” they are popular presents and allow recruits to call parents at the latter’s expense—much to the army’s chagrin, which sees discipline undermined and has tried to ban their use in the field.
1
culminating in one bizarre case in early 1997 when a mother was discovered hiding on base, having spent four days videotaping the activities of recruits to make sure her daughter came to no harm. To better allow parents to monitor their children Israeli technical ingenuity has come up with specially designed cellular telephones. Known as “mangos,” they are popular presents and allow recruits to call parents at the latter’s expense—much to the army’s chagrin, which sees discipline undermined and has tried to ban their use in the field.
Other books
1.4 by Mike A. Lancaster
Dolly by Susan Hill
Suicide's Girlfriend by Elizabeth Evans
Blue Moon II ~ This is Reality by A.E. Via
Screaming Yellow by Rachel Green
Bride of the Castle by John Dechancie
Murder at Redwood Cove by Janet Finsilver
The Twins by Tessa de Loo
The Lake Season by Hannah McKinnon
