The United Nations Security Council and War:The Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945 (166 page)

⁹⁹
This possibility was contemplated in the process of the establishment of the Proliferation and Security Initiative (PSI), available at
www.state.gov/t/np/rls/fs/23764.htm
See Michael Byers, ‘Policing the High Seas: The Proliferation Security Initiative’,
American Journal of International Law
98 (2004), 526–45.

^*
The author would like to thank Sandy Cameron, Carolyn Haggis, and Emily Paddon for their research assistance in preparing this chapter.

¹
There is no standard definition of ‘humanitarian intervention’, and there is a significant debate as to how it should be conceived. For the purposes of this chapter, the following definition will be used:
coercive interference in the internal affairs of a state, involving the use of armed force with or without Security Council authorization, with the purpose of addressing massive human rights violations or preventing widespread human suffering.

²
Simon Chesterman,
Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International Law
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 48–9. For a discussion of the legitimacy of actions beyond these two exceptions, see Christine Gray,
International Law and the Use of Force
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 24–6; and Oscar Schachter, ‘The Legality of Pro-Democratic Invasion’,
American Journal of International Law
78, no. 3 (1984), 645–50.

³
Adam Roberts, ‘The United Nations and Humanitarian Intervention’, in Jennifer M. Welsh (ed.),
Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 72.

⁴
British representatives were particularly keen on the language of human rights in the early Articles of the Charter, partly as a way of giving the Security Council some freedom of action with respect to human rights violations occurring inside member states. See Llewellyn Woodward,
British Foreign Policy in the Second World War
, Vol. II (London, 1971), 212–17.

⁵
Roberts, ‘The United Nations and Humanitarian Intervention’, 74.

⁶
See also Rahul Roy-Chaudhury’s discussion of this issue in Ch. 14.

⁷
Nicholas Wheeler,
Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), chs. 2 and 3.

⁸
U Thant,
View from the UN
(London: David & Charles, 1978), 422–4. It is also noteworthy that some legal scholars began to argue in favour of humanitarian rationale as a legitimate justification for the use of force. See Richard B. Lillich (ed.),
Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations
(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1973).

⁹
See also James Cockayne and David Malone’s discussion of this issue in
Chapter 17
.

¹⁰
See, for example, Richard B. Lillich, ‘The Role of the UN Security Council in Protecting Human Rights in Crisis Situations: UN Humanitarian Intervention in the Post-Cold War World’,
Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law
3, no. 1/2 (1995), 7.

¹¹
See ‘Letter to the President of the Security Council from Permanent Representative of Turkey to the UN’, UN doc. S/22435 of 2 Apr. 1991.

¹²
French President Mitterand, cited in Wheeler,
Saving Strangers
, 141.

¹³
The troops remained in Iraq until mid-July 1991 as part of Operation Provide Comfort. The military exclusion zone subsequently became a northern ‘no-fly’ zone.

¹⁴
For a more in-depth discussion of the politics surrounding this resolution, see Chesterman,
Just War or Just Peace
, 131–3.

¹⁵
This interpretation is reflected in the preambular paragraph of the resolution itself.

¹⁶
See UN doc. S/PV.2982 of 5 Apr. 1991.

¹⁷
Wheeler,
Saving Strangers
, 154. See also Chesterman,
Just War or Just Peace
, 196–206.

¹⁸
Wheeler,
Saving Strangers
, 169.

¹⁹
The Council’s decisions correspond with three phases of UN (or, in the case of UNITAF, UN-authorized) missions: UNOSOM I, established by SC Res. 751 of 24 Apr. 1992, UNITAF, established by SC Res. 794 of 3 Dec. 1992 and UNOSOM II, established by SC Res. 814 of 26 Mar. 1993.

²⁰
For a more in-depth discussion of the international response to the humanitarian crisis in Somalia, see Wheeler,
Saving Strangers
, ch. 6.

²¹
During Somalia’s fall into chaos in 1991, UN involvement was limited to its humanitarian organizations and the activities of the Secretary-General.

²²
SC Res. 733 of 23 Jan. 1992.

²³
UN doc. S/PV.3060 of 17 Mar. 1992.

²⁴
SC Res. 746 of 17 Mar. 1992. While this resolution did not authorize the use of force, it nonetheless emphasized the need to ‘establish mechanisms to ensure the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance’.

²⁵
SC Res. 751 of 24 Apr. 1992.

²⁶
See Ioan Lewis and James Mayall, ‘Somalia’, in James Mayall (ed.),
The New Interventionism 1991–1994: United Nations experience in Cambodia, former Yugoslavia and Somalia
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 108–9.

²⁷
SC Res. 794 of 3 Dec. 1992.

²⁸
UN doc. S/PV.3145 of 3 Dec. 1992.

²⁹
Lewis and Mayall, ‘Somalia’, 114.

³⁰
Before the Security Council started to address the question of Haiti and authorized the use of force in July 1994, the UN had been involved through the International Civilian Mission, known as MICIVIH. This joint UN/OAS mission was established by the General Assembly in the spring of 1993 (at the request of Aristide) to monitor human rights violations in Haiti. See GA Res. 47/20Bof 20 Apr. 1993.

³¹
SC Res. 940 of 31 July 1994. For a detailed discussion, see David Malone,
Decision-Making in the UN Security Council: The Case of Haiti
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).

³²
UN doc. S/25958 of 16 June 1993. This request was further supported by the Group of Friends (which included Canada, the US, France, and Venezuela) and the GRULAC, the group of Latin American and Caribbean states which contains thirty-three members.

³³
SC Res. 841 of 16 June 1993.

³⁴
UN doc. S/PV.3238 of 16 June 1993.

³⁵
Ibid.

³⁶
Ibid.

³⁷
The agreement was followed by talks at UN Headquarters on 14 July 1993 among the majority of Haiti’s political parties, as specified by Article 1 of the Agreement.

³⁸
UN doc. S/PV. 3271 of 27 Aug. 1993.

³⁹
SC Res. 862 of 31 Aug. 1993. Dockside demonstrations by the Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti (FRAPH), combined with downing of US helicopters in Somalia a week earlier, led the US to withdraw the ship carrying American and Canadian UNMIH troops (the
USS Harlan County
) from Haitian waters.

⁴⁰
SC Res. 867 of 23 Sep. 1993. The mission was initially comprised of 567 UN police monitors and a military construction unit of 700 (including sixty military trainers).

⁴¹
SC Res. 917 of 6 May 1994. The embargo included a ban on all flights in and out of Haiti, with the exception of scheduled commercial lights and lights for humanitarian assistance purposes; the prevention of any member/family member of the Haitian military and participants in the coup of 1991 from entering another state; and a ban on the import and export of all commodities and products to and from Haiti (with the exception of medical and foodstuffs, petroleum for certain specified uses, and education information materials).

⁴²
Ibid.

⁴³
UN doc. S/PRST/1994/32 of 12 July 1994.

⁴⁴
SC Res. 940 of 31 July 1994. Brazil and China abstained, and Rwanda was absent.

⁴⁵
These were similar to the concerns voiced in the second report submitted by the Secretary-General (S/PRST/871).

⁴⁶
SC Res. 940 of 31 July 1994. The Council extended the size and prolonged the mandate of UNMIH on four occasions: SC Res. 964 of 29 Nov. 1994, SC Res. 975 of 30 Jan. 1995, SC. Res. 1007 of 31 July 1995, and SC Res. 1048 of 29 Feb. 1996. The mission ended in June 1996, and was replaced by a UN support team (UNSMIH).

⁴⁷
See also Adam Robert’s discussion of this issue in
Chapter 4
.

⁴⁸
Wheeler,
Saving Strangers
, 208. For other critiques of the United Nations’ performance during the Rwandan crisis, see Linda Melvern,
A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda’s Genocide
(London: Zed Books, 2000); Michael Barnett,
Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002); and Romeo Dallaire and Brent Beardsley,
Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda
(New York: Carroll & Graf, 2005). The United Nations produced a damning indictment of its own behaviour five years later. See
Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda
, UN doc. S/1999/1257 of 15 Dec. 1999.

⁴⁹
Colin Keating, ‘Rwanda: An Insider’s Account’, in David Malone (ed.),
The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century
(London: Lynne Reiner, 2004), 505.

⁵⁰
The most glaring illustration of this breakdown is the fact that UNAMIR General Romeo Dallaire’s cabled reports, which contained strong warnings of ethnic slaughter, were not communicated fully to the Security Council.

⁵¹
SC Res. 912 of 21 Apr. 1994. While this resolution was to leave Dallaire in command of 270 troops, approximately 500 remained in Rwanda. UNAMIR had been created by SC Res. 872 of 5 Oct. 1993 to monitor the ceasefire between the government and the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front and to secure a weapons-free zone in Kigali.

⁵²
For a comprehensive discussion of the US opposition to intervention in Rwanda, see Samantha Power,
A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide
(New York: Basic Books, 2002), ch. 10.

⁵³
PDD 25, which was a review of US policy on multilateral peace operations, remains classified. The quotation comes from a press briefing on its content. See Anthony Lake, ‘Press Briefing by National Security Advisor Tony Lake and Director for Strategic Plans and Policy General Wesley Clark’, 5 May 1994. Available at
www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd25_brief.htm
I am grateful to Patrick Travers for pointing out this source to me.

⁵⁴
Power,
A Problem from Hell
, 370–80.

⁵⁵
SC Res. 918 of 17 May 1994.

⁵⁶
Barnett,
Eyewitness to a Genocide
, 142–4.

⁵⁷
James Mayall, ‘Humanitarian Intervention and International Society: Lessons from Africa,’ in Welsh (ed.),
Humanitarian Intervention
, 137.

⁵⁸
Ibid.

⁵⁹
See SC Res. 929 of 22 June 1994. The vote was 10 in favour, with five abstentions.

⁶⁰
Barnett,
Eyewitness to a Genocide
, 148–9.

⁶¹
See UN doc. SG/SM/7136 of 20 Sep. 2000. Annan’s experience as UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations during the genocide informed his later views on how the international community should respond to humanitarian crises. He claimed in 1999 that of all his objectives as Secretary-General, he was most committed to ensuring that the UN never again failed to protect a civilian population from genocide. See Kofi Annan, ‘Two Concepts of Sovereignty’,
Economist
, 352 (18 Sep. 1999), 49–50.

⁶²
Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty,
The Responsibility to Protect
, (Ottawa: International Development Research Council, 2001), 8, xi. For an assessment of the ICISS report, see Jennifer Welsh, Carolin Thielking, and S. Neil MacFarlane, ‘The Responsibility to Protect: Assessing the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty’, in Ramesh Thakur, Andrew F. Cooper, and John English (eds.),
International Commissions and the Power of Ideas
(Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2005), 198–220.

⁶³
UN doc. S/1998/318-A of 13 Apr. 1998.

⁶⁴
UN doc. S/PRST/1999/6 of 12 Feb. 1999.

⁶⁵
Ibid., and UN doc. S/1999/957 of 8 Sep. 1999.

⁶⁶
SC Res. 1265 of 17 Sep. 1999.

⁶⁷
SC Res. 1296 of 19 Apr. 2000.

⁶⁸
See SC Res. 1674 of 28 Apr. 2006 and SC Res. 1738 of 23 Dec. 2006. The first of these resolutions expressed particular concern about violence against women and children, and the second highlighted the treatment of members of the media in situations of armed conflict.

⁶⁹
UN doc. S/PV.4130 of 19 Apr. 2000. For a discussion of these resolutions and their implications, see S. Neil MacFarlane, ‘Human Security and the Law of States’, in Benjamin Goold and Liora Lazarus,
Security and Human Rights
(Oxford: Hart, 2007), 357–60.

⁷⁰
See also Susan Woodward’s discussion of this issue in
Chapter 18
.