The Wizards of Langley (22 page)

Read The Wizards of Langley Online

Authors: Jeffrey T Richelson

BOOK: The Wizards of Langley
13.11Mb size Format: txt, pdf, ePub

Drell and his colleagues concluded that CORONA had been pushed about as far as it could be, and that to achieve significantly better resolution would require a new system. Meanwhile, NPIC’s photointerpreters demonstrated that a wide-area system with resolution of two feet would dramatically improve their ability to spot new facilities and extract intelligence about them. As a whole, the exercise resulted in the realization that, according to Wheelon, “something a lot better was needed.”
100

But McMillan’s willingness to fund a research effort did not mean a willingness to fund a satellite to be developed on the basis of the group’s findings and recommendations. Wheelon later recalled that “from the outset McMillan did everything in his power” to stop that program, including refusing to provide funds.
101
But McMillan’s decision did not prevent McCone from authorizing the use of CIA funds for the same project. With the Land Reconnaissance Panel and PFIAB suggesting that the expenditure of $10 million would be worthwhile to investigate the feasibility of a new wide-area, high-resolution system, McCone approved the funding.
102

DS&T representatives talked to both Itek and Perkin-Elmer about the possibility of working on the program. In February 1964, using personnel from various offices and staffs within the science and technology directorate, the systems analysis group began a study in conjunction with Itek, whose ideas were preferred to those of Perkin-Elmer, to determine the feasibility and potential intelligence value of using several individual sensors or combination of sensors in a satellite system. The study led to a camera design believed to be capable of producing high-resolution over a wide swath.
103

It was not until June that McMillan discovered the CIA effort, code-named FULCRUM, which the agency had concealed not only from the Soviet Union but from the NRO as well. To pursue the project beyond the initial phase would require NRP funding. Wheelon initially proposed a six-month design effort. At the beginning, a project office of five to seven people, reporting directly to Wheelon, would be established within the CIA and be responsible for system engineering and technical direction. The proposal, according to an NRO history, was “precise, carefully detailed, seemingly quite accurate, technologically conservative, and—on the whole—exceptionally well constructed.”
104

But McMillan believed that to approve the proposal would enable the CIA to establish “an independent capability for full-scale development of space systems,” even though their feasibility had yet to be determined. To establish such a capability, the CIA would have to recruit a substantial technical establishment. Not surprisingly, the NRO director was thoroughly opposed to the idea.
105

McMillan also believed that he had Fubini’s support. The deputy director of defense research and engineering had observed that over the past two years, no committees had recommended a new search system. Also, Fubini had technical reservations about whether the high-speed film flow envisioned in the FULCRUM system was attainable. He also argued that proceeding toward a new broad-coverage system was unwise while the causes of CORONA’s variable performance remained unknown.
106

McMillan attempted to head off any fait accompli by turning McNamara’s attention to the matter. With Fubini’s support and Vance’s approval, he submitted a McNamara-to-McCone memorandum for the Secretary’s signature, but in the end it was revised and signed by Vance. It proposed that the CIA be authorized to do only those tests needed to establish FULCRUM’s feasibility while the NRO simultaneously undertook comparative studies. By January 1965, Vance suggested, a determination of development desirability and a selection of a system should be possible. He added, “At that time we can discuss the assignment of responsibilities for development and operational employment.”
107

Wheelon, according to an NRO history, “either did not await DoD action or, more probably, had advance notice of Vance’s intentions.” On July 9, before Vance’s letter could reach McCone, the science and technology chief sent McMillan an outline of “the various tasks for which we require immediate NRO funding.” Wheelon’s task description went beyond feasibility studies to include funding for spacecraft, booster, and “assembly, integration, and checkout” contracts.
108

That same month, the United States Intelligence Board formally called for development of a new search system—which still left open the question of the system’s characteristics and which agency should manage its development. On August 11, a meeting of Vance, McCone, Fubini, and McMillan addressed the CIA’s proposal. McCone accepted in principle a funding level of about $30 million and a set of Vance instructions on FULCRUM issued a week earlier, which was expanded to provide for some system design study work but under the aegis of the NRO.
109

In a late 1964 presentation to the PFIAB, McMillan noted the Purcell panel’s report and apparently referred to its suggestion that the best thing to do was stay with CORONA. In a memo, the DS&T’s John McMahon contended that such an argument was misleading. He noted the contents of the briefings given by Reber and Lundahl as well as the panel’s being told that the new search system proposed as a follow-on to CORONA was a “10,000 lb. monster” that would require a Titan 3C booster. Thus, “the panel felt that rather than bankrupt the US Treasury . . . we turn to CORONA and make [it] work all the time” at nine-foot resolution. McMahon argued that the Purcell panel members failed to explain the documentation and presentations upon which they based their recommendations, and he suggested that if they were briefed on the current systems under way and the resolutions required, they would reach different conclusions than they did in July 1963.
110

In any case, McMillan and the NRO were determined that FULCRUM, about which the CIA would tell them little, would not be the only candidate to succeed CORONA. A contract to begin studies for a system designated the S-2 was issued to Eastman-Kodak, whose approach McMillan recalled as “fairly conventional.” Some attention was also devoted to a proposal for a smaller system, designated MATCHBOX, that was advertised as being capable of producing equally detailed imagery.
111

Then, on February 24, 1965, Itek made an announcement that stunned Wheelon and “the NRO Staff found hilariously enjoyable”—that it would undertake no further work on the FULCRUM program.
112
Since Itek began serious work on FULCRUM, it had been faced with a CIA requirement that it felt unnecessary and unreasonable—that the camera be capable of photographing targets up to 60 degrees to the left or right of the satellite’s path above the earth—from horizon to horizon. The farther a camera is moved “off axis,” the more the atmosphere degrades its resolution, and thus a 35-degree capability in each direction had been the maximum demanded of any CORONA camera. As Walter Levison, a camera
designer and senior Itek official at the time, recalled, Itek thought the decline in resolution that would result would be too great to justify attempting to produce a system that could scan 120 degrees.
113

The difference in viewpoints had apparently led to some hard feelings between Special Projects Staff head Jack Maxey and Itek’s FULCRUM program manager John Wolfe. Maxey was, according to Frank Madden, the chief engineer for FULCRUM, “high-handed, demanding.” But the event that triggered Itek’s withdrawal, according to Levison, occurred at a meeting in Boston of the Land Reconnaissance Panel, attended by, among others, Levison, Itek president Frank Lindsay, Wheelon, and McMillan. The meeting featured a briefing by Leslie Dirks on FULCRUM. Dirks insisted that the requirement for the new satellite to scan 60 degrees in each direction was an Itek recommendation and not made at the CIA’s insistence. Levison’s reaction, in “the heat of the moment,” was “that tears it.” Later that afternoon, a meeting among Levison, Lindsay, and other Itek executives resulted in the decision to withdraw from the FULCRUM program.
114
*

After the meeting, Levison called NRO staffer Paul Worthman, who in a memo described Levison’s voice “as shaking throughout the conversation.” Levison informed Worthman of Itek’s decision and requested advice on how to handle the situation. Worthman suggested the first thing to do was inform McCone, which Levison said Itek president Frank Lindsay was trying to do at that moment. When McCone could not be reached, Lindsay called John Bross to give him the bad news.
115
Worthman then called McMillan and told him to call Levison immediately. A meeting among Levison, Wolfe, McMillan, and Land followed, which left the latter two “stunned.” Levison told them that Itek felt it could not survive under “the domination of the CIA” and that the CIA had fostered an “immoral environment.”
116

Itek’s announcement that it would no longer work on FULCRUM “hit us like a ton,” John McMahon recalled. It also led to suspicions on the part of several CIA officials that McMillan or Fubini had offered Itek an inducement to withdraw from the CIA program—such as a guarantee of
an NRO contract to build the next search system. McMillan denied any previous arrangement with Itek, and Levison recalled that “nobody made any promises to anybody.” McMillan did transfer the S-2 program from Eastman-Kodak to Itek after its withdrawal from FULCRUM. According to Levison, McMillan wanted to keep Itek working in the reconnaissance field, and Eastman-Kodak had plenty of work—including working on the KH-10 optical system for the Air Force’s Manned Orbiting Laboratory. Part of McMillan’s decision was apparently the result of the technical discussion about a new search system at the February 24 meeting.
117

Back at Langley, McCone and Wheelon decided they would have to find another contractor, possibly Perkin-Elmer. Meanwhile, McMahon, along with two other CIA officials—Jim MacDonald and Henry Plaster—were sent to Itek, where they seized all records, brassboards, and engineering notebooks related to FULCRUM.
118

During a visit to Perkin-Elmer, Wheelon asked Rod Scott for any ideas. Scott explained the concept of the “twister,” which would allow images to be recorded on film that was see-sawed back and forth—a radical departure from the practice of advancing the film frame by frame past the focal plane. The twister would permit placement of the cameras in the satellite so that they would be parallel to the satellite’s motion rather than perpendicular—which in turn meant the satellite could carry cameras of sufficient size to achieve the CIA’s resolution and scan objectives. (In other words, placing cameras of sufficient size across the
width
of the spacecraft would require building a spacecraft that would be too large for the nose of the launch vehicle, whereas placing them across the length would not.) The concept also involved rotating the focal plane rather than the camera.
119

Wheelon next consulted Land, who preferred Perkin-Elmer’s design to Itek’s. According to McMillan, Land was supportive because he was not a systems engineer but a scientist who “liked nothing more than an innovative, clever device.” The twister “just knocked him off his chair.” Mc- Cone then put up $10 million–$30 million of agency money to keep the project going.
120

In mid-July, McMillan made one last effort to slow down FULCRUM, sending Vance and Raborn a report in which he asked for a deferred review of progress. McMillan reported to Vance that the original S-2 system still appeared to be the most promising approach, adding that he proposed to select either Itek or Eastman-Kodak to develop an alternate camera configuration.
121

The reaction from Raborn was similar to the reactions of McCone, Carter, and Wheelon to comparable proposals on similar occasions in the
past. First, he politely protested McMillan’s apparent intention of unilaterally selecting a specific search system for development. Then he invoked the pending Land panel report as reason for not rushing to judgment. Finally, he made the point that only he and Vance could make the final decision on any specific search system.
122

Vance had earlier cautioned McMillan to proceed cautiously in making program commitments to Itek, but McMillan, who was convinced that the S-2 system was by far the best prospect, had continued to invest in it. Since the Land panel had proposed no solution, only further study, Raborn suggested that McMillan had exceeded the authority entrusted to him.
123

According to an NRO history, failure of the Land panel to make a choice was a disappointment for the NRO and McMillan. They had “hoped for selection of some system other than [FULCRUM], a development that would tend to choke off the CIA’s involvement in the creation of new satellite systems.”
124

As a result of the August 1965 agreement, the CIA was given responsibility for managing the development of the new search system. But in September, a McMahon memorandum charged that McMillan had indicated that Itek had been selected to build the new search system, despite the fact that the competition was still ongoing.
125

Perkin-Elmer ultimately won the competition, probably because of the coverage provided. The criteria for evaluation were written by McMillan’s successor as NRO director, Al Flax, and the scan angle received high priority. Its optical bar system provided horizon-to-horizon coverage, even though it was not used a majority of the time because the resolution was, as Itek had warned, severely degraded at the extremes. Normally, the camera scanned 30 degrees to either side rather than 60 degrees. The system was intended to yield resolution of three feet at the nadir (when the target was directly underneath) but produced no better than six feet at the extremes.
126

Other books

Assassin by Kodi Wolf
A Kind Of Wild Justice by Hilary Bonner
The Chair by Michael Ziegler
More Than a Memory by Marie James
Wild in the Moonlight by Jennifer Greene
Midnight in Austenland by Shannon Hale
Taming the Demon by Doranna Durgin
Cure by Belinda Frisch
Lightning People by Christopher Bollen