Triumph and Tragedy (The Second World War) (31 page)

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operations against Japan. The United States had given us the most handsome assistance in the fight against Germany. It was only to be expected that the British Empire in return would give the United States all the help in their power towards defeating Japan.

After the meeting I telegraphed home:
Prime Minister to

13 Sept. 44

Deputy

Prime

Minister and War

Cabinet

The Conference has opened in a blaze of friendship.

The Staffs are in almost complete agreement already.

There is to be no weakening of Alexander’s army till
Kesselring has bolted beyond the Alps or been
destroyed. We are to have all the landing-craft in the
Mediterranean to work up in the Northern Adriatic in
any amphibious plan which can be made for Istria,
Trieste, etc.

2. The idea of our going to Vienna, if the war lasts
long enough and if other people do not get there first, is
fully accepted here.

3. After their work in the Adriatic the landing-craft will
of course be free to go on to the Bay of Bengal, or
farther, as circumstances may require.

I was also able to reassure our commanders in the Mediterranean.

Prime Minister to

13 Sept. 44

General Wilson and

General Alexander

Everything has opened here very well so far as your
affairs are concerned. There is to be no weakening of

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Alexander’s army till after Kesselring is disposed of,
which our Intelligence indicates as probable.

2. Moreover, Admiral King is not making any claims
on the landing-craft in the Mediterranean, and the
Americans are quite ready to agree that as many as
necessary of these should be used for any amphibious
work in the Northern Adriatic that may be found
practicable.

3. Pray therefore address yourselves to this greatly
improved situation in a spirit of audacious enterprise.

The Americans talk without any hesitation of our
pushing on to Vienna, if the war lasts long enough. I am
greatly relieved at the reception all our ideas have met
here. We must turn these advantages to the best
account.

During the days which followed I had a number of conversations with the President and his advisers. I had been surprised to find when I arrived at Quebec that the President was accompanied by Mr. Morgenthau, the Secretary of the United States Treasury, though neither the Secretary of State nor Harry Hopkins was present. But I was glad to see Morgenthau, as we were anxious to discuss financial arrangements between our two countries for the period between the conquest of Germany and the defeat of the Japanese. The President and his Secretary of the Treasury were however much more concerned about the treatment of Germany after the war. They felt very strongly that military strength rested on industrial strength.

We had seen during the nineteen thirties how easy it was for a highly industrialised Germany to arm herself and threaten her neighbours, and they asserted that there was no need for so much manufacturing in a country as large as Germany, which could to all intents and purposes feed herself. The United Kingdom had lost so many overseas

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investments that she could only pay her way when peace came by greatly increasing her exports, so that for economic as well as military reasons we ought to restrict German industry and encourage German agriculture. At first I violently opposed this idea. But the President, with Mr.

Morgenthau — from whom we had much to ask — were so insistent that in the end we agreed to consider it.

The so-called Morgenthau Plan, which I had not time to examine in detail, seems to have carried these ideas to an ultra-logical conclusion. Even if it had been practicable I do not think it would have been right to depress Germany’s standard of life in such a way; but at that time, when German militarism based on German industry had done such appalling damage to Europe, it did not seem unfair to agree that her manufacturing capacity need not be revived beyond what was needed to give her the same standards of life as her neighbours. All this was of course subject to the full consideration of the War Cabinet, and in the event, with my full accord, the idea of “pastoralizing” Germany did not survive.

We held our last meeting at midday on Saturday, September 16. The Combined Chiefs of Staff had now completed their final report to the President and myself, and at Mr. Roosevelt’s request Admiral Leahy read it out to us paragraph by paragraph. The principal passages were as follows:

9. The Supreme Commander’s broad intention is to
press on with all speed to destroy the German armed
forces and occupy the heart of Germany. He considers
his best opportunity of defeating the enemy in the West
lies in striking at the Ruhr and Saar, since he is
convinced that the enemy will concentrate the

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remainder of his available forces in the defence of
these essential areas. The first operation will be to
break the Siegfried Line and seize crossings over the
Rhine. In doing this his main effort will be on the left. He
will then prepare logistically and otherwise for a deep
thrust into Germany.

10. We have approved General Eisenhower’s
proposals and drawn his attention
(a) to the advantages of the northern line of
approach into Germany, as opposed to the southern,
and(b)to the necessity for the opening up of the northwest ports, particularly Antwerp and Rotterdam, before
bad weather sets in.

I had no quarrel with these broad intentions, but the reader will remember the doubts which I had voiced to the British Chiefs of Staff during our voyage across the Atlantic about the imminence of Germany’s defeat. I had also written a paper in this sense which will be printed in a later chapter.

Rundstedt’s counter-stroke was still to come, and the crossing of the Rhine was not to be achieved for more than another six months.

The military recommendations about Italy were as follows:
11. We have examined a report by General Wilson
on operations within his theatre. In so far as the battle
in Italy is concerned, he considers that operations will
develop in one of two ways:

(a) Either Kesselring’s forces will be routed, in which
case it should be possible to undertake a rapid
regrouping and a pursuit towards the Ljubljana Gap
(and across the Alps through the Brenner Pass),
leaving a small force to clear up Northwest Italy; or
(b)Kesselring’s army will succeed in effecting an
orderly withdrawal, in which event it does not seem
possible that we can do more than clear the Lombardy
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plains this year. Difficult terrain and severe weather in
the Alps during winter would prevent another major
offensive until the spring of 1945.

The report continued as follows:

12. We have agreed:

(a) That no major units should be withdrawn from
Italy until the outcome of General Alexander’s present
offensive is known.

(b)That the desirability of withdrawing formations of
the United States Fifth Army should be reconsidered in
the light of the results of General Alexander’s present
offensive and of a German withdrawal in Northern Italy,
and in the light of the views of General Eisenhower.

(c)To inform General Wilson that if he wishes to
retain for use in the Istrian peninsula the amphibious lift
at present in the Mediterranean he should submit his
plan to the Combined Chiefs of Staff as soon as
possible, and not later than October 10. We have
instructed the Supreme Allied Commander accordingly.

Here I had to beware of bargains. No major units to be withdrawn until we knew the result of Alexander’s offensive; so far, so good. But how far was the offensive to be pushed? If he was only to be allowed to go to the Rimini line, for instance, then the proposal was quite unacceptable. I accordingly said I presumed he would be allowed to invade and dominate the valley of the Po, and I was much relieved when Marshall and Leahy agreed that this was what they meant.

I then thanked Admiral King for promising to lend us his landing-craft for an attack on the Istrian peninsula. The Admiral stressed that they would also be wanted for the assault on Rangoon, and we must therefore make up our minds about invading Istria by October 15.