Triumph and Tragedy (The Second World War) (33 page)

The policy for future operations in Southeast Asia was again under review at this time, and, after consultation with his Commanders-in-Chief, Admiral Somerville, General Giffard, and Air Chief Marshal Peirse, Mountbatten came to London to explain his plans. He was already committed to a Triumph and Tragedy

203

land advance into Central Burma, which was to continue until the Fourteenth Army was across the Chindwin and had joined hands with Stilwell’s forces coming from the north.

But with his ever-lengthening line of communications and the limited number of supply aircraft on which he so greatly depended it was doubtful whether he could advance from Mandalay as far as Rangoon. He therefore proposed to carry out the large-scale amphibious attack on Rangoon mentioned in the last chapter and given the code-name

“Dracula.” Once firmly established there, his troops could thrust northward and meet the Fourteenth Army. This was an excellent idea, but it demanded many more troops and much more shipping than Mountbatten possessed. They could only be found from Northwest Europe.

My view on this and its variants are given in a minute written at Quebec.

WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Prime Minister to

12 Sept. 44

General Ismay, for

C.O.S. Committee

The British share in this war may take the form
either of direct participation in particular United States
enterprises in the Far East or of British diversionary
enterprises on a major scale calculated to wear down
the enemy forces by land and air, and also to regain
British possessions conquered by the Japanese. Of the
two I favour the latter, because:
(a) It is nearly always a sound policy to engage the
largest number of the enemy as closely and continuously as possible, at the earliest moment and for the
longest time.

(b) This can best be achieved by a direct thrust
across the short-haul of the Bay of Bengal, aimed at

“Dracula” [Rangoon], “Culverin” [Sumatra], or other
attainable preliminary objectives.

Triumph and Tragedy

204

(c) A great diminution of the forces engaged with the
enemy results from lengthening the communications. A
gush has to be poured into the pipe-line at one end to
produce only a trickle at the other, so great is the
leakage as the route lengthens.

2. It follows, for the above reasons, that I am
opposed to sending any British troops to join the
Australians and New Zealanders under General
MacArthur. The contribution would be both petty and
tardy. On the other hand, I do not object to supporting
General MacArthur with a British Naval Task Force,
including carriers, or with R.A.F. squadrons, provided
that the detachment of these does not weaken our
major operations across the Bay of Bengal.

3. Admiral Leahy informed me yesterday that it had
been decided to accept the British offer to send our
Fleet to participate in the main operations against
Japan. It would not be inconsistent with this policy to
make a detachment from it for the purpose of
sustaining General MacArthur’s operations.

4. To sum up, our policy should be to give naval
assistance on the largest scale to the main American
operations, but to keep our own thrust for Rangoon as
a preliminary operation, or one of the preliminary
operations, to a major attack upon Singapore. Here is
the supreme British objective in the whole of the Indian
and Far Eastern theatres. It is the only prize that will
restore British prestige in this region, and in pursuing it
we render the maximum aid to the United States
operations by engaging the largest numbers of the
enemy in the most intense degree possible and at the
earliest moment.

In our discussions at Quebec we had carried the Americans with us on the Rangoon plan. This promised many advantages. Six months’ fighting in the hills and jungles of Burma and on the frontier of India was estimated to have cost the British and Imperial forces 288,000 losses from sickness alone, but a seaborne stroke against Rangoon and a northward advance would cut the enemy’s Triumph and Tragedy

205

communications and divide his forces. The destruction of the Japanese in Burma would liberate a considerable army, which could immediately attack such targets across the Bay of Bengal as might be considered to be most beneficial to the common cause, the wearing down of Japanese troops, and above all air forces. For this purpose we had resolved to strain every nerve to attack Rangoon by March 15, 1945.

It was thought that five or six divisions would be needed for such an operation, but Mountbatten could only supply two or three and not more than one could be spared from the United Kingdom. Failure meant not only needless sacrifices through prolonging in Burma operations ravaged by disease but the setback of our whole further deployment against the Malay peninsula and beyond until 1946.

Thus the solution, I had suggested, was to send one or two United States divisions to Burma instead of Europe. This was better than taking two divisions from Montgomery’s army which were actually fighting, and would bring more troops rapidly into action against Japan without withdrawing any of those who were engaged against Germany. I explained at Quebec that I did not want a decision there and then, but only that the United States Chiefs of Staff should examine my suggestions. This General Marshall agreed to do, but for various reasons my proposals were not adopted. The sanguine hopes, which I had not shared, that Germany would collapse before the end of the year failed. At the end of September it was obvious that German resistance would continue into and beyond the winter, and Mountbatten was instructed, not for the first time, that he must do what he could with what he had got. I telegraphed accordingly:

Prime

Minister

to

5 Oct. 44

Admiral Mountbatten

Triumph and Tragedy

206

The Defence Committee have been forced to the
conclusion that March “Dracula” [Rangoon] is off, and
Chiefs of Staff have made this proposal to United
States Chiefs of Staff. You will receive official
instructions in due course. Meanwhile you should know
that the postponement of the operation is due to the
working of far larger forces in the Western theatre
rather than to any attitude which you or S.E.A.C. have
adopted. You have now to address yourself to the
problem of bringing “Dracula” [the attack on Rangoon]

on in November [1945]. I am very sorry indeed that we
have not been able to carry out this operation, on which
I had set my heart, but the German resistance both in
France and Italy has turned out to be far more
formidable than we had hoped. We must clean them
out first.

All this time our Fourteenth and Stilwell’s Armies had been forging slowly ahead. The 5th Indian Division captured Tiddim on October 18, and with the help of concentrated pinpoint bombing soon cleared the enemy from the dominating 8000-foot Kennedy Peak. Thence they fought on towards Kalemyo. The XXXIIId Corps, after taking Tamu, sent an East African brigade eastward. It established a valuable bridgehead across the river Chindwin at Sittaung. The rest of the 11th East African Division went south along the Kabaw valley towards Kalemyo, which they entered hand-in-hand with the 5th Indian Division on November 14. This was a remarkable march against great physical difficulties through an area notorious for malaria and scrub-typhus. The good hygiene discipline now practised by all our units in Burma, the use of the new drug Mepacrine, and constant spraying with D.D.T. insecticide, kept the sick rate admirably low. But the Japanese were not versed in these precautions and died in hundreds. From Kalemyo the East Africans pushed on to Kalewa and

Triumph and Tragedy

207

crossed the Chindwin. Here the engineers built a bridge nearly four hundred yards long in twenty-eight working hours, not the least of their many achievements throughout the campaign. Thus on the central front in early December General Slim’s Fourteenth Army, with two bridgeheads across the Chindwin, was poised for his main advance into the central plain of Burma.

Changes among the senior United States officers took place in November. General Stilwell was recalled by Washington. His widespread, multifarious duties were taken over by three others. General Wedemeyer succeeded him as military adviser to Chiang Kai-shek, General Wheeler became Deputy to Mountbatten, and General Sultan took over the Northern Front. Here the Allied forces slowly threw back the two divisions of the Japanese Thirty-third Army. By mid-November Bhamo was closely invested, but held out stubbornly for a further month. The 36th British Division took Indaw on December 10. Six days later they made contact there with the 19th Indian Division, which had crossed the Chindwin at the Sittaung bridgehead and thrust eastward. So at last, after more than a year of hard endeavour, marked by many ups and downs, the two Allied armies joined hands.

But formidable administrative problems lay ahead. Far away in Southeast China, some months before, the Japanese had begun an advance on Chungking, the Generalissimo’s capital, and Kunming, the delivery point of the American supply air-lift. In November General Wedemeyer took a serious view of this situation. Already the forward bases of the U.S. Air Force in China, which had been operating against enemy coastwise shipping, were Triumph and Tragedy

208

being overrun. The Chinese troops gave little promise, and Wedemeyer appealed for two of the Chinese divisions in North Burma, and also for more American air squadrons, in particular for three transport squadrons.

The President addressed me.

President

Roosevelt

1 Dec. 44

to Prime Minister

A telegram has been received from General
Wedemeyer outlining the gravity of the situation in
China and stating that he concurs in the decision of the
Generalissimo to transfer the two best trained divisions
of Chinese troops from Burma to the Kunming area.

You have undoubtedly seen this message, which went
to Mountbatten and has been furnished to your Mission
here in Washington, so I shall not repeat it.

We have General Wedemeyer’s view on the ground
as to the gravity of the situation, along with his
knowledge of the situation and the plans for operations
in Burma. I feel that he is better informed as to the
general situation and requirements than any other
individual at this moment. Furthermore, we are faced by
the fact that the Generalissimo, in a grave crisis which
threatens the existence of China, has decided that he
must recall these two divisions in order to check the
Japanese drive on Kunming. It would avail us nothing
to open a land-line to China if the Japanese seized the
Kunming terminal for air and ground. Under the
circumstances I therefore am of the opinion that we are
not in a position to bring pressure on the Generalissimo
to alter his decision.

These were hard tidings, but we had no choice but to accept.

Prime

Minister