Triumph and Tragedy (The Second World War) (30 page)

On the morning of Wednesday, September 13, we held our first plenary meeting. With me were Brooke, Portal, Cunningham, Dill, Ismay, and Major-General Laycock, who had succeeded Mountbatten as Chief of Combined Operations. The President had with him Leahy, Marshall, King, and Arnold. But this time, alas, there was no Harry Hopkins. He had sent me a telegram just before I left England: “Although I am now feeling much better, I still must take things easy, and I therefore feel that I should not run the risk of a setback in health by attempting to fight the Battle of Quebec on the Plains of Abraham, where better men than I have been killed.” I was not then aware of the change in the character of his relationship with the President, but I was sure that he would be sorely missed.

Mr. Roosevelt asked me to open the discussion. I thereupon made a general survey of the war which I had prepared on the voyage. Since our meeting in Cairo the affairs of the United Nations had taken a revolutionary turn for the better. Everything we had touched had turned to gold, and during the last seven weeks there had been an unbroken run of military success. The manner in which the situation had developed since the Teheran Conference gave the impression of remarkable design and precision of execution. First there had been the Anzio landing, and then on the day before the launching of “Overlord” we had captured Rome. This seemed the most perfect timing. I congratulated the United States Chiefs of Staff on the gratifying results of “Dragoon.” It seemed that eighty or ninety thousand prisoners had already been captured, and the southern and western parts of France were being systematically cleared of the enemy. Future historians Triumph and Tragedy

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would surely say that since Teheran our Allied war machine had worked with extraordinary efficiency.

I was also glad to record that although the British Empire had now entered the sixth year of the war it was still keeping its position, with a total population, including the Dominions and Colonies, of only seventy million white people. Our effort in Europe, measured by divisions in the field, was about equal to that of the United States. This was as it should be, and I was proud that we could claim equal partnership with our great Ally. Our strength had now reached its peak, whereas our Ally’s was ever increasing.

There was complete confidence in General Eisenhower, and his relations with General Montgomery were of the best, as were those between General Montgomery and General Bradley. The part played by General Bedell Smith in directing and cementing the staffs was of the highest order. An efficient integrated American-British Staff machine had been built up, and the battle was being brilliantly exploited.

In Italy General Alexander had resumed the offensive at the end of August. Since then the Eighth Army had suffered about 8,000 casualties and the Fifth Army about 1,000. The Fifth Army had hitherto not been so heavily engaged, but they were expected to attack that very day. In this theatre there was the most representative British Empire army there had ever been. There were in all sixteen British Empire divisions, namely, eight British, two Canadian, one New Zealand, one South African, and four British-Indian. I explained that I had been anxious lest General Alexander might be short of certain essentials for the vigorous prosecution of his campaign, but I now understood that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had agreed to withdraw nothing from his army until either Kesselring’s troops had been destroyed or were on the run out of Italy.

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General Marshall confirmed this undertaking, and I accordingly emphasised that in that case we should have to look for fresh woods and pastures new. It would never do for our armies to remain idle. I said I had always been attracted by a right-handed movement to give Germany a stab in the Adriatic armpit. Our objective should be Vienna.

If German resistance collapsed we should of course be able to reach the city more quickly and more easily. If not I had given considerable thought to aiding this movement by capturing Istria and occupying. Trieste and Fiume. I had been relieved to learn that the United States Chiefs of Staff were willing to leave in the Mediterranean certain landing-craft now engaged in the attack on the South of France to provide an amphibious lift for such an operation, if this was found desirable and necessary. Another reason for this right-handed movement was the rapid encroachment of the Russians into the Balkan peninsula and the dangerous spread of Soviet influence there.

I then reviewed the campaign in Burma. This had been on a considerable scale; 250,000 men had been engaged, and the fighting for Imphal and Kohima had been extremely bitter. General Stilwell was to be congratulated on his brilliant capture of Myitkyina. We had suffered 40,000 battle casualties and 288,000 sick. Of the sick, happily, the greater proportion recovered and returned to duty. As a result of this campaign the air line to China had been kept open and India made safe from attack. It was estimated that the Japanese had lost 100,000 men. The Burma campaign was the largest land engagement of Japanese forces so far attained.

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In spite of these successes, it was, I continued, most undesirable that the fighting in the Burmese jungles should go on indefinitely. For this reason the British Chiefs of Staff had proposed Operation “Dracula,” the capture of Rangoon.

Difficulties were being experienced in gathering the necessary forces and transporting them to Southeast Asia in time to take Rangoon before the monsoon of 1945. The present situation in Europe, favourable as it was, did not permit a decision being, taken now to withdraw forces.

What we wanted was to keep an option open for as long as possible, and every effort was being directed to this end.

Certain trouble-makers said that we would take no share in the war against Japan once Germany had been defeated.

Far from shirking this task, the British Empire was eager to play the greatest possible part. We had every reason for doing so. Japan was as much the bitter enemy of the British Empire as of the United States. British territory had been captured in battle and grievous losses had been suffered.

The offer I now made was for the British main fleet to take part in the major operations against Japan under United States Supreme Command. We should have available a powerful and well-balanced force. We hoped that by the end of 1945 this would include our newest 15-inch battleships. A fleet train of adequate proportions would be built up, making the warships independent of shore-based resources for considerable periods.

The President intervened to say that the British Fleet was no sooner offered than accepted. In this, though the fact was not mentioned, he overruled Admiral King’s opinion.

I continued that placing a British fleet in the Central Pacific would not prevent us sending a detachment to General MacArthur in the Southwest Pacific if this was desired. We had of course no intention of interfering in any way with his

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command. As a further contribution to the defeat of the enemy, the Royal Air Force would like to take part in the heavy bombardment of Japan. A bomber force of no mean size could be made available, and would feel honoured to share with their American colleagues the dangers of striking at the heart of the enemy. As for land forces, when Germany had been beaten we should probably be able to send six divisions from Europe to the East, and perhaps six more later on. In Southeast Asia we had sixteen divisions, which might ultimately be drawn upon. I had always advocated an advance across the Bay of Bengal and operations to recover Singapore, the loss of which had been a grievous and shameful blow to British prestige and must be avenged. There was nothing cast-iron in these ideas. First we should capture Rangoon and then survey the situation. If a better plan could be evolved it should certainly not be ruled out in advance. Our key word should be to engage the largest number of our own forces against the largest number of the enemy at the earliest possible moment.

The President thanked me for this review, and said it was a matter of profound satisfaction that at each succeeding Conference between the Americans and the British there had been ever-increasing solidarity of outlook and identity of basic thought. Added to this there had always been an atmosphere of cordiality and friendship. Our fortunes had prospered, but it was still not quite possible to forecast when the war with Germany would end. It was clear that the Germans were withdrawing from the Balkans, and it seemed likely that in Italy they would retire to the Alps. The Russians were on the edge of Hungary. The Germans had shown themselves good at staging withdrawals, and had Triumph and Tragedy

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been able to save many men, although they had lost much material. If Alexander’s battle went well we should reach the Piave reasonably soon. All forces in Italy should be engaged to the maximum intensity. In the West it seemed probable that the Germans would retire behind the Rhine.

Its right bank would be the western rampart of their defense and would present a formidable obstacle. We should have to attack them either from the east or from the west, and our plans must therefore be flexible. The Germans could not yet be counted out. One more big battle would have to be fought, and our operations against Japan would to some extent depend on what happened in Europe.

The President agreed that we should not remain in Burma any longer than was necessary to clean up the Japanese in that theatre. The American plan was to regain the Philippines and to dominate the mainland of Japan from there or Formosa, and from bridgeheads which would be seized in China. If forces could be established on the mainland of China, China could be saved. American experience had been that the “end run” method paid a handsome dividend. Rabaul was an example of this by-passing technique which had brought considerable success at small cost of life. Would it not be possible, he asked, to by-pass Singapore by seizing an area to the north or east of it, such as Bangkok? He said that he had not hitherto been greatly attracted to the Sumatra plan, but now the operation had acquired greater merit.

I said that all these projects were being examined and would be put in order. No decision could be reached until after we had taken Rangoon. It should not be overlooked that Stalin had volunteered a solemn undertaking at Teheran that Russia would enter the war against Japan the day that Hitler was beaten. There was no reason to doubt that Stalin would be as good as his word. The Russians Triumph and Tragedy

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undoubtedly had great ambitions in the East. If Hitler was beaten by, say, January, and Japan was confronted with the three most powerful nations in the world, she would undoubtedly think twice about continuing the fight.

I then cast back to make sure where we stood, and asked for a definite undertaking about employing the British Fleet in the main operations against Japan.

“I should like,” said the President, “to see the British Fleet wherever and whenever possible.”

Admiral King said that a paper had been prepared for the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and the question was being actively studied.

“The offer of the British Fleet has been made,” I repeated.

“Is it accepted?”

“Yes,” said Mr. Roosevelt.

“Will you also let the British Air Force take part in the main operations?”

Here it was much more difficult to get a direct answer.

Marshall said that General Arnold and he were trying to see how to use the greatest number of aircraft they could. “Not so long ago,” he explained, “we were crying out for planes.

Now we have a glut. If you are going to be heavily engaged in Southeast Asia and Malaya, won’t you need most of your Air Force? Or is Portal’s plan to bomb Japan something quite separate?”

“Quite separate,” answered Portal. “If our Lancaster bombers are refuelled in the air they can go nearly as far as your B.29s.”

I said that for the sake of good relations, on which so much depended in the future, it was of vital importance that the British should be given their fair share in the main