Under the Bloody Flag (28 page)

For the Spanish, the spread of English raiding into the Pacific starkly demonstrated the dangers to colonial commerce and settlement from small-scale provincial adventurers, who seemed to be capable of promoting piratical ventures with little check from the regime. Oxenham informed the Spanish that ‘no licence or permission of anybody was necessary, for these and more can depart out of England without there being required more licence than their will to go’.
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However, Oxenham’s voyage came at a time when English depredation in the Caribbean was losing momentum. In part this was the result of the inherent dangers and difficulties of transatlantic plunder. These grew progressively worse as Spain improved its defence of the isthmus region, helped by the failure of the English alliance with the cimaroons to develop. At the same time an unfavourable political and diplomatic environment in England weakened support for a direct assault on Spain’s colonial possessions in America, though the Queen’s interest in more indirect and discrete activity was demonstrated by her support for Drake’s voyage of 1577. Furthermore, the seafaring infrastructure appeared to be ill-suited for sustained predatory venturing across the Atlantic, particularly as piracy and sea roving were flourishing in the seas around the British Isles. Most of the piratical ventures into the Caribbean during the 1570s were undertaken by small-scale, marginal operators from provincial bases in the south-west, who were unable or unwilling to bear the hazards of a dangerous and mercenary business.

Nonetheless, this introductory phase of Caribbean piracy was a formative experience for the English, during which traditional tactics, practices and forms of organization were tested under new and challenging conditions. Secrecy, subterfuge and surprise remained essential characteristics of piratical enterprise, though when opportunity arose they could be accompanied by displays of bold theatricality. As ‘becomes their calling’, noted one Spanish official about Drake’s attack on the mule train, ‘they did not arrive by the public entrance’.
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If surprise failed, the raiders would often withdraw, for fear of sustaining heavy casualties. On occasion pirates might herald their arrival with a trumpet call or appear with their faces daubed with charcoal and red dye. Much of their raiding was concentrated in the south-west corner of the Caribbean, around a key strategic and commercial region, though some pirate groups ranged further along the coast of the Main or cruised off the more accessible islands. In small, fast-sailing vessels, and armed with a variety of hand weapons, they raided along coasts, lying in wait around capes and headlands, while reconnoitring river systems with the assistance of local guides. In this way they played a part in the unintended and unrecorded exploration of the Caribbean, the results of which may have been widely shared, becoming part of an oral culture and inheritance that circulated among pirate bands as part of a rudimentary survival kit.

Caribbean depredation rapidly developed its own rhythm and mode of operation that newcomers were able to imitate or adapt. By 1569 French rovers had developed the practice of following fleets from Spain, awaiting an opportunity to pick off stray vessels. Geographical conditions enabled pirate groups to use small offshore islands or secure coastal areas as temporary bases, providing the English with their first real experiences of life in the New World. These habitations developed varying degrees of contact with the cimaroons and to a lesser extent with Indian groups, enabling pirates to develop tactics for raiding on land and at sea during extended stays in the Caribbean.
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In varying ways the pirate invasion of the isthmus region during the early 1570s depended on these cross-cultural relationships. For the cimaroons, whose war against the Spanish included night-time raids on settlements, such as Nombre de Dios, the arrival of the pirates created a potentially powerful force of allies who shared a common purpose in the acquisition of booty. In May 1573 Spanish officials in Panama reported that the cimaroons ‘advertise that they have allied and confederated themselves with the English and French to destroy this realm, a thing not until this year ever seen or imagined’.
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Yet Spanish reports also present a complex picture of relations between the English and the cimaroons which may reflect the uncertainty of short-term relations that were both local and transatlantic in character.

During the early 1570s the Spanish were alarmed that the cimaroons would teach English pirates the ‘methods and means to accomplish any evil design they may wish to carry out and execute’.
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Several years later, as colonial authorities sent out expeditions to attack their settlements, they were equally concerned that the cimaroons were trained by the English in military tactics. Under the leadership of men such as Juan Vaquero or Anton Mandinga, the cimaroons supported pirate groups in exchange for a share of their plunder, including supplies of wine and linen. In some circumstances, as the experience of Drake suggests, groups of cimaroons may have undergone a form of conversion. According to Spanish reports, the group who assisted Oxenham in the attack on the Pearl Islands were instructed in the doctrine of Lutheranism. When one of Oxenham’s men danced about wearing an alb, so delighted were the cimaroons that they uttered ‘I, English; pure Lutheran’.
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But the depth and extent of these conversions were problematic. In addition, the loyalty of the cimaroons to the English was stretched by the successes of Spanish military expeditions during the later 1570s. Many were reported to be unhappy with Mandinga for helping the survivors of Oxenham’s company. By 1579 several cimaroon communities were ready to make peace with the Spanish in exchange for written guarantees of their freedom. As a result Mandinga moved to the north coast to await the English, who he expected to return in greater numbers within two or three years. According to a statement by a cimaroon known as Pedro, ‘a black flag was the signal agreed upon between them, to be made from the sea, that they might be recognized’.
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The use of the black flag, which subsequently became a powerful sign and symbol for pirates, raises intriguing questions about the social organization of English piracy in the Caribbean during these years. Although English pirates and rovers were not part of a deviant sub-culture, of the kind which was to emerge within transatlantic piracy during the second half of the seventeenth century, they did form a loose fraternity, based on similar backgrounds and shared experiences, which was the focus of growing recognition, if not admiration, in England. Within the Caribbean, piracy found expression in adaptable forms and patterns of behaviour which ranged from the pathologically cruel and violent to the humorous and teasing. Such conditions created fertile ground for the emergence of that radical egalitarianism which flourished among later pirate groups and communities, though its development during the 1570s was constrained by the modest scale and extent of piratical activity. While estimates for the number of English pirates operating in the Caribbean must be treated cautiously, particularly as they were part of a broader pattern of depredation which included temporary alliances with other European rovers, at its height it may have involved seven or eight vessels, manned with crews that ranged in number from about thirty to eighty men and boys, giving an overall total of between 210 and 560 recruits.
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In some years the total may have been considerably less.

Many pirates, including leaders such as Drake, were young men from seafaring backgrounds. A significant proportion probably came from the maritime communities of south-west England, including Plymouth and Bristol and their wider hinterlands, though pirate companies undoubtedly were complemented by migratory recruits whose residence was either casual or temporary in nature. During his examination by Spanish officials, Oxenham admitted that his company of fifty Englishmen included ‘many youths and seamen, and second class seamen not fit for war’.
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Of the company of seventy-three men and boys who left Plymouth with Drake in May 1572, the eldest was aged fifty, the rest were under thirty.

Although the crews of pirate ships seem to have been predominantly English in origin, they included a handful of recruits from more diverse backgrounds. Among Andrew Barker’s company there were at least three Frenchmen, in addition to a Dutchman and Philip, a Welshman. One of Oxenham’s leading officers was an Irishman, John Butler, known as Chalona to the Spanish, who had lengthy experience of living in the Indies which enabled him to serve as an interpreter for the expedition. Among Oxenham’s company Chalona was described by a Spanish official as the ‘principal corsair of all, and the one, it is understood, who induced them to come to these parts, and led them into the bush’.
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Spanish reports indicate that Chalona spoke with a Portuguese accent, possibly to conceal his real identity.

Little is known of recruitment to pirate ships, or the terms and conditions under which recruits served. Oxenham stated that he bought a vessel, ‘and with his men he came to an understanding and signed them on for the voyage’, though he failed to elaborate on its nature. Drake’s company of 1572 were described as ‘all voluntarily assembled … [and] richly furnished, with victualles and apparel for a whole yeare’.
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As was customary among pirates or privateers sailing in European waters, these men served for a share in the plunder taken during the course of the voyage rather than for a wage. It was this prospect, of sharing in a rich prize laden with gold, silver, pearls and other valuable commodities, which lured young men into the Caribbean, despite the dangers of disease or death at the hands of the Spanish.

Evidence for the operation of this system is provided by the papers of Captain Barker, which were seized by the Spanish. They included several sheets described as a true note of all the gold, silver and jewels that were shared among the company.
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Individual rewards were based on an allocation of shares. Accordingly, the captain and master were allotted eight and seven shares, the officers and surgeons were allocated four, the ordinary sailors were granted two or three, while the two boys were to receive a half-share each. A company of soldiers were awarded individual shares ranging from one to four.

The division of the plunder was undertaken by five representatives of the company, made up of the quartermasters and one of the boatswains, who were nominated or elected for that purpose. This system managed to present an image of cooperation and community, among a group of men who shared the dangers and rewards of the voyage, while reaffirming the traditional hierarchy of shipboard life. But the division of booty could be the source of festering suspicion and discontent. It may have been a serious issue among Barker’s crew, contributing to the mutiny off La Guanaja in 1577. After the captain’s death, a gold chain was found in his chest which was divided among the surviving members of the crew. In one of the earliest recorded notices of a practice that was to become commonplace among pirate crews operating in the Caribbean, Barker’s company also made provision for the allocation of shares for members of the company who died during the voyage.
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Although the practice of dividing plunder along an agreed or recognized system of shares was partly intended to promote harmony among unruly, potentially uncontrollable, groups of aggressive young men, it was possibly underpinned by popular and radical, though ultimately self-serving attitudes towards property and wealth. According to Spanish evidence, during the course of Oxenham’s raid on the Pearl Islands some of the company found a child’s school book which was read out by Chalona, enabling him to reinterpret one of the Ten Commandments in a revealing manner. Thus when ‘he came to the commandment: Thou shalt not steal, he laughed loudly at it, and said that all goods were common property; and all of them laughed and jeered at the commandments and remarked that one was missing, for there should be eleven commandments’.
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But the vision of good fellowship and commonalty, which the social organization of piracy was partly intended to promote, was difficult to realize in the Caribbean. Later accounts might portray the pirates, especially Drake and his men, as a community of gallants, but their conduct and lack of self-regulation points more towards a fraternity of angry and aggressive youths and young men, whose hatred of Catholicism and hostility towards Spain served to justify intimidation, terror and gratuitous violence. This was an ill-disciplined, irregular force that was difficult to control. During 1572 Drake faced mutterings of discontent against his leadership, though he was prepared to consult with his men, even to the extent of constructing a building for that purpose.
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Other pirate leaders faced more overt challenges to their authority and leadership. Even during this early stage of English transatlantic piracy, therefore, it appeared to contain the seeds of its own fragmentation and dissolution.

By the later 1570s it seemed to some observers that the Spanish were winning the war against piracy in the Caribbean. According to Lopez Vaz the provision of two galleys along the coast of the Main had an almost immediate effect on improving the defence of the region, with the seizure of six or seven French ships during their first year of service. Once ‘this was knowen’, indeed, ‘there were no more Englishmen or Frenchmen of warre that durst adventure to approach the coast’, until Drake returned under very different conditions in 1586.
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The challenge of overseas privateering and piracy

The faltering development of English depredation in the Caribbean contrasted with the underlying strength of piracy and other forms of plunder across the Atlantic, though a subtle shift in focus appears to have been in progress during the mid-1570s. In the face of repeated provocation, the spoil of English shipping by foreign privateers or pirates became a serious problem, arousing widespread anger which did little to weaken support for localized piracy or sea roving, particularly by adventurers who portrayed their activities as unofficial retaliation or reprisals against overseas attack. At the same time the growing practice of English adventurers serving with foreign commissions or men-of-war presented the regime with a potentially dangerous and divisive problem.