Under the Bloody Flag (24 page)

77.
  I.A. Wright (ed.),
Spanish Documents concerning English Voyages to the Caribbean 1527
–
1568
(Hakluyt Society, Second Series, 57, 1929), pp. 78, 82, 117–8, 121.

78.
  Ibid., pp. 119, 123, 127;
CSPS 1568
–
79
, pp. 1, 68;
NAW
, II, pp. 406, 567–8.

79.
  The bullion was owned by Genoese bankers. P. Croft, ‘“The State of the World is Marvellously Changed”: England, Spain and Europe, 1558–1604’ in S. Doran and G. Richardson (eds.),
Tudor England and its Neighbours
(Basingstoke, 2005), pp. 183–5.

80.
  McDermott,
Frobisher
, pp. 70–2; R.G. Marsden, ‘The Early Career of Sir Martin Frobisher’,
EHR
, 21 (1906), pp. 538–44;
CSPD 1547
–
80
, pp. 273–4.

81.
  
CSPS 1568
–
79
, pp. 79, 82–3; Andrews, ‘Expansion of English Privateering and Piracy’, pp. 205–10; J. Marx,
Pirates and Privateers of the Caribbean
(Malabar, Fl., 1992), pp. 61 ff.

82.
  
CSPS 1568
–
79
, pp. 83–4, 88, 94–5; B. Dietz, ‘The Huguenot and English Corsairs during the Third Civil War in France, 1568 to 1570’,
Proceedings of the Huguenot Society of London
, 19 (1952–58), pp. 278–94.

83.
  
CSPS 1568
–
79
, pp. 73, 75, 99–104;
Tudor Proclamations
, II, pp. 301–5; Williamson,
Hawkins
, pp. 218–20, 225–6.

84.
  He claimed that booty valued at 200,000 ducats was taken by pirates,
CSPS 1568
–
79
, pp. 107, 135–7.

85.
  
Tudor Proclamations
, II, pp. 313–5.

86.
  
Tudor Proclamations,
II, pp. 315–6. Plundering under French commissions continued, HCA 14/9, nos. 22, 137–8. 176.

87.
  
CSPS 1568
–
79
, pp. 107, 112, 135–9, 154–6, 176.

88.
  
CSPS 1568
–
79
, pp. 188, 201, 212–3, 232; Dietz, ‘Huguenot and English Corsairs’, pp. 287–90.

89.
  
CSPS 1568
–
79
, pp. 218, 230–1, 234, 240;
CSPV 1558
–
80
, pp. 444–7.

90.
  
CSPS 1568
–
79
, pp. 216, 219–20.

The international crisis of the late 1560s and early 1570s led to a dramatic and widespread increase in maritime disorder and lawlessness. Conditions in the Low Countries, France and England turned the Channel into a dangerous and violent frontier haunted by privateers, pirates and men-of-war of varied nationality. The attention of these rovers was focused heavily on Spanish, Flemish and French Catholic targets. At times the predators were organized into mixed fleets of Protestant rovers, operating between La Rochelle, Plymouth and the coast of Flanders. The breakdown in Anglo-Spanish relations enabled English adventurers to play a prominent part in an undeclared war on the trade and shipping of the subjects of Philip II, while also offering safe havens to Dutch and French men-of-war. Although the restoration of diplomatic relations during 1573 may have reduced the international tension, and contributed to a lessening in organized plunder in the Channel, it was followed by an upsurge in local and indiscriminate piracy. Within this context, English depredation spread across the Atlantic and into the Caribbean. But the expansion of piratical enterprise also exposed structural weaknesses in deep-sea plunder. The pirate invasion of the Spanish Caribbean was difficult to sustain, particularly at a time of improving Anglo-Spanish relations. By the mid-1570s, indeed, organized piracy and plunder may have been showing signs of decline, in the face of the increasing presence in local waters of foreign men-of-war, many of which were manned with English recruits. This latter practice, which the regime tried unsuccessfully to prohibit, suggests that the decline in activity was more apparent than real. It was certainly short lived, as the subsequent revival of piracy, sea roving and privateering demonstrated.

Crisis in the Channel: piracy and privateering during the early 1570s

The collapse of Anglo-Spanish relations during the late 1560s and early 1570s, and the commercial embargoes in the Iberian Peninsula and in Flanders, were accompanied by an upsurge in piracy and plunder. English depredation contributed to a wider crisis at sea, which was the consequence of rebellion, insurrection and religious conflict in France and the Low Countries. As rulers and rebel leaders resorted to the issue of letters of reprisal or marque against their enemies, the Channel and its approaches became the scene for confusing conflicts involving private men-of-war and trading vessels, in which the legal distinction between legitimate and illegitimate forms of plunder was in danger of collapse.

Despite the instability and chaotic conditions at sea, it is possible to distinguish between several different strands of depredation during these years. Local piratical activity, opportunistic and sometimes amateurish in character, remained a problem as demonstrated by nagging complaints to the council. Although widespread, it was irregular and random in occurrence, and occasionally confused with the illegal arrest of overseas shipping in English ports. Alongside it, more organized and structured venturing continued to develop under the leadership of captains, for whom sea roving was increasingly an occupation. In addition there was a resumption of legally authorized depredation or privateering, but it was limited in scale and volume. Although the Queen was concerned to ensure that English merchants were compensated for the arrest of their goods in the Low Countries, issuing a proclamation in June 1570 that invited claims for losses, there was no general issue of letters of reprisal by the High Court of Admiralty. Commissions seem to have been awarded in a discriminating manner, with some concern for their potential consequences, though this did not prevent their wider circulation, through sale or auction to groups of potential bidders. At the same time, a growing number of captains and adventurers served with French or Dutch privateering fleets, under the guise of commissions issued by Protestant rebel leaders, such as William of Orange or the Queen of Navarre. For the English this provided a veneer of legitimacy for the spoil of Spanish, Flemish and French shipping.
¹

The assembly of a multinational privateering force in the Channel, which had radical implications for English depredation, was the most striking development of these confusing years. It was made up of mixed groups of Huguenot adventurers, Dutch rebels and their English sympathisers. As such it served the interests of a diverse range of seaborne predators, whose motives and methods varied. The Spanish ambassador in London, de Spes, angrily dismissed them as corsairs or pirates. He came close also to portraying England as a rogue nation which openly supported and sponsored robbery at sea.
²
Yet these pan-Protestant groups of privateers could not be lightly discounted, particularly as they were strongly identified with the common cause of Protestantism and liberty in many parts of northern Europe.

This hybrid force of men-of-war, privateers and pirates amounted to an impressive array of shipping. In January 1570 de Spes reported that the corsairs had sixteen strong and well-equipped vessels which were divided into two squadrons or fleets. By June the number had more than doubled, amounting to between forty and forty-five vessels. In October there were fourteen or fifteen ships sailing in the Channel under the Prince of Orange’s colours, with a similar number from La Rochelle. The following year, in April 1571, the Spanish ambassador reported that there were twenty pirate ships cruising near Dover, of which seven were described as large, well-armed vessels. In April 1572 Dutch rovers, defiantly assuming the name of sea beggars, had a fleet of twenty-six ships at sea, though most were evidently small vessels. During January 1573 twenty-two vessels from La Rochelle were reported to be sailing along the south coast of England. Although many of the Dutch and French had outworn their welcome in England, in June 1574 de Spes warned that the pirates were preparing to send out a fleet of sixteen small ships from Colchester, while towards the end of the year ten men-of-war from Flushing were at Rye.
³

The vessels that made up these privateering fleets were well suited for coastal and Channel raiding. Most of them were small and nimble craft, though they were complemented by a number of larger vessels. The ships fitted out in Colchester during June 1574 were less than thirty tons’ burden, and described as long and low, with oars as well as sails.
⁴
Tactically, such vessels depended on surprise, manoeuvrability and weight of numbers rather than on tonnage or weight of ordnance. The guns they carried were intended to disable enemy shipping, allowing large companies of boarders to seize and spoil their prey. Consequently, they were heavily manned with recruits of Dutch, French, English and other backgrounds. According to de Spes the sixteen ships which were at the Isle of Wight in June 1570 were poor vessels, but they were well manned with English and French rogues. Each of the forty or so warships which infested the Channel during these months reportedly included between twelve and fifteen Englishmen among their companies. Although English recruits or volunteers were ordered ashore by the Queen during August, because her own ships were short of men, in the following month de Spes claimed that there were still 200 Englishmen serving with the corsairs. They were, he insisted, ‘men of inferior class’, who were reinforced by a steady stream of ‘mean knaves’ from the Low Countries.
⁵

Despite the difficulties in maintaining the cohesion of an irregular force of voluntary warships, superficially this group of privateers developed an impressive degree of organization. In December de Spes informed Philip II of discussions to make William of Orange’s brother, Ludovic of Nassau, the ‘head of the pirates’, commanding a fleet of thirty-five vessels which was capable of ranging the Atlantic and the Caribbean.
⁶
Six months later, in June 1571, the Dutch leader allegedly ordered all the privateers to gather at La Rochelle under Ludovic’s command, on pain of death. In reality, however, it was difficult to maintain the organization of such a heterogeneous group of maritime adventurers.

While Spanish perceptions that the rebel leader, William of Orange, was the guiding hand that organized Dutch privateers may be overdrawn, nonetheless he played an important role in commissioning and directing their activities. His agents in English ports issued commissions in his name, as well as supplying shipping and provisions for the rebel cause. In June 1570 one of Orange’s servants was at Rye to facilitate the fitting out of two vessels as men-of-war. For the French a similar role was undertaken by Odet de Coligny, Cardinal Châtillon, whose brother, Gaspard, was one of the Huguenot leaders and Admiral of France, and a leading sponsor of French colonial ventures in Brazil during the 1550s and in Florida in the 1560s. Châtillon was a frequent visitor to England during the early 1570s, while some of his servants took up temporary residence, to promote the Huguenot cause. In 1570 his secretary was in the Isle of Wight, collecting a levy on prizes brought in by Huguenot men-of-war.
⁷

The activities of the privateers benefited from the support and connivance of local officials, and sympathetic naval and mercantile interests, including John Hawkins and his brother, William. The response to the presence of Dutch and French men-of-war in English waters was heavily influenced by the growth of hostility towards Spain, which was mixed with self-interest regarding their potential strategic value. During February 1570 Châtillon was reported to have presented a proposal to the council ‘by which, without cost to themselves but to their profit, they might become masters of the Channel’. The following month the council was also reportedly involved in discussions concerning the despatch of a force of men-of-war to intercept the Spanish fleet returning from the Indies. By June 1570 Antonio de Gueras was convinced that Elizabeth intended to use the corsairs to make war on Spain. At the same time, Philip II was informed that the Queen depended on the privateers to patrol her coasts; with their protection, Elizabeth claimed ‘that she had no need of other defence’.
⁸

The resort of the privateering fleets to English havens encouraged discussion relating to the seaborne defence of the Protestant cause, which included aggressive schemes for the plunder of the Spanish in the Atlantic and the Caribbean. During the summer of 1570 de Spes kept Philip II regularly informed about Hawkins’ plans to lead an expedition to the Indies, with the assistance of a Portuguese pilot, reputedly of great knowledge and experience. The pilot, Bartolome Bayon, was involved in talks with members of the council ‘about the project which was discussed here before, to occupy and colonize one or two ports in the kingdom of Magallanes, in order to have in their hands the commerce of the southern sea, and that of Guinea and the coast of Africa, as well as getting as near as they wish to Peru’.
⁹
Little came of these discussions, but they underlined the potential relationship between seaborne plunder and piracy with aggressive commercial expansion which was to emerge during the 1580s and 1590s.

Spanish reports suggest that Hawkins was planning to join forces with a French fleet which had already departed for Florida. In August 1570 de Spes informed Philip II that Hawkins had twelve vessels prepared for the sea, as retaliation for former losses and injuries. According to the ambassador’s Portuguese informant, Hawkins did not intend to ‘colonize the Indies, although most of the pirates may stay there’. Instead, he was planning ‘to take possession of the island of San Juan de Ulloa, in order to be the master of the fleets which may come and go’.
¹⁰
Although the plans were abandoned, Hawkins and his naval associates, including William Winter, were involved in promoting Drake’s voyages in the Caribbean during the early 1570s.