Under the Bloody Flag (33 page)

Dartmouth harbour, Devon. Dartmouth had a long-standing interest in seaborne plunder, including piracy and privateering, which persisted throughout the sixteenth century. In 1577 Captain Clarke captured a French ship in the harbour. Nearby, Tor Bay was an important meeting place for large numbers of pirates, especially during the 1570s. (Author’s collection)

An analysis of the plunder taken during these years, though inevitably based on incomplete data, provides some indication of the commercial consequences of persistent, but local, depredation. Collectively, the pirates seized a significant number of trading and fishing vessels. Many of these prizes were small and laden with various commodities which were of limited or modest value. Small French coasting vessels were particularly vulnerable to attack, but most pirates made little distinction in the spoil of foreign ships. During 1577 John Granger of Plymouth seized a French fishing vessel returning from Newfoundland; Hicks plundered several vessels belonging to merchants of the Steelyard in London, as well as a Danish ship which he took in consort with Callice; while Captain Clarke took a French vessel in Dartmouth harbour. In addition, Edward Denny returned to the Isle of Wight with two prizes – one of which was French, the other Spanish – and Gilbert Horseley brought two French hoys laden with coal into Shoreham. Some prizes were of such little value that they appear to have been abandoned by their captors. Two small vessels taken by Phipson were left in the Humber or nearby, where one was salvaged by local watermen, while the other was driven ashore at Kilnsea.
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Most pirates tacitly refrained from plundering English vessels, though this was a practice that was not always adhered to. During August 1577, for example, the council issued orders for the arrest of a ship in Portsmouth harbour, owned by Christopher Andrews and others, on the grounds that its company had spoiled subjects and allies of the Queen, especially the Scots. At a time of uncertain and uneasy Anglo-Scottish relations, the regime was acutely concerned about the spoil of Scottish vessels, particularly as it provoked retaliation, including Scottish attacks on Cornish fishermen in the Irish Sea. While the diplomatic damage might be contained, Scottish victims continued to complain of long and expensive legal suits for the recovery of their property.
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The scale and vigour of local piracy during the later 1570s had far-reaching consequences, apart from the disruption and damage to commerce. While piratical venturing served as a safety valve for organized violence and aggression, especially among young men from seafaring backgrounds, it also strengthened the recruiting ground for deep-sea depredation. The companies of captains like Callice and Hicks provided the human resources for the oceanic expansion of English piracy and spoil. But the underlying links between these different forms of plunder served to complicate the official response to seaborne robbery and commercial warfare. The survival of Callice, as well as the re-emergence of Drake, demonstrated an ambivalent attitude towards piracy and sea roving, which deepened as it became more focused on Spain.

The commissions for piracy during the later 1570s

The regime responded vigorously to the growing threat of local piracy during the later 1570s, but with mixed success. A patchwork of agencies were involved in dealing with the problem, creating a multi-layered structure, though it was weakened by conflicts of interest between rival jurisdictions and the unreliability of local officials. The Lord Admiral and the judge of the High Court of Admiralty were closely involved in handling complaints of piracy. But the Queen and her council remained deeply concerned about the spread of piracy and spoil within English waters, not least because of the shadow it cast over royal jurisdiction and honour.

The council was the key agency in responding to complaints and reports of pirate activity. Its surviving registers indicate that these occurred on a weekly, sometimes daily, basis during these years. The result was a rapidly expanding volume of business. At times the council struggled to cope with complaints of piracy, delegating some matters to regional bodies, such as the Council in the Marches of Wales and the Council in the North, or to local corporations and officials. To a considerable degree the effectiveness of the regime’s response to the disorder at sea depended on the cooperation of the latter, which included Vice Admirals and their deputies, acting increasingly in association with officers representing the High Court of Admiralty in London.

Much of the official response continued to be characterized by short-term expediency as the regime sought to deal with two separate, but interrelated, issues concerning the incidence of piracy at sea and the support it received on land. The range of business relating to these matters was reflected in an unrelenting flow of commands, directions and instructions issued by the council during the later 1570s. Directions for sending out one of the Queen’s ships, the
Foresight
, in October 1577 and April 1579, for the suppression of pirates were interspersed with commissions of July 1578 authorizing private adventurers to set forth ships for their apprehension. Commands were issued periodically for the arrest of pirates, and for their speedy trial under commissions of oyer and terminer in Hull, Newcastle and other ports, as well as for the discovery of pirate plunder. Suspected pirates and their supporters, particularly of gentry status, were ordered to appear before the council. On one occasion during May 1578, however, it was so busy with other matters that Roger Puttocke of Fareham, who appeared to answer allegations of buying pirate goods, was dismissed on bond. Letters of assistance of various kinds were circulated for the recovery of captured vessels and cargoes or to support and reinforce the legal process in the High Court of Admiralty.
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The council was especially concerned with complaints from Scotland, issuing a general warrant in August 1577 for the recovery of all Scottish goods brought in by pirates, though it was generally determined to show its regard for overseas grievances. During November it ordered that fines levied on the supporters of pirates were to be used to compensate their victims. On several occasions thereafter the council ordered the payment, out of such fines, of £80 to a Danish merchant; of £260, subsequently increased to £300, to Adam Fullerton, a Scot; and £20 to another Scot whose case was recommended by James VI.
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By various means the council also encouraged or cajoled local officials to discharge their duties. In September 1578 the captain of the Isle of Wight was commended for his efforts in trying to capture Captain Clarke. Although Clarke escaped, at least two men and one boy from his company were taken. Later in the month, however, officials on Guernsey were reprimanded for their evident unwillingness to take action against a group of French pirates. The council was determined that the pirates be ‘proceeded against as public enemies pronounced by civil laws &c’, though such cases of local obduracy often grew out of long-standing and jealously guarded rights and privileges.
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Shortly thereafter, indeed, officials in Queenborough refused to deliver Captain King, arrested on suspicion of piracy, claiming exemption from the jurisdiction of the High Court of Admiralty.

The determination of the regime to repress piracy was underlined by its search for a comprehensive and long-term solution, based on the re-establishment of commissioners for piracy with expanded powers and responsibilities. By comparison with the earlier ineffective commissions of the 1560s, there was greater pressure on officials to take action against pirates, while providing an effective means for the recompense of their victims. Under the supervision of the council these commissions laid down a procedure for community policing and enforcement which, despite evident weaknesses, had wider implications for the consolidation of the authority of the Tudor state, especially in remote and disorderly regions.

During September 1577 the council appointed commissioners in England and Wales with detailed instructions for the suppression of piracy. As during the 1560s these appointments were drawn from the ranks of leading representatives in the maritime counties, including landowners and office holders. As commissioners they were instructed to survey all the havens, creeks and landing places in their regions, and to nominate deputies for each area. The procedure is indicated by practice in Cornwall, where the commissioners, who included Sir John Killigrew, John Arundell and Francis Godolphin, met for the first time on 11 January 1578 when they nominated their deputies, with instructions to appear before them six days later ‘to receave ther charge by othe according to the instructions’.
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They certified the council of the names of thirty-three deputies who were to take charge of various locations along the coast. The deputies were responsible for making presentments to the commissioners, copies of which were to be sent to the council, with details of cases of piracy and other suspicious activity. The commissioners were expected to investigate these matters by examining suspected pirates and their supporters, with the assistance of juries of local men. Officials in Kent informed the council that they had empanelled a jury of ‘the most honeste, sufficient and least suspected persons from all parts of this shyre’.
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The council instructed the commissioners to compile an account of their proceedings. This was to include information regarding the value of the lands and goods of offenders, particularly those who purchased pirate plunder, in order that they could be fined accordingly. The magistrates of Norfolk, for example, were requested to provide a true valuation of the property for ‘every person named to be offenders for causes of pyracye’ who resided in the county.
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In collecting this material the magistrates were forced to rely on constables and other local officers.

At the same time as re-establishing the piracy commissioners, the regime took action to regulate and control the movement of shipping, partly in response to overseas complaints against the plunder and spoil of trade. This included attempts to prevent ships from putting to sea, unless engaged in trade and fishing, without a commission from the Queen or council, signifying that they were sent out either for royal service or for the discovery of new trades. Vice Admirals and piracy commissioners were given extensive powers to supervise shipping, especially vessels suspected of evil intent. They included the authority to prevent the departure of suspicious vessels frequenting ‘any arme of the sea, navigable river, landing places or darke corners of this realme’.
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Collectively, the regime’s actions represented an ambitious and demanding programme for the eradication of piracy. It was a striking affirmation of its determination to tackle a deep-seated problem which had damaging consequences for overseas relations.

The revived campaign against piracy was driven by a combination of domestic and international concerns. In particular, it reflected the concern of the Queen and her council to remain on good terms with France during an unsettled and difficult period in cross-Channel diplomacy. Paulet’s mission to France during 1577 drew attention to the anger and recriminations engendered by piracy and disorderly privateering. In an audience with the French King, Henry III, he complained that the English were ‘robbyd, spoyled and killed on the seas daylie; that they had made sondry and often complaints [but] that no justice was ministered unto them’.
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While the King was sympathetic, attributing the increase in maritime depredation to the ‘malice of this tyme’, he responded with comparable complaints of French merchants and mariners at the ‘wrongs done to them, and … the shorte justice they founde in England’. Paulet piously replied that the English ‘would be ashamed that any pirate or murtherer notoriously knowne should escape unpunished’. Later in the year, during discussions with one of Henry’s ministers, Paulet insisted that the best way of promoting Anglo-French amity was to ‘ponishe with severitie all pirates and robbers on the seas, pestilent enemyes to all comone welthes’. By then the English were deeply angered at the seizure of more than fifty trading vessels on the grounds that they were men-of-war which were trafficking with Huguenot rebels at La Rochelle. Paulet continued to exchange complaints with French ministers, claiming that English losses greatly exceeded those of the French, while asserting that more than 100 ‘restitucions had been made to the Frenche within theise few years, and verie few or none at all made unto us’.
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If there were pressing diplomatic reasons for the firm reaction to piracy by the regime during the later 1570s, the scale and nature of the response suggests that it was also part of a broader campaign against disorder and organized criminality, which was intended to discipline and reform a growing number of men who were in danger of being identified as beggarly outcasts or dangerous outlaws. Although it is difficult to gauge opinion and attitudes, a new tone appeared to be creeping into the social labelling of pirates, as suggested by Paulet’s description of them as pestilent enemies of the commonwealth. While the wider social response to piracy and sea roving remained deeply ambivalent, this changing emphasis appeared to foreshadow the deliberate marginalization of pirates during the later seventeenth century.

Although the regime achieved some success in its attack on piracy, it was uneven and impossible to sustain. Piracy commissioners assembled in many parts of England and Wales in an impressive attempt to fulfil the orders of the council. On paper this seemed to be a model example of the mobilization of unpaid, local officials whose reports and certificates provided the council with a mass of information on piracy, which was unprecedented in its scope and level of detail. In practice, however, the work of the commissioners was heavily qualified and variable in effect.

Delays in the proceedings of commissioners were probably unavoidable, though at times they may have been the result of local indifference or hostility. Officials in Somerset excused their slowness in returning certificates to the council by drawing attention to the sickness and unavailability of several commissioners. In Cornwall officials blamed their apparent lack of diligence on the uncooperative attitude of Sir John Killigrew. Commissioners in Carmarthenshire informed the council during February 1578 that they were too few in number to proceed: one lived forty miles from Carmarthen and was too busy with other matters to attend, while another had gone to London on business. In Hampshire officials also admitted that their delayed proceedings were due to the lack of sufficient commissioners. In Gloucestershire, too, the commissioners warned that they were too few in number to proceed, and consequently there was a marked delay in responding to the council.
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