Under the Bloody Flag (8 page)

As a result of such arrangements the maritime conflict was characterized by an uneasy partnership between the regime and private enterprise. But the results were striking. In November 1544 the council reported that during the year the ports of the south-west had between twelve and sixteen ships-of-war at sea, which seized prizes worth at least £10,000. At the same time, adventurers in Rye had three or four vessels at sea ‘and gained much by it’.
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John Stow subsequently reported that 300 French prizes were taken during 1544. It seemed, therefore, that for a modest investment, the business of plunder was capable of yielding a profitable return.

The reliance on private enterprise by the state was as much defensive as it was offensive. In part it was intended to meet the twin threat of French and Scottish raiding in English waters. On the one hand, Scottish rovers were a serious menace to trade and fishing along the east coast. On the other hand, the presence of French men-of-war on the coast of Ireland provoked concern that the Bretons ‘will be lords between Brittany and Scotland’, without an adequate defensive force at sea.
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Although the regime managed to shift some of the costs of defence onto the shoulders of private adventurers in the south and south-west, it met with less success in the port towns of the east coast. In November 1544 the council rebuked Newcastle for not sending out vessels to defend its trade. Local leaders claimed that there were insufficient mariners in the port to send out ships; most were either employed in the King’s service or had fled to Norfolk and Suffolk to avoid a recent outbreak of sickness. Prominent northern magnates, such as Francis Talbot, 5
th
Earl of Shrewsbury, were also used to put pressure on port towns to support the war at sea. In response to promptings from Shrewsbury, who served on the Anglo-Scottish border during 1544 and 1545, officials in Hull insisted that most of their principal shipping was unavailable for service. Local merchants and shipowners had ‘been at importunate costs in manning three ships of war’ during the year.
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Two had guarded the north coast until they were driven off by a fleet of Scottish vessels, the third was forced into Dover by bad weather. Nonetheless, the Hull men offered to send out two ships if Shrewsbury granted them a commission to take prizes. Their neighbours in Scarborough agreed to send out two small vessels if they were supplied with guns, powder and shot. Further north, Whitby was in no position to respond to the urgings of Shrewsbury: following the decay of the harbour, local traders and shipowners had sold their vessels.

The proclamation of December 1544 was an attempt to deal with local recalcitrance by authorizing privateering without the need for letters of reprisal. This was a gamble, resting on the effectiveness of self-regulation among promoters, whose overriding concern with prize taking generated potential conflicts of interest in the conduct of the war at sea between their own priorities and the objectives of the regime. The dangers of disorderly activity at sea, by naval officers as much as by private adventurers, were self-evident. The previous year the council had been forced to reprimand a captain in the King’s Navy for stopping friendly vessels at sea. The King’s anger at this practice provoked a sharp letter from the council, with instructions to the captain to behave in such a way ‘as itt might nott appere that his Grace were in hostilitie wyth all the worlde’.
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But the proclamation of 1544 encouraged the growth of maritime disorder, including the spoil of neutral trade and shipping, which led to a storm of diplomatic protest. Within months of its publication, Henry was reported to be so annoyed at the English seizure of Spanish ships that he intended to recall all men-of-war.

Although the growth of privateering drew on the strength of localized piracy, it was shaped by deeper undercurrents which linked predatory overseas commercial expansion with anti-Spanish hostility. Commercial and religious rivalries lent new direction to seaborne depredation, with far-reaching consequences for the development of piracy and privateering. Merchants and shipowners in the provincial ports of the south and south-west played a key role in what was to become a prolonged, intermittent assault on Spanish trade and shipping. The leading figures in this rising tide of organized plunder during the 1540s included William Hawkins of Plymouth and Robert Reneger of Southampton, both of whom had extensive trading interests in the Iberian Peninsula. Hawkins was one of the pioneers of English commercial enterprise in the Atlantic, developing interests in the Brazil and Guinea trades during the 1530s. Reneger was also involved in the Brazil trade. The character of this expansion was inherently aggressive, attracting not just prominent provincial traders but also ambitious adventurers of dubious reputation, such as Thomas Wyndham, who were tempted into the illicit spoil of Iberian shipping during the 1540s. Wyndham was a naval commander with experience of serving aboard private ships-of-war, including one owned by Lord Russell. The anti-Spanish interests of these adventurers were shared by a younger generation of courtiers, particularly Sir Thomas Seymour, who were part of an increasingly powerful group of evangelical, if not Protestant sympathisers.
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Several of Seymour’s captains came to the attention of the council during these years for their attacks on ships belonging to the Emperor’s subjects, Flemish as well as Spanish.

Drake’s Island and Plymouth Sound, Devon. Formerly known as St Nicholas’ Island, it acquired the name of Drake’s Island during the later sixteenth century. The island was fortified in 1549 to defend the port against overseas attack. As well as the link with Drake, Plymouth was the home of the Hawkins family. (Author’s collection)

The prospect of richer Iberian prizes, laden with cargoes of American treasure, lured English raiders into the Atlantic, laying the foundations for the emergence of long-distance plunder. Reneger’s seizure of the
San
Salvador
, off Cape St Vincent, laden with gold, sugar and pearls valued at 19,315 ducats, provoked a crisis in relations with Spain, but it also demonstrated the attraction of this kind of enterprise. On his return to England, Reneger informed the Privy Council of the incident and placed some of the plunder in the Tower of London. In June 1545 the Imperial ambassador in London complained that Reneger, instead of ‘being punished like a pirate, was treated like a hero’. Furthermore, he warned that ‘the English mean to seize everything they meet at sea as French and then refer claimants to the Admiralty’.
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Within weeks Reneger was reported to have seized a French vessel laden with Spanish commodities, returning from the Levant.

Although reports that the King intended to recall privateers and halt the issue of commissions of reprisal were premature, the council tried to limit the danger of indiscriminate plunder by instructing officials in provincial ports, like Bristol, to take bonds of adventurers not to attack the subjects of the Emperor. However, these instructions did little to reduce the volume of complaint to the council from Spanish and Flemish merchants whose vessels continued to be seized by English raiders of varying legality. Early in July 1545 the council issued orders for the release of three Spanish vessels brought into Plymouth by the King’s ships. Later in the month, William Hawkins was imprisoned at the council’s command during the course of a bitterly contested dispute over the ownership of plundered commodities, which were eventually restored to their Spanish owners.
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The problem of disorderly depredation, while showing no sign of abating during 1545, was an inescapable consequence of the conduct of the war at sea. Faced with fighting an expensive conflict on two fronts, the regime was compelled to rely on private adventurers to undertake various duties at sea which were subsidized by the returns from plunder. But the difficulty in implementing this strategy was underlined by the lukewarm, if not indifferent, response from the east-coast ports to the council’s persuasions in 1544. After further negotiations, by February 1545 Shrewsbury informed the council that the port of Hull was prepared to send out six vessels at its own charge. According to Shrewsbury the ships would perform a combination of public and private duties, enabling the Hull men to keep open their trade while frustrating the enemy. Their success might also encourage others. Indeed, within a few weeks officials in Newcastle indicated that they were willing to send out two ships.
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Though these arrangements were intended to alleviate the pressure on the King’s Navy, the main priority of private adventurers was profit. During April and May 1545 ships of Hull seized neutral vessels from the Low Countries and elsewhere on the grounds that they were carrying Scottish cargoes. John Dove, one of the leading adventurers in Hull, plundered several vessels from Pomerania and Denmark, as well as a Flemish ship reportedly carrying Scottish goods and a passenger bearing letters from the Pope. Several weeks later a vessel of Bremen was forced into Newcastle by bad weather, where it was plundered of provisions and tackling by John Iven of Hull. The plunder amounted to less than £10 in total, but it included a range of useful accessories such as an anchor and cable; a compass and lead line; eight bow staves, five axes and a sword; ten hats and two caps; four pairs of shoes and one pair of boots; a doublet and a pair of hose. Yet the actions of men-of-war along the east coast failed to contain the spread of Scottish depredation. By April 1545 Scottish privateers, who were using bases in Normandy and Brittany, were reported to have taken plunder from the English, valued at between 30,000 and 40,000 crowns.
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In a further attempt to encourage and organize private enterprise at sea, the King issued a proclamation in April 1545, appointing ‘John of Calais’ as the captain of ‘Ships of Marque’, with the power to levy recruits on both sides of the Channel ‘as shall offer themselves to serve at their own adventure’.
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Soldiers, servants and apprentices were ineligible for service without a special licence from their masters or captains. But the proclamation had a limited impact. Shortly after its publication the Lord Deputy of Ireland, Sir Anthony St Leger, informed the council that John Hill seized two French prizes off the Irish coast; however, like many others he seems to have been operating independently of government control, though he was seeking a commission to levy men and provisions. His request was supported by St Leger whose brother, Robert, had a ship furnished for war which he intended to send out in consort with Hill.
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The uneasy relationship between the early Tudor regime and private adventurers encouraged the growth of aggressive spoil at sea, blurring the distinction between legal and illegal plunder. At the same time it contained inherent weaknesses which were demonstrated during the crisis of July 1545, when a French naval force sailed into the Solent after raiding Portsmouth and the Isle of Wight. The regime struggled throughout the summer to assemble a fleet off Portsmouth. Orders were sent to the ports of the south-west recalling adventurers from the sea and for a press of all mariners, but they met with a tardy response. A varied force of vessels from the region reached Portsmouth by early August; nonetheless, there were complaints that many had failed to respond to demands from London. Moreover, some of those already at Portsmouth abandoned the service. The Lord Admiral complained that many were ‘wholly given to pillage and robbery’.
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Although the King came under pressure from the council to make peace with France, the war lingered on until June 1546, becoming increasingly disorderly at sea during its closing stages. The seizure of Spanish and Flemish ships persisted, despite the concern of Henry and his diplomatic representatives. Scattered reports and complaints to the council demonstrate the extent of these attacks. Despite the emphasis of such evidence on the unruly and uncontrolled nature of the war at sea, privateering, loosely defined and regulated, was an organized business based on extensive networks of suppliers for the provisioning and fitting out of men-of-war. It was heavily concentrated in the port towns of the south and south-west, and Calais on the other side of the Channel. While provincial shipowners and traders were deeply involved in the business, it attracted the interest of some London merchants as well as officials and courtiers, including the Lord Admiral, John Dudley, Viscount Lisle, who had extensive interests in shipping. Under the shadow of the wars with France and Scotland, the regime had called into being a voluntary force of seaborne predators which it could neither control nor direct effectively.

During 1545 the council instructed privateers to use the Emperor’s subjects in a ‘gentle sort’, but shipping from the Low Countries and Spain continued to bear the brunt of English aggression at sea.
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Throughout the summer the council was forced to intervene in cases of spoil, in response to complaints from Flemish, Iberian and other neutral traders. Early in June it ordered the return of a lading of canvas plundered by Freeman of Calais out of a ship bound for Flanders; later in the month it issued orders for the restoration of the
Mary
of Dunkirk which had been brought into Plymouth. Despite this, and other interventions, the council was unable to stop the seizure of neutral shipping at sea.