Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader: North Korea and the Kim Dynasty (156 page)

Hungarian scholar Balazs Szalontai (“The Dynamic of Repression: The Global Impact of the Stalinist .Model, 1944–1953” [see chap. 4, n. 45]) says that Kim’s purges during this period
’were
“comparable to the attack Stalin had launched on the intra-party opposition in 1926–1928, and even to the Great Terror of 1937, 1938, but its methods proved rather different. First of all, the number of party members expelled between July 1957 and July 1958 did not exceed 4,000, i.e., less than one per cent of the total membership. By contrast, the Soviet
proverka
of 1935 had resulted in the expulsion of 9.1 per cent of party members. On the other hand, the enforced participation of the whole membership in the screening process certainly filled each KWP member with fear and a sense of insecurity. … [P]arty members, assembled in groups, had to practise criticism and self-criticism. If a person proved unable to name two witnesses testifying that he had not been involved in any anti-regime activity since the outbreak of the Korean War, his self-criticism would not be accepted. Since one was prohibited from naming relatives, friends, or acquaintances as his witnesses, the psychological pressure thus created became extremely intense. In the second half of 1958 the regime purged the provincial party committees and People’s Committees, replacing most of their chairmen, and at the end of the year it organized a public trial in each province. The courts usually meted out death sentences (executions
’were
also public), and in some cases the incited audience beat the accused unconscious. The methods … had more in common with .Maoist practices than with Soviet Stalinism. Nevertheless, the events that happened in North Korea between 1957 and 1969 had a logic somewhat similar to that of the Soviet purges of 1926–1938.”

60.
Kim’s official biographer obviously had Khrushchev and company in mind when he wrote scathingly of those communists who “baulked at the struggle against imperialism, and putting principles aside, entered into compromises with it. Spreading illusions about the nature of imperialism, in particular U.S. imperialism, they did everything within their power to dampen the revolution ary struggles of the peoples seeking social and national liberation” (Baik II, p. 485).

61.
See van Ree,
Socialism in One Zone,
pp. 121–122. This sort of attitude can be seen throughout Lim Un’s book,
The Founding of a Dynasty in North Korea—An Authen tic Biography of Kim Il-song,
which is one of the reasons for doubting Bruce Cumings’s suggestion that it is actually a South Korean–produced work.

Suh observes
(Kim Il Sung,
p. 108) that “Soviet-Koreans lost much when the Soviet Union withdrew and did not return to fight for [North] Korea during the Korean War.”

62.
Cumings (Origins I [see chap. 2, n. 25], p. xxv) says that Soviet policy in North Korea “failed to create a docile satellite state . . . because the Soviets sponsored a group of radical nationalists who had cut their teeth in anti-Japanese conflict and who chafed under Soviet controls.”

63.
Kim complained in his memoirs that misguided North Koreans even referred to Ri Su-bok, a communist hero of the Korean War battle to retake Heartbreak Ridge, as “the Korean Matrosov,” a reference to a Soviet war hero (Kim,
With the Century,
vol. 3, p. 333).

In China, Mao Zedong had reached a similar stage of dissatisfaction with the tendency of many of his colleagues to imitate Soviet practice. As his personal physician writes, “[institutional and organizational arrangements were being copied without regard to the special circumstances of China. … It was this disaffection with his own party that would fester for years and grow, leading finally to the catastrophe of the Cultural Revolution” (Dr. Li Zhisui,
The Private Life of Chairman Mao: The Memoirs of Mao’s Personal Physician
[New York: Random House, 1994], pp. 118–119).

64.
October 13, 1945, speech to Five Province Conference, cited by Scalapino and Lee,
Communism in Korea,
p. 330. Judging from pp. 253–254, there may be some question whether the “Comrade Kim” who was speaking was Kim Il-sung, but on p. 330 Scalapino and Lee say this speech is found in a different version in Kim’s selected works, published in 1963. In any case, this was not an isolated example. Scalapino and Lee refer on p. 347 to Kim’s “lengthy and obsequious eulogies of the Russians.”

65.
Van Ree,
Socialism in One Zone,
p. 159.

66.
Nodong Shinmun,
July 2, 1950, as cited by Cumings,
Origins
II, p. 633.

67.
Kim,
With the Century,
vol. 3, p. 333.

68.
Van Ree,
Socialism in One Zone,
p. 165. The author adds, “In the 1945–50 period Soviet radio broadcasts
’were
relayed at least three times a day to North Korea. Soviet news was distributed through the North Korean news agency. In 1947 English was discontinued in all senior middle schools; Russian became a compulsory subject. There was a large influx of Soviet literature and films. From 1946–8 a total of ten million books
’were
published in North Korea. In one of his 1948 speeches Kim Il Sung revealed that after the merger of the parties the Central Committee of the North Korean Workers’ Party published nearly three million books of propaganda and on .Marxism-Leninism, including the translation of Stalin’s notorious history of the Soviet communist party. We can safely assume that of these three million political books a substantial portion
’were
translations from Russian.” Besides, “Moscow had a strong—an unfriendly observer would say strangling—economic leverage in the form of its quasi-monopoly on Pyongyang’s foreign trade.”

69.
Van Ree,
Socialism in One Zone,
p. 168.

70.
A typical account in a 1976
Nodong Shinmun
(Workers’ Daily) article by Yi Chan-gol says, “The great leader Comrade Kim Il-sung issued orders to all commanders and soldiers of the Korean People’s Revolutionary Army to defeat the Japanese imperialists.” This force then “delivered the decisive blow to the Japanese Kwantung Army” in Manchuria before moving to Korea, where it “finally defeated the Japanese completely and liberated the whole country” (quoted in Lim Un,
Founding of a Dynasty,
p. 109).

An official biography is slightly more generous to the Russians: “On August 8, 1945, the Soviet Union finally declared war on Japan. General Kim Il-sung, who had already completed his operational plan for the final decisive offensives against Japan, immediately ordered the mobilization of all units under the Korean People’s Revolutionary Army. … In the face of the strong attack by the
Korean People’s Revolutionary Army and the Soviet Army Japan’s ‘impregnable defense line’ guarding the border collapsed like a wall of clay and the main forces of the Kwantung Army so proud of its might,
’were
completely crushed” (Baik I [see chap. 4, n. 25], pp. 529–530).

71.
Seiler (p.
46)
cites an August 26, 1991, interview article in
JoongAng Ilbo,
a leading Seoul daily, in which the Soviet occupation chief, Maj. Gen. Nikolai Lebe-dev, recalled that Kim had asked him directly, “Commander, sir, please make it so that it appears as though the anti-Japanese partisans participated in the war of liberation.” Lebedev declined.

72.
Hwang Jang-yop,
Problems of Human Rights (1)
(see chap. 2, n. 1).

73.
Suh,
Kim Il Sung,
p. 104. He adds, “They claim that it was Kim who returned triumphantly and founded the Communist republic of the North. These assertions deserve no refutation.”

74.
“If, in North Korea, one
’were
to say that ‘Korea was liberated from the yoke of Japanese imperialism by the Soviet Russian army’ the reaction would be most curious to observe,” Lim Un
’wrote
in his 1982 book. “Those between their teens and 30s in age will give a confident answer that it is propaganda of imperialists and the domineering class. It is a malicious lie … . Korea was liberated by the People’s Revolutionary Army led by comrade Kim Il-song. Those Koreans in their 40’s and 50s will say that from the memory of our childhood, we think the Soviet army liberated Korea. But in looking back upon those days, they will say meekly that they thought the Korean People’s Revolutionary Army liberated the fatherland. Those above the age of 50 would not give any answer. For them silence is the only answer, as if to agree with the statement that Korea was liberated by the Soviet army” (Lim Un,
Founding of a Dynasty,
p. 265).

75.
Suh reports that Pyongyang museum curators literally cropped the likeness of Kim’s Chinese superior from a photograph showing Kim with guerrillas
(Kim Il Sung,
pp. 8–10).

76.
Hankuk Ilbo,
November
4,
1990.

77.
Hankuk Ilbo,
November 20 and 26, 1990.

78.
Hankuk Ilbo,
November 29, 1990.

79.
Kim Il-sung, “On Eliminating Dogmatism and Formalism and Establishing
Juche
in Ideological Work,” December 28, 1955, quoted in Baik II, p. 479. According to the scholar who served as Kim’s ideology secretary from 1958 to 1965, before the Korean War the
’word juche
“did not even exist. The North Korean leaders started using that word during the purging of pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese people from the party, and ‘Juche ideology’ became an established phrase only in the 1960s” (Hwang Jang-yop,
The Problems of Human Rights [1]).

80.
Kim Il Sung.
Selected Works,
vol. 1, p. 36, quoted in Bruce G. Cumings, “Kim’s Korean Communism,”
Problems of Communism
(March-April 1974), p. 36, cited in Foster-Carter, “Development and Self Reliance,” p. 75.

81.
“In postwar economic construction we must follow the line of giving priority to the rehabilitation and development of heavy industry, while simultaneously developing light industry and agriculture,” as Kim put it (Baik II, p. 431). Baik says (pp. 432–433) that it was possible to carry out this “bold and original basic line” because of “the revolutionary ideas and seasoned guidance of Comrade Kim Il Sung, the great Leader of the 40 million Korean people, peerless patriot, national hero, ever-victorious, iron-willed brilliant commander.”

82.
Quoted in Baik II, p. 558.

83.
Ibid., pp. 554–555.

84.
I interviewed Shin and Ahn, separately, in Seoul in August 1996.

85.
Baik II, p. 560.

86.
Ibid., pp. 477–481, 517–523.

87.
Some foreign analysts believed for a time that Kim had made the right choice. For example, Aidan Foster-Carter (“Development and Self Reliance,” pp. 77–78) praised Kim for “a difficult decision to chart a course not previously mapped out by any other country. In that sense his far-sightedness can be said to be a major cause of the DPRK’s subsequent remarkable development.” As evidence piled up that Pyongyang’s economic policies had become counterproductive, Foster-Carter revised his opinion drastically to become a leading critic of those policies. He acknowledged the error of his former ways far more forth-rightly than was the case with some other analysts who had started out in the same camp. A blurb introducing his contributions to the Web
site
A
sia Times Online (www.atimes.com/atimes/about.html)
noted with a touch of self-deprecating humor that Foster-Carter had “followed Korean affairs for over 30 years, starting (embarrassingly) as a young fan of Kim Il-sung.”

(Full disclosure: Although I would not by any means have described myself as a fan of Kim’s, I acknowledge having been pretty impressed [see chap. 9] by what the Great Leader, to a 1979 first-time North Korea visitor, appeared to have wrought with the economy.)

88.
Kim Jong-min, a former high-ranking official of North Korea’s .Ministry of Public Security, said when interviewed by a South Korean magazine in 1991 that he still considered it “quite an impressive accomplishment that Kim Il-sung has been able to silence the mouths of the North Korean people, people who ordinarily would have much to say.” Emphasizing
juche
was the key to this, since “even among Orientals the pride of the Korean people is extraordinary ” he said. “Kim used this psychology in his politics in creating juche. Kim Il-sung skillfully uses the nationalistic self-reliant consciousness of the Korean people” (Cho Gap-jae, “Interview of Former High-level Official of DPRK Ministry of Public Security Who Defected to South Korea,”
Wolgan Choson
[July 1991]: pp. 290–303; translation courtesy of Sydney A. Seiler). The article referred to the former official using a pseudonym, Choe Sang-kyu. In a later interview with me, Kim Jong-min confirmed that he was “Choe” and said that he had been quoted correctly in the
Wolgan Choson
interview. He gave me permission to attribute that material to him using his real name. I also have permission from
Wolgan Choson
interviewer Cho to identify his interview subject as Kim Jong-min.

89.
“The defeated U.S. imperialists continue to squat in South Korea, sharpening their tusks. But the heroic Korean people under the leadership of Comrade Kim Il Sung, the ever-victorious iron-willed brilliant commander, will not let them live on. It is complete defeat that is waiting for U.S. imperialism in Korea” (Baik II, p. 417).

90.
It is open to question how much the atomic threat frightened China, in particular. As we have seen, Mao Zedong had already decided it was unlikely the United States would dare to use nuclear weapons against either China or North Korea. Mao’s personal physician writes that it was apparent “as early as October 1954, from a meeting with India’s Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, that Mao considered the atom bomb a ‘paper tiger’ and that he was willing that
China lose millions of people in order to emerge victorious against the so-called imperialists. ‘The atom bomb is nothing to be afraid of,’ Mao told Nehru. ‘China has many people. They cannot be bombed out of existence’ ” (Dr. Li Zhisui,
Private Life of Chairman Mao,
p. 125).