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Authors: David Hilfiker,Marian Wright Edelman
Urban Injustice: How Ghettos Happen (13 page)
BOOK: Urban Injustice: How Ghettos Happen
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As many affluent left urban areas, cities lost more political power. The “New Federalism” of the Reagan and first George Bush administrations sharply cut direct federal aid to the cities. By 1980, federal assistance came to 18 percent of urban budgets; by 1990, it accounted for only 6.4 percent.
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During the 1980s, as federal and state governments were reducing their contributions to urban areas, the cities were hit with the explosion of crack cocaine addiction and its associated violence, the AIDS epidemic and the public health costs that went with it, and the growing problem of homelessness. As a result of their troubled status and the tax-cutting mood of the country, most city governments were forced to adopt austerity budgets. Since other government functions like road maintenance or trash pickup require a relatively constant level of funding, and still other functions like police protection are unlikely to be cut in a time of social crisis, social welfare budgets suffered disproportionately. Cities were forced to cut social services and other forms of assistance. General relief, housing assistance, local medical assistance (to that majority of the indigent not eligible for Medicaid), child protection, and other social service programs were decimated.
State and local governments often chose to reduce spending by tightening eligibility requirements. Most benefits had previously been given to people on the basis of need alone. If you were poor enough, you received benefits. During the 1970s, states and cities began restricting eligibility to those considered “unemployable.” Although the definition of “unemployable” varied from locale to locale, the restrictions generally meant that childless, able-bodied adults were no longer eligible for help. It did not matter whether or not there were appropriate job openings available. Those who were physically capable of working were denied benefits even if they looked for and could not find work. Local governments also changed eligibility regulations to exclude those who were unable to work because of alcoholism or drug addiction. Once again, government charged itself with discriminating between the “deserving” and the “undeserving” poor. Hundreds of thousands of people lost their eligibility, and benefits for most others declined.
The federal government also took an active role in the attack on welfare. In 1980, Ronald Reagan was elected president in a campaign that featured fierce anti-welfare rhetoric. He promptly set about trying to dismantle welfare programs. His administration attempted to cut not only AFDC, but also elements of social insurance. A strong negative public reaction, however, immediately precluded significant changes in Social Security or unemployment insurance, a clear example of the political popularity of programs perceived to be “social insurance,” not “public assistance.”
The administration was more successful, however, in cutting into disability insurance, part of the Social Security Act intended for anyone who had been disabled for at least a year. Charging fraud and waste, the administration tightened requirements (a move that required no approval from Congress) and speeded up the mandatory regular review of cases. Of the 400,000 cases “reviewed” in the first year of this accelerated process, almost half were ruled ineligible for further benefits. When those denied had the legal resources to challenge their administrative termination, over half of them had their eligibility reinstated on appeal. The majority of those cut, however, never challenged and simply lost eligibility.
Public assistance programs were even more successfully targeted. By 1983, 300,000 families had lost their eligibility for AFDC, “saving” the government over a billion dollars a year. Eligibility was restricted and benefits reduced for food stamps, school lunch programs,
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Medicaid, extended unemployment benefits, and other programs. The federal housing budget was slashed from $74 billion in 1987 to less than $13 billion in 1989,
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virtually precluding any new housing construction for the poor. Not surprisingly, homelessness soared in the next decade.
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Medicaid, extended unemployment benefits, and other programs. The federal housing budget was slashed from $74 billion in 1987 to less than $13 billion in 1989,
10
virtually precluding any new housing construction for the poor. Not surprisingly, homelessness soared in the next decade.
By 1992, political support for curtailing social welfare programs was bipartisan, and in most places it was political suicide to campaign on the basis of increasing the amount the government spent on programs for poor people. The welfare reform legislation that Congress passed in 1996 was only the capstone on this decades-long process.
Except in certain low-cost-of-living areas in high-benefit states (for example, rural areas of Minnesota), it has never been remotely possible to survive on AFDC or TANF benefits alone. Even adding food stamps does not bring a family anywhere near the official poverty level, not to mention the 150 percent of poverty level that a family really needs to survive. Those receiving government assistance, therefore, have to find other sources of income.
How do they do it?
Most of us get only anecdotal information about welfare and people who are poor. We ingest the media’s sensationalized stories. We listen to acquaintances who work as police officers, social workers, or other kinds of “street-level bureaucrats” dealing directly with those among the poor having the most difficulty. We ourselves observe men loitering on street corners or young women using food stamps at the grocery store. We don’t pay much attention to statistics or studies. As a result, our perceptions have been systematically distorted in negative ways. Common beliefs about welfare and work reflect these distortions.
We hear much about “welfare-to-work,” as if one were either on welfare
or
working. The common association is between welfare and laziness. Nothing could be further from the truth. Many people on welfare work—they have to in order to live.
or
working. The common association is between welfare and laziness. Nothing could be further from the truth. Many people on welfare work—they have to in order to live.
Before writing
Making Ends Meet
,
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sociologist Kathryn Edin and anthropologist Laura Lein asked 379 welfare mothers from four different cities about their survival strategies.
Making Ends Meet
,
11
sociologist Kathryn Edin and anthropologist Laura Lein asked 379 welfare mothers from four different cities about their survival strategies.
The first jolt to our preconceptions is that these welfare mothers tended to spend less money than poor people with similar incomes who had full-time jobs. In part this was because working mothers have extra expenses like childcare, transportation, and clothing, but even when these expenses were taken into account, welfare mothers apparently lived more frugally. Contrary to myth, they managed their money well. Nevertheless, their total benefits averaged about 60 percent of their expenditures. It should be no surprise, then, that all these welfare families had some other source of income.
These other sources of income fell into three main categories. The first was work. Almost half of the welfare mothers interviewed worked, averaging $276 a month in earnings. Although reporting those earnings to their social worker is legally required, few of them did so, since almost all of their reported earnings would have been subtracted from their welfare checks, leaving them more exhausted and no further ahead financially. Most of the work they did was informal: babysitting, yard work for friends, or working for a small business that would pay in cash under the table. Only a small minority (about 8 percent) worked in the underground or illegal economy, chiefly at prostitution or drug selling.
Their second major source of income was friends and relatives, including boyfriends and the fathers of their children, whether they lived in the house or not. Almost four out of five welfare recipients received such support from their personal networks, although, for the same reasons, most did not report this income. From the women’s stories, however, these contributions were hardly “free money.” These mothers had to provide something in exchange for what they received: time and energy in maintaining relationships, free babysitting, house cleaning. Boyfriends who provided money received room and board in exchange.
The third source of extra income was local charity. In most cases, this was not considered a desirable source because few charities could offer much. Going from one to the other and meeting various requirements, only to receive a grab bag of groceries or some second-hand clothes, ate up time and energy.
The take-home lesson Edin and Lein offered was that virtually all welfare mothers “work” in many senses of the word: they do extra jobs, maintain the networks that support them, visit charities, and continually strive to meet the bureaucratic requirements necessary to stay on AFDC or TANF itself.
As if to prove the point about how deeply embedded our misconceptions are, a front-page article in the
Washington Post
quoted extensively from Edin and Lein’s research, but managed to look past the reality that the women interviewed
had
to find some other source of income in order to survive. It looked past their industry and resourcefulness and past the fact that they are not lazy to make a darker and more ominous point: these women were committing welfare fraud!
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Washington Post
quoted extensively from Edin and Lein’s research, but managed to look past the reality that the women interviewed
had
to find some other source of income in order to survive. It looked past their industry and resourcefulness and past the fact that they are not lazy to make a darker and more ominous point: these women were committing welfare fraud!
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Most people agree that welfare needed reforming. Because AFDC was a federally funded but state-run program, benefits varied wildly from state to state, ranging from 12 percent to 55 percent of the poverty level for a family of three, making it not only an inadequate but also an inequitable program. In addition, AFDC contained perverse anti-work and anti-marriage incentives. Essentially all work income was deducted from benefits, and mothers going to work also lost Medicaid and childcare benefits, making it almost impossible to transition from welfare to work. Since a marriage partner’s income would be deducted from benefits, it was better to keep the relationship informal and not get married. AFDC needed change and improvement. It certainly got change.
Despite his rhetoric, President Reagan had only limited success in limiting “welfare,” that is, the AFDC program. It took a Democratic president, who had campaigned on a promise to “end welfare as we know it,” to eliminate the entitlement that had existed since the Depression. President Bill Clinton joined with a Republican Congress in 1996 to pass the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), popularly known as “Welfare Reform,” to change almost every aspect of federal and state public assistance.
The best-known and most controversial part of PRWORA rescinded the AFDC program and replaced it with Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grants to the states. This change converted welfare from an
entitlement
that paid cash benefits to all needy parents who met income restrictions into a combined cash benefit/work program whose benefits were contingent upon meeting work or work-preparation requirements. Open-ended federal funding to the states was replaced with block grants—fixed amounts determined by AFDC funding levels for 1994-1995 that could also be used for other purposes—thereby giving states a financial incentive to lower welfare caseloads. Most important, however, no matter how little income families had, they no longer had an entitlement to assistance. Government no longer required itself to help even destitute families.
entitlement
that paid cash benefits to all needy parents who met income restrictions into a combined cash benefit/work program whose benefits were contingent upon meeting work or work-preparation requirements. Open-ended federal funding to the states was replaced with block grants—fixed amounts determined by AFDC funding levels for 1994-1995 that could also be used for other purposes—thereby giving states a financial incentive to lower welfare caseloads. Most important, however, no matter how little income families had, they no longer had an entitlement to assistance. Government no longer required itself to help even destitute families.
Aside from the fixed funding (which is not indexed to inflation) through block grants, there are several major differences between TANF and AFDC. The first is “work supports.” Under TANF, states now have far more discretion than under AFDC to spend funds for purposes other than cash assistance. The block grants can fund transportation, wage subsidies, pregnancy prevention programs, childcare, and state earned income tax credits to support participants in their “transition to work.” For example, in an effort to “make work pay,” some states now allow welfare recipients to keep more of their earnings, thus making work more attractive. States are encouraged to innovate and create new approaches. Like AFDC, TANF is a combined federal/state program. In order to qualify for full funding, states must continue to spend from their own coffers at least 75 percent of what they spent under AFDC.
Mandated work requirements are a major part of the legislation. Cash assistance is designed to be temporary, and recipients must transition “from welfare to work.” States must sanction recipients who fail to meet state work requirements by reducing or eliminating their cash benefits and, sometimes, their food stamps. The federal government will reduce the block grants of states that fail to move enough recipients into jobs.
Time limits are also important signals to the states that recipients are to be moved off the rolls. In almost all instances, states are prohibited from using federal funds to give cash assistance to an individual for more than sixty months in her lifetime. States have the option of setting time limits as short as twenty-four months. Again, states are penalized through reductions in funding if appropriate numbers of people receiving cash assistance are not off the rolls soon enough. The states’ freedom to individualize their programs under the broad guidelines of the legislation does not extend to modification of this basic goal: to get people off welfare (not, it must be noted, out of poverty).
Next to TANF, the most controversial provisions in the PRWORA legislation were those that sharply restricted benefits for immigrants. The 1996 legislation essentially eliminated cash assistance, food stamps, Medicaid, SSI disability, and other benefits for almost 90 percent of immigrants. Congress modified the immigrant provisions in 1997 to restore some benefits to disabled immigrants who had arrived before 1996. In May 2002 the Farm Bill reinstated food stamp benefits for adult legal immigrants who have lived in the United States for at least five years, with no minimum residency requirement for their children or the disabled. Otherwise, until they become citizens, legal immigrants (including children) arriving after 1996 have no access to government assistance—for example, SSI or Medicaid—regardless of need.
BOOK: Urban Injustice: How Ghettos Happen
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