Wellington’s Engineers: Military Engineering on the Peninsular War 1808-1814 (18 page)

There was real confusion both at the time and amongst later writers about which plan was being followed. The plan Wellington wrote up was not that proposed by Fletcher. The plan implemented was not that proposed by Fletcher either, but was much closer to it. The engineers believed they were working to a plan that Beresford would not let them implement fully, after he had approved it. Their frustration comes through clearly in several of their letters.

The resources required were not available, either in terms of guns or siege materials. The siege train was too small and ineffective. Although thirty-two guns were available for the siege, only thirteen of these made it into the batteries. Five guns
⁷⁷
opened against San Christobal on 11 May, four of which were damaged the same day and were not replaced before the siege was raised, although a new battery for four guns was started. The eight guns for the attacks on the two outworks on the south side were too far away to cause any significant damage. During the whole siege there were only five siege guns firing to make a breach from 7 a.m. to around noon on 11 May. The stores in terms of tools, shot and powder were insufficient and had to be shipped in from Lisbon. Even the reduced stores ordered from Lisbon did not arrive until the 12th.

There were too many delays in starting the siege. It appears that the decision to besiege Badajoz had developed a level of momentum and rather than stop it, each problem just delayed the start, with no-one re-evaluating the costs and benefits of continuing with the siege. Most of the delays were not the fault of the engineers. These included the problems with the bridging across the Guadiana, getting the stores to Badajoz and getting the agreement of the Spanish commanders to Wellington’s operational plan. The loss of a week between 24 April and 1 May, due to the river rising, was the last in a series of delays that severely affected the plan to attack Badajoz. Wellington’s correspondence shows that the deciding factor for starting the siege was the agreement of the Spanish commanders to his memorandum. Beresford did not want to commit to starting the siege until he knew he would have their full support. Neither Oman, Fortescue or later historians pick up on this.

Beresford knew on 10 May that Soult was advancing to relieve Badajoz. He was in a difficult situation. There was no way that there would be sufficient time to complete the siege before Soult arrived. But if Soult was just making a demonstration, or decided that his force was not strong enough and retired, Beresford would be criticised for raising the siege too early.

The engineers all wanted to start the attack on the castle on 9 May, but Beresford would not allow them. From the 11th, Beresford was trying to protect the siege materials and conduct the siege at the same time. The result was that neither was done successfully. The siege was half-hearted in its application and many stores had to be destroyed when the siege was raised. A better strategy would probably have been to suspend the siege and keep a tight blockade around Badajoz until Soult’s intentions were clear and then restart with all the materials and resources immediately at hand. In the end there was no way that the siege could have succeeded. There were only five days between the investment of the fortress and the raising the siege. It was impossible to take the fortress in that time. It should be remembered that the French took forty-two days to take Badajoz and that was through surrender. It would have taken them longer to take the fortress by storm.

One impact of the first siege of Badajoz was the effect it had on Beresford’s reputation. There was a growing lack of confidence in his leadership that had started with the action at Campo Mayor. Gordon, Wellington’s ADC, had very little good to say about Beresford before they rode down to sort out the problems. Squire described the leadership as all ‘doubt and indecision’.
⁷⁸
Boutflower, the surgeon of the 40th Foot, complained that they were ‘victims of some shameful mismanagement’.
⁷⁹
Following the Battle of Albuera, there were many more officers complaining about Beresford’s leadership.

The first siege resulted in nearly 750 casualties with no visible benefit, although the bulk of the casualties were caused by the reckless pursuit of the French sortie on 10 May. Of the twenty-one engineers present, two were killed and three wounded, all in the attack on San Christobal.
⁸⁰
The troops were despondent, and after the bloodbath at Albuera they were to come straight back to Badajoz to try again.

The engineers played no part in the battle, being employed removing or destroying the siege stores. Fletcher, who was at Jerumenha on the morning of 16 May, heard of the battle and rode with Rice Jones, arriving after the battle was over. The two of them spent an uncomfortable night out in the open and waited the next day with Beresford to see what Soult intended to do next. On the 18th Rice Jones followed the retreating French with the Allied advance guard and was used as a messenger between the Spanish cavalry and Beresford. Realising that Soult was indeed retreating, Beresford ordered Hamilton’s Portuguese division and Madden’s cavalry brigade to re-invest Badajoz. That night the engineer officers retired to Olivenza and ‘procured good quarters’, their thoughts going back to the challenge of besieging Badajoz.
⁸¹
In the period since the siege had been raised Phillipon, the governor, had worked hard to make repairs. He also ordered the soil to be removed from the area where the batteries would be sited for any subsequent attack on San Christobal.

The Second Siege of Badajoz

Wellington arrived at Elvas on 19 May 1811, having ridden from the north after defeating the French under Masséna at Fuentes del Oñoro. While Beresford followed Soult south, he took control of the plans for a second attempt on Badajoz. He ordered Dickson to collect the necessary siege materials. Jones believed that it would take around eleven days to have the guns ready, primarily because the carriages used to transport the siege pieces needed significant repairs after the first siege.
⁸²

It was not until 29 May that the convoy set off from Elvas. During this ten-day delay, Allied reinforcements had also arrived to replace the losses at the Battle of Albuera. The 7th Division arrived on 25 May and re-invested the northern bank of the Guadiana, once again completely cutting off the fortress. General Picton arrived with the 3rd Division on the 27th and took up a position on the southern bank. Wellington was in no doubt that this siege would also have to be conducted against the clock. Although Soult and Masséna had been temporarily repulsed, it quickly became apparent that the French were preparing once again to come to the aid of the fortress. As early as 23 May, Wellington noted the movement of reinforcements to the south which would give the French 50,000 troops to use against him. Whilst the French still held Ciudad Rodrigo to the north, Wellington could not bring enough troops south to face this force. Consequently, when Soult advanced, Wellington would once again be forced to raise the siege unless the fortress could be taken by that time. Fletcher also reported that ‘it seems highly probable that our siege may again be interrupted’.
⁸³

Wellington now considered the plan to be followed for the second attempt, Jones noting that ‘After much consideration, [he] determined … to follow the plan … for the last attack’.
⁸⁴
This infers that the plan that the engineers actually followed for the first siege was known to Wellington, even though it was not documented, as discussed above. The plan was for attacks against the San Christobal and Picurina outworks (which would ultimately become the attack against the castle), with a false attack against the Pardaleras outwork. Some changes were made to the overall plan, to increase the number of guns available, to set up counter-battery fire and to start both attacks simultaneously. There was one major boost to the planning, in that the stores that Wellington had ordered from Lisbon in April 1811, for the first siege, had eventually arrived at Elvas and were now available for use. But there were still not enough tools for the planned activities as 1,000 more picks and shovels were ordered from Lisbon on 22 May.
⁸⁵

The siege train that Dickson put together comprised thirty 24-pounder and four 16-pounder guns, and eight 8in and four 10in howitzers. As before, these were all supplied from Elvas and were of the same age and poor quality as those used previously. To bolster these limited resources, orders were sent to expedite the arrival of the six iron guns that had been ordered from Lisbon around 10 April and also to assign a company of British artillerymen to support the Portuguese artillerymen. Wellington, clearly still had no intention of using the new battering train that was at Lisbon. As early as 14 May, he was arranging for it to be moved north for the planned siege of Ciudad Rodrigo. Fletcher also requested that Beresford assign 250 soldiers to the engineers and that the assistant engineers who volunteered for the first siege would be made available again.

All the officers knew that this was going to be another race against time, Dickson, writing on 29 May, said ‘Reinforcements are on their march from Masséna’s army to the south, so that we must soon take Badajoz, or we probably will be interrupted again’.
⁸⁶
Similarly, Jones’ view was ‘anything to be undertaken against Badajoz, must therefore be of a rapid nature’.
⁸⁷
As with the first siege, collecting men and material together with the limited resources that were immediately available proved time consuming and it was not until 30 May that everything was in place to start the attacks.

Between 30 May and the morning of 3 June, the batteries and trenches were formed for the attacks against San Christobal and the castle. The attack against San Christobal suffered the same problems as before, through the lack of soil and the incessant bombardment from the French. Due to the limited number of workmen available on the south side, the parallel was not as long as proposed and on the night of 31 May 1811 it was decided to prepare the main battery at the end of the current parallel rather than wait a further twenty-four hours for the parallel to be extended nearer to the walls. The decision was made to accept the extra distance for the sake of speed.
⁸⁸
The batteries were completed and opened fire on the morning of 3 June 1811.

There was an impressive increase in the number of guns brought forward. Compared with the first siege, three times the number of guns were available on the morning the firing commenced. On the north side, there were four batteries in action. On the south side all the guns were initially placed in one large battery. Fletcher had written to Wellington on the evening of 3 June, stating that as ‘the guns employed are so uncertain in their effects it may become necessary to push yet further forward’.
⁹²
He told Wellington that he had ordered work to be started that night on the second parallel and a new battery that would bring the range to the castle walls down to 650 yards. This work was completed and seven guns opened fire on the morning of 5 June. Again that night, the parallel was extended further to the right and another battery was started at 520 yards from the castle. This battery opened with three guns on 7 June, and that night the six iron 24-pounders, which had eventually arrived from Lisbon were installed with one other gun, bringing the battery up to ten guns on the morning of the 8th.