What Stalin Knew (44 page)

state frontier and the dramatic increase in Luftwaffe reconnaissance over-

flights could not be ignored. Nevertheless, the interrogations of those ar-

rested during April, May, and June went on. One group consisted of techni-

cal specialists, some of whom were already confessing to having sabotaged

the armaments program of the air forces. The second group was made up

of general officers of the Red Army Air Forces, as well as Colonel General

Shtern, who had headed PVO. Of this latter group, several had served in

the Spanish civil war. Had they remained at liberty, they would have con-

tinued in service and risen higher in rank but would also have been un-

welcome witnesses in any subsequent inquiry into the performance of the

air forces.

As for Proskurov, as of June 18 he still had no assignment. His friend

Prokofev, who was visiting, claims he overheard one side of a telephone

conversation in which Proskurov pleaded with Stalin for a job, any job,

even in Odessa. After he hung up, Proskurov complained that it was ‘‘the

bald one’’ (Timoshenko) who had told Stalin that he was being ‘‘capricious,

disdainfully rejecting numerous offers of appointments.’’34 Unbeknownst

to him, on May 30, 1941, Major General B. P. Belov, chief of the Personnel

Directorate of the Red Army air forces, had sent a top-secret memoran-

dum to Pavel F. Zhigarev, Rychagov’s replacement as chief of Red Army air

forces. The subject was ‘‘The Confirmation of Hero of the Soviet Union

Lieutenant General of Aviation Ivan Iosifovich Proskurov as Chief of the

Air Forces and Chief of the Aviation Department of the Seventh Army.’’ The

memorandum read in part: ‘‘Proskurov was relieved of his position of

assistant chief of the Chief Directorate of Red Army air forces by Order No.

0022–41 of the Defense Commissar because of accidents in the units of

bomber aviation. . . . I consider the employment of Comrade Proskurov as

chief of the air forces of an army, and specifically as chief of the air forces

of the Seventh Army, necessary. . . . I hereby apply for confirmation of

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203

Comrade Proskurov as chief of the air forces and chief of the Aviation

Department of the Seventh Army.’’35 This was apparently the assignment

for which Proskurov had been waiting. It was a demotion, but he had said

he would accept any position, ‘‘even in Odessa.’’ Why then, on June 4, was

Belov deprived of his rank as major general of aviation for ‘‘violating pro-

cedures in the selection of cadres and placing in leadership positions un-

proven and politically doubtful people’’?36 There seems to have been some

confusion about Proskurov’s appointment as head of aviation of the Sev-

enth Army, which at the time was subordinate to the Leningrad Military

District. Was he one of the ‘‘unproven and politically doubtful people’’

whom Belov recommended?

While all these arrests were taking place, Stalin continued to deceive

himself about German intentions and to deprive his country of the very

officers it needed on the eve of the invasion. Meanwhile, Proskurov, appar-

ently unaware of Belov’s fate, heard on June 19 that he was to head the

Seventh Army, then stationed in Petrozavodsk, northeast of Leningrad. He

planned to leave for his new assignment on Sunday evening, June 22.

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C H A P T E R

On the Eve

On Friday, June 20, with rumors of an imminent

German attack growing more persistent, Proskurov decided to visit mili-

tary intelligence headquarters and get the facts. There is no indication he

spent any time there with his successor, Filipp I. Golikov. This is not sur-

prising, as Golikov’s reputation for manipulating intelligence information

to conform to Stalin’s theories was by this time well known to most of the

RU officers. Instead, Proskurov went to the office of Colonel Ivan A. Bol-

shakov, who headed the German desk.1 Proskurov’s purpose was obviously

to discuss the situation with officers who had been handling information

reports from the field—from the RU components and other intelligence

and security services, including the NKGB Foreign Intelligence Service.

He probably would have been particularly interested in the report from

source Brand of the RU Helsinki residency on Finnish mobilization mea-

sures.2 Perhaps of even greater interest would have been the report by

Admiral Arseny G. Golovko, commander of the Northern Fleet, concern-

ing the overflight on June 17 of the fleet base at Polyarnyi by German

aircraft flying at very low altitude. Antiaircraft batteries were ordered to

open fire but did not. When the admiral asked a battery commander why

he disobeyed the order, he was told that the troops had been warned for so

long to avoid provocations that they were afraid to act.3 Proskurov could

have been reminded of an incident on June 18 in which fear of being

accused of spreading panic affected the way in which a German defector’s

ON THE EVE

205

information was handled. The defector, who had struck a superior officer

and feared a court martial, had appeared in the area of the Fifteenth Rifle

Corps, at Kovel, in the northwest corner of the Ukrainian SSR. He stated

that the Wehrmacht would attack at 4:00 a.m. on June 22. When the corps

commander reported this information to his superior, he was told, ‘ You’re

sounding the alarm in vain.’’4

Proskurov might well have seen the startling report from Starshina,

the NKGB’s source in the German Air Ministry, that ‘‘all the preparations

by Germany for an armed attack on the Soviet Union have been com-

pleted, and the blow can be expected at any time.’’ This report was received

at 6:00 a.m. on Monday, June 16 and by midday had been disseminated to

the Central Committee. It was sent to Stalin and Molotov on June 17 under

a letter of transmittal from People’s Commissar for State Security Mer-

kulov. We know that Pavel M. Fitin, who prepared the formal report sent to

Stalin by Merkulov, took care to see that his reports were sent to the RU.

Proskurov was probably also shown two reports by Richard Sorge

from June 15, one declaring that ‘‘the war will start in late June,’’ the other

that ‘‘the attack will occur along a broad front at dawn on June 22.’’5 He

may also have been shown reports from border troop units. One such

report, dated June 18, described the movement of German troops into

jump-off positions. (Postwar examination of German documents con-

firmed that divisions of the First Echelon of the German forces began to

move at night into their attack positions at this time.)6

One report that Proskurov probably never saw but that as an aviator he

would have greatly appreciated was prepared by Colonel G. N. Zakharov,

commander of the Forty-third Fighter Division, who had made a recon-

naissance flight of the entire length of the border during the daylight hours

of June 19. He reported to his superiors, Dimitry G. Pavlov and Ivan I.

Kopets, that the evidence was indisputable: the Germans were getting

ready to attack in the very near future. Pavlov and Kopets rejected that

conclusion and the report was never sent.7 The failure to forward it is

inexplicable. A reconnaissance flight at this time would have told Red

Army defenders a great deal about the nature and location of the forces

poised to attack them. Whereas the Germans normally maintained a high

degree of camouflage discipline, some actions that were hard to conceal,

such as moving river-crossing equipment into place, were necessary if the

attack was to take place as scheduled.

Although he could not have seen this particular report, Proskurov

heard and saw enough during his visit to alert him to the imminent danger

206

ON THE EVE

facing his aircraft. While still at military intelligence headquarters, he

went to a secret communications telephone and called the chief of staff of

the Seventh Army’s air forces. He told him of the near certainty of a Ger-

man invasion in the next few days and ordered him to move all aircraft to

reserve fields at once. He gave this order even though Stalin had expressly

forbidden any actions that the Germans might consider a provocation.8

Proskurov spent Saturday, June 21, preparing for his departure. The

city seemed deserted as many Muscovites took advantage of the beautiful

early summer weather to leave for the weekend. The next day, Proskurov,

his wife, Aleksandra Ignatievna, and his two daughters, ages eight and

fourteen, planned to have a picnic, but for some reason Proskurov kept

delaying their heading out. At noon, Molotov went on the air to describe

the fighting that had been under way since dawn. This was the first most

people heard of the German attack and the shock was palpable. Proskurov

left immediately for the Defense Commissariat. He returned later in the

afternoon, picked up his gear, and said good-bye to his daughters. Then he

and his wife went to the train station and he departed. His family never

saw him again.

At the Liubianka, the week of June 16 began for Pavel M. Fitin with the

arrival of the message from Berlin containing the prediction by Starshina

that the attack would come at any moment. Korsikanets added to the

impact of the report by listing the German officials assigned to occupation

duties in various Soviet cities and ended by quoting Alfred Rosenberg, who

gave this group their final instructions: ‘‘The very idea of the Soviet Union

must be wiped from the map!’’9 This report was sent to Stalin on June 17 by

People’s Commissar for State Security Vsevolod N. Merkulov. After Stalin

read it he ordered Merkulov and Fitin to report to him in his Kremlin

office. An article in
Krasnaia Zvezda
describing their visit puts the time as

12:00 noon on June 17. This is strange because the journal registering

Stalin’s visitors that day indicates that no one was received by Stalin until

Molotov arrived at 8:15 p.m. Then at 8:20 p.m. Merkulov and his deputy,

Bogdan Z. Kobulov, arrived, remaining until 9:00 p.m. There is no mention

of Fitin. It would have been most unusual, in any event, for Stalin to have

come to his Kremlin office by noon from his dacha at Kuntsevo. The times

of Stalin’s arrival at his Kremlin office in the week leading up to the Ger-

man invasion varied, but the earliest hour noted in the journal is 4:00 p.m.

Other historians have confirmed that it was Stalin’s habit to come to the

office in the evening hours, work late into the night, and return to his

dacha toward morning to sleep.10 This incident and others cause us to

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207

question the degree to which the journal accurately reflected all of Stalin’s

visitors. As for the Merkulov-Kobulov visit, that may have been related to

the report, also sent to Stalin on June 17 by Merkulov, on the results of the

operation to remove some 40,178 ‘‘anti-Soviet, criminal, and socially dan-

gerous’’ persons from Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. Merkulov was appar-

ently absent from Moscow from June 11 to June 17. His absence was

probably caused by his involvement in the planning and execution of this

operation. Kobulov acted for Merkulov during his absence.11

In any case, when Merkulov and Fitin arrived at Stalin’s office, his

secretary said only, ‘‘He is waiting for you.’’ Stalin greeted them with a nod;

he did not ask them to be seated and remained standing himself. Merkulov

said not a word, leaving it to Fitin to explain the background of the report.

Stalin termed it ‘‘disinformation’’ and directed them to check its veracity

and give him the results.12 Fitin returned to his office and called in Pavel M.

Zhuravliev, chief of the German Department; Mikhail A. Allakhverdov,

head of the newly formed Information Section of the department; Zoia

Rybkina; and Yelena D. Modrzhinskaia, an NKGB intelligence officer in

Warsaw.13 He briefed them on the session with Stalin and ordered them to

review all the reporting from Starshina and Korsikanets. On the basis of

their review, they put together a so-called
Kalendar
of reports, beginning in

September 1940, that included the date of each report, the source and

subsources, and a précis of the contents. By including the names and job

descriptions of the subsources, the analysis demonstrated that Starshina

and Korsikanets had access to a wide circle of well-placed collaborators.

From the
Kalendar,
which Zhuravliev and the others finished on Friday,

June 20, it was evident that as of the summer of 1940 the Germans had

every intention of invading the USSR in the spring or early summer of

1941. When Fitin read it he must have realized that Merkulov would never

send it on to Stalin because it completely contradicted the his conviction