When the War Was Over (101 page)

92 communist leaders, when they met undetected . . . Description of the congress and the quotes from the founding document that follow are from Pol Pot, “Long Live the 17th Anniversary of the Communist Party of Kampuchea,” speech, September 1977.

93 “to liberate the South . . .” Heder, “Historical Basis.”

94 Phat was released from jail . . . The story of Phat continues based on his confession. All of Phat quotes that follow are from the confessions.

98 “We know that several [students] . . .” U.S. embassy to the Department of State, April 11, 1963, released through FOIA.

101 They claimed to have “waged the nationalist struggle . . .” “Party History.”

103 The new collection system was called
ramassage du paddy
. The story of the rebellion based on Ben Kiernan,
The Samlaut Rebellion and Its Aftermath: 1967-1970, the Origins of Cambodia's Liberation Movement
(Melbourne: Monash University Center of Southeast Asian Studies, 1976).

105 he offered large bounties . . . Heder, “Historical Basis.”

106 The major benefit of the trip . . . Ieng Thirith in author interview.

106 One historian believes that “perhaps discreetly . . .” Heder, “Historical Basis.”

106 The peasants, they wrote, were “like dry straw . . .” From Pol Pot, “Long Live.”

107 “We are surrounded by forests, which are infested . . .” Henri Mouhot,
Henri Mouhot's Diary: Travels in the Central Parts of Siam, Cambodia and Laos During the Years 1858—1861
(Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1966).

108 “The most perfect equality . . .” Ibid.

108 . . . as easily as they had followed . . . Osborne Ph.D.

108 “like beasts under an extremely . . .” Pol Pot, “Let Us Continue to Firmly Hold Aloft the Banner of the Victory of the Glorious Communist Party of Kampuchea in Order to Defend Democratic Kampuchea, Carry On Socialist Revolution and Build Up Socialism,” speech, Phnom Penh, September 1978.

109 The party organized its recruits . . . Pol Pot, “Long Live.”

109 “No zone could come directly . . .” Ibid.

109 “I will assume responsibility . . .” Heder, “Historical Basis.”

110 The army of Lon Nol and Sihanouk . . . Phat confession.

110 “Brother Number One had just presented . . .” Ibid.

110 “They gave rifles to the Khmer Leou . . .” Heder, “Historical Basis.”

110 “total war . . . Civil war these days . . .” Kiernan,
Samlaut Rebellion.

113 “whose honor and dignity . . .” Pol Pot, “Let Us Continue.”

114 Description of the 1970 coup d'état taken from reporting at the time and from T. D. Allman, “Anatomy of a Coup,” Jonathan S. Grant, Laurence A. G. Moss, and Jonathan Unger, eds., in
Cambodia: The Widening
War in Indochina
(New York: Washington Square Press, 1971), and Sak Sutsakhan,
The Khmer Republic at War and the Final Collapse
(Washington: U.S. Army Center for Military History, 1980).

116 the queen performed a ceremony . . . William Shawcross,
Sideshow: Kissinger,
Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1979).

118 The previous year . . . Sihanouk had ended the commission's mandate. Sak Sutsakhan.

119 “Black Papa” from William N. Harben, “The Anthropological Lon Nol,” confidential airgram from U.S. embassy, Phnom Penh, to the Department of State, May 25, 1972, released through FOIA.

120 Lon Nol made no secret . . . Ibid.

121 Their goals were fascist . . . Definition from
The Merriam-Webster
Dictionary
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1974).

121 Lon Nol was an echo . . . Harben.

122 The first months of battle were disastrous . . . Sak Sutsakhan.

123 “Cutting of the skin in order to allow . . .” Harben.

124 And he did not restrict his holy war . . . Discussion of the pogrom based on Grant et al. and Shawcross.

125 “The soldiers took over a deserted house . . .” Author interview with May Sisophan.

125 A cycle of recriminations began. U.S. embassy, Phnom Penh, to the Department of State, September 2, 1970, released through FOIA.

126 “certain to place further strain . . .” Ibid.

126 one respected anti-war group in the U.S. . . . The group was the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars in
Indochina
Story
.

126 “We, the Khmer people, descendants . . .” Harben.

127 “At the peak of its splendor. . .” Lon Nol,
Le Néo Khmerisme
(Phnom Penh: République Khmere, 1974). All subsequent quotes from the book translated by author.

129 . . . after the May 1970 U.S. incursion into Cambodia . . . At the height of the involvement, May 7, 1970, there were 25,000 U.S. troops in Cambodia.

129 The original, secret and illegal 1969 bombing raids . . . See Shawcross for complete description of U.S. bombing policy in Cambodia.

130 Lon Nol's own officers complained . . . Sak Sutsakhan.

131 “He is obviously still too much . . .” U.S. embassy, Phnom Penh, to the Department of State, signed by Ambassador Swank, April 19, 1971, released through FOIA.

131 “to take an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.” This quote and subsequent description of dispute with army over Chenla II from Sak Sutsakhan.

132 In Tam's confidential conversation with Ambassador Swank from U.S. embassy, Phnom Penh, confidential cable to the Department of State, November 13, 1972, released through FOIA.

133 Khmer Rouge army grew from 15,000 to 40,000. Timothy Carney, “The Unexpected Victory,” typescript, forthcoming.

133 $1 billion annual aid to North Vietnam figure from government spokesman in Hanoi to author,
Washington Post
, February 27, 1983. $1.6 billion entire war aid from the U.S. to the Khmer Republic in Carney, “Unexpected.”

133 The Khmer Rouge had won control . . . Author reporting 1973 in
Washington Post
.

134 $10 million figure from the IMF confidential report.

134 Sar had met with Pham Van Dong . . . “Black Paper—Facts and Evidences of the Acts of Aggression and Annexation of Vietnam Against Kampuchea,” Phnom Penh, September 1978.

134 But numerous eyewitnesses report . . . From Carney, “Unexpected,” and Richard Dudman,
Forty Days with the Enemy
(New York: Liveright, 1971).

134 Purge of ethnic Vietnamese. “Black Paper,” p. 56.

135 “He said that the returning compatriots . . .” Heder interview with Hem Samin.

135 “Contacts between the upper level . . .” Ibid.

135 Among the returnees was Ieng Lim . . . U.S. embassy airgram, from which the subsequent story and all quotes are taken.

137 This mingling of intellectual and peasants . . . This section based on Edward Friedman,
Backward Toward Revolution
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), especially pp. 213-15.

139 “Our soldiers have been ordered to give up . . .” from Malcolm Caldwell and Lek Hor Tan,
Cambodia in the
Southeast Asian
War
(New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973).

139 List of officials of GRUNK and FUNK. From Caldwell.

140 “water buffalo to get across the mud.” Chea Soth interview by Stephen Heder from Heder interview series, typescript.

140 . . . the one detailed account of this stage . . . The description and quotes that follow are based on two translations of Ith Sarin,
Regrets for the Khmer Soul.
One, in typescript, was commissioned by author and the late Ishiyama Koki, and excerpts of it were published in “Who Are the Khmer Rouge,” by the author,
Washington
Post
, March 1974. The second, and more complete, was done by Timothy Michael Carney in
Communist Party Power
in
Kampuchea
(Ithaca: Cornell University, 1977). All the quotes from
Regrets
from either Carney or Koki translation.

143 The publication of a party history . . . All the quotes that follow and description of the history are based on “Party History.”

145 . . . formed a separate organization within . . . Confession of Keo Meas, “Responses of X.,” September 30, 1976, at Tuol Sleng. Heder translation.

145 . . . pamphlets were printed. “The Leaders of the Khmer Resistance and Members of the Royal Government of National Union in the Interior of Cambodia,” NUFC Press, 1972, in author's collection.

147 the Khmer Rouge had refused . . . “Black Paper.”

148 The Khmer Rouge ordered everyone . . . into strict cooperatives. The description of cooperatives that follows is based on “Cadres, party men, people and the revolutionary army must be unanimous,” in
Tung Padevat,
August 1975; and Kenneth M. Quinn, “The Khmer Kraphom Program to Create a Communist Society in Southern Cambodia,” airgram to the Department of State, February 19, 1974.

148 “. . . the landowners and merchants . . .” Pol Pot, “Let Us Continue.”

149 “The Vietnamese were the biggest problem . . .” Author interview with Thiounn Prasith.

149 “After 1973 the Vietnamese forces were faced . . .” John Pilger and Anthony Barnett,
Aftermath: The Struggle of Cambodia and Vietnam
(London: New Statesman, 1982), p. 59.

150 “Stories carried back by those people . . .” From Quinn airgram, as are all subsequent Quinn quotes.

151 “If he felt it was so important . . .” Author interview with confidential U.S. embassy, Phnom Penh, source.

152 The description of wartime Phnom Penh that follows is based on author's reporting at the time and the daily report cables of the U.S. embassy, Phnom Penh, covering the entire war period, released to the author through FOIA.

154 “When the local bullies . . .” From Stuart Schram,
The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963).

154 “work of God, for it is too imposing . . .” Pol Pot,
Tung Padevat.

155 “fought alone on the Cambodian front.” Ibid.

156 “the amount of U.S. bombs dropped in Laos . . .” Barnett,
Aftermath.

156 “Our country suffered much more than Vietnam . . .” Author interview.

157 “hypnotic spell.” Sak Sutsakhan.

157 As the U.S. embassy intervened . . . U.S. embassy, Phnom Penh, to Department of State, July 31, 1973, released through FOIA.

158 “They would say we should attack right away . . .” Heder interview with Hem Samin.

158 . . . the Khmer Rouge, . . . ordered a general offensive, . . . Pol Pot,
Tung Padevat.

159 “were made possible . . .” U.S. embassy, Phnom Penh, to Department of State, January 29, 1974, released through FOIA.

159 The Republic forces rallied in February . . . The description of the final battles based on Sat Sutsakhan and the daily embassy reports.

159 “Khmer Communist troops blasted . . .” U.S. embassy, Phnom Penh, to Department of State, January 7, 1975, released through FOIA.

160 By 8:30 that same morning . . . Sak Sutsakhan.

161 “This is what we should call . . .” Pol Pot,
Tung
Padevat.

161 “The whole experiment . . .” Isaac Deutscher,
Stalin: A Political
Biography
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1967).

161 “The Chinese leaders were now in a hurry . . .” Franz Schurmann and Orville Schell, eds.,
Communist China: Revolutionary Reconstruction and International Confrontation
(New York: Vintage, 1967).

164 Ieng Sary was in Hanoi . . . Author interview with Ieng Sary, upon which the following Sary account of the first days is based.

165 The army numbered 68,000, and the party 14,000 members. Carney, “Unexpected.”

169 Description of Saigon's food supply from
With Firm Steps: Southern Vietnam Since Liberation 1975-1977
(Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1978).

169 . . . less than one week's supply of rice . . .
New York Times,
July 14, 1975.

169 Damage figures from Ieng Sary's speech to the United Nations General Assembly, October 1976, and from the confidential report of the IMF.

170 The Ream and Kompong Som example based on author reporting during 1978 trip through Democratic Kampuchea.

171 Thirith, Sary, and their children . . . This description based on author interview with Thirith, author trip to D. K., and Y Phandara,
Retour à Phnom Penh
(Paris: A.-M. Métailié, 1982).

175 “We made the war and won . . .” Pol Pot,
Tung Padevat.

175 The result of this reorganization . . . These calculations are based on comparisons of figures from Kiernan and Heder. I concluded that the old Northern Zone gave all three divisions to the Center; two stayed in Phnom Penh and one went to the northeast
border. The Eastern Zone gave one division to Phnom Penh, which stayed with the Center army, and kept two divisions. The Special Zone became the Center and gave all its forces to Phnom Penh. The Northwestern Zone's one understaffed division stayed in place. The Southwestern Zone gave one division to Phnom Penh, but it was posted in the zone at Kompong Som seaport; it kept its other two divisions.

177 Southwestern Zone history based on Stephen Heder, “From Pol Pot to Pen Sovan to the Villages” (typescript, presented at the International Conference on Indochina and Problems of Security and Stability in Southeast Asia, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, 1980).

177 Biography of Ta Mok based on the confession of Non Suon, November 21, 1976, made at Tuol Sleng, entitled “Responses of XII Confession Stage One, concluding section: Section 6-XII talks about a number of elder brothers in the leading organization.” Translation by Heder.