A History of the Crusades-Vol 1 (33 page)

The Crusaders at
Hosn al-Akrad

While these supplies were being collected,
Raymond and his commanders met to discuss what route should now be taken.
Raymond himself favoured the view that the army should strike due west across
the Nosairi range in order to reach the coast as soon as possible. Lattakieh
was already in Christian hands; and so long as he kept to the coast he would be
in touch with Antioch and could obtain supplies from the Byzantine authorities
in Cyprus, with whom he was on good terms. But Tancred pointed out that to be
sure of the coast road it would be necessary to capture all the great
fortresses that lay on the way. The fighting strength of the army was now only
a thousand knights and five thousand infantrymen. How could such a force
indulge in siege warfare? They ought, he argued, to march straight on to
Jerusalem, avoiding the necessity of capturing the coastal fortresses. If they
could take Jerusalem, not only would the news bring more soldiers out from
Europe, but cities like Tripoli, Tyre and Acre would no longer attempt to hold
out against them. The argument against his view was that all the country
between the Lebanon and the desert was held by Duqaq of Damascus, who, unlike
the Arab princelings, would undoubtedly oppose the Crusaders’ progress. It was
eventually decided to strike the coast further to the south, through the
Buqaia, the plain between the Nosairi range and the Lebanon, which provides the
only easy access from inner Syria to the sea, and to waste as little time as
possible on attempts to reduce enemy fortresses.

On 22 January the Crusaders reached the town of
Masyaf, whose lord hastened to conclude a treaty with them. From there they
turned south-south-east, to avoid the massif of the Jebel Helou. Next day they
came to the town of Rafaniya, which they found deserted by its inhabitants but
full of supplies of every kind. They remained there for three days, then
descended into the Buqaia. The plain was commanded by the huge fortress of Hosn
al-Akrad, the Castle of the Kurds, built on the height where the ruins of Krak
des Chevaliers now stand. The local inhabitants had driven all their herds to
shelter within its walls; and, for the purpose of revictualment rather than for
strategic reasons, the Crusaders decided that it must be taken. On 28 January
they attacked the fortifications. But the defence, aware of their habits,
opened a gate and let out some of their beasts.
So intent
were the Franks on rounding up all this booty that they scattered; and a sortie
from the castle not only prevented them from reassembling but also nearly
succeeded in capturing Count Raymond himself, who had been deserted by his
bodyguard. Next day the Franks, ashamed of having been tricked, planned a
serious assault; but when they reached the walls they found that the castle had
been abandoned during the night. There was still considerable booty left
within; and the army settled down to spend three weeks there, while further
discussions about strategy were held. The Feast of the Purification was celebrated
within the castle.

While Raymond was at Hosn al-Akrad, envoys
reached him from the Emir of Hama, offering him gifts and promising not to
attack his men. They were followed by envoys from the Emir of Tripoli. This
Emir, Jalal al-Mulk Abu’l Hasan, of the dynasty of the Banu ‘Ammar, a family
noted more for its learning than for its warlike qualities, had maintained the
independence of his emirate by playing off the Seldjuks against the Fatimids.
With the Turkish power in decline, he was ready to encourage the Franks against
the renascent Egyptians. Raymond was invited to send representatives to Tripoli
to discuss arrangements for the passage of the Crusade and to bring the banners
of Toulouse, which the Emir would unfurl over the city. The prosperity of Tripoli
and the surrounding country greatly impressed the Frankish ambassadors; who on
their return to the camp advised Raymond that if he made a show of force
against one of the fortresses of the emirate, the Emir would certainly pay a
large sum to buy immunity for the rest of his dominions. Raymond, who was in
need of money, took their advice and ordered his army to attack the town of
Arqa, situated some fifteen miles from Tripoli, where the Buqaia opens out to
the coast. He arrived before its walls on 14 February.

Meanwhile, anxious as he was to establish
communications with the garrison at Lattakieh and the sea, Raymond encouraged
Raymond Pilet and Raymond, Viscount of Turenne, to attempt a surprise attack on
Tortosa, the one good harbour on the coast between Lattakieh and Tripoli. The
two Raymonds, with a small detachment, hurried westward and arrived before the
town after dark on 16 February. They lit a series of camp fires all round the
walls, to suggest the presence of a far larger army than they possessed. The
ruse was successful. The governor of Tortosa, who was subject to the Emir of
Tripoli, was so seriously alarmed that he evacuated himself and his garrison by
sea during the night. Next morning the gates of the town were opened to the
Franks. At the news of their conquest the governor of Marqiye, ten miles to the
north, hastened to recognize Raymond’s suzerainty. The capture of Tortosa
greatly strengthened the Crusade. It opened up easy communications by sea with
Antioch and Cyprus and with Europe.

The Siege of
Arqa

This success roused jealousy among the
Crusaders still at Antioch and decided them to follow Raymond southward. About
the end of February Godfrey of Lorraine, Bohemond and Robert of Flanders set
out from Antioch to Lattakieh. There Bohemond turned back. He thought that
after all it would be wiser to consolidate himself in Antioch lest the Emperor
might march towards Syria in the spring. Godfrey and Robert moved on to besiege
the small sea-port of Jabala. While they lay there, the Bishop of Al-bara
reached them from Raymond, begging them to join him at Arqa.

The siege of Arqa was not going well. The town
was well fortified and courageously defended; and Raymond’s army was not large
enough to invest it completely. Tancred’s warning that the army was in no
condition to attempt to storm fortresses was fully justified. But once Raymond
had begun the siege he could not abandon it for fear that the Emir of Tripoli,
seeing his weakness, would become openly hostile. It is possible that the
soldiers made no great effort. Life was comfortable in the camp. The
countryside was fertile and further supplies began to arrive through Tortosa.
After all that they had endured the men were pleased to relax themselves a
while. Early in March there was a rumour that a Moslem army was assembling to
relieve Arqa, led in person by the Caliph of Baghdad. The rumour was false, but
it alarmed Raymond into summoning Godfrey and Robert of Flanders. On the
receipt of the message Godfrey and Robert made a truce with the Emir of Jabala,
who accepted their suzerainty, and hurried southward to Arqa. They celebrated
their arrival by an attack on the suburbs of Tripoli and by several successful
raids to round up beasts of all sorts, including camels, in the Buqaia.

Raymond soon regretted the arrival of his
colleagues. He had been for two months the accepted leader of the Crusade. Even
Tancred had acknowledged his authority in return for five thousand sous. But
now he had been obliged to call on his rivals for help. Tancred, whose advice
he had ignored, moved over to Godfrey’s camp, saying that Raymond had not paid
him sufficiently. The two Roberts showed little inclination to admit Raymond’s hegemony.
In his attempt to assert his rights he aroused resentment; and quarrels began.
The men of each army, seeing their leaders at loggerheads, followed suit and
would not co-operate with each other.

The Question of
the Holy Lance

The controversy was worsened by the arrival in
early April of letters from the Emperor. Alexius informed the Crusaders that he
was now ready to start out for Syria. If they would wait for him till the end
of June, he would be with them by St John’s Day and would lead them on into
Palestine. Raymond wished to accept the offer. As the Emperor’s faithful ally
he could count on imperial backing to help him to reassert his supremacy over
the Frankish army. Amongst his own men, there were many, like Raymond of
Aguilers, who, much as they disliked the Byzantines, felt that the Emperor’s
arrival would at least provide the Crusade with a leader whom all the princes
would admit. But the bulk of the army was impatient to move on to Jerusalem;
and none of the other princes wished to find himself under imperial suzerainty.
Against such strong public opinion, Raymond’s policy could not prevail. It is
probable that Alexius never expected that the Crusaders would wait for him.
Disgusted by their behaviour at Antioch he had already decided upon an attitude
of neutrality. This to a Byzantine diplomat was not a passive attitude but
meant the establishment of relations with both sides in order that benefits
might be reaped whichever should be victorious. He was in communication with
the Egyptians, who had probably written to him when the Crusade advanced
towards their territory to ask if it was acting on his account. In answer
Alexius repudiated the movement. He had reason for so doing. Bohemond’s actions
taught him that he could not count upon the loyalty of the Franks; nor was he
particularly interested in Palestine. It lay outside the lands that he had
hoped to recover for the Empire. His only obligation there was towards the
Orthodox Christians, whose protector he was. He may well have considered that
they would fare better under the tolerant rule of the Fatimids than under the
Franks who were already showing at Antioch a marked hostility towards native
Christianity. At the same time he did not wish to sever his connection with the
Crusade, which might still be of use to the Empire. His correspondence with
Egypt later fell into the hands of the Crusaders, who were genuinely shocked by
the evidence of his treachery to them, though their treachery to him seemed to
them perfectly reasonable and right. They blamed it on him that the ambassadors
they had sent to Cairo from Antioch had been detained there for so long.

These ambassadors returned to the army at Arqa
a few days later, bearing the Fatimids’ final offer for a settlement. If the
Crusade would abandon any attempt to force its way into Fatimid territory, its
pilgrims would be allowed free access to the holy places and everything would
be done to facilitate the pilgrimage. The suggestion was at once rejected.

In spite of the desire of the other princes to
resume the march, Raymond refused to leave Arqa untaken. To bring matters to a
head, Peter Bartholomew announced that on 5 April Christ, Saint Peter and Saint
Andrew had all appeared to him to announce that an immediate assault on Arqa
must be made. The bulk of the army was growing tired of Peter’s revelations,
which they regarded as a political device of Count Raymond’s. A section of the
northern French, led by Robert of Normandy’s chaplain, Arnulf of Rohes, now
openly declared their disbelief and even questioned the authenticity of the
Holy Lance, remarking that Adhemar of Le Puy had never been convinced of it.
The Provencals rallied to Peter’s support. Stephen of Valence reminded the army
of his vision at Antioch. Raymond of Aguilers told how he had kissed the Lance
while it was still embedded in the ground. Another priest, Peter Desiderius, reported
that Adhemar had appeared to him after his death and had described the
hell-fire to which his doubts had led him. Another, Everard, said that when he
was visiting Tripoli on business during the Turkish siege of Antioch a Syrian
there had told him of a vision in which Saint Mark had spoken of the Lance. The
Bishop of Apt, who had been a sceptic, mentioned a vision that had caused him
to change his mind. One of Adhemar’s own entourage, Bertrand of Le Puy,
announced that the bishop and his standard-bearer had both come to him in a
vision to admit that the Lance was genuine. Faced by this impressive evidence,
Arnulf publicly confessed that he was convinced; but his friends continued to
cast doubt on the whole story; till at last Peter Bartholomew in a fury
demanded to be allowed to defend himself by the ordeal of fire. Whatever the
truth may have been, he clearly by now believed firmly in his divine
inspiration.

The ordeal took place on Good Friday, 8 April.
Two piles of logs, blessed by the bishops, were erected in a narrow passage and
set alight. Peter Bartholomew, clad only in a tunic, with the Lance in his
hand, leapt quickly through the flames. He emerged horribly burnt and would
have collapsed back into the fire had not Raymond Pilet caught hold of him. For
twelve days he lingered on in agony, then died of his wounds. As a result of
the ordeal the Lance was utterly discredited, save only by the Provencals, who
maintained that Peter had passed safely through the flames but had been pushed
back by the enthusiastic crowd in their eagerness to touch his sacred tunic.
Count Raymond still kept the Lance with all reverence in his chapel.

The Crusaders
before Tripoli

The army lingered on for a month outside Arqa
before Raymond could be induced to abandon the siege. The fighting there had
cost many lives, including that of Anselm of Ribemont, whose letters to his
liege lord, the Archbishop of Reims, had given a vivid account of the Crusade.
On 13 May Raymond yielded to his colleagues’ persuasion and, with tears in his
eyes, ordered the camp to be struck; and the whole host moved down to Tripoli.
There had been further discussions about the route to be followed. The Syrians
informed Raymond that there was an easy road passing through Damascus, but
though food was plentiful there, water was short. The road over the Lebanon was
well watered, but it was difficult for beasts of burden. The third alternative
was the coast road; but there were many places where it could be blocked by a
handful of the enemy. However, local prophecies declared that the deliverers of
Jerusalem would travel along the coast. This was the road that was chosen, less
for its prophetic reputation than for the contact that it provided with the
English and Genoese fleets that were now cruising in Levantine waters.