A History of the Crusades-Vol 1 (41 page)

It is probable also that the rate of mortality
was particularly high amongst these non-combatants, especially the old men and
children. Among the combatants the infantry must have died off from disease and
hardships in greater proportion than the knights and ladies, who were better
tended and better able to buy food. In battle the cavalry played a more exposed
role than the infantry and therefore suffered as heavily.

The proportion of cavalry to infantry seems to
have been about one to seven when every possible combatant was enrolled into
the latter. Anna’s estimate of the relative strength in Godfrey’s forces,
though her figures should be divided at least by ten, is probably correct. At
the battle of Ascalon, when every available man in Palestine was employed,
there were 1200 cavalry and 9000 infantry, a proportion of one to seven and a
half. At the siege of Jerusalem there were, according to Raymond of Aguilers,
1200 to 1300 knights out of an army of 12,000; which, however, included Genoese
and English engineers and marines. The term ‘knights’ must be used to mean
armed horsemen, and not in any chivalrous sense; while many of the infantrymen
were not fully armed. The archers and pikemen were probably only a fairly small
proportion of the whole.

Of the individual armies it is almost certain
that Raymond’s was the largest; but we have only one indication of its size.
When he heard at Coxon the false rumour that the Turks had evacuated Antioch he
sent a cavalry force of 500, including some of his leading knights, to occupy
the city. The number 500 occurs with suspicious frequency; but it may well have
been considered the proper unit for a large raid or expedition of this type. It
is unlikely that Raymond would have spared half his cavalry strength at this
stage. If we accept this figure of 500 as approximately correct, his whole
cavalry strength must have been 1200 or more, and his total force about 10,000,
apart from old men, women and children.

The Chronicle of Lucca tells us that Bohemond
went to the East with 500 knights. Anna Comnena notes that he did not have a
particularly large army; so this figure may well be correct. He allowed Tancred
100 knights and 200 infantrymen for his Cilician expedition, though he sent
another 300 infantrymen after him. These numbers fit together reasonably.

The only indication that we have of the
proportionate size of the other armies is given by Raymond’s action at Rugia,
when he attempted to bribe his rivals to accept his leadership. He offered Godfrey
and Robert of Normandy each 10,000 sous, Robert of Flanders 6000, and Tancred
5000, and lesser sums to the lesser chiefs. The sums must have been fixed in
relation to the strength that each prince could now supply, though Tancred was
probably offered a disproportionately high sum in order to detach him and as
many Normans as possible from Bohemond.

Our only evidence for the size of Godfrey’s
army, apart from Anna’s fantastic figure, is provided by his willingness to
spare 500 cavalry and 2000 infantry to his brother Baldwin for his Cilician
expedition. It is most unlikely that he would have parted with more than half
his cavalry strength, even though he intended this force to rejoin him before
reaching Antioch. It is tempting to assume that Raymond’s offer at Rugia was
made on the basis of ten sous for each head of cavalry. If at the same time we
divide Anna’s figures by ten, we may credit Godfrey with some 1000 cavalry and
7000 infantry at the time of his arrival at Constantinople. He must have suffered
considerable losses before the date of the conference at Rugia, quite apart
from the knights that accompanied Baldwin to Edessa; but he had been joined by
survivors from Peter the Hermit’s Crusade and the abortive German Crusades, as
well as by some of Guynemer’s marines; who, as their master was a Boulonnais,
would naturally associate themselves with the Count of Boulogne and his
brothers.

Robert of Normandy ranked equal to Godfrey at
Rugia. If Godfrey commanded 1000 head of cavalry, he must have been equally
strong. A century later Normandy was obliged to provide its duke with slightly
under 600 knights. For the Crusade Robert might well have been able to raise a
rather larger number of horsemen, perhaps 650. He was joined by soldiers from
Brittany and across the Channel; which may have given him another 100 or 150
horsemen. Moreover, after the return to Europe of Stephen of Blois and Hugh of
Vermandois, he had assumed command of such of their forces as remained behind.
Stephen, whose territories were not large but were rich, may have provided 250
or 300 horsemen. Hugh probably did not bring with him many more than 100. In
all Robert may well have had close on 1000 under his command at the time of
Rugia.

On the same basis Robert of Flanders must be
credited with 600 cavalrymen, some of whom came from the territory of his
neighbour, the Count of Hainault. Robert legally owed his liege, the king of
France, only twenty fully armed knights; but in 1103 he offered in a treaty to
provide Henry I of England with 1000 cavalrymen. He could therefore easily
raise 600 for the Crusade.

Bohemond’s force of 500 cavalrymen, mentioned
by the Chronicle of Lucca, fits in with these figures. If we assume that the
armies of the lesser lords are to be counted in with the greater armies, and
that the sums offered to them by Raymond at Rugia were purely personal, we
reach a total for the whole expedition of roughly 4200 to 4500 cavalry and 30,000
infantry, including civilians that could be pressed into service. The letter
written by Daimbert to the Pope numbers the army of Crusaders at 5000 cavalry
and 15,000 infantry. By the latter armed combatants alone were probably
included. The former figure is a permissible exaggeration from 4000.

This seems a small enough army. Yet when we come
to the figures given by the chroniclers for individual battles, the numbers are
smaller still. At the battle of the Lake of Antioch, when, we are told, all the
available knights were used, there were only 700 of them. But many of the
knights were sick at the time; and it appears from a letter of Anselm of
Ribemont that the real shortage was of horses. He estimates that only about 700
were available for use at the time of the siege of Antioch, so many had
perished from hunger and from cold. He declares that there was no shortage of
men. Moreover, on this occasion, it is probable that Raymond’s cavalry remained
with him to guard the camp. The raiding expedition led by Bohemond and Robert
of Flanders the following month was said to have been composed of 2000 cavalry
and 15,000 infantry; and this definitely excluded Raymond’s army. But again,
only 1200 or 1300 cavalry were present at the siege of Jerusalem, and a little
over 10,000 infantry; and the strength of the army at Ascalon was very similar.
Though many soldiers had died or been killed and many had returned home, it is
impossible that the strength of the army should have declined by two-thirds
between the time of the conference at Rugia and the siege of Jerusalem.

We can only therefore repeat that any estimate
must be taken with reserve. I believe that the whole army at the time that it
left Constantinople roughly reached the total that I have suggested above. In
the course of the next two years it was very much reduced; and at Rugia Raymond
was using an out-of-date and highly optimistic calculation on which to base his
offers. The comparatively small figures given in the chronicles of Baldwin’s
exploits can, I think, be accepted as roughly accurate.

The size of Peter the Hermit’s original
expedition is equally impossible to calculate. The figure of 40,000 given by
Albert of Aix is clearly excessive; but his followers may have numbered as many
as 20,000. Of these non-combatants formed the vast majority.

For purposes of comparison it may be noted that
the whole Byzantine army in the ninth century has been calculated to have
numbered 120,000. The loss of the Anatolian provinces must have resulted in a
reduction of available forces by the end of the eleventh century; but Alexius
could probably dispose of about 70,000 men, most of which were needed to
garrison his far-flung frontiers; while a large proportion was probably
disbanded every winter for purposes of economy. It is improbable that the
largest army led into battle by the Byzantines at this period numbered more
than 20,000 men, well equipped and well trained. It is impossible to estimate
the size of the Moslem armies. Kerbogha’s army probably numbered about 30,000;
but no actual evidence exists. It was able to undertake a more effective
blockade of Antioch than the Crusader army could manage. The Egyptian army at
Ascalon was certainly larger than the Crusaders’; but its actual size can only
be guessed. It is doubtful if the Turkish army at Dorylaeum was as large as the
Crusaders. The Turks relied on their sudden attack and their mobility to
compensate for any disadvantage in numbers.