America At War - Concise Histories Of U.S. Military Conflicts From Lexington To Afghanistan (3 page)

Washington retired in good order and encamped northwest of the city. Howe placed his troops nearby, in Germantown, and directed Cornwallis, with four thousand soldiers, to occupy the city, which he did, entering Philadelphia on September 26, 1777. Lord Charles and his men were warmly welcomed. Philadelphia may have hosted the Continental Congress (which fled to York), but its citizens, at least many of them, were loyalists at heart.

Once again, Washington rallied his men, and to Howe’s surprise, they attacked the British troops stationed in Germantown. The battle took place on October 4. Washington’s plan was complicated and confusion reigned, with, at one point, Continental soldiers firing on one another. The British rallied and, in the end, won the battle. The Americans had about one thousand men killed or wounded; the British half that number.

By the end of 1777 the two principal cities in America, New York and Philadelphia, were under British control. The Continental army had been beaten at both Brandywine and Germantown. And many Americans, from Georgia to New Hampshire, had remained loyal to the king. Thus Howe had reason to be pleased. But he was not. Sir William knew that up north, near Albany, disaster had struck: an entire British army had surrendered to the rebels.

John Burgoyne was a playwright, a member of parliament, and a man who enjoyed London society. He was also a major general in the British army. Lord George Germain was a politician, retired soldier, and a favorite of the king’s who served in government as secretary of state for the American colonies. In this latter capacity he in essence directed the British war effort. Early in 1777, Burgoyne proposed to Germain a plan that would strike hard at the rebels and lead, he believed, to a successful conclusion of the war.

Burgoyne proposed that he lead an army south from Canada into New York. A smaller force would attack from the west, traveling east across the Mohawk Valley. At the same time Howe in Manhattan would launch a major attack up the Hudson. The three forces would converge at Albany and destroy the rebels. The resulting victory would isolate the New England colonies, enabling His Majesty’s troops to deal separately and methodically with the other provinces. Moreover, when they saw a large British force achieve success in battle, those Americans still loyal to the king would rise in support, while those on the fence would swing to the British side.

The plan was not without merit, and it gained Germain’s approval. Unfortunately for the British and for Burgoyne, its execution was to be flawed. An earlier attack from Canada in 1776 had failed due to winter weather and Benedict Arnold’s vigorous defense at Valcour Island. Nevertheless, Burgoyne, promoted to lieutenant general, was confident his expedition would succeed.

In June 1777 his army began to move. It was composed of approximately seven thousand men and consisted of British regulars, German mercenaries, Canadian militia, and three hundred Native Americans, the latter to serve as scouts. Its artillery numbered 138 field pieces, and its excessively large number of supply wagons, according to one historian, carried “numerous ladies of high and low estate.”

At first the expedition went well. The British secured Fort Ticonderoga in July and later defeated a small rebel force at Hubbardton. Then everything turned sour. Burgoyne chose to proceed through the forests rather than by water, causing a delay that gave the Americans time to react. Supplies began to run low. The Native American scouts proved unreliable. The force coming from the west was stopped in battles at Oriskany and Fort Stanwix. An effort by the Germans to secure much needed food and horses was crushed near Bennington. And, incredibly, Germain did not order Howe to march north to Albany (Sir William proceeded south to Philadelphia). So Burgoyne and his depleted force were left to fight alone.

During the War for Independence, American forces operated in three areas or departments. Washington commanded the main army and waged war primarily in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and lower New York. A Northern Department and a separate Northern army carried on the fight in New England and upstate New York. The Southern Department operated in Virginia, the Carolinas, and Georgia. Although Washington was the Continental army’s commander in chief, he did not appoint general officers. Congress did. It did so often with political parameters, as each colony demanded its share of brigadiers and major generals.

To command the Northern Department Congress first appointed Philip Schuyler, who, on his return from Canada, creditably organized Northern forces. In actual command of the Northern army was Major General Horatio Gates, ably assisted by Benedict Arnold, Benjamin Lincoln, and Daniel Morgan. Much was expected of Gates, the Continental army’s first adjutant general. He did not disappoint. When Burgoyne finally arrived in the vicinity of Albany, Gates positioned his army to fight. In September the first battle took place at Freeman’s Farm. The outcome was a draw with both sides sustaining substantial losses. The second battle occurred early in October at Bemis Heights, where, in large part due to Arnold’s leadership, the British were defeated. Burgoyne then retreated toward Saratoga, where, surrounded by an army far larger than his and running out of supplies, he surrendered on October 17, 1777.

The capitulation by Burgoyne and his army had an effect far greater than simply the removal of a British army from the field, significant though that was. Freeman’s Farm and Bemis Heights provided the French the opportunity to convince themselves that aiding the Americans would be advantageous to King Louis. As a monarchy France had little reason to support a revolt against a king. But assisting those who were fighting a traditional enemy, in this case, Great Britain, had much to recommend it.

So, early in 1778, the American colonies and the Kingdom of France signed a treaty under which the latter would provide the former with money, arms, and soldiers. Already, France surreptitiously had sent over the first two (as had the Dutch). Now soldiers came as well. In July 1780 four thousand well-trained, well-equipped French troops under the command of the Comte de Rochambeau arrived in America, disembarking at Newport, Rhode Island. One of the first steps taken by Rochambeau was to place his forces under the command of George Washington. Just as important to the American cause was the financial support France provided. During most of the conflict, the Continental Congress and its armies had little money. Moreover, the currency the Congress issued declined in value so that, more often than not, American generals in command lacked funds to pay their troops or purchase supplies. French money rectified this.

French assistance also was rendered on the high seas. France contributed to the military equation something the Americans neither had nor could have. That was a fleet capable of challenging the Royal Navy.

Three times a French fleet sailed to America. In July 1778, warships flying the fleur-de-lis appeared off New York and Newport. But their efforts were of little consequence and in November they departed. A year later a large naval force, in company with American infantry, attacked the British-held city of Savannah. The attack failed and many French sailors and marines were killed. So, again, the ships departed. The third expedition, a fleet under the command of the Comte de Grasse, entered the Chesapeake in 1781. Its efforts—to be explained later—would prove decisive.

Though it was small, the Americans did possess a navy. In October 1775, the Continental Congress approved the outfitting of several small warships, and one month later in Philadelphia, John Adams drafted “Rules for the Regulation of the Navy of the United Colonies.” Earlier, George Washington had secured his own collection of vessels that attacked British supply ships. By 1777, when his “fleet” disbanded, the general’s naval force had captured fifty-five prizes.

Late in 1775, the Congress authorized the construction of thirteen frigates (requiring that they be built in seven different colonies) and appointed the first officers of the Continental navy. Of the five first lieutenants so designated, the most senior was a Scotsman named John Paul Jones.

These frigates, and later additional vessels, achieved several successes. In 1776, for example, the Continental brig
Andrew Doria
, under the command of Captain Nicholas Biddle, took ten British ships during a four-month voyage. In 1777, Captain Lambert Wickes’s brig
Reprisal
captured five prizes off the coasts of Spain and France. And, in 1778 John Paul Jones, now a captain, took the sloop
Ranger
to England, raiding its west coast and causing great alarm though little damage. Sixteen months later he engaged a British man-of-war that was escorting a convoy of forty-one ships. The ensuing battle was long and bloody. The result was a victory for Jones, who gained immense fame. However, the convoy escaped, and the British commander, having put up a spirited defense, was knighted by George III.

Yet, overall, despite these successes, the Continental navy did not accomplish much. During the years 1775–1783 its defeats far exceeded its victories. For example, of those thirteen frigates authorized in 1775, only seven got to sea and all were lost.

Where the Americans achieved considerable maritime success was with privateers. These were privately owned armed vessels. Because they sailed under official commissions issued by the colonial governments, they were not considered pirates. Privateers were a fact of life in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and their employment was widespread. Most European nations sponsored them, and in France their captains often became national heroes.

Given that the American colonies were coastal entities, they had substantial maritime capabilities. Their citizens could build ships, raise crews, and sail the oceans. As privateers made large profits from successful cruises—they kept what they captured—incentives to sponsor and sail in such vessels were great. Hence, throughout the War for Independence, large numbers of American privateers, especially from New England, were active in Atlantic and Caribbean waters, hunting for unescorted British ships.

These privateers—there were some 440 of them by 1781—caused significant damage to England’s vast maritime enterprise. How many British ships the American privateers captured is in dispute; the number lies somewhere between two hundred and four hundred. However, the cost to the Americans was not negligible. Sailors captured by the Royal Navy—and there were many—were imprisoned in hulks, rotting ships from which masts and guns had been removed. These were moored in British-controlled harbors. Conditions aboard the hulks were dreadful and many prisoners failed to survive.

Of course men died on land as well. The causes of death were many: disease, malnutrition, weather, medical ignorance, and British gunfire. All but the last were in evidence at Valley Forge, a nondescript piece of real estate twenty miles northwest of Philadelphia where, after the Battle of Germantown, Washington and his army spent the terrible winter of 1777–1778. Conditions in the American camp were dreadful. At times men ate their shoes. More than twenty-two hundred men did not survive. Beyond the loss of life the tragedy was that many of the supplies needed had been obtained but not delivered. Clothes, for example, were stored in a warehouse in Lancaster, Pennsylvania. What had occurred was the collapse of the army’s supply system. Washington therefore appointed a new quartermaster general, Nathanael Greene, who, prior to his military service, had been a successful businessman. Greene spent the next two years improving the supply corps, which at one time employed more than three thousand men engaged in securing the means to clothe, house, and transport American soldiers.

Washington made another appointment that would change things for the better. In February 1778, there had appeared at Valley Forge a Prussian officer by the name of Friedrich Wilhelm Ludolf Gerhard Augustin von Steuben. Washington made him the officer in charge of training, and von Steuben, who knew his trade, built the Continental army into a highly professional force. In May Congress rewarded him with the rank of major general and made von Steuben the army’s inspector general.

During the War for Independence the Continental Congress gave commissions to numerous Europeans who, like the Prussian drill master, had come to aid the American cause. Many, however, were dilettantes and contributed little. But a few made major contributions: Casimir Pulaski, a Pole, was a fearless cavalry leader. Johann deKalb was a senior commander in the South. And George Washington’s favorite, the Marquis de Lafayette, a major general like von Steuben, commanded American troops in Rhode Island, New York, New Jersey, and Virginia.

By the spring of 1778 Washington and his much improved army were still at Valley Forge. But the British, who also had not moved, had made a major change. General Howe had resigned and returned to England. Sir William believed military success in the colonies required an additional thirty-five thousand troops, which he knew would not be forthcoming. So he declared the war unwinnable and departed. Lord Germain then had to find a new commander. He selected Sir Henry Clinton. A senior officer known to be personally brave yet prone to caution, Clinton had served as Howe’s second-in-command. His military record was sound, despite having played a major role two years before in an unsuccessful effort to seize Charleston. So on March 21, 1778, Henry Clinton took control of the British army in America.

Almost immediately he was directed by Germain to send some of his troops to the West Indies and to Florida. With his army reduced in size Clinton decided to concentrate his forces in New York, evacuating Philadelphia on June 18. Washington promptly occupied the city and proceeded to pursue Clinton, who had left by land rather than by sea.

General Washington was looking for a fight, and at Monmouth Court House in New Jersey he found one. The Continental army attacked the British on June 28, and in a fierce engagement, both sides lost approximately 350 men. Clinton and his army survived and soon reached New York. Washington, aware that a decisive victory could have been achieved but wasn’t, took solace in the solid performance of his von Steuben–trained regulars.