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stood Russian culture or how his lack of understanding of Russian thought processes might foster misperception, miscalculation, and ultimately friction.

It is interesting to note that, in the end, Khrushchev employed economic weapons to cope with Beijing's challenge. How and why did he choose to do so? What objectives did he intend to achieve? How effective did he believe his "economic blackmail" could be? A succinct answer to these questions has yet to be found. And perhaps a more interesting question is: How great an effect did the Western embargo against China have in causing the Sino-Soviet split? These questions deserve a more comprehensive study than what this chapter has aimed at. Such an undertaking would have to be an international history with an analytic focus on the use of economic sanctions in pursuit of foreign policy goals an interesting and important phenomenon of twentieth-century international relations.

⁹⁸

Notes

1. These views are best summarized in Alexander Eckstein,
Communist China's Economic Growth and Foreign Trade: Implications for U.S. Policy
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), 136-7.

2. See, in particular, Stephen M. Wait,
The Origins of Alliance
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987), chaps. 1-3; Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder, eds.,
Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), intro.

3. Mao Zedong, "Address to the Preparatory Meeting of the New Political Consultative Council,"
Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung
(Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1971), vol. 4, 469. For how Mao's concerns about the U.S. threat evolved, see Zhang Shuguang,
Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese-American Confrontation, 1949-1958
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992), 14-21.

4. Speech, Mao Zedong, at the Meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee, September 8, 1948,
Dang de wenxian
[Party documents], no. 5 (1989): 3-6.

5. Mao's telegram to the CCP Central Committee, January 5, 1950,
Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao
[Mao's manuscripts since the founding of the People's Republic of China] (hereafter
Mao wengao
), vol. 1, 215; for an English translation, see
Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) Bulletin
8-9 (Winter 1996/1997): 229-30.

6. Mao's telegram to the CCP CC, January 2, 1950,
Mao wengao,
vol. 1,213; See also
CWIHP Bulletin
8-9 (Winter 1996/1997): 228-9.

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7. When the negotiations started, the Soviets seemed unwilling to accommodate all the Chinese demands. One great difficulty for Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai was to obtain a clear commitment from the Soviet Union to assist China if it was invaded, an objective he regarded as the key to an alliance treaty. The first Soviet-drafted version of the treaty stated that if one side was invaded by a third party, the other side "is supposed to [
de yi,
in Chinese] offer assistance." To Zhou this was not sufficient because it did not make clear the binding liability of a military alliance. He exerted all his efforts to get a clarified version out of the Soviets: "is supposed to" was to become ''must devote all its efforts" [
jiejin quanli,
in Chinese]. It took quite a while for Zhou and his aides to bargain over this with the Soviets. The Chinese were happy with the final text, however, which provided that "if one side is attacked by a third party, the other side must devote all its efforts to provide military and other assistance." Wu Xiuquan,
Zai Waijiaobu banian
[My eight years in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 1950-October 1958] (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi, 1983), 8-9.

8. Mao Zedong's speech at the sixth meeting of the Central People's Government Council, April 11, 1950,
Mao wengao,
vol. 1,291.

9. CCP CC, Instruction on Diplomatic Affairs, August 18, 1944,
Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji
[Selected documents of the CCP CC], vol. 14, 314-18.

10.
Dangdai Zhongguo jiben jianshe
[China today: Capital construction] (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue, 1989), vol. 1, 4-5.

11. Mao Zedong, "Address to the Preparatory Meeting of the New Political Consultative Council,"
Selected Works,
vol. 4, 469; Chen Yun, "To Overcome Serious Financial and Economic Difficulties,"
Chen Yun wengao xuanbian, 1949-1956
[Selected works and manuscripts of Chen Yun] (Beijing: Renmin, 1984), 2.

12. Speech, Mao Zedong, at the meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee, September 8, 1948,
Dang de wenxian,
no. 5 (1989): 15.

13. Mao, "Report to the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the CCP" and "On the People' s Democratic Dictatorship,"
Mao Zedong xuanji
[Selected works of Mao Zedong] (Beijing: Renmin, 1960), 1432-4, 1479-80.

14. Ibid., 1434, 1436.

15. Zhou, "The Present Financial and Economic Situation and Relations between the

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