France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe, 1944-1954 (27 page)

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Authors: William I. Hitchcock

Tags: #History, #Europe, #France, #Western, #Modern, #20th Century, #Political Science, #Security (National & International), #test

BOOK: France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe, 1944-1954
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Page 118
favor the progressive integration of Germany into a European structure, and into organizations which will be the foundation for peaceful cooperation between the European states, so we consider the reconstitution of a German military force to be beyond discussion."
51
Press speculation in the United States made it very difficult to avoid discussion of the issue, however, as Ambassador Bonnet reported from Washington. Despite public reassurances by Defense Secretary Johnson and General Bradley that they were not considering rearmament, "a considerable surge in favor of German rearmament has appeared in the press." Bonnet worried that these reports might so raise expectations that public opinion would be led to believe that the success of American policy in Europe now depended on a German contribution to European defense.
52
Even the American denials that the policy was under discussion seemed suspect. In early December, Seydoux informed François-Poncet that, according to his information, the United States was examining ways of transforming
Land
police forces into a reserve force "which could be mobilized quickly in the event of a crisis."
53
Clearly, French officials took little comfort from the stated American policy against German rearmament.
They were still more unnerved by the response of Chancellor Adenauer to the growing controversy. Although François-Poncet thought that most West Germans were firmly in favor of a neutral stance in the Cold War, Adenauer jumped at the opportunity to discuss what measures the Allies were willing to take to provide for West Germany's security. The agitated chancellor pressed the French high commissioner, asking, "will the line of western defense be established on the Rhine or the Elbe?" Aware that the Soviets were setting up a new armed force in East Germany, Adenauer urged François-Poncet to consider the implications of leaving Germany outside the western security framework, and the Frenchman appears to have been sympathetic. "I do not think, for my part, that he was insincere," he reported. The Allies had left Germany disarmed and vulnerable. Would they not now accept responsibility for defending the new nation?
54
Adenauer did not confine his diplomacy to the back rooms of the Allied High Commission, however. On December 3, he gave an interview to a correspondent of the
Cleveland Plain Dealer
in which he reaffirmed his opposition to the reconstitution of a German army but stated that he would consider the creation of a German contingent inside a European army, under European command. In his memoirs Adenauer wrote that this had been a calculated bid to secure from the West
 
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the recognition of Germany's equal status alongside other West European nations. "Equal duties supposed equal rights. I thought that rearmament would have far-reaching consequences for the political position of our people in the world. Rearmament might be the way to gaining full sovereignty for the Federal Republic. This made it the essential question of our political future."
55
The scenario that French officials had most feared  that one concession to the crafty chancellor would only lead him to seek others  had come to pass.
Schuman sought to put an end to any speculation about German rearmament, whether within a European army or otherwise. Not only was the policy anathema to France from a security and diplomatic point of view, but the question was perhaps the only topic on which French public opinion was united. To have admitted that the government, even for a moment, had considered accepting a German contribution to western defense would have instantly undone the coalition government and put an end to the Third Force. Schuman, therefore, spoke in uncompromising terms when he addressed the Conseil de la République (the Fourth Republic's Senate) on December 9. Those who suggested the formation of a European army were quite deluded, he said. The structure of Europe did not yet have the strength economically or politically to begin to consider a security component. The Atlantic Alliance provided for Europe's security, and Germany had specifically been left out of it. There could be no question of elevating Germany to a status equal to the members of this organization, for Germany had been defeated in war and must remain occupied by the victors. France and its allies, Schuman continued, had earned their right to occupy Germany, and they would stay there to safeguard western Europe. Germany simply did not have any right to raise the issue with the Occupation Powers, and therefore the idea of a European army  the product of "a fertile imagination"  had no validity whatsoever.
56
That Germany, nearly sovereign in economic and political matters, might soon be granted influence in security matters was a prospect that flew in the face of five years of French diplomacy, and hence, from France's perspective, was inadmissible.
Schuman was swimming against the tide. Already in London and Washington, military planners had begun to speculate about how German manpower might be brought to bear in the framework of the Western Alliance. The British chiefs of staff took a long look at Europe's strategic requirements in March 1950, and concluded that NATO forces as then constituted, including a British military commitment of two infantry divisions, would be inadequate to hold off a Soviet army re-
 
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ported to have 25 divisions stationed in eastern Europe  and perhaps as many as 175 within Soviet borders. Though fully aware of the political difficulties of proposing German rearmament, the British cabinet had come to the conclusion by April that the FRG should eventually join NATO.
57
The U.S. State Department believed that the political consequences of German rearmament would be too great for the fragile alliance, and particularly France, to bear. By the spring of 1950, however, this view had been overtaken by an emerging consensus in favor of some kind of German contribution to European defense. The Jjoint Chiefs of Staff in late April were ''firmly of the opinion that, from the military point of view, the appropriate and early rearming of Western Germany is of fundamental importance to the defense of Western Europe against the USSR."
58
Coming hard on the heels of a very influential policy paper from the National Security Council  the famous NSC 68, a frothing account of Soviet designs for world domination  the Joint Chiefs' active support for a reversal of American disarmament policy signaled a clear break with the past. Though Acheson and Truman were very worried about the impact such a shift in policy might have on the European allies  Truman dismissed the JCS recommendation as "decidedly militaristic"  the chief American ambassadors, after a meeting in Rome in late March, concurred in the view that "immediate consideration" ought to be given to using German industrial capacity to contribute to a European defense buildup.
59
As if this evolution in American thinking were not enough of a threat to French conceptions, Chancellor Adenauer also kept pressing the Allies to address German defense needs. In April, he proposed that a West German police force, 25,000 strong, be placed under the control of the Federal government, above and beyond the already existing
Land
police forces.
60
For France, all of these developments pointed toward a greater degree of German sovereignty and influence in Europe.
In light of these unfavorable portents concerning German rearmament, French officials believed it incumbent upon them to remind the chancellor of Germany's second-class status within the western European state system. The ongoing debate about French designs in the Saar provided a useful opportunity to deliver this message. In early 1950, France moved ahead with a plan to link the economy of the coal-rich Saar to France through a customs union, and to control the mines and railways with long-term leases, while granting the Saar an autonomous government. The French also outlined a formal convention between the Saar and France that would legally institute this state of affairs until
 
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a future peace treaty might revisit the issue.
61
Despite the firm legal ground on which France stood, the Germans remained profoundly dissatisfied about the status of the Saar. "No Oder-Neisse line in the West!" was the cry of the SPD.
62
Chancellor Adenauer, to mute criticism that he was too submissive to western demands, used the Saar issue to attack French policy toward Germany. During a visit in January 1950 by Schuman to Bonn to try to calm troubled waters, Adenauer launched into a stem condemnation of French policy in the Saar, claiming that if the French did not show flexibility in the creation of a Saar statute, Germany would refuse to join the Council of Europe. Schuman, angered at the tone of both Adenauer and the German press, shot back through his emissaries that if Germany did not join the Council, the entire Petersberg accords would be placed in jeopardy, and this would surely work to Adenauer's disadvantage. Schuman claimed that his policy had the full support of the Allies, and that France would proceed with a statute that reflected French interests.
63
Although Britain and the United States did not formally object to France's position on the Saar  they recognized that France was legally in the right  leaders in both countries bemoaned France's timing in opening a new round of negotiations on the Saar just at a time when Adenauer needed strong gestures of support to justify his policy of alignment with the West.
64
Instead, the publication of the Franco-Saar Conventions on March 3, 1950, cast a pall over Franco-German relations, with Adenauer claiming that French policy could place European unity in grave jeopardy.
65
Though France did not alter its policy to suit Adenauer, and in fact Germany joined the Council of Europe anyway in May, the entire affair revealed an undercurrent of hostility in the Paris-Bonn relationship.
In a further effort to underscore Germany's junior status in Europe, the French sought the reorganization of the NATO alliance in such a way as to enhance French influence while limiting a future German role. All the allies were keen on strengthening the powers of the North Atlantic Council (NAC), the chief decision-making body of NATO, so that it could deal, in a way the OEEC or Council of Europe clearly could not, with the complex problem of rearmament, its economic impact on European recovery, and the future relation of Germany to NATO. The United States favored a stronger NAC, probably including West Germany, but wanted to avoid any weakening of European economic and political institutions. Britain, by contrast, was willing to see the Council emerge as the sole focus of real economic and political power in the
 
Page 122
Atlantic-European region, with European institutions consequently weakened.
66
Neither scheme suited French interests. In hopes of deflecting the British assault on European economic institutions, while also keeping Germany out of the Western Alliance, France proposed what might be termed a two-tier approach to the problem. On the upper tier, the French envisioned a strengthened NAC, the chief decisionmaking body on rearmament questions, though the executive leadership of the Council would be limited to the three powers of the Standing Group, perhaps with Canada thrown in. On the lower tier, the European economic organizations would be widened, perhaps expanded to include Canada and the United States, and Germany's full membership would be promoted. Posing as a champion of Germany's economic reintegration into the European economy, then, France also sought to fend off any incursion against the tripartite character of the NAC leadership. In this way, some kind of German contribution to western economic security could be made and Germany be linked to the western world. Yet Germany would remain without influence in strategic and defense questions.
67
These issues were scheduled for debate at the upcoming three-power conference, scheduled for early May in London.
France delivered an additional snub to Germany's initiating role in European politics when Robert Schuman rejected a proposal made by Chancellor Adenauer in March 1950 to explore the possibility of a Franco-German economic union. Adenauer proposed the idea to promote economic growth on both sides of the Rhine and to dispel the fears of a postoccupation German colossus.
68
For France to accept such a proposal would be to acknowledge the defeat of the principle that had governed its diplomacy since the end of the war: that Germany, a vanquished nation, would be admitted back into the community of nations on an Allied, not a German, timetable. Grateful for Adenauer's evidently Francophile instincts, Schuman nevertheless rejected his ideas and reiterated France's belief that Germany's integration into Europe could go forward only in steady, deliberate stages. In a speech to his MRP delegates at the Party Congress in March, he reminded the audience that "certain preliminary conditions of a political and psychological nature must first be met, even for economic union; because what is at the basis of close cooperation is confidence and mutual security. . . . We cannot avoid the political problem in speaking solely about economic issues."
69
As long as Germany's political character had yet to be proven, France would continue to adopt a cautious attitude toward Germany's search for equality of rights.

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