France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe, 1944-1954 (26 page)

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Authors: William I. Hitchcock

Tags: #History, #Europe, #France, #Western, #Modern, #20th Century, #Political Science, #Security (National & International), #test

BOOK: France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe, 1944-1954
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Page 112
Bevin, and Schuman, all agreeing on the urgency of facing Stalin with a fait accompli on West Germany, swept aside the complex draft agreements over which the occupation authorities had labored since June 1948 and signed nine brief directives, putting into place the framework for a new German state and a new Allied control authority. They signed an Occupation Statute that gave almost complete political sovereignty to the new German government, while reserving the right of the Allied High Commission to intervene if it chose to do so. They signed an agreement for the fusion of the French zone with the bizone; they drew up instructions to the Bonn Parliamentary Council, informing it of their views in favor of a federal Basic Law; they reached agreement on dismantling and reparations; and they confirmed their agreement on the Ruhr Authority. In about forty-eight hours they settled problems with which Allied negotiators had wrestled for months. Schuman's new tactics to secure a constructive settlement with Germany had been the prerequisite.
32
Schuman's political calculation that solidarity with the Anglo-Americans would pay off by bringing France closer to Germany within an Allied-sponsored framework appeared justified in late May, when the four occupation powers gathered in Paris to convoke the CFM. The three western Allies presented their proposals to the new Soviet foreign minister, Andrei Vishinsky: the eastern zone must be incorporated with the other three zones through the framework of the Basic Law and Occupation Statute; free elections would follow throughout Germany and a federal government be established; a four-power civilian High Commission would supervise these proceedings. The Soviets, not surprisingly, rejected these conditions and the conference sputtered to an end in late June. Though Stalin lifted the Berlin blockade, the four occupying powers were no nearer to agreeing on terms for the unification of Germany.
33
The United States, Great Britain, and France concluded that a prompt establishment of a West German state would serve their interests by stabilizing Germany and bringing it into the western European framework. However, the precise means to effect this link had yet to be specified. On the political plane, Germany's resurrection pointed to the need for international institutions, like the Council of Europe and Western Union, to anchor the new state into place among its less powerful western neighbors. Yet Germany had not been offered membership in these organizations. On the economic plane, the OEEC purported to act as a monitor of European economic growth and cooperation, but Britain and
 
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France vitiated the effectiveness of this organization by feuding bitterly over the basic principles of economic cooperation and harmonization of monetary policies.
34
Thus, the emergent German state was not linked to Europe in any way except through the tenuous connection of the Marshall Plan and the occupation, both of which were temporary. Germany even balked at cooperating with the supervisory IAR.
The French government therefore heartily endorsed America's renewed efforts, upon the formal establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany, to secure German allegiance to the West. The new state held elections to its Bundestag in August, and on September 15, 1949, this body elected Konrad Adenauer to the post of federal chancellor. Adenauer quickly formed a coalition government comprised of his Christian Democrats, the Free Democratic Party, and the German Party, isolating the powerful and vociferous Social Democrats. As chancellor, Adenauer had primary responsibility for dealing with the occupation government, which was reconfigured into the civilian Allied High Commission (AHC). In the AHC, the influential and well-connected lawyer John J. McCloy served as the American high commissioner, replacing General Clay. France's prewar ambassador to Berlin, André François-Poncet, succeeded General Koenig, while the British military governor, General Sir Brian Robertson, remained in his post. These three men, in ensuring German compliance with the Occupation Statute, were to allow Germany enough freedom of action to demonstrate good behavior, while maintaining the authority to intervene in German affairs should events require.
35
Adenauer quickly discovered, to the consternation of his European partners, just how much bargaining power he possessed. Immediately after taking up his post, the chancellor began a sustained campaign against the Allied policy of dismantling German heavy industry, a policy that, he claimed, created bitter resentment within the country and might undermine his own government.
36
Ernest Bevin and Dean Acheson agreed. By late October, Bevin had come to fear that the dismantling policy was sapping the "moral authority" of the AHC. Adenauer's government, which had promoted a policy of cooperation with the Allies, might be weakened by the controversy over the issue. In these circumstances, Bevin believed that an agreement on slowing dismantling in exchange for a commitment from Germany to cooperate with the economic control mechanisms like the Ruhr Authority and the Military Security Board (MSB) would improve the prospects of "associating Germany closely with the western world."
37
 
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In October 1949, Acheson wrote to Schuman, laying out the case for a still more conciliatory French policy toward Germany. France, in bringing Germany into western Europe, could demonstrate leadership and magnanimity, thus bolstering France's own security by improving relations with Germany. Acheson urged Schuman to join the United States and Britain in eliminating the more burdensome plans for the dismantling of German industry and offering Germany membership in the Council of Europe. In exchange, Germany would be asked to cooperate with the IAR and the MSB.
38
Schuman knew that his policy of rapprochement presented real political risks at home. But the risks of failing to grasp the opportunities presented by a "European" solution to the German question were even greater. As Jean Letourneau, one of Schuman's MRP colleagues put it, "Britain, despite Strasbourg [i.e., the Council of Europe], is separated from Europe, and the Americans are pressing us to take command of it. If we refuse, the United States will bestow this leadership role on Germany within six months."
39
This was the last chance to put teeth into the Ruhr Authority while at the same time asserting French leadership in Europe. Only Germany would benefit from France's failure to act.
In early November, Schuman courageously brought Acheson's proposals before the French cabinet. Though he clearly favored the package, Schuman trod lightly in the cabinet, aware that any hint of concessions to Germany would be poorly received in some quarters. Indeed, the debate was ferocious, with Interior Minister Jules Moch severely critical of Schuman's conciliatory policy. Justice Minister René Mayer also expressed concern at the apparent American willingness to coddle the Germans. Building Europe was fine, he thought; "the only problem is that France must be at the head of the line and not Germany." Above all, "Germany must not become the little darling [
chou-chou
] of the Marshall Plan." Support, however, came from the new prime minister, Georges Bidault, who in many ways had initiated the policy of rapprochement with Germany and who recognized that Schuman was in the same kind of dilemma that he, Bidault, had been in following the London accords of June 1948. In the face of a concerted effort by the United States and Britain to ease controls over German life, France had little choice but to cooperate. Indeed, there were distinct advantages to be gained. The fruits of the policy of cooperation had now ripened: "we must begin to build Europe," Bidault stated. "It will be difficult, but we must do it. We must do it with Germany, and if possible, we must develop a plan with Britain." Germany must enter the Council of Eu-
 
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rope, not least because "the organization of Europe will be a means of controlling German production which, in any case, must not surpass its present level." For Bidault, Schuman's policy complemented the efforts he himself had made as foreign minister to secure German cooperation with the beneficent controlling power of a reconstructed and united western Europe. Following Bidault's remarks, the cabinet voted in favor of Schuman's policy.
40
During November 9 and 10, Acheson, Bevin, and Schuman met in Paris to define the terms of the agreement to be offered to Adenauer. The three men proposed to slow, though not halt, dismantling of factories and industrial plants and ease restrictions on German shipbuilding. They agreed to invite Germany to join the Council of Europe as an associate member and to allow the new state to establish consular and commercial relations abroad. In return, Germany would commit itself to cooperate with the MSB to maintain the demilitarization of the FRG. Germany would also be obliged to submit to the oversight of the IAR, which would enforce limits on the annual production of German steel (II.2 million tons per annum) and monitor the production, distribution, and management of the coal and steel industries.
41
When the AHC met with Adenauer at its headquarters on the hill near Bonn called the Petersberg to offer him this package, he quickly accepted. The agreement, he wrote later, "represented a very great success. For the first time since the collapse we were officially recognized as equal and for the first time we re-entered the international sphere."
42
For these very reasons, Robert Schuman knew that he would have a tough time securing the assent of the National Assembly to the Petersberg Protocol. The agreement was widely seen in France as a major concession to Bonn.
43
However, Schuman argued that enforceable if lenient restrictions were far more desirable than a severe settlement that created mistrust and rancor. "I do not mean to minimize the concessions we have granted," he told the deputies, "but I am convinced we have done the right thing. We cannot remain stuck in a negative attitude. Experience has shown that excessive prohibitions will weaken if they are not universally enforced. Our security cannot be based on unilateral clauses. True, Frenchmen do not have the right to forget the past, with its suffering and cruelties; but we who are responsible for the future of France, of Europe and even humanity, we must avoid the repetition of previous mistakes."
44
Reminding his audience of the obstructionist policy France had pursued following World War I, Schuman claimed that concessions to Germany would win the sympathy of the new German
 
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government and so entice the new state into a voluntary economic and political association with its neighbors.
Yet the element of risk in Schuman's approach must not be overlooked. Germany was recovering at an enormously rapid rate.
45
The OEEC and Council of Europe remained weak, and Adenauer's commitment to the Western Alliance had not yet been tested. Would the German chancellor willingly restrain German power in the interests of European stability? Schuman clearly believed so, but as the Cold War intensified, and as the debate about German rearmament got under way, the new French policy of accommodation toward Germany was put to a very serious test.
The Western Alliance and the Origins of the Schuman Plan
The increasingly conciliatory position on Germany taken by Robert Schuman, culminating in the Petersberg accords, reflected a striking degree of strategic convergence between the United States and France over the course of 1949. The unified position taken against the Soviets at the Paris CFM represented a major departure for French policy, which for years had profited from U.S.-Soviet disagreements to postpone action on German recovery. Yet the focal point of this convergence was NATO. Since taking up his position as secretary of state in January 1949, Dean Acheson had shown himself to be far more sensitive to French security concerns than his predecessors. Indeed, as the historian Melvyn Leffler and others have shown, one of Acheson's principal arguments in favor of the Atlantic Alliance was that, by reassuring France of America's commitment to Europe, it would promote an atmosphere of trust and stability and encourage France to take a less hostile view of German recovery. The OEEC and the Council of Europe, two institutions also backed by France and America, had failed to serve these ends. NATO, because it excluded Germany and boosted French stature in Allied strategic planning, promised to be far more successful.
46
The United States and France were also finding common ground in Indochina. Since the end of the war Americans had been critical of the French reassertion of its colonial presence in Asia. With the proclamation in October 1949 of the People's Republic of China, however, western observers feared the possible linkage between Mao and Ho Chi Minh's movement in Vietnam. In January 1950, Mao recognized Ho's government, forcing France's allies to shore up the position of Emperor
 
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Bao Dai, a young, French-backed national leader who appeared more at ease on the Côte d'Azur than in Saigon. France signed an agreement with Bao Dai in March 1949, giving Vietnam associate status within the French Union and a certain degree of autonomy. The agreement pleased neither the left nor the right in Paris and languished in the Assembly, unratified. Recognition of Ho by Mao, however, followed by Soviet recognition on January 30, 1950, formally brought Indochina into the Cold War. The French Assembly ratified the Bao Dai agreement on February 2, 1950, and London and Washington recognized his government within the week.
47
By March, the United States was considering giving "immediate military assistance" to French forces in Indochina. Though the French would welcome such aid, they could also expect increased American pressure for a more aggressive military campaign against Ho.
48
Among these points of convergence, however, Germany remained a sticking point. For despite their similar assessment of the threats facing western Europe, the French and Americans remained divided on how best to meet them. Ever since the formation of the West German government, questions had been raised in Washington about how to handle the thorny problem of integrating Germany into the western defense system. Of course, American officials steadfastly denied that they envisioned a rearmed West Germany. When, in mid-November, the
New York Times
reported that staff officers of a number of European countries had been considering a plan for raising five German divisions, American officials, and President Truman, were obliged to deny any American involvement in the scheme. Matters were not helped when, a week later, General Lucius Clay, now retired from his duties as military governor, called for "a composite force" for European defense, using French aircraft and armor, Benelux artillery, and German infantry.
49
French observers grew suspicious. "Everything is happening," noted François Seydoux, the new director of the European Office in the Quai, "as if the American planners were moving in stages: they want to use Germany against the USSR but must take into account French sensitivities." Seydoux speculated on the possible consequences of a rearmed Germany: either the Soviets would be provoked into a preemptive strike against this new bulwark or, perhaps worse, Germany, once rearmed and the master of its own destiny, might be drawn into an unholy alliance with the Soviets.
50
For these reasons, Seydoux, in instructions to the missions in London, Washington, and Bonn, firmly stated the Ministry's opposition to German rearmament: "Just as we

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