France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe, 1944-1954 (28 page)

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Authors: William I. Hitchcock

Tags: #History, #Europe, #France, #Western, #Modern, #20th Century, #Political Science, #Security (National & International), #test

BOOK: France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe, 1944-1954
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As the May conference neared, however, French policymakers grew increasingly concerned that their efforts to keep the Germans in place would not succeed for long. The chief of the Direction d'Europe, François Seydoux, believed that France was likely to find itself completely isolated at the upcoming conference. "The Americans and British," he wrote in a long memorandum in early April, "probably think at this point that the moment has come not simply to revise the Occupation Statute but to move beyond the framework of a statute, to conclude a separate peace with the West German government and to return to her the privileges of sovereignty which they [the Allies] now hold." Such a policy, for France, was unacceptable. Germany was welcome in the European community, but its evolution must be carefully monitored. "The increasing liberty which she [Germany] enjoys in the international arena'' must not be allowed to expand beyond the confines set out by the Occupation Statute and the Petersberg agreements. Nevertheless, Seydoux acknowledged, European organizations, particularly the Council of Europe, had not proved effective in coordinating the behavior of any of the member states, and not until they were strengthened could the German problem be solved. "It seems," he wrote, "that it is in bringing West Germany into ever closer association with a Europe of improved organization that we shall be able to find a satisfactory solution for Germany as well as for France, while also demonstrating to the Americans and to the British that it is not our intention to leave the Germans indefinitely in a position of inferiority." Seydoux recognized that to entice Adenauer into the framework of Europe, France too might have to limit its own freedom of action somewhat, for a strengthened Council of Europe would have "supranational authority, [able] to impose its decisions upon Western Europe." But this would be a fairly small price to pay to realize what had been France's chief political aim since 1945. In a tightly integrated Europe, Seydoux thought, "Germany would not recover her complete independence. From her present régime of trusteeship would follow without transition another régime under which other limitations would restrain her liberty." In such a scenario, "no moment would be allowed to pass during which Germany would be the complete master of her destiny. She would leave the framework that presently contains her only to enter into another." This integrative approach had the potential to solve many aspects of the German problem: it "would bind Germany; it would correspond to the preoccupation of the United States to see Europe accentuate its integration; it would facilitate study of the German rearmament question; it would give us possibilities of
 
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maneuver and at the same time inform our interlocutors of the goals we hope, with their help, to achieve."
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To ensure that Germany never possessed complete freedom of action, France would insist that the Occupation Statute be left intact until the framework of a strong, European organization was in place and ready to accommodate France, Germany, and their neighbors on equal terms.
Seydoux's vision had one obvious flaw. He anticipated that the Council of Europe could be strengthened and made the vehicle of a much closer integration of the European states. The problem with the Council since its inception had been the unwillingness of Britain to consider wide powers for the body, and there seemed no evidence that Britain was willing to change its view on this matter now. Even so, Seydoux's general tactical approach  that France could counter the American generosity toward Germany with its own positive, but restrictive, scheme  was echoed in the instructions that the Quai sent on to René Massigli as he prepared to lead the French delegation in the May talks. "The question must be asked," the memo read, "whether it is in our best interests to abandon the position we habitually defend and to take the initiative, right from the start of the coming conference, to propose a constructive long-term plan for Germany. . . . [France should] define a policy which can, within the Occupation Statute, allow the close association of Germany with Western Europe. . . . The positive aspect [of this policy], from the Anglo-Saxon perspective, would be undeniable. At the same time, with the limits [of this policy] specifically defined, we would be secure from excessive German demands and any overly ambitious American proposals."
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As the May conference drew near, then, the Foreign Ministry had determined to propose some kind of plan for the close association of Germany and France within a European framework, one that would preempt any move by the Americans in the coming conference to seek a softening of the Occupation Statute. Precisely what this proposal would look like had yet to be determined.
The case for a direct French appeal to Germany, perhaps before the conference began, was immeasurably strengthened during the tripartite preparatory meetings held in London in early May. The American, British, and French delegations had gathered to shape the agenda of the meetings slated to start on May 8, and the French for the first time were formally given the British and American views on the future of the NAC and the relation of Germany to the newly emerging European and Atlantic institutions. Seydoux had been quite correct in anticipating that the United States and Britain would call for the reevaluation of the
 
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Occupation Statute, and that they would also call for a strengthening of the NAC. He was probably not prepared for the vociferousness of the British position, laid out by the permanent undersecretary of foreign affairs and future high commissioner, Ivone Kirkpatrick, who wanted most restrictions on German economic, political, and even military activity lifted immediately. "He felt," the American minutes record, "you could not succeed in making Germany a member of the club if we could not progressively release even security restrictions. He stated we would have to trust her or not trust her."
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Kirkpatrick's views seemed considerably in advance of Bevin's, who, though favorable to German membership in the NAC in the long run, was dead-set against German rearmament and said so in a stirring House debate with Churchill in late March. But Bevin was hospitalized from April 11 to May 4, just as the ground-work for the May conference was being laid, and seems to have left Kirkpatrick with a rather free rein.
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Allowing for the possibility that Kirkpatrick was not speaking for Bevin, the Americans were nonetheless taken aback. Britain appeared willing to grant a great deal of freedom to the FRG  including membership in the NAC and "substantial, but unbalanced, military forces"  without any assurances in return. Henry Byroade of the American delegation thought London's real aim was to reduce American influence in Europe by removing all vestiges of control from Germany, in turn ''allow[ing] the British to be a major shaper of policy towards Germany which they would hope to increase by tight financial arrangements." In Byroade's mind, Britain threatened to block any "effective organization of Europe or of the North Atlantic Community." Byroade also reported Kirkpatrick's confidential remark that France was "no damn good" as an alliance partner, and that a strong Germany would be a greater asset to European security than France.
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The French delegation, led by René Massigli and Hervé Alphand, could not have known that the Americans were appalled by Kirkpatrick's proposals. The French attitude on Germany and the NAC had been prickly from the start of the talks. Alphand, speaking on April 27 at the beginning of the tripartite preparatory meetings, said "he must declare categorically, in the name of the French Government, that Germany must not become, either directly or indirectly, a member of the Atlantic system."
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The French government had tried to be cooperative, and its willingness to compromise with the Allies had been crucial in the gradual reestablishment of German sovereignty. But now the United States and Britain appeared to be going too far, demanding a virtual abandonment of the occupation system and the rearmament of Germany within
 
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NATO. These were demands no French government could accept. If these preparatory meetings were any indication, Schuman stood to receive a very serious shock from his Anglo-American allies when he arrived in London for the start of the conference.
It is in this environment  with French influence in Germany and within the alliance challenged from all sides  that the Schuman proposal of May 1950 for merging German and French coal and steel production must be understood. Most accounts of the Schuman Plan attribute a great deal of credit to Planning Commissioner Jean Monnet for devising the scheme and pressing it on the foreign minister. To Monnet, certainly, should go much praise. Yet such ideas were not unusual with Monnet, a man whose unorthodox thinking in economic matters had led him to propose politico-economic union with Britain on at least two occasions. Monnet, concerned about the deteriorating international situation and about the damage the Saar issue had done to Franco-German relations, conceived of the idea during a week of hiking in the Swiss Alps. He sought to bring the two nations together through an international High Authority that controlled access to and production of the economic lifeblood of Europe: coal and steel. The idea bore his characteristic traits, those that had inspired the Plan de Modernisation et d'Equipement of 1946. An apolitical body, beyond the pressures of governments and nations, could rationally arbitrate between opposing interests and through the sheer force of logic prevail over long-standing economic, political, and cultural animosities. The "planning consensus" he had fashioned for domestic recovery informed Monnet's vision of European unity, and explains why he so quickly soured on the OEEC and even the Council of Europe, bodies largely held hostage by the national priorities of their members. Monnet had held this vision since 1940, if not earlier, and at last he had an opening to urge it upon a sympathetic listener.
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Yet Monnet's ideas could never have been realized without the political clout of Robert Schuman. In training their searchlights on Monnet and the economic aspects of the plan, scholars have left the French Foreign Ministry in the shadows.
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What motivated Schuman to accept Monnet's far-reaching and radical experiment, one that echoed the concepts Adenauer had put forward in March but that Schuman then rejected as precipitous?
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Of course, Schuman immediately saw that Monnet's scheme had obvious economic advantages for France. Due to the heavy investments of the Monnet Plan, France's steel industry had done remarkably well since the end of the war, recovering its 1929 level of production. Yet it still remained dependent on imports of German cok-
 
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ing coal. The Ruhr Authority had been designed to guarantee continued French access to German coal, but Adenauer's bid for sovereignty could well weaken the power of this board and leave France once again dependent on the good will of Germany to ensure the expansion of the French steel industry. Given German double-pricing policies, this was a dismal prospect. Further, with an Allied plan for European rearmament in the offing, Schuman knew that the limits imposed on German steel making would soon be stripped away, creating an unregulated glut of steel and also making Germans less willing to export coal that they needed for their own steel production. German and French industrialists saw this threat on the horizon, and had already begun quiet discussions about reviving prewar cartel agreements. Yet such ideas ran directly counter to the principles of the OEEC, and Schuman felt that international control could ensure coordinated expansion while not countering the broad trend in favor of trade liberalization.
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More important than the proposal's economic implications, however, was its diplomatic utility. Schuman's policy of cautious accommodation, which so pleased Acheson and Bevin, had culminated in the Petersberg Protocol of November 1949, securing for France modest guarantees concerning Germany's economic and political behavior in exchange for a scaling back of the dismantling program. To Schuman's horror, the debate over German rearmament in late 1949 and early 1950 threatened to shatter the fragile balance established at the Petersberg. The prospect of rearmament dramatically strengthened Adenauer's bargaining position vis-ß-vis the Allies while once again placing France in the unenviable role of spoiler, protesting further concessions to German sovereignty. To avoid such an outcome, Schuman had to find a way to consolidate a Franco-German balance of power while an agreement to that effect still appealed to the Germans. The plan for a coal-steel pool provided such a mechanism. It neatly squared the circle. To France, it offered direct control of German resources, in a framework far more enduring than the IAR. To Germany, it offered parity in an international organization and status as a partner in a genuinely "European" enterprise. Its cunning lay in its ability to provide France a crucial degree of "containment" of Germany, but through novel and constructive means rather than through the Occupation Statute, which Germans resented and which the British and the Americans had come to question. By securing such guarantees before the issue of German rearmament had been fully broached by the NAC, Schuman also denied Adenauer the ability to further exploit the Cold War to gain Germany's release from the array of postwar controls that the occupation put in place.

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