France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe, 1944-1954 (29 page)

Read France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe, 1944-1954 Online

Authors: William I. Hitchcock

Tags: #History, #Europe, #France, #Western, #Modern, #20th Century, #Political Science, #Security (National & International), #test

BOOK: France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe, 1944-1954
14Mb size Format: txt, pdf, ePub
 
Page 128
Monnet himself acknowledged these objectives quite openly. In a long letter dated May 1, 1950, Monnet set out his scheme to Schuman not in idealistic terms, but in the language of hard realpolitik, the force of which Schuman could quickly grasp. The Cold War, he wrote, had frozen any progress on Germany. The divided nation had become "a cancer" in Europe, the source of ill will and mistrust among the superpowers. Meanwhile, Europe itself had made "no real progress" toward economic and political stability or collective security. In these circumstances, the Americans, Monnet believed, wanted to strengthen Germany by repealing economic restrictions and boosting steel production. The French might protest this policy, but would be forced, as usual, to cede to American initiative. He predicted that the Americans would unveil this policy at the upcoming London Conference. A strong, unfettered Germany, backed by Washington and raised up as an anti-Communist bulwark in the heart of Europe, would once again be free to wreak economic havoc on French coal and steel industries.
By merging French and German coal and steel production, Monnet's plan could forge an economic balance of power between the two states and create the basis for political good will as well. The scheme would eliminate "the supremacy of German industry, whose existence creates fear in Europe," Monnet thought. International competition could be replaced by "communal expansion," ensuring that French and German industry were both placed on the same "
base de départ.
" Through such bold statesmanship, "France will have liberated Europe" from the confines of the Cold War. The cost of inaction, by contrast, was too great to contemplate. Europe would be turned into a staging point for the conduct of the Soviet-American confrontation. Germany and Britain "will quickly appear as the most vital elements,'' while the other nations of Europe will become mere "satellites" of this alliance. A rearmed Germany would rise again, while France, defeated, divided, weak, "will succumb to her previous malthusianism which will lead to her obliteration."
80
Placed alongside the formidable challenges that Schuman faced on the eve of the May conference, these were forceful arguments indeed.
After just a week of secret discussions among a small group of colleagues  the CGP officials Etienne Hirsch and Pierre Uri, the law professor Paul Reuter, Schuman's private secretary Bernard Clappier  Monnet sketched out the proposal and presented it to Schuman. Schuman in turn mulled over the idea during a weekend in the country, consulted privately with two close cabinet members, René Mayer and René Pleven, as well as Alexandre Parodi at the Quai d'Orsay, and then
 
Page 129
decided to plunge forward. He quietly secured Adenauer's approval in advance, to ensure that the idea would not be rebuffed, and gained the tentative support of Dean Acheson, who was passing through Paris on his way to the London Conference. On May 9, Schuman called a press conference in the ornate Salon de l'Horloge of the Foreign Ministry and proposed, in the interest of making war between France and Germany "not simply unthinkable, but materially impossible," that they place the control of their steel and coal industries in the hands of a High Authority that could pursue expansion and modernization of production along fair and equal lines.
81
If Schuman's intention had been to turn the tide of French diplomatic fortunes, his proposal certainly succeeded. Indeed, it is not too much to say that the Schuman Plan constituted a diplomatic revolution in Europe. It brought America and France strongly together on the future of Germany, reversing five long hard years of Franco-American antagonism. The Schuman Plan, crowed the American ambassador David Bruce, "is a bold proposition, and to my mind the most constructive thing done by the French Government since the Liberation. If properly developed, adopted and activated it can have a vast influence on bringing about an atmosphere favorable to peace, aside from its almost revolutionary economic implications." The American government largely shared this reaction, despite initial grumblings about the possibility of the plan being simply a prewar cartel agreement dressed up in the hopeful language of European integration. The Schuman Plan appeared consistent with the United States' most sought-after objective in Europe: the rapprochement, through European initiative, of France and Germany.
82
Further, the plan shattered Great Britain's claim of leadership in postwar Europe, and the British cabinet knew it. The plan threatened to push Britain to the margins of the emerging European community, and the Labour government naturally felt that France "had behaved extremely badly in springing this proposal on the world at this juncture without any attempt at consultation" with Britain or the United States. Further, British economic advisers thought the plan might be a bid to place Franco-German heavy industries in "a dominating position throughout Europe," a prospect that could damage British industry. The plan's political implications likewise raised the defenses of the British government. Bevin feared that "political federation" with the continent  so odious to Britain  "might be an essential prerequisite to such a scheme." Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick queried the French motives in advancing the proposal: ''Is this French move," he wondered, "to be regarded as
 
Page 130
an expression of the desire of many Frenchmen to create a Third Force in Europe and to that extent to build on Europe rather than on the Atlantic community? . . . If so, the proposal is inherently dangerous and objectionable."
83
Such reactions might well be expected from a government that had consistently opposed close political and economic integration in Europe.
The caution in the initial British response did not yet imply rejection of the scheme. Following a visit by Monnet to London on May 14 to explain the proposals, a hastily gathered special committee concluded that British opposition to the plan would be politically inept. Far better to participate in the general talks on the scheme and "to influence the discussions in a direction which would make possible U.K. participation in the Authority in some form." If Britain did not join the talks, the proposal might take "a form inimical to British interests." Ernest Bevin agreed: negotiations on the subject would be a good thing, for "we should be in a position to exercise an important influence in the working out of the details."
84
Naturally, the French anticipated that the British might not openly embrace the scheme as it stood in May. Yet allowing Britain to introduce various conditions weakening the High Authority, the crucial component of the plan designed to compel compliance from the member states, might open the way for the Germans, too, to escape from the controlling aspects of the plan. Consequently, the French government, at Monnet's urging, insisted that all the governments that wanted to participate in the talks on the plan must subscribe first to the principles outlined in the proposal of May 9. There would be no debate on the basic objectives  pooling and a High Authority  but only discussion on how to attain them as soon as possible. The French assured the British that support of the general objectives did not involve any binding commitment; the British told the French that they could not possibly subscribe to an idea about which very little was known and that might be inconsistent with British national interests. Neither side proved willing to alter its position. By June 2, the British cabinet had decided not to participate in the talks on the terms proposed by France.
85
Did the French conspire to keep Britain out of the talks by setting out conditions they knew Britain could not fulfill? The British thought so, but the evidence on the French side is less clear. Certainly Monnet seemed predisposed to think that Britain would not participate. As early as May 22, before the British government had made its position clear, Monnet told U.S. Ambassador David Bruce that "there is no possibility of the U.K. joining France and Europe in the enterprise at this time."
86
 
Page 131
Schuman himself seemed genuinely distraught by the British refusal to join the talks, but he was unwilling to withdraw the conditions he had set. Only René Massigli, the Anglophile ambassador in London, thought the French ought to drop the preliminary condition. "We are asking the British Government," he argued, "to accept after one week that the life of the United Kingdom be from now on commanded by decisions from a High Authority about which we know neither how it will be set up nor what powers it will have. . . . No British Government could accept this. What is more, if by chance [the government] should accept it, a unanimous Parliament will reject it." Ending with a flourish, perhaps aimed at Monnet, he proclaimed that "the substitution of technocracy for democracy will not be accepted here."
87
Beyond Massigli's objections to the tactics employed by Paris, however, a large degree of unanimity prevailed in the government that France had taken the initiative in Europe and must maintain it. Obviously, such a stance might strain relations with Britain somewhat, but it would probably appeal to Washington, provided that France made clear to the United States that it did not aim to set up a continental trading bloc or Third Force between East and West, as the British implied.
88
According to one Quai d'Orsay assessment, the objections that the British raised, and that some industrialists, coal producers, and syndicalists had voiced, were the predictable expressions of concern about a plan whose "political and economic implications may reorient in a decisive way the destiny of Europe, a Europe itself searching for the bases of unification."
89
Whatever the logic of Britain's position in refusing to "buy a pig in a poke," in Bevin's memorable phrase, most French leaders felt that Britain was simply hostile to any French initiative in Europe.
90
In the OEEC, in the Council of Europe, in its protective attitude toward the Anglo-American special relationship, and in its insistence on British exceptionalism, the Labour government had signaled its unwillingness to participate in a continental union. Britain must now accept the consequences of this position.
French leaders were determined to move forward with the plan, even without Great Britain. At a gathering of MRP leaders in mid-June, Georges Bidault, still prime minister, called Labour's response to the plan "artless," and believed firmly that "the English are against Europe." For Bidault, the loss of the British was unfortunate, but France must press on: "If we don't persevere, France will renounce once and for all her initiating role in international politics." The vice president of the Foreign Affairs Commission in the National Assembly, Marc Scherer,
 
Page 132
agreed: "I had been among those urging caution," he said. "But my apprehensions have been removed by the attitude of Labour. The essential thing is that we have retaken the diplomatic initiative." Robert Schuman, rarely present at MRP leadership meetings, had joined the group to explain and defend his vision. He tried to downplay the implications of the plan. It did not, as the Communists had claimed, seek to remove all restrictions from Germany or to rebuild German arms manufacturing. "What the plan aims to do is equalize costs of production. . . . The plan has neither a doctrinal nor dogmatic character. Each country will retain control of its own industrial and commercial principles, free of political interference [from the High Authority]." Of course, the plan had been inspired by a larger vision. "The aim of the system," Schuman stated, "is to make Germany work with us, and thus to control her much more directly, and to incorporate her progressively into Europe.'' He assured his listeners that the plan reflected the long-standing goal of advancing French economic security. "There has not been any new orientation of our foreign policy. The methods are perhaps new, but the direction is unchanged. . . . The aim of the plan of May 9 is to solve the political problem [of Franco-German relations] through economic means. Without this settlement, Germany will grow more unsettling every day." To bring stability to Europe, Britain's help would certainly be required, Schuman thought. But the British, who for some time had been "hostile toward Europe," might be persuaded to join in the future if the project succeeded. Therefore, rather than let British objections derail the plan, France must insist that the plan proceed: "We must maintain our
sang-froid
towards the English." To this, Bidault heartily agreed: "
Il faut savoir prendre des risques,
" he cried, and the party meeting broke up amid murmurs of mutual congratulation.
91
Indeed, the plan was a risk. Would the French public support a rapprochement with Germany without Britain present to arbitrate it? Would the scheme provide enough guarantees to French industry against German economic power? Could European stability be assured through such novel and unknown means? The French government might have had much more to say on the advantages and drawbacks of the plan, but before extended debates could be held, war in Asia presented the Western Alliance with its greatest challenge yet, and shattered French hopes for a swift settlement of the German problem.
 
Page 133
Chapter 5 
Sound and Fury:
The Debate over German Rearmament
The Schuman Plan of May 1950 was the result of almost six years of French efforts to clarify and articulate a coherent national strategy for recovery. It promised great things: the stabilization of the Franco-German relationship through transnational economic coordination of coal and steel and, on a higher plane, the repudiation of the constant search for national advantage that had brought these two nations into conflict three times during the previous seventy years. Yet as we have seen, the Schuman Plan also reflected France's reading of the worsening international situation. Germany, French planners believed, had to be enrolled in a carefully crafted political and economic system so that stability in western Europe might be ensured at a time when the larger East-West conflict appeared at its most menacing.
By the middle of 1950, that conflict threatened to crush all of France's hopes for a regional economic and political entente. Following the outbreak of the Korean War in June, a divisive and unproductive debate over Germany's contribution to European defense nearly destroyed the still fragile Western Alliance. France stood at the heart of the struggle, deeply conflicted about an appropriate response to the problem of German rearmament. On the one hand, the French public and many leaders maintained a strong  and understandable  aversion to the creation of a German army so soon after the end of the war. Germany had yet to prove its trustworthiness and its commitment to the West, and German remilitarization was sure to provoke the Russians, making the détente with Moscow for which many Frenchmen still longed impossible. On the other hand, the French government was placed under immense pressure by its Anglo-American allies to lift its objections to some form of German rearmament, for the cause of western  and French  defense demanded a substantial German role. Further, the French government had learned during 1947 and 1948 that outright obstruction of American

Other books

Entangled (Vice Games) by Cooper, Alice
A Night at the Asylum by Jade McCahon
Evil for Evil by James R. Benn
Blow the House Down by Robert Baer