Makers of Ancient Strategy: From the Persian Wars to the Fall of Rome (50 page)

2 Ammianus Marcellinus 28.5, with further comment in Peter J. Heather,
The Fall of

the Roman Empire: A New History
(London: Macmillan, 2005), 67–68.

3 Ammianus 28.2, 29.6; Themistius
Orationes
10. These moments do show up in the

archaeology: James Lander,
Roman Stone Fortifications from the First Century a.d. to the

Fourth
, B.A.R International Series 206 (Oxford, 1984); Sandor Soproni,
Der spätrömische

Frontier Defense 243

Limes zwischen Esztergom und Szentendre
(Budapest: Akademiai Kiado, 1978); Constantin

Scorpan,
Limes Scythiae: Topographical and Stratigraphical Research on the Late Roman For-

tifications on the Lower Danube
, B.A.R. International Series 88 (Oxford, 1980).

4 Ammianus 26.5, 27.1.

5 John Drinkwater,
The Alamanni and Rome 213–496
(Oxford: Oxford University Press,

2007), has recently argued that all Roman operations on the Upper Rhine frontier were

driven by different emperors’ needs for prestige rather than by military necessity, but

this is to overstate the point. True, the Alamanni did not by themselves (see below)

pose a threat to the overall existence of the empire, but they were responsible for sub-

stantial raiding (see note
20) and occasionally threatened local annexations of Roman

territory: in the 350s, for instance, a band some 50 km wide in the Rhine valley. For

more limited—and to my mind more convincing—general critiques of the “rational”

Luttwak approach, see J. C. Mann, “Power, Force and the Frontiers of the Empire,”

Journal of Roman Studies
69 (1979): 175–83; C. R. Whittaker,
Frontiers of the Roman Empire:

A Social and Economic Study
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994).

6 Mann, “Power, Force”; see esp. Benjamin H. Isaac,
The Limits of Empire: The Roman

Army in the East
, 2nd rev. ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), ix. For further

comment, see Heather,
Fall of the Roman Empire
, chap. 2.

7 L. Michael Whitby,
Rome at War ad 293–696
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002),

provides an excellent introduction to issues of readiness and mobility; see now John F.

Matthews,
The Journey of Theophanes: Travel, Business, and Daily Life in the Roman East

(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), on the limited speeds possible even for

officially assisted travelers.

8 Tetrarchic campaigns have to be reconstructed largely from very fragmented

narrative sources and the evidence of the victory titles they claimed: see Timothy D.

Barnes,
The New Empire of Diocletian and Constantine
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univer-

sity Press, 1982). The main sources for the mid-fourth century are the first part of the

Anonymous Valesianus and then the full and contemporary narrative of Ammianus

Marcellinus for the years 354–78. General commentary and more detailed discussion

of the pattern can be found in Peter J. Heather, “The Late Roman Art of Client Man-

agement and the Grand Strategy Debate,” in
The Transformation of Frontiers from Late

Antiquity to the Carolingians:
Proceedings of the Second Plenary Conference, European Science
Foundation Transformation of the Roman World Project
, ed. Walter Pohl, Ian N. Wood, and

Helmut Reinitz, 15–68 (Leiden: Brill, 2000).

9 Compare, e.g., the Caesar Julian on the Rhine frontier and the Augustus Constantius

on the Middle Danube, both in the 350s: Ammianus 17.1, 6, 10, 18.2 (Julian); 17.12–13 (Con-

stantius). But the pattern was the same with Valentinian on the Rhine in the 360s and 370s

(Ammianus 27.2, 10, 29.4) and Valens on the Lower Danube in the 360s (Ammianus 27.5).

10 Maureen Carroll,
Romans, Celts and Germans: The German Provinces of Rome

(Stroud, UK, 2001) is excellent on the economically debilitating effects of constant im-

perial campaigning on Germanic groups of the Weser in the first and second centuries.

Drinkwater,
Alamanni
, 9, shows that the Alamannia exhibited marked signs of eco-

nomic development in the fifth century after Roman raiding stopped.

11 Maximian:
Panegyrici Latini
2 [10].7–10. Julian: Ammianus 17.1.12–13, 17.10, 18.2.15–

19. Constantius: Ammianus 17.12.9–21.

244 Heather

12 See further discussion in Heather, “Client Management.”

13 Ammianus 17.12.9ff. On subsidies, see further Heather, “Client Management,” and

on the longer-term history, Johannes Klose,
Roms Klientel-Randstaaten am Rhein und an

der Donau: Beitrage zu ihrer Geschichte und rechtlichen Stellung im 1. und 2. Jhdt. N. Chr.

(Breslau: Marcus, 1934).

14 Some examples of forced drafts of manpower: Ammianus 17.13.3, 28.5.4, 30.6.1,

31.10.17.

15
Panegyrici Latini
7 [6].10.1–7; see Ammianus 27.2.9 for another example from 366.

16 E.g., Ammianus 17.1.12–13, 10.8–9, 18.2.19.

17 Limigantes: Ammianus 17.13. The Tetrarchs organized substantial resettlements,

particularly of Franks and Carpi; see Erich Zollner,
Geschichte der Franken bis zur Mitte

des sechsten Jahrhunderts
(Munich: Beck, 1970), and Gh. Bichir,
The Archaeology and His-

tory of the Carpi
, trans. Nubar Hampartumian, B.A.R. Supplementary Series 16 (Oxford,

1976). Constantine resettled more Sarmatians in the empire in the 330s:
Anonymous Vae-

sianus
6.32. On the terms of such settlements, see Peter J. Heather,
Goths and Romans

332–489
(Oxford, 1991), 4. For all the precautions, resettlement could occasionally go

badly wrong: Ammianus 19.11.

18 Detailed report:
Die Alamannenbeute aus dem Rhein bei Neupotz
, ed. Ernst Küunzl,

4 vols. (Mainz: Verlag des Römisch-Germanischen Zentralmuseums, 1993). A brief

English summary can be found in K. Painter, “Booty from a Roman Villa Found in the

Rhine,”
Minerva
5 (1994): 22–27.

19 Heather,
Goths and Romans
, 3. E. A. Thompson,
The Early Germans
(Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 1965), shows how rare such an economically open frontier arrange-

ment was.

20 On the execution of hostages, note the laments of the Alamanni recorded at Am-

mianus 28.2.8–9. David C. Braund,
Rome and the Friendly King: The Character of Client

Kingship
(London: Macmillan, 1984), explores Roman cultural diplomacy more gener-

ally. Not that it always worked. The Gothic royal hostage taken by Constantine in 332

seems to have reacted adversely to the experience, advising his son to have nothing

to do with the Romans: Ammianus 27.5.9, with Herwig Wolfram,
History of the Goths

(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1988), 62ff. On the other

hand, Ammianus received help from an ex-hostage who had come to love classical

learning when on a spying mission on the Persian front: Ammianus 18.6.17ff.

21 Macrianus: Ammianus 29.4.2–5; Vadomarius: Ammianus 21.4.1–6 (see also 21.3.5;

26.8.2); Vithicabius: Ammianus 27.10.3–4; Gabinus: Ammianus 29.6.3–5; leadership of

Gothic Tervingi: Ammianus 31.5.5–8.

22 In more detail, see Heather, “Client Management.”

23 See now Peter J. Heather,
Empires and Barbarians: Migration, Development and the

Creation of Europe
(London: Macmillan, 2009), chap. 2.

24 Wolfram,
Goths
, 62ff.

25 D. H. Green,
Language and History in the early Germanic World
(Cambridge: Cam-

bridge University Press, 1998).

26 Chnodomarius: Ammianus 16.12.60. On the warband excavated at Ejsbøl Mose,

see Mogens Ørsnes, “The Weapon Find in Ejsbøl Mose at Haderlev: Preliminary Re-

port,”
Acta Archaeologica
34 (1963): 232–48. For an example of retinue and enforcement,

Frontier Defense 245

see Peter Heather and John Matthews, trans.,
The Goths in the Fourth Century
, Trans-

lated Texts for Historians (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1991), 5.

27 Heather,
Empires and Barbarians
, 3.

28 For an introduction, see L. Hedeager, “The Evolution of Germanic Society 1–400

AD,” in
First Millennium Papers: Western Europe in the First Millennium
, ed. R.F.J. Jones,

J.H.F. Bloemers, S. L. Dyson, and M. Biddle, 129–44, B.A.R. International Series 401

(Oxford, 1988).

29 Ammianus 17.12.9–11; compare the famous apoplectic fit of the emperor Valentin-

ian I when barbarian envoys failed to show him sufficient respect: Ammianus 30.6.8.

30 Above note 20.

31 Drinkwater,
Alamanni
, has recently argued that the Alamanni offered no threat

at all, but this is to move from one extreme to another. On the agendas of the Gothic

Tervingi, see in more detail Heather,
Goths and Romans
, 3.

32 The events of 376 are well documented in, among other sources, Ammianus 31.3ff.

The events of 405–10 have to be reconstructed, but again, the most plausible recon-

struction is that a second westward movement of Huns was the fundamental cause

of the exodus onto Roman soil: Heather,
Fall of the Roman Empire
, 4–5, with Peter J.

Heather, “Why Did the Barbarian Cross the Rhine?,”
Journal of Late Antiquity
(forth-

coming, 2009), responding to the arguments of those who have attempted in the mean-

time to come up with alternative explanations of the invasions of the Roman west in

the period 405–8.

33 As is shown, for instance, by the defeats in 386 and 405 of two Gothic refugee lead-

ers, Odotheus and Radagaisus, who attempted to force their way across the Roman

frontier by themselves. These examples, and the aggressive imperial response to the

more successful, clustered invasions, show that this period saw no fundamental shifts

in Roman policies to outsiders, as was argued famously by Walter Goffart, “Rome,

Constantinople, and the Barbarians in Late Antiquity,”
American Historical Review
76

(1981): 275–306.

34 Visigoths: Heather,
Goths and Romans
, 6. Vandals-Alan alliance: Heather,
Fall of the

Roman Empire
, 5–6.

35 For introductions to the Hunnic Empire and its activities, see Otto J. Maenchen-

Helfen,
The World of the Huns
, edited by Max Knight (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Uni-

versity of California Press, 1973), and E. A. Thompson,
The Huns
, rev. ed., People of

Europe Series (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995).

36 The process is examined in more detail in Heather,
Fall of the Roman Empire
, chaps.

9–10.

37 Heather,
Empires and Barbarians
, esp. chaps. 2, 10, and 11.

246 Heather

Acknowledgments

I wish to thank my fellow contributors for their professionalism and

skill in helping to put this volume together—as well as for their

shared interest in making the knowledge of the ancient world more

accessible to the modern. Robert Tempio, classics editor at Princeton

University Press, first suggested to me that I consider editing a prequel

to Princeton’s hallowed
Makers of Modern Strategy
editions, and he was

largely responsible for the conception of the volume. Deborah Tegar-

den at Princeton did a marvelous job as editor, both in reviewing the

manuscript and preparing the essays for publication. Tobiah Waldron

compiled an excellent index. My assistant Jennifer Heyne helped with

both the copy editing and final proof correction.

Finally, I wish to gratefully acknowledge Bill and Nancy Myers, and

their children, Mary Myers Kauppila and George Myers, for their finan-

cial support in the preparation of this volume. In addition to their inter-

est in the humanities at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, the

Myers family members have also long demonstrated their appreciation

of scholarship in the classics—especially its application to contempo-

rary history.

Victor Davis Hanson

The Hoover Institution

Stanford, California

November 2009

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Index

abolitionism, 191

Egypt and, 120; empire building and,

Abulites, 125

118–35; enthronement of, 119; failures of,

Achaea, 166

118, 122–23, 132; founding cities and, 127–28;

Achaean League, 189

Gordian knot and, 120, 124; Hellenization

Acropolis of Athens: defense of, 59–61, 79n2;

and, 118, 130–35; India and, 122–23; military

Mouseion hill and, 144; new temple

brilliance of, 118–9, 124; mutiny of men

construction and, 45; Odeion of Pericles

and, 122, 123; occupational policies of, 6,

and, 145; sacred olive tree of, 83n28; shrine

9–10, 126–32; Opis mutiny and, 129–30;

of Athena and, 41; temple burnings and,

Oracle of Zeus and, 120; Philotas affair

27; treasury 35

and, 121–22; preemption and, 100; psycho-

Ada, 126

logical tactics of, 119–20, 123, 129–30, 133; as

Adrianople, battle of, 3

regent, 119; religion and, 120, 124, 131–32;

Aedui, 211, 214, 216