Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East (15 page)

With the conclusion of the main operations north and south of the Pripet marshes, Directive No. 21, again characterising the attack within the framework of a ‘pursuit of the enemy’, instructed the army groups towards new objectives. Army Group South was to proceed towards the mineral-rich Donets Basin, important to the Soviet war industry, while in the north the main German forces, having secured the Baltic and occupied
Leningrad, would seek the immediate capture of Moscow. In addition to the capital's crucial railway junction, the capture of the
city was portrayed as representing ‘a decisive political and economic success’.
¹⁴³
Yet however much value one attributes to the term ‘decisive’ it cannot be denied that Moscow remained a secondary objective, only to be attempted following the battles in Belorussia, the Baltic and Leningrad
. In that sense, Moscow's significance in Directive No. 21 was a far cry from Halder's conception of the Soviet capital as the vital and definite war-winning
objective.
¹⁴⁴

The German air force was assigned the dual role of obtaining complete control over the theatre's airspace by eliminating the Soviet air force as well as offering ground support to the main operations of the army. Long-range air attacks against industrial targets located in the distant Urals region would not feature in the initial phase of the campaign, but would commence following the conclusion of mobile operations. The navy's focus was still to be directed primarily against British shipping, though in the Baltic Sea the navy was ordered first to secure the German coastline, with the prevention of Soviet ships escaping into the North Sea, and later, following the army's occupation of all Soviet naval bases, to seek the final destruction of the Soviet Baltic fleet. Final preparations for all services in accordance with Directive No. 21 were to be completed by 15 May 1941, indicating strongly the envisaged date for the opening of the
campaign.
¹⁴⁵

1
Geoffrey Roberts,
The Soviet Union and the Origins of the Second World War. Russo-German Relations and the Road to War
, 1933–1941 (London, 1995), pp. 119–121.

2
Franz Halder,
Kriegstagebuch: Tägliche Aufzeichnungen des Chefs des Generalstabes des Heeres 1939–1942
, Band I:
Vom Polenfeldzug bis zum Ende der Westoffensive (14.8.1939 – 30.6.1940)
, Hans-Adolf Jacobsen and Alfred Philippi (eds.) (Arbeitskreis für Wehrforschung, Stuttgart, 1962), p. 362 (18 June 1940). Hereafter cited as: Franz Halder, KTB I.

3
Klink, ‘Die militärische Konzeption’, p. 206 and see note 61.

4
Ibid., p. 210. See also Olaf Groehler, ‘Goals and Reason: Hitler and the German Military’ in Wieczynski (ed.),
Operation Barbarossa
, p. 56.

5
Jürgen Förster, ‘Hitler Turns East – German War Policy in 1940 and 1941’ in Bernd Wegner (ed.),
From Peace to War. Germany, Soviet Russia and the World, 1939–1941
(Oxford, 1997), pp. 119–120. See also Müller,
Der letzte deutsche Krieg
, pp. 80–81.

6
Franz Halder,
Kriegstagebuch: Tägliche Aufzeichnungen des Chefs des Generalstabes des Heeres 1939–1942
, Band II:
Von der geplanten Landung in England bis zum Beginn des Ostfeldzuges (1.7.1940 – 21.6.1941)
, Hans-Adolf Jacobsen (ed.) (Arbeitskreis für Wehrforschung, Stuttgart, 1963), pp. 32–33 (22 July 1940). Hereafter cited as: Franz Halder, KTB II.

7
Ibid., p. 33 (22 July 1940). Leach,
German Strategy Against Russia
, p. 92; Klink, ‘Die militärische Konzeption’, pp. 213–214.

8
Franz Halder, KTB II, p. 33 (22 July 1940).

9
Domarus,
Hitler. Speeches and Proclamations
(Würzburg, 1997), p. 2067.

10
Kershaw,
Hitler 1936–1945. Nemesis
, p. 305.

11
Klink, ‘Die militärische Konzeption’, p. 214.

12
Albert Speer,
Inside the Third Reich
(London, 1971), p. 188.

13
See map for disposition and stationing areas of 22 July 1940, Klink, ‘Die militärische Konzeption’, p. 209.

14
Ibid., p. 214.

15
Ibid., see note 70.

16
Walter Warlimont,
Im Hauptquartier der deutschen Wehrmacht 1939 bis 1945
, Band I:
September 1939 – November 1942
(Koblenz, 1990), pp. 126–127.

17
Ibid., pp. 126–127.

18
Hillgruber,
Hitlers Strategie
, pp. 222–223.

19
Warlimont,
Im Hauptquartier
, Band I, p. 127; also see note 19.

20
Raeder however left the conference following his opening presentation.

21
Klink, ‘Die militärische Konzeption’, p. 215; also see note 73.

22
Irving,
Hitler's War
, p. 163.

23
Franz Halder, KTB II, p. 49 (31 August 1940).

24
This should be seen in terms of Hitler's earlier acceptance of the more limited objectives set out by Brauchitsch on 21 July 1940.

25
Italics in the original. Franz Halder, KTB II, pp. 49–50 (31 August 1940).

26
Ibid., p. 50. Curiously Halder does not include in his total forces for occupation duties in Denmark, Poland or the Reich itself.

27
Hillgruber,
Hitlers Strategie
, p. 211.

28
Franz Halder, KTB II, p. 46 (30 August 1940).

29
Andreas Hillgruber, ‘The German Military Leaders’ View of Russia Prior to the Attack on the Soviet Union’ in Wegner (ed.),
From Peace to War
, p. 179.

30
Jürgen Förster, ‘Hitlers Entscheidung für den Krieg gegen die Sowjetunion’ in Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (ed.),
Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg
, pp. 14–15.

31
Klink, ‘Die militärische Konzeption’, p. 219.

32
Otto Jacobsen,
Erich Marcks: Soldat und Gelehrter
(Göttingen, 1971), p. 90.

33
‘Barbarossa’ was not yet a term in use; the code word used early on in Halder's diary is ‘Otto’. Likewise, Lossberg had given his study the code-name ‘Fritz’. The switch to ‘Barbarossa’ was adopted in Hitler's War Directive No. 21. The code-name ‘Barbarossa’ (originating from the Italian ‘Red Beard’) was selected in reference to the twelfth-century Holy Roman Emperor Frederick I. Barbarossa drowned while leading his Third Crusade in the east, but legend had it he survived and only awaited the call of his country to return. The name, chosen by Hitler, was thought to evoke the idea of Operation Barbarossa as a modern-day crusade. Barton Whaley,
Codeword Barbarossa
(Cambridge, 1973), p. 18; Warlimont,
Im Hauptquartier
, Band I, p. 154, footnote 11.

34
Klink, ‘Die militärische Konzeption’, pp. 219–220.

35
Friedhelm Klein and Ingo Lachnit, ‘Der “Operationsentwurf Ost” des Generalmajors Marcks vom 5. August 1940’,
Wehrforschung
4 (1972), 116; Erhard Moritz (ed.),
Fall Barbarossa. Dokumente zur Vorbereitung der faschistischen Wehrmacht auf die Aggression gegen die Sowjetunion (1940/41)
(Berlin, 1970), p. 122, Document 31 ‘Aus dem Operationsentwurf des Generalmajors Marcks für die Aggression gegen die Sowjetunion, 5. August 1940’; Leach,
German Strategy Against Russia
, Appendix I, p. 250.

36
Klein and Lachnit, ‘Der “Operationsentwurf Ost”’, pp. 116–118; Moritz (ed.),
Fall Barbarossa
, pp. 121–125.

37
The Soviet railway gauge was wider than the European standard and would have to be changed to accommodate German trains. The problems this posed to the German logistical apparatus will be dealt with in a later section.

38
Klink, ‘Die militärische Konzeption’, pp. 224–225.

39
Klein and Lachnit, ‘Der “Operationsentwurf Ost”’, pp. 116–119; Moritz (ed.),
Fall Barbarossa
, pp. 122 and 126.

40
Klink, ‘Die militärische Konzeption’, p. 225.

41
Ibid., pp. 226–227.

42
Barry Leach, ‘Halder’ in Correlli Barnett (ed.),
Hitler's Generals
(London, 1989), p. 114.

43
Bryan Fugate,
Operation Barbarossa. Strategy and Tactics on the Eastern Front, 1941
(Novato, 1984), p. 67.

44
Klink, ‘Die militärische Konzeption’, p. 265.

45
A good discussion can be found in Jürgen Förster, ‘Zum Russlandbild der Militärs 1941–1945’ in Hans-Erich Volkmann (ed.),
Das Russlandbild im Dritten Reich
(Köln, 1994), pp. 141–163.

46
Groehler, ‘Goals and Reason’, pp. 51–55.

47
Michael Burleigh,
Germany Turns Eastwards. A Study of ‘Ostforschung’ in the Third Reich
(Cambridge, 1988); Michael Burleigh,
The Third Reich. A New History
(London, 2001), p. 490.

48
Ben Shepherd,
War in the Wild East. The German Army and Soviet Partisans
(Cambridge, 2004), pp. 11 and 13.

49
Christian Hartmann,
Halder Generalstabschef Hitlers 1938–1942
(Munich, 1991), pp. 230–231.

50
Klink, ‘Die militärische Konzeption’, p. 220. See also Ludolf Herbst,
Das nationalsozialistische Deutschland 1933–1945. Die Entfesselung der Gewalt Rassismus und Krieg
(Frankfurt am Main, 1996), pp. 348–349.

51
With a previous period of service in Moscow lasting from 1931 to 1933.

52
Hillgruber, ‘The German Military Leaders’ View of Russia’, pp. 172, 177–178.

53
Klink, ‘Die militärische Konzeption’, pp. 195–196.

54
Italics in the original. Ernst Köstring,
Der militärische Mittler zwischen dem Deutschen Reich und der Sowjetunion 1921–1941
, ed. Hermann Teske (Frankfurt am Main, 1965), p. 202.

55
Franz Halder, KTB II, p. 86 (4 September 1940).

56
Seaton,
The Russo-German War 1941–45
, p. 45.

57
George Blau,
The Campaign against Russia (1940–1942)
(Washington, 1955), p. 12.

58
For associated critical literature see Hillgruber,
Hitlers Strategie
, p. 228, footnote 93; Hillgruber ‘The German Military Leaders’ View of Russia’, pp. 177–180; Seaton,
The Russo-German War 1941–45
, pp. 45–46, also p. 46, footnote 5.

59
Klink, ‘Die militärische Konzeption’, p. 230.

60
Weinberg,
A World at Arms
, pp. 184–185.

61
Moritz (ed.),
Fall Barbarossa
, p. 126. Document 32, ‘Operationsstudie des Gruppenleiters Heer in der Abteilung Landesverteidigung im OKW für die Aggression gegen die Sowjetunion (Lossberg-Studie), 15. September 1940’. Leach,
German Strategy against Russia
, Appendix II, p. 255.

62
Moritz (ed.),
Fall Barbarossa
, pp. 127–129.

63
Ibid., pp. 130–131.

64
Köstring's warning to Halder in early September regarding the difficulty of motorised movement over such long distances represents one possible explanation for Lossberg's heightened concern, yet in drawing any firm conclusions one must not underestimate the level of inter-service rivalry, nor the degree of separation which existed between the OKH and OHW.

65
Moritz (ed.),
Fall Barbarossa
, pp. 130, 133.

66
Although the capture of Black Sea ports could never have been a decisive option given the proportional strength of Soviet naval forces.

67
Moritz (ed.),
Fall Barbarossa
, p. 129.

68
Ibid., p. 132.

69
Ibid., pp. 131–132.

70
Which should have been made clear to him by the above-mentioned study from the Military Geography Department.

71
Moritz (ed.),
Fall Barbarossa
, p. 132.

72
Ibid., pp. 132–133.

73
Ibid., p. 127. For a good study highlighting the many problems of intelligence gathering within Foreign Armies East see David Thomas, ‘Foreign Armies East and German Military Intelligence in Russia 1941–45’,
Journal of Contemporary History
22 (1987), 274–279.

74
George P. Megargee,
Inside Hitler's High Command
(Lawrence, 2000), p. 110.

75
Hillgruber, ‘The German Military Leaders’ View of Russia’, pp. 169–170; Burleigh,
The Third Reich
, p. 490.

76
Megargee,
Inside Hitler's High Command
, p. 116.

77
Karl-Heinz Frieser,
Blitzkrieg-Legende. Der Westfeldzug 1940
(Munich, 1996), pp. 110–116. English translation
The Blitzkrieg Legend. The 1940 Campaign in the West
(Annapolis, 2005), pp. 94–99.