Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East (12 page)

This brief insight into Lossberg's political aspirations for the war in the east represents the infancy of the planning stages in which he took part. In the final Barbarossa plan there would be no attempt to win over any of the Soviet people. Hitler was later to make clear the ominous racial and ideological dimensions of the war to be conducted against the Soviet Union and his disregard for the Slavic peoples who inhabited the region. Yet Lossberg's assumption that non-Russian peoples would largely support Germany's invasion, with the exception of the Baltic states and other newly acquired territories, was not backed at the time by substantive evidence and subsequently, in part as a result of Germany's brutal ‘new order’ of administration, proved not to be a widespread phenomenon in the initial period of the war. Much less than providing aid to the German advance, the likelihood of active hostility among the non-Russian peoples of the western Soviet Union would require an ever increasing deployment of strength to ensure German control. Such dire repercussions represented a significant reversal of a key assumption upon which Lossberg's plan was built, undercutting another basis of support and placing further demands on the already overstretched resources.

Just as Marcks had done, Lossberg's plan never questioned the
ability
of the Wehrmacht to achieve victory and concerned itself only with the best method of achieving that end. His outline of the campaign included no timetable for operations and is remarkably vague concerning the critical advance of the main army groups. There appears a wanton lack of consideration for the difficulties Soviet counter-measures could represent and an astounding under-estimation of the size and robustness of
the Soviet economy. Lossberg believed that, even if one considered the Ural industrial area,
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it was ‘impossible that Russia can remain capable of resistance after losing her western territories and contact with the seas’.
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In any case, attainment of the final line of advance would, in Lossberg's estimation, allow bombing of the Ural region.
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The
delusory assumptions seen throughout Lossberg's study are symptomatic of the army's inflated self-assurance and unquestioning conviction of their own superiority. It is not without significance that Lossberg
notes at the beginning of his study the considerable difficulty he encountered in obtaining accurate intelligence about the enemy.
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Geoffrey Megargee has pointed out the tendency among senior figures in the Army High Command, including intelligence officers, to fill the void of information concerning the Soviet Union with cultural preconceptions of diehard stereotypes.
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Central tenets of such preconceptions, identified by Andreas Hillgruber and Michael Burleigh, date back as far as the Crimean War and cast the Russian empire in the opposing roles of an aggressive colossus looking to expand westward and an internally fractured state unable to resist an external attack.
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Such contradictory, double-sided notions fit well with National Socialist precepts allowing, on the one hand, convincing arguments for the pursuit of
Lebensraum
in the east, while also providing a ‘foe image’ which depicted the Soviet state as a threatening godless enemy of ‘cultured’ Europe, providing the justification for a pre-emptive war.

The early planning stages of Barbarossa reveal a muddled process where information was produced to match major decisions already taken, rather than information being gathered on which to base major decisions.
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Here the exuberant over-estimation of the Wehrmacht's own ‘blitzkrieg’ represents an obvious source of blame. Most German generals were trained and educated in forms of military manoeuvre and organisation unsuited to the requirements of rapid mechanised warfare or close air support. Thus, while they showed little surprise at the swift defeat of Poland as a small secondary power, they were largely united in
their opposition to the western campaign and were therefore astounded at both the totality of the victory and the apparent ease with which it was carried through.
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Consequently, their faith in blitzkrieg reigned supreme with little attention devoted to the necessary mechanics of this process in logistics and technical support, nor was there any real appreciation for the fundamental differences that existed between an eastern and a western theatre of war.
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Such intellectual bankruptcy speaks strongly of the decline in excellence within the German General Staff and the ease with which events were allowed to overshadow judgement and reason.

The
disassociation from reality not only affected the planning stages of the campaign but pervaded most levels of the Wehrmacht's organisation including its armaments programme. The large expansion in the number of infantry and motorised divisions forced such large production demands that they could not be met without everything being subordinated to the army.
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The result was a prioritisation of equipment with the army favouring its much needed Mark III and Mark IV tanks in addition to the new 50mm anti-tank gun. Yet, even in this narrow selection, estimates for production capacity differed greatly from actual output, indicating that an immense effort needed to be made in order to lift production. In July 1940 a monthly goal of 380 tanks was envisaged, but by August this figure was revised down to 200. In September 1940 a mere 121 tanks were produced in the course of the month. This, however, did not stop new targets being set on 14 September which aimed for the extraordinary figures of 2,000 Mark III and 800 Mark IV panzers to be delivered by 1 April 1941, requiring a monthly output of 466 tanks starting immediately.
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The absurdity of such projections is another plain confirmation of the regime's tendency towards delusional practices, forming a chief impediment to realising the extent of its limitations and responding accordingly.

The expansion of the army also had profound implications on the already serious shortage of motorised transportation within its ranks. Even before the army's expansion to 180 divisions was decided, Hitler wanted to double the number of panzer divisions to 20 as well as raise
the number of motorised divisions to 10.
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Production capacity simply did not exist to achieve this fanciful goal in any realistic time frame so the divisions were created by simply reducing the strengths of those already in existence – a solution which immediately solved the problem on paper, but offered no practical benefit to the army's strength.
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In managing this process Colonel-General
Fritz Fromm, Chief of the Land-Force Armaments and Commander-in-Chief of the Replacement Army, informed Halder that the activation of new panzer divisions required so many vehicles that those allotted to the infantry divisions would have to be reduced further.
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By the end of September 1940 Halder was complaining in his diary that there was not enough motorised transport to meet even the most urgent needs of the army and as a result, further cuts would have to be made to the mobility of divisions in the 13th and 14th waves.
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Further considerations of even more fundamental importance to the conduct of operations in the east arose in November 1940 when Halder met with the Army Quartermaster-General, Major-General
Eduard Wagner. Concerned primarily with the issues of supply and logistics, Wagner came to report his findings based on the premise of keeping some two million men, 300,000 horses and 500,000 motor-vehicles supplied.
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Such an undertaking, he frankly assessed, would allow for an advance of between 700 and 800 kilometres given projected fuel consumption. In addition, foodstuffs and ammunition supply would suffice for only the first 20 days.
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Such a troubling appraisal should have evoked considerable concern with plans afoot to march far deeper into the Soviet interior. At the very least a delay in operations of many weeks would be required before the army groups could gather their strength to reach Leningrad, Moscow and the eastern Ukraine. This was plainly not in line with the rapid victories predicted by the operational studies, to say nothing of reaching the distant Caucasus oil fields or the Volga
. Most probably Halder tempered such a foreboding forecast with the optimistic anticipation of the Red Army's swift defeat, allowing for an
unopposed ‘railway advance’ further east. In any case it remains clear that the campaign was driven in its conception by grand strategic and macro-economic considerations
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above more pertinent questions such as available strength, logistical possibilities and a sober respect for the ever present element in war which
Clausewitz dubbed ‘friction’.
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Crisis postponed – from war games to Directive No. 21

Although
there is some debate among historians regarding the finality of Hitler's decision for an attack in the east between July and December 1940, it is enough to reassert the importance of his ideologically-driven programme for eastern expansion through which war and the conquest of
Lebensraum
remained inevitable components. Yet, throughout 1940 at least, Hitler chose to emphasise the more pragmatic rationale for his invasion plans.
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Speaking at the beginning of December, Hitler told Field Marshal Fedor von Bock, the future commander of Army Group Centre in the invasion of the Soviet Union, that ‘the eastern question is becoming acute’. He pointed to the supposed development of links between the Soviets and Americans that he said suggested a corresponding link existed with England. Awaiting such an outcome, Hitler insisted, was dangerous and thus he concluded, ‘if the Russians were eliminated, England would have no hope left of defeating us on the continent’.
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In spite of Hitler's confused strategic manoeuvring, resulting from his lack of a clear direction as well as the unexpected developments in North Africa and
Greece resulting from
Mussolini's ill-fated invasions, there was remarkably little detraction from the overall planning for Operation Barbarossa. Even before his arrival, the state visit of Soviet foreign minister
Vyacheslav Molotov was seen as irrelevant to the question of an approaching conflict. On the same day Molotov arrived in Berlin
(12 November), Hitler issued War Directive No. 18 which under the title ‘Russia’ stated:

Political discussions for the purpose of clarifying Russia's attitude in the immediate future have already begun. Regardless of the outcome of these conversations, all preparations for the East for which verbal orders have already been given will be continued.

Further directives will follow on this subject as soon as the basic operational plan of the Army has been submitted to me and
approved.
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The
Marcks and
Lossberg plans formed the basis for the final draft of planning which was prepared under the supervision of Lieutenant-General
Friedrich Paulus, the recently appointed Senior Quartermaster I. The two studies set out some of the basic underpinnings of the German plan. They reveal a great deal about the army's expectations for success and also hint at the many divergent operational objectives that, as we will see, become a major subject of contention between the army and Hitler.

The studies by Marcks and Lossberg shared a common acceptance that victory rested on the rapid penetration and encirclement of major Soviet forces positioned west of the Dnepr–Dvina Rivers. Further operations would be conducted in secondary phases, after periods of recuperation and based on indeterminate factors such as Red Army strength, position of neighbouring army groups and distance to major population centres. As the advance continued, resistance was calculated to weaken accordingly, reducing the strain on operating deep in the interior. Economic collapse was also seen as an unavoidable consequence of the Wehrmacht's occupation of Western Russia as the loss of essential raw materials, farming lands and industrial centres would cripple the Soviet Union. Finally, both plans settled on grossly unrealistic final lines of advance that, perhaps more than anything else, highlight the grandiose objectives set for the short campaigning season.

To test the effectiveness of the strategic thinking thus far formulated, General Paulus, under instruction from Halder, conducted detailed map exercises at the beginning of December, which brought together the departmental heads of the Army General Staff and utilised the ‘Consolidated Files, Russia’ provided by the Foreign Armies East intelligence branch.
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In the exercise it was estimated that Germany could field 154
divisions, including 18 panzer and 18 motorised infantry divisions as well as ten Romanian divisions. These would face 125 Soviet divisions with 50 tank and motorised brigades. Interestingly, after listing the relative army strengths and making no mention of German reinforcements, Paulus factored in a Soviet ‘subsequent build-up’ which he said would arise from Red Army units being transferred from other regions and newly raised formations. He calculated this would add another 30–40 divisions in the first three months of the war and within six months the figure would rise to 100 divisions.
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In his appreciation of the unparalleled ability of the Soviet state to generate new forces, Paulus showed considerably more foresight than his contemporaries in the General Staff. Although still an under-estimation of real Soviet potential, it is significant that previous studies made no mention of, and therefore no allowance for, the critical element Soviet force generation could – and indeed did – play in the German failure in 1941.
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Marcks and Lossberg concluded, as Paulus ultimately did, that the opening weeks would largely decide the campaign, although Paulus added, ‘calculations of enemy strength…were of primary importance when it came to determining the objectives and the timetable of the German offensive’.
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