Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East (8 page)

39
Albert Seaton,
The Russo-German War 1941–45
(Novato, 1971), pp. 131–132.

40
In spite of a once prominent standing in the field of military history, Irving is now notorious for his anti-Semitic views and his active role as a Holocaust denier.

41
David Irving,
Hitler's War
, Volume I (New York, 1977), p. 308.

42
Wolf Stern and Ernst Stenzel, ‘Die Blitzkriegsstrategie des deutschen Militarismus und ihr Scheitern beim Überfall auf die Sowjetunion’,
Jahrbuch für die Geschichte der UdSSR und der volksdemokratischen Länder Europas
5 (1961), p. 32.

43
Hans Busse, ‘Das Scheitern des Operationsplanes “Barbarossa” im Sommer 1941 und die militaristische Legende von der “Führungskrise”’,
Zeitschrift für Militärgeschichte
1 (1962), 62–83.

44
Helmut Göpfert, ‘Zur Anfangsperiode des faschistischen Überfalls auf die Sowjetunion’,
Zeitschrift für Militärgeschichte
4 (2) (1965), 171–172. Not all of Göpfert's article can be viewed with such merit and he considerably over-estimates the state of Soviet preparations for war in 1941. The extraordinary losses which befell the Red Army in the early period of war he ascribes largely to Stalin's refusal to alert the army in sufficient time. Another article by Göpfert dealing with the failure of German operations in the east appeared later, see Helmut Göpfert, ‘Das Scheitern des blitzkrieges der faschistischen Wehrmacht an der deutsch-sowjetischen Front’ in Erhard Moritz (ed.),
Das Fiasko der antisowjetischen Aggression. Studien zur Kriegführung des deutschen Imperialismus gegen die UdSSR (1941–1945)
(East Berlin, 1978), pp. 45–73.

45
Shilin,
Der Grosse Vaterländische Krieg
, Volume I, pp. 119–121.

46
Magenheimer,
Hitler's War
, p. 85.

47
Italics mine. Ibid., pp. 85–86.

48
Jacob W. Kipp, ‘Barbarossa and the Crisis of Successive Operations: The Smolensk Engagements, July 10–August 7, 1941’ in Wieczynski (ed.),
Operation Barbarossa
, p. 117; Jacob W. Kipp, ‘Barbarossa, Soviet Covering Forces and the Initial Period of War: Military History and Airland Battle’, published online by the Foreign Military Studies Office (Fort Leavenworth, 1989) p. 1. http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/ fmsopubs/issues/barbaros.htm

49
Bryan Fugate and Lev Dvoretsky,
Thunder on the Dnepr. Zhukov–Stalin and the Defeat of Hitler's Blitzkrieg
(Novato, 1997), p. xiii.

50
Earl F. Ziemke, ‘Book Review –
Thunder on the Dnepr
’,
The Journal of Military History
, 62(2) (April, 1998), 433.

51
Yel'nya is sometimes spelled in the literature ‘El'nia’, ‘Yelnia’ or ‘Yelnya’.

52
See also R. H. S. Stolfi, ‘Blitzkrieg Army, Siege Führer. A Reinterpretation of World War II in Europe’ in Command Magazine (ed.),
Hitler's Army. The Evolution and Structure of German Forces, 1933–1945
(Boston, 2003), pp. 153–164.

53
Among the most outstanding is an alleged quotation from the commander of Panzer Group 4, Colonel-General Erich Hoepner, written according to Stolfi ‘after the war’ for which no footnote is given. In fact Hoepner was hanged in 1944 for his role in the July plot to assassinate Hitler (Stolfi,
Hitler's Panzers East
, p. 53).

54
For contrasting views see comments by Weinberg,
A World At Arms
, pp. 269–270; David M. Glantz,
Colossus Reborn. The Red Army at War, 1941–1943
(Lawrence, 2005), pp. 16–17; Domarus,
Hitler
, Volume IV, pp. 2461–2462.

55
Casting doubt on Stolfi's contention, see Günther Blumentritt, ‘Moscow’ in William Richardson and Seymour Freidin (eds.),
The Fatal Decisions
(London, 1956), p. 73; Gerd Niepold, ‘Plan Barbarossa’ in David M. Glantz (ed.),
The Initial Period of War on the Eastern Front 22 June–August 1941
(London, 1997), p. 77.

56
To cite one example from early August 1941, Stolfi writes: ‘Army Group Centre was so successful that Soviet forces opposed to it, according to German intelligence estimates, appeared to have been reduced to roughly half the strength of Army Group Centre.’ Stolfi,
Hitler's Panzers East
, p. 154. In fact, the enormous Soviet force generation undertaken in July and August 1941 was heavily concentrated in front of Bock's army group, increasing overall Soviet numbers in spite of their great losses. See David M. Glantz and Jonathan House,
When Titans Clashed. How the Red Army Stopped Hitler
(Lawrence, 1995), pp. 68–69 and 301.

57
According to his distorted representation, ‘without similar provocation, Red Army soldiers committed atrocities against German ground and air force personnel. The accounts of murder, mutilation, and maiming come entirely from German sources’: Stolfi,
Hitler's Panzers East
, pp. 90–91.

58
Ernst Klink, ‘Die Operationsführung’ in Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (ed.),
Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg
, Band IV:
Der Angriff auf die Sowjetunion
(Stuttgart, 1983).

59
Andreas Hillgruber, ‘Die Bedeutung der Schlacht von Smolensk in der zweiten Juli-Hälfte 1941 für den Ausgang des Ostkrieges’ in Inge Auerbach, Andreas Hillgruber and Gottfried Schramm (eds.),
Felder und Vorfelder russischer Geschichte. Studien zu Ehren von Peter Scheibert
(Freiburg, 1985), pp. 266–279. Reproduced in Andreas Hillgruber,
Die Zerstörung Europas. Beiträge zur Weltkriegsepoche 1914 bis 1945
(Frankfurt am Main, 1988), pp. 296–312. See also Andreas Hillgruber,
Der Zenit des Zweiten Weltkrieges Juli 1941
(Wiesbaden, 1977).

60
John E. Tashjean, ‘Smolensk 1941. Zum Kulminationspunkt in Theorie und Praxis’ in Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (ed.),
Die operative Idee und ihre Grundlagen. Ausgewählte Operationen des Zweiten Weltkrieges. Vorträge zur Militärgeschichte
, Volume X (Herford, 1989) pp. 39–51.

61
See studies by Kipp, ‘Barbarossa and the Crisis of Successive Operations’, pp. 113–150, and Glantz,
The Battle for Smolensk: 7 July–10 September 1941
(privately published study by David M. Glantz, 2001). See also the more general study by John Erickson,
The Road to Stalingrad. Stalin's War with Germany
, Volume I (London, 1975).

62
For an insight into research gaps see David M. Glantz,
Forgotten Battles of the German–Soviet War (1941–1945)
, Volume I:
The Summer–Fall Campaign (22 June–4 December 1941)
(privately published study by David M. Glantz,
1999
) and Glantz, ‘Forgotten Battles’ in The Military Book Club (ed.),
Slaughterhouse. The Encyclopedia of the Eastern Front
(New York, 2002), pp. 471–496.

63
Interestingly, in the wake of Napoleon's failed 1812 invasion of Russia, the French also took solace from the myth that they had been defeated by the Russian winter, rather than the Russians themselves or Napoleon's own mistakes. Adam Zamoyski,
1812. Napoleon's Fatal March on Moscow
(London, 2004), p. xvii.

64
Ronald Smelser and Edward J. Davies II,
The Myth of the Eastern Front. The Nazi–Soviet War in American Popular Culture
(Cambridge, 2008).

65
For one overview see Glantz,
Colossus Reborn
, pp. 14–17.

66
According to David Glantz: ‘The paucity of detailed information on the war available in the English language reinforces the natural American (and Western) penchant for viewing the Soviet–German War as a mere backdrop for more dramatic and significant battles in western theatres, such as El Alamein, Salerno, Anzio, Normandy, and the Ardennes Offensive.’ Glantz,
The Soviet–German War 1941–1945: Myths and Realities: A Survey Essay
(privately published study by David M. Glantz) p. 2. See also Glantz, ‘Introduction’, in The Military Book Club (ed.),
Slaughterhouse
, p. 2. It is also worth remembering that the same historical distortion has taken place, to perhaps an even greater extent, in representing events in the war against Japan. Here events in the Pacific have dominated much of our understanding of this aspect of the conflict with the frightful war in mainland China accounting for only the most rudimentary historical research.

67
The best single-volume guides to the war are Weinberg's
A World At Arms
, and from the German perspective Rolf-Dieter Müller's
Der letzte deutsche Krieg 1939–1945
(Stuttgart, 2005).

68
David M. Glantz, ‘The Red Army at War, 1941–1945: Sources and Interpretations’,
The Journal of Military History
62(3) (July, 1998), 596–598.

69
Alan Clark,
Barbarossa. The Russian-German Conflict 1941–1945
(London, 1996),
Chapter 4
, ‘The First Crisis’.

70
For some key points see Alan F. Wilt, ‘Hitler's Late Summer Pause in 1941’,
Military Affairs
45(4) (1981), 190–191.

71
Basil Liddell Hart,
History of The Second World War
(London, 1970), p. 163.

72
Hubert P. van Tuyll,
Feeding the Bear. American Aid to the Soviet Union
, 1941–1945 (Westport, 1989), p. 4.

73
Winston S. Churchill,
The Second World War. Abridged Edition
(London, 1959), p. 658.

74
Geoffrey Roberts,
Victory at Stalingrad. The Battle that Changed History
(London, 2002),
Chapter 8
, ‘Conclusion: The Battle That Changed History’. See also Max Hastings's comments in the Foreword to Willy Peter Reese,
A Stranger to Myself. The Inhumanity of War: Russia, 1941–1944
(New York, 2005), p. x.

75
Mark Healy,
Kursk 1943: Tide Turns in the East
(Oxford, 2000), p. 7. See also Rupert Butler,
Hitler's Jackals
(Barnsley, 1998), Chapter 13, ‘Kursk: The Turning Point’.

76
Overy,
Why the Allies Won
, p. 17.

77
Ibid., p. 64.

78
‘[The] many fundamental improvements in the way the Soviet forces fought were displayed fully in the battles that rescued Stalingrad between November 1942 and January 1943, when the German Sixth Army under General Friedrich Paulus was forced to capitulate. The turning-point came six months later, when the German armed forces launched Operation “Citadel” to seize a major salient around Kursk to try to unhinge the Soviet front and create the possibility for a renewed assault on Moscow.’ Richard Overy,
The Dictators. Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia
(London, 2004), p. 529.

79
Klaus Reinhardt,
Moscow – The Turning Point. The Failure of Hitler's Strategy in the Winter of 1941–42
(Oxford, 1992). See also Klaus Reinhardt, ‘Moscow 1941. The Turning Point’ in John Erickson and David Dilks (eds.),
Barbarossa. The Axis and the Allies
(Edinburgh, 1998), pp. 207–224.

80
John J. Miller, ‘Sounding Taps. Why Military History is being Retired’,
National Review Online
(October, 2006). http://nrd.nationalreview.com/article/?

81
The actions and beliefs of German neo-Nazis notwithstanding, although in relation to some other extremist right-wing organisations in Europe they have retained comparatively little support in Germany. Only in the past few years have these groups gained a surge in popularity, particularly in the former eastern states.

82
A convincing case highlighting the pitfalls of promoting national pride is made by Patrick Graichen, ‘Deutsche Vergangenheitspolitik und deutscher “Nationalstolz”’ in Stiftung für die Rechte zukünftiger Generationen (ed.),
Was bleibt von der Vergangenheit? Die junge Generation im Dialog über den Holocaust
(Berlin, 1999), pp. 222–229.

83
Cases in point would be Japan's disputed role in its war of annihilation in Korea and China during World War II and Turkey's ardent denial of its genocide against Armenians during World War I. More general examples can be seen in the brutality and exploitation of colonial rule. These periods are still viewed by many in European countries – especially Britain – with unabashed pride as golden eras of nationhood. One can also add the generally appalling treatment of indigenous peoples around the world for whom histories of displacement, exploitation and even genocide have been followed in more recent years by neglect and discrimination.

Part I Strategic plans and theoretical conceptions for war against the Soviet Union

1 Fighting the bear

The evolution of early strategic planning

In August 1939 the signing of the
Nazi–Soviet Non-Aggression Pact (otherwise referred to as the
Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact) set out the partition of
Poland following an agreed invasion, first by Hitler and later Stalin. The pact heralded a new degree of co-operation between the two nations, while the secret agreement on spheres of influence in eastern Europe and
Finland had the important ramification of ensuring security for Germany's eastern border. This freed Hitler's hand for the war he found himself fighting against
France and Britain and allowed for the heavy concentration of his forces in the west. Hitler's subsequent campaign in May and June of 1940 seized control of the Low Countries, knocked France out of the war and effectively secured control of Germany's western flank.