Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East (7 page)

Although there are some fine studies by German historians, a great deal of work, particularly on Germany's eastern front in World War II, remains to be done. Doubts by some German intellectuals, often backed, as I discovered in my time at the Humboldt University, by significant elements of the student body, about the underlying ‘meaning’ or suspected motives of such research, must be judged on a case by case basis and not be allowed to cloud the field as a whole. Certainly such fears are not completely unjustified. Any in-depth look at military histories in the English language reveals there is an all too common tendency for histories to adopt a brazen tone of glorification, becoming a medium for patriotic embellishment and national pride. Although such dubious contributions do not dominate the scholarly field, they are nonetheless present and, in some instances, have been well received by large audiences keen to embrace romantic depictions of their county's exploits in war. Still, misguided and potentially damaging rogue elements are a challenge to all fields of study which debate in an open forum. Indeed, it is the absence of informed opinion that allows radical theories to gain credibility.

Investigating Germany's military history is unlikely to spawn a rise of similarly ill-conceived, misguided publications. The well-established culpability of Germany for crimes perpetrated between 1933 and 1945 has left Germans much more inclined to assess their country's exploits in war critically and objectively. There is also a much more limited tolerance for forms of nationalistic expression because it is still inextricably linked to the rhetoric and actions of the Third Reich. Thus, advocating the proliferation of military history in Germany's contemporary historical discourse entails little risk, but promises a good deal of important research. To that end, I hope the following work can make a modest contribution.

1
Hans-Adolf Jacobsen (ed),
Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht (Wehrmachtführungsstab)
, Band I/1:
1. August 1940–31. Dezember 1941
(Munich, 1982), p. 300 (3 February 1941). Hereafter cited as KTB OKW, Volume I.

2
Max Domarus,
Hitler. Speeches and Proclamations 1932–1945. The Chronicle of a Dictatorship
, Volume IV:
The Years 1941 to 1945
(Wauconda, 2004), p. 2458; Winston S. Churchill,
Never Give In: The Best of Winston Churchill's Speeches
(New York, 2003), pp. 289–293. Also available online: www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/ww2/churchill062241. html

3
Michael Howard and Peter Paret (eds.), Carl von Clausewitz,
On War
(New York, 1993), p. 639.

4
‘KTB 3rd Pz. Div. vom 16.8.40 bis 18.9.41’ BA-MA RH 27–3/14.

5
See comments on these sources in Gerhard Weinberg, ‘Some Thoughts on World War II’,
The Journal of Military History
, 56(4) (October, 1992), 659–660; Gerhard Weinberg,
Germany, Hitler, and World War II – Essays in Modern German and World History
(New York, 1995), pp. 307–308; Wolfram Wette,
Die Wehrmacht. Feindbilder, Vernichtungskrieg, Legenden
(Frankfurt am Main, 2002), Teil V: ‘Die Legende von der “sauberen” Wehrmacht’, pp. 197–244; English translation:
The Wehrmacht. History, Myth, Reality
(Cambridge, 2006),
Chapter 5
, ‘The Legend of the Wehrmacht's “Clean Hands”’, pp. 195–250.

6
Ernst Klink, ‘Die militärische Konzeption des Krieges gegen die Sowjetunion’, in Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (ed.),
Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg
, Band 4:
Der Angriff auf die Sowjetunion
(Stuttgart, 1983).

7
Barry Leach,
German Strategy Against Russia 1939–1941
(Oxford, 1973).

8
Andreas Hillgruber,
Hitlers Strategie. Politik und Kriegführung 1940–1941
(Bonn, 1965).

9
Robert Cecil,
Hitler's Decision to Invade Russia 1941
(London, 1975).

10
Raymond James Sontag and James Stuart Beddie (eds.),
Nazi–Soviet Relations, 1939–1941. Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office
(Washington DC, 1948).

11
Soviet Information Bureau,
The Falsifiers of History
(Moscow and London, 1948).

12
Walter Hofer,
War Premeditated, 1939
(London, 1955).

13
A. J. P Taylor,
The Origins of the Second World War
(London, 1961).

14
Gerald Reitlinger,
The House Built on Sand. The Conflicts of German Policy in Russia 1939–45
(London, 1960), p. 10. E. M. Robertson stated that: ‘Hitler seldom looked more than one move ahead; and the view that he had tried to put into operation a programme, carefully formulated in advance, is quite untenable.’ E. M. Robertson,
Hitler's Pre-War Policy and Military Plans: 1933–1939
(London, 1963), p. 1. Even recent works have continued to reflect Taylor's thesis. Heinz Magenheimer considers the idea of Hitler harbouring preconceived plans as ‘endeavours to explain a casual chain of incidents that extend over a long period and culminate in a multiple, complex combination of events, simply by pointing to statements made by one of the protagonists in the distant past’. Heinz Magenheimer,
Hitler's War. Germany's Key Strategic Decisions 1940–1945
(London, 1999), p. 42.

15
Hugh Trevor-Roper, ‘A. J. P Taylor, Hitler and the War’ in
Outbreak of the Second World War: Design or Blunder?
(Boston, 1962), pp. 88–97. See also Hugh Trevor-Roper (ed.),
Hitler's War Directives 1939–1945
(London, 1964), pp. 13–14; Ian Kershaw,
Hitler 1936–1945. Nemesis
(London, 2001), p. 336; Alan Bullock,
Hitler. A Study in Tyranny
(London, 1962), p. 594; Lucy Dawidowicz,
The War Against the Jews 1933–45
(London, 1987), p. 157; William Shirer,
The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich
(New York, 1960), pp. 122–123, 1044.

16
Hillgruber,
Hitlers Strategie
.

17
See comments by Rolf-Dieter Müller in Rolf-Dieter Müller and Gerd R. Ueberschär,
Hitler's War in the East 1941–1945. A Critical Assessment
(Oxford, 1997), pp. 10–15.

18
Erich von Manstein,
Lost Victories
(Novato, 1958), pp. 154, 169–171, 181–182; Franz Halder,
Hitler as Warlord
(London, 1950), pp. 17, 22–23; Albrecht Kesselring,
The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Kesselring
(London, 1953), pp. 86–87; Walter Görlitz (ed.),
The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Keitel. Chief of the German High Command, 1938–1945
(New York, 1966), pp. 124 and 243. In counterpoint to these assertions see the helpful essay by Manfred Messerschmidt, ‘June 1941 Seen Through German Memoirs and Diaries’ in Joseph Wieczynski (ed.),
Operation Barbarossa. The German Attack on the Soviet Union June 22, 1941
(Salt Lake City, 1993), pp. 214–227.

19
Lev Besymenski,
Sonderakte Barbarossa. Dokumentarbericht zur Vorgeschichte des deutschen Überfalls auf die Sowjetunion – aus sowjetischer Sicht
(Reinbek, 1973); Hans Höhn (ed.),
Auf antisowjetischem Kriegskurs. Studien zur militärischen Vorbereitung des deutschen Imperialismus auf die Aggression gegen die UdSSR (1933–1941)
(Berlin, 1970); A. A Gretschko (ed.),
Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieges 1939–1945, Volume II: Am Vorabend des Krieges
(East Berlin, 1975); P. A. Shilin,
Der Grosse Vaterländische Krieg der Sowjetunion
, Volume I (Berlin, 1975).

20
Leach,
German Strategy Against Russia
, p. 2.

21
Gerd R. Ueberschär, ‘Hitlers Entschluß zum “Lebensraum” – Krieg im Osten. Programmatisches Ziel oder militärstrategisches Kalkül?’ in Gerd Ueberschär and Wolfram Wette (eds.),
‘Unternehmen Barbarossa’. Der deutsche Überfall auf die Sowjetunion 1941
(Paderborn, 1984), pp. 83–110; Klaus Hildebrand, ‘Hitlers “Programm” und seine Realisierung 1939–1942’ in Manfred Funke (ed.),
Hitler, Deutschland und die Mächte. Materialien zur Außenpolitik des Dritten Reiches
(Düsseldorf, 1976), pp. 63–93; Klaus Hildebrand,
Deutsche Außenpolitik, 1933–1945. Kalkül oder Dogma?
4th edn (Stuttgart, 1980); Gerhard Schreiber, ‘Deutsche Politik und Kriegführung 1939 bis 1945’ in Karl Dietrich Bracher, Manfred Funke and Hans-Adolf Jacobsen (eds.),
In Deutschland 1933–1945. Neue Studien zur nationalsozialistischen Herrschaft
(Bonn, 1992), pp. 333–356; Eberhard Jächel,
Hitlers Weltanschauung. Entwurf einer Herrschaft
(Stuttgart, 1991),
Chapter 2
, ‘Die Eroberung von Raum’. In English the most valuable studies are those by Norman Rich,
Hitler's War Aims. Ideology, the Nazi State, and the Course of Expansion
(New York, 1972); Cecil,
Hitler's Decision to Invade Russia 1941
; Leach,
German Strategy Against Russia
; Gerhard Weinberg,
A World At Arms. A Global History of World War II
(Cambridge, 1994).

22
These views persisted in the Soviet Union up until its final years when Gorbachev's
glasnost
and
perestroika
decreed a new openness allowing fundamental change in the discourse of Soviet history. Central among these was the recognition of the secret protocols agreed to by Stalin in the Molotov–Ribbentrop pact. Curiously, the East German state opted not to partake in this new discussion choosing instead to hold doggedly to the long since discredited denial. Müller and Ueberschär,
Hitler's War in the East
, pp. 28, 31.

23
Victor Suvorov,
Icebreaker: Who Started the Second World War
(London, 1990); Ernst Topitsch,
Stalin's War: A Radical New Theory of the Origins of the Second World War
(New York, 1987); Joachim Hoffmann, ‘The Soviet Union's Offensive Preparations in 1941’ in Bernd Wegner (ed.),
From Peace to War. Germany, Soviet Russia and the World, 1939–1941
(Oxford, 1997), pp. 361–380; Constantine Pleshakov,
Stalin's Folly. The Tragic First Ten Days of WWII on the Eastern Front
(New York, 2005). In 2000 I had the opportunity to hear Victor Suvorov (this is only a pseudonym, his real name is Vladimir Rezun) speak at King's College Department of War Studies. He spoke at length on the general thesis of
Icebreaker
and included what he explained to be new research. Overall, however, I found the presentation (as with his book) thoroughly unconvincing and sorely lacking in documentary evidence for such outlandish claims.

24
The most comprehensive overall survey is that by Gabriel Gorodetsky,
Grand Delusion. Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia
(New Haven, 1999). See also Gabriel Gorodetsky, ‘Stalin and Hitler's Attack on the Soviet Union’ in Bernd Wegner (ed.),
From Peace to War
, pp. 343–359; Gerd R. Ueberschär, ‘Hitler's Decision to Attack the Soviet Union in Recent German Historiography’ in Joseph Wieczynski (ed.),
Operation Barbarossa
. On a different tack from Gorodetsky, David M. Glantz argues the case through a pre-war analysis of the Red Army; see David M. Glantz,
Stumbling Colossus. The Red Army on the Eve of World War
(Lawrence, 1998). For a more complete listing of the large body of literature in this area see the selected titles in Müller and Ueberschär,
Hitler's War in the East
, pp. 390–397.

25
Antony Beevor,
Stalingrad
(London, 1998), p. 21.

26
Between May 1937 and September 1938 an estimated 36,700 men were purged from the army and 3,000 from the navy (Gorodetsky,
Grand Delusion
, p. 115). These included three out of the Red Army's five marshals, fifteen out of sixteen army commanders, sixty from sixty-seven corps commanders, 70 per cent of all divisional commanders and a large number of the senior political commissars. Rodric Braithwaite,
Moscow 1941. A City and Its People at War
(New York, 2006), p. 46.

27
R. H. S. Stolfi,
Hitler's Panzers East. World War II Reinterpreted
(Norman, 1993), p. 22.

28
Ibid., p. 16.

29
Von Manstein,
Lost Victories
, pp. 177–178.

30
R. A. C. Parker,
Struggle for Survival. The History of the Second World War
(Oxford, 1989), pp. 65–67.

31
Richard Overy,
Why the Allies Won
(New York, 1996), p. 211.

32
Ibid., pp. 3–4.

33
For a useful discussion of this process see chapters by Rolf-Dieter Müller in
Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg
, Band IV:
Der Angriff auf die Sowjetunion
(Stuttgart, 1983). See also Omer Bartov,
Hitler's Army. Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich
(Oxford, 1992), Chapter 1, ‘The Demodernization of the Front’.

34
Robert M. Citino,
Death of the Wehrmacht. The German Campaigns of 1942
(Lawrence, 2007), pp. 34–35.

35
Ibid., pp. 38–39.

36
Ibid., p. 36.

37
Ibid., p. 39.

38
Andrew Nagorski,
The Greatest Battle. Stalin, Hitler, and the Desperate Struggle for Moscow That Changed the Course of World War II
(New York, 2007), p. 110. See also Andrew Nagorski, ‘Stalin's Tipping Point’ in
Newsweek
(US edition, 10 September, 2007), 44.