Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East (45 page)

139
Franz Halder, KTB III, p. 26 (29 June 1941).

140
Hoth,
Panzer-Operationen
, p. 66.

141
‘3rd Pz. Gr. KTB 25.5.41 – 31.8.41’ BA-MA Microfilm 59054, Fol. 71 (29 June 1941).

142
Guderian,
Panzer Leader
, p. 160; ‘KTB Nr.1 Panzergruppe 2 vom 22.6.1941 bis 21.7.41’ BA-MA RH 21–2/927, Fols. 90–91 (30 June 1941).

143
Guderian,
Panzer Leader
, p. 161.

144
Franz Halder, KTB III, p. 29 (30 June 1941).

145
As cited in Meyer,
Heusinger
, pp. 152–153.

146
Franz Halder, KTB III, p. 29 (30 June 1941).

147
Ibid., p. 31 (1 July 1941).

148
‘Panzerarmeeoberkommandos Tagesmeldungen 21.6 – 31.8.41’ BA-MA RH 21–3/43, Fol. 67 (2 July 1941). Exact figures reported: Officers fallen 48, wounded 75, missing 2, totalling 125. Non-commissioned officers and lower ranks: fallen 387, wounded 1,111, missing 146, totalling 1,644. Research by Bernhard Kroener revealed that during the first year of the war in the east, out of every 1,000 casualties 229 (on average) were killed in action (Kroener, ‘Die Winter 1941/42’, p. 879).

149
‘Verlustmeldungen 5.7.1941 – 25.3.1942’ BA-MA RH 21–2/757, Fol. 1 (Casualty lists until 30 June 1941, report dated 5 July 1941). Exact figures reported: Officers fallen 89, wounded 151, missing 6, totalling 246. Non-commissioned officers and lower ranks: fallen 1,058, wounded 2,796, missing 289, totalling 4,143.

150
Franz Halder, KTB III, pp. 34–35 (2 July 1941).

151
Fedor von Bock, KTB ‘Osten I’, Fol. 12,
War Diary
, p. 235 (2 July 1941).

152
Franz Halder, KTB III, pp. 35–36 (2 July 1941).

153
Ibid., p. 35 (2 July 1941).

154
‘KTB Nr.1 Panzergruppe 2 vom 22.6.1941 bis 21.7.41’ BA-MA RH 21–2/927, Fol. 96 (1 July 1941).

155
Guderian's letter as cited by Macksey,
Guderian
, p. 136. See also Hürter,
Hitlers Heerführer
, p. 285, footnote 22.

156
Guderian,
Panzer Leader
, p. 161.

157
In his memoirs Guderian merely states that he visited the division and learned that enemy breakout attempts had been successfully repelled. General Weber, the divisional commander, left no record as he was later mortally wounded.

158
Guderian's defiance of higher authority was already evident from a number of previous instances in the 1940 Western campaign when he openly defied the orders of his superior von Kleist (Frieser,
Blitzkrieg-Legende
, pp. 187–190. English translation:
The Blitzkrieg Legend
, pp. 154–156).

159
Guderian,
Panzer Leader
, p. 162.

160
Underlining in the original. ‘Tagesmeldungen der Heeresgruppe Mitte vom 22.6.41 bis 15.7.41’ BA-MA RH 19 II/128, Fol. 138 (3 July 1941).

161
H. C. Robbins Landon and Sebastian Leitner (eds.),
Diary of a German Soldier
(London, 1963), p. 73 (3 July 1941).

162
Kempowski (ed.),
Das Echolot Barbarossa ’41
, p. 111 (26 June 1941).

163
As quoted in Steiger,
Armour Tactics
, p. 119.

164
Müller, ‘Das Scheitern der wirtschaftlichen “Blitzkriegstrategie”’, p. 963.

165
There is evidence that Guderian was particularly unaware of the logistical dangers his forces faced, but the under-estimation was a general flaw seen throughout the army (Krumpelt,
Das Material und die Kriegführung
, p. 165).

166
‘Panzerarmeeoberkommandos Tagesmeldungen 21.6 – 31.8.41’ BA-MA RH 21–3/43, Fol. 73 (3 July 1941). See also ‘3rd Pz. Gr. KTB 25.5.41 – 31.8.41’ BA-MA Microfilm 59054, Fol. 86 (3 July 1941).

167
‘Kriegstagebuch der O.Qu.-Abt. Pz. A.O.K.2 von 21.6.41 bis 31.3.42’ BA-MA RH 21–2/819, Fol. 324 (2 July 1941).

168
As cited in Catherine Merridale,
Ivan's War. Life and Death in the Red Army, 1933–1945
(New York, 2006), p. 107.

169
Hürter,
Ein deutscher General an der Ostfront
, p. 63 (23 June 1941).

170
Bartov,
The Eastern Front, 1941–45
, pp. 130 and 134.

171
Gerhard Weinberg, ‘The Yelnya–Dorogobuzh Area of Smolensk Oblast’ in John A. Armstrong (ed.),
Soviet Partisans in World War II
(Madison, 1964), p. 408.

172
Ernst Kern,
War Diary 1941–45. A Report
(New York, 1993), p. 5.

173
True To Type. A Selection From Letters and Diaries of German Soldiers and Civilians Collected on the Soviet–German Front
(London), p. 13 (24 August 1941). This book makes no reference to its editor or date of publication.

174
An outstanding new study by Jeffrey Rutherford provides a rare insight into three Infantry Divisions from Army Group North. In addition to his main thesis, Rutherford's work shows that the practice of plundering was a common feature of the Wehrmacht's attempt to supply itself throughout the summer advance. See Jeffrey Rutherford, ‘Soldiers into Nazis? The German Infantry's War in Northwest Russia, 1941–1944’ (unpublished PhD dissertation from the University of Texas at Austin, 2007), pp. 125–128, 134, 138–140.

175
Franz Halder, KTB III, p. 36 (2 July 1941).

176
Ibid., pp. 38–39 (3 July 1941).

177
Von Below,
Als Hitlers Adjutant 1937–45
, p. 285.

178
Fröhlich (ed.),
Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels
, Teil I: Aufzeichnungen 1923–1941, Band 9, Dezember 1940–Juli 1941, p. 418 (2 July 1941).

179
Siegfried Knappe with Ted Brusaw,
Soldat. Reflections of a German Soldier, 1936–1949
(New York, 1992), pp. 212–213.

180
Kipp, ‘Soviet Covering Forces’, pp. 7–8.

181
For a good discussion of Pavlov's role in the collapse of Western Front during the first days of the war see Mawdsley,
Thunder in the East
, pp. 61–65.

182
Viktor Anfilov, ‘Timoshenko’ in Harold Shukman (ed.),
Stalin's Generals
(London, 1993), p. 253.

183
Barber and Harrison,
The Soviet Home Front 1941–1945
, pp. 60–61; Richard Overy,
Russia's War
(London, 1997), p. 80.

184
Leonid Grenkevich,
The Soviet Partisan Movement 1941–1944
(London, 1999), p. 75.

185
Minus the 12th Panzer Division which was not yet released from the main pocket.

186
Hoth,
Panzer-Operationen
, Anlage 3: ‘Gruppenbefehl Nr.10 für den 4. und 5. Juli 1941’, p. 155.

187
Minus the 17th Panzer Division which was not yet released from the main pocket.

188
Landon and Leitner (eds.),
Diary of a German Soldier
, p. 74 (3 July 1941).

189
‘Panzerarmeeoberkommandos Tagesmeldungen 21.6 – 31.8.41’ BA-MA RH 21–3/43, Fol. 73 (3 July 1941).

190
Vasily B. Emelianenko,
Red Star Against the Swastika. The Story of a Soviet Pilot over the Eastern Front
(London, 2005), p. 59.

191
‘Panzerarmeeoberkommandos Tagesmeldungen 21.6 – 31.8.41’ BA-MA RH 21–3/43, Fol. 73 (3 July 1941).

192
Fedor von Bock, KTB ‘Osten I’, Fol. 13,
War Diary
, p. 237 (3 July 1941).

193
Henrik Eberle and Matthias Uhl (eds.),
The Hitler Book. The Secret Dossier Prepared for Stalin from the Interrogations of Hitler's Personal Aides
(New York, 2005), p. 74.

194
KTB OKW, Volume II, p. 1020, Document 66 (3 July 1941).

195
Ibid., Document 67 (4 July 1941). Peter de Mendelssohn,
Die Nürnberger Dokumente. Studien zur deutschen Kriegspolitik 1937–45
(Hamburg, 1947), pp. 366–367.

196
Franz Halder, KTB III, p. 40 (4 July 1941).

197
Hürter,
Ein deutscher General an der Ostfront
, p. 66 (8 July 1941). On 11 July in another letter to his wife, Heinrici wrote of his belief that after the eastern campaign the infantry would have to be disbanded, owing to the inability of his slow-moving formations to support the motorised units. As Heinrici concluded: ‘The difference between motor and manpower is too great’ (Hürter,
Ein deutscher General an der Ostfront
, p. 68 (11 July 1941)).

198
Ibid., p. 67 (11 July 1941). See also Knappe with Brusaw,
Soldat
, p. 208.

199
Walter Bähr and Hans Bähr (eds.),
Kriegsbriefe gefallener Studenten, 1939–1945
(Tübingen and Stuttgart, 1952) p. 48 (30 June 1941).

200
Ibid., p. 70 (30 June 1941).

201
Ibid., p. 71 (4 July 1941). Hans Joachim Schröder, ‘German Soldiers’ Experiences During the Initial Phase of the Russian Campaign’ in Bernd Wegner (ed.),
From Peace to War. Germany, Soviet Russia and the World, 1939–1941
(Oxford, 1997), pp. 313–314.

202
Kempowski (ed.),
Das Echolot Barbarossa ’41
, pp. 176–177 (1 July 1941).

203
Helmut Pabst,
The Outermost Frontier. A German Soldier in the Russian Campaign
(London, 1957), p. 14.

204
William Lubbeck with David Hurt,
At Leningrad's Gates. The Story of a Soldier with Army Group North
(Philadelphia, 2006), p. 85.

205
Hans von Luck,
Panzer Commander. The Memoirs of Colonel Hans von Luck
(New York, 1989), p. 55.

206
Haape with Henshaw,
Moscow Tram Stop
, pp. 51–53.

207
Ibid., p. 57.

208
Alexander Stahlberg,
Bounden Duty. The Memoirs of a German Officer 1932–45
(London, 1990), p. 161.

209
‘KTB Nr.1 Panzergruppe 2 vom 22.6.1941 bis 21.7.41’ BA-MA RH 21–2/927, Fols. 119–120 (3 July 1941).

210
Ibid., Fol. 127 (4 July 1941).

211
‘Panzerarmeeoberkommandos Tagesmeldungen 21.6 – 31.8.41’ BA-MA RH 21–3/43, Fol. 78 (4 July 1941).

212
Glantz and House,
When Titans Clashed
, p. 58.

213
Hoth,
Panzer-Operationen
, p. 80.

214
‘KTB Nr.1 Panzergruppe 2 vom 22.6.1941 bis 21.7.41’ BA-MA RH 21–2/927, Fol. 133 (5 July 1941).

215
Ibid. (5 July 1941).

216
Franz Halder, KTB III, p. 40 (4 July 1941).

217
Of which 281 were incorporated into Operation Barbarossa. See table on armoured fighting vehicles in Müller, ‘Von der Wirtschaftsallianz’, p. 185.

218
Franz Halder, KTB III, p. 42 (4 July 1941).

219
Fedor von Bock, KTB ‘Osten I’, Fol. 15,
War Diary
, p. 238 (5 July 1941).

220
Haape with Henshaw,
Moscow Tram Stop
, p. 60.

221
Fedor von Bock, KTB ‘Osten I’, Fol. 15,
War Diary
, p. 238 (5 July 1941).

222
At the beginning of the war Bock's Army Group Centre numbered some 1,180,000 men (including reserves). These were allocated as follows: 9th Army 248,000 men; 4th Army 310,000 men; Panzer Group 2 248,000 men; Panzer Group 3 145,000. The rest of the army group's manpower was divided between reserve divisions, security divisions and the Luftwaffe. Brian Taylor,
Barbarossa To Berlin. A Chronology of the Campaigns on the Eastern Front 1941 to 1945
, Volume I:
The Long Drive East 22 June 1941 to 18 November 1942
(Staplehurst, 2003), pp. 17–19.

6 The perilous advance to the east

Forging across the Dvina and Dnepr – the threshold to demise

As
Army Group Centre heaved its way forward in the centre of Germany's long eastern front, there was a steadily emerging concern for its southern flank. Throughout June,
Rundstedt's
Army Group South had struggled to advance against vigorous Soviet counter-strokes and, by early July, its rapid forward movement was further hindered by the primitive Soviet infrastructure and intermittent downpours which turned the roads to seas of mud. The Operations Officer at OKH responsible for Army Group South, Major
Karl Thilo, noted in his diary on 7 July that, ‘the tanks “suffocate” in the mud of the Ukrainian
chermozem
[black earth]’.
¹
The following day he recorded the situation estimate by Army Group South's High Command: ‘Enemy well commanded…At first, defensive operations close to the border, then withdrawal to the
Stalin Line with heavy counterattacks against our armoured wedge…Operational breakthrough by
Panzer Group 1
still not
achieved’. Thilo also noted that the army group was still sizeably outnumbered with 61 major Soviet units versus 46 German and allied formations.
²
Contemplating the further advance of Army Group Centre on 5 July,
Brauchitsch raised the difficulty of screening Bock's right flank pointing out the emerging problem that Army Group South's
6th Army and 1st Panzer Group, ‘are still quite far back’.
³