Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East (77 page)

207
Ibid., p. 316 (1 August 1941).

208
Ibid., p. 317 (2 August 1941).

209
Ibid., p. 318 (3 August 1941).

210
Italics in the original. Hoepner's letter as cited by Hürter,
Hitlers Heerführer
, p. 291.

211
In a letter to his wife on 6 August Manstein described the floundering operations of Army Group North as having developed into a ‘sideshow war’. Manstein's letter cited in Hürter,
Hitlers Heerführer
, p. 288, footnote 39.

212
Rundstedt's letter cited in ibid., p. 290, footnote 47.

213
Malaparte,
The Volga Rises in Europe
, p. 54 (7 July, 1941).

214
Klink, ‘Die Operationsführung’, pp. 477–478.

215
Martin Gareis,
Kampf und Ende der Fränkisch-Sudetendeutschen 98. Infanterie-Division
(Eggolsheim, 1956), p. 103.

216
Klink, ‘Die Operationsführung’, pp. 480–482.

217
Franz Halder, KTB III, p. 131 (30 July 1941).

218
Gottlob Herbert Bidermann,
In Deadly Combat. A German Soldier's Memoir of the Eastern Front
(Lawrence, 2000), pp. 25 and 27.

219
KTB OKW, Volume II, p. 560 (8 July 1941).

220
Rundstedt's letter cited in Hürter,
Hitlers Heerführer
, p. 292.

221
KTB OKW, Volume I, pp. 328–329 (17 February 1941).

222
Jürgen Förster, ‘Die Entscheidungen der “Dreierpaktstaaten”’ in Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (ed.),
Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg
, Band IV:
Der Angriff auf die Sowjetunion
(Stuttgart, 1983), p. 903.

223
Gerhard Krebs, ‘Japan and the German-Soviet War, 1941’ in Bernd Wegner (ed.),
From Peace to War. Germany, Soviet Russia and the World, 1939–1941
(Oxford, 1997), p. 551.

224
Förster, ‘Die Entscheidungen der “Dreierpaktstaaten”’, p. 904; Karl Drechsler, ‘Germany and its Allies and the War Against the Soviet Union, 1940–42’ in Joseph Wieczynski (ed.),
Operation Barbarossa. The German Attack on the Soviet Union June 22, 1941
(Salt Lake City, 1993), pp. 39–40.

225
Ibid.

226
Hillgruber,
Die Zerstörung Europas
, p. 306.

227
In this brief undeclared war the Japanese forces were badly beaten by the Red Army under Georgi Zhukov, then a corps commander and now the Chief of the General Staff who was presently overseeing operations against Army Group Centre. For the most detailed work on this war see Alvin D. Coox,
Nomanhan. Japan Against Russia 1939
(Stanford, 1990).

228
Fedor von Bock, KTB ‘Osten I’, Fol. 43,
War Diary
, p. 263 (25 July 1941).

229
Krebs, ‘Japan and the German-Soviet War, 1941’, p. 553.

230
Hillgruber,
Die Zerstörung Europas
, p. 307.

231
Nagorski,
The Greatest Battle
, p. 157.

232
Leonidas E. Hill (ed.),
Die Weizsäcker-Papiere 1933–1950
(Frankfurt am Main, 1974), p. 265 (31 August 1941).

233
Erickson,
The Soviet High Command 1918–1941
, pp. 631–632.

234
Hillgruber,
Die Zerstörung Europas
, p. 309; Drechsler, ‘Germany and its Allies’, pp. 39–40; Krebs, ‘Japan and the German-Soviet War, 1941’, pp. 551–553; Reinhardt,
Moscow – The Turning Point
, p. 44.

235
Förster, ‘Die Entscheidungen der “Dreierpaktstaaten”’, p. 899.

236
Görlitz (ed.),
Memoirs of Field-Marshal Keitel
, p. 160. In rendering such a severe judgement it is possible that Keitel's portrayal was somewhat influenced by later events.

237
Förster, ‘Die Entscheidungen der “Dreierpaktstaaten”’, p. 899.

238
Finland never formally became a member of the Axis and preferred instead to see its confederacy with Germany simply as ‘comradeship-in-arms’ against a common enemy.

239
Manfred Menger, ‘Germany and the Finnish “Separate War” against the Soviet Union’ in Bernd Wegner (ed.),
From Peace to War. Germany, Soviet Russia and the World, 1939–1941
(Oxford, 1997), pp. 533–534.

240
Mark Axworthy, Cornel Scafes and Cristian Craciunoiu,
Third Axis Fourth Ally. Romanian Armed Forces in the European War, 1941–1945
(London, 1995), p. 45.

241
Jürgen Förster, ‘Die Gewinnung von Verbündeten in Südosteuropa’, p. 345.

242
Richard L. DiNardo,
Germany and the Axis Powers. From Coalition to Collapse
(Lawrence, 2005), pp. 112–115.

243
Axworthy
et al., Third Axis Fourth Ally
, p. 49.

244
Mark Axworthy, ‘Peasant Scapegoat to Industrial Slaughter: the Romanian Soldier at the Siege of Odessa’ in Paul Addison and Angus Calder (eds.),
A Time to Kill. The Soldier's Experience of War in the West 1939–1945
(London, 1997), p. 227. See also Mihai Tone Filipescu,
Reluctant Axis: The Romanian Army in Russia 1941–1944
(Chapultepeq, 2006), Chapter Two, ‘The Battle for Odessa’.

245
Axworthy, ‘Peasant Scapegoat’, p. 232.

246
Förster, ‘Die Entscheidungen der “Dreierpaktstaaten”’, p. 894.

247
Mark Axworthy,
Axis Slovakia: Hitler's Slavic Wedge 1938–1945
(New York, 2002), pp. 103–115.

248
Förster, ‘Die Entscheidungen der “Dreierpaktstaaten”’, pp. 889–892. See also Gorlitz (ed.),
Memoirs of Field-Marshal Keitel
, p. 157; Cecil D. Eby,
Hungary at War. Civilians and Soldiers in World War II
(University Park, 1998), p. 18.

249
Spain was an Axis ally in all but name. Franco never officially joined the alliance, just as he never formally entered World War II, but he willingly recruited volunteers for the eastern front, sent workers and raw materials to relieve the strain on German industry and aided German submarines.

250
So named for the blue shirts worn by the Falangists.

251
Jürgen Förster, ‘Freiwillige für den “Kreuzzug Europas gegen den Bolschewismus”’ in Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (ed.),
Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg
, Band IV, pp. 911–913.

252
For useful overall surveys of the Axis coalition on the eastern front see DiNardo,
Germany and the Axis Powers
; Richard L. DiNardo, ‘The Dysfunctional Coalition: The Axis Powers and the Eastern Front in World War II’,
The Journal of Military History
60(4) (October, 1996) 711–730; Karl Drechsler, ‘Germany and its Allies’, pp. 30–47.

9 In search of resurgence

The arduous road to renewal

In his first letter to the Soviet leader after the beginning of Barbarossa,
Churchill informed
Stalin of his unreserved commitment to the Soviet war effort. After praising the Red Army's ‘strong and spirited resistance’, Churchill then promised; ‘We shall do everything to help you that time, geography and our growing resources allow. The longer the war lasts the more help we can give.’
¹
On 30 July Roosevelt's special representative, Harry
Hopkins, met with Stalin in Moscow to discuss US assistance to the Soviet Union. Hopkins reported that Stalin was optimistic about the progress of the war and believed that a continued German offensive would be difficult in September and not possible by October when the heavy rains would begin. Thus, it was not 1941 that worried Stalin, indeed Hopkins remarked on Stalin's ‘great confidence’ that the Soviets would hold through the winter. Stalin was more concerned about the coming spring when mobile operations would again be possible. For this he wanted steel for more Soviet tanks and he also expressed his desire to purchase as many American tanks as possible. Additionally, he requested aluminum for aircraft construction, anti-aircraft guns, machine guns and rifles.
²
The list would be added to in September at the follow-up Three-Power conference in Moscow, attended by Lord
Beaverbrook for the UK and Averell
Harriman for the USA. The
Three-Power conference agreed on urgent support for the USSR, even at the expense of reinforcing other theatres, and thereafter increasingly voluminous supplies began to flow, initially via Nordic convoys and the Far East (
Vladivostok), but later also
overland through
Persia.
³
Indeed, during the period of the
First Protocol, running from October 1941 to June 1942, the British and Americans undertook to ship some 400 aircraft, 500 tanks and 10,000 trucks each month, as well as a wide range of other supplies. These targets were met, but a significant proportion of these supplies were lost en route as German air and naval forces from northern Norway attempted to cut access to
Murmansk and Arckangel'sk.
⁴

If Stalin exuded a sublime self-assurance to Hopkins
in late July, it was a premature confidence in the success of his forces. Germany's offensive strength was being weakened, but it had by no means entirely ebbed.
Zhukov, the Chief of the General Staff, foresaw dangers for the Central Front, chiefly opposite
Guderian's XXIV Panzer Corps and
Weichs's 2nd Army. Summoned to a meeting with Stalin to give a full report of the situation on 29 July, Zhukov stated:

On the strategic axis of Moscow the Germans are unable to mount a major offensive operation in the near future owing to their heavy losses and they lack appreciable reserves to secure the right and left wings of Army Group Centre.

On the Leningrad axis it is impossible for the Germans to begin an operation to capture Leningrad and link up with the Finns without additional forces.
⁵

The situation in the
Ukraine was not yet so easy to determine with the
Uman encirclement still in progress. According to the Soviet Chief of Staff, the real danger was that Bock would temporarily give up his thrust on Moscow and shift his attention to the south, solving the threat to his over-extended southern flank, and assisting Army Group South by cutting into the rear of Kirponos's
South-Western Front. This prospect was all the more dangerous because, as Zhukov noted, the
Central Front covering this area of the line ‘was the weakest sector of our line’ and its armies were ‘badly equipped’. Zhukov recommended reinforcing it with three armies, one from the
Stavka
Reserve, one from
Western Front and a last from South-Western Front. The movement of these forces, Zhukov added, could later be replaced by forces arriving from the Far East. He also advocated that Kirponos pull his front back behind the Dnepr which would mean abandoning
Kiev, but Zhukov presented a solid military
rationale for this course.
⁶
Stalin flew into a rage at the mere suggestion of deserting Kiev and accused Zhukov of ‘talking nonsense’. Zhukov was one of the few Marshals who spoke his mind to Stalin and, after failing to convince him, promptly insisted: ‘If you think the Chief of the General Staff talks nonsense, then I request you relieve me of my post and send me to the front.’
⁷
Stalin did just that. Zhukov
was sent to command the new
Reserve Front, and was replaced by the more amenable Marshal Boris
Shaposhnikov.
⁸

Stalin's rash dismissal of the threat posed to his southern flank was to bode ill for the future, yet the Soviet dictator remained convinced that Army Group Centre would push on towards Moscow after a short pause to reorganise and patch up its forces. To pre-empt this move, Stalin ordered
Timoshenko to prepare new large-scale offensives all along his front with the aim of disrupting the next phase of German operations before they could begin. Additionally, Stalin directed all of his Front commanders to organise fresh counter-offensives to be undertaken from the middle of August in a co-ordinated effort from
Staraia Russa in the north to the approaches of Kiev
, with the biggest effort being mounted against Bock's army
group.
⁹

In the immediate aftermath of the battle of Smolensk the front settled down somewhat with more localised Soviet assaults replacing the larger offensives of the past two weeks. Although the intense pressure on Bock's lines had eased, certain sectors of the front were still suffering dearly, complicating the withdrawal of the motorised divisions to begin their refit. On 6 August the
12th Panzer Division, awaiting relief by the
5th Infantry Division, suffered heavily in close quarters combat with the Soviet
19th Army.
¹⁰
An officer in the division later recalled:

The 12th Panzer Division, one of the units created for fast breakthroughs and envelopments, was demoted overnight to an infantry division,…typical positional warfare developed, with minor advances on both sides…The 5th Infantry Regiment had been stretched too thinly along too long a defence line and had no reserves. If the Russians discovered that, it would be easy for them to break through here. Every single soldier was needed.
¹¹