Rendezvous with Destiny: Ronald Reagan and the Campaign that Changed America (39 page)

Ford went down to Florida to give a speech at Eckerd College in St. Petersburg—for which he was paid $50,000, as with all of his appearances. The three networks, the BBC, the
New York Times
, the
Washington Post
, and dozens of other
outlets caught up with Ford at the small college to read the tea leaves.
⁴⁰
The national media were on their guard. The past three years they had heard “Ford is running,” “Ford isn't running,” “Ford might run”; they referred to him behind his back as the “Hamlet of Rancho Mirage.”
⁴¹

Spencer coyly told the reporters, “I think you can look for a news story next week.” An undergraduate who attended Ford's lecture on “National Character” was skeptical. “I've never heard anybody who can talk for an hour and not say anything,” said Tim Storm.
⁴²

If Ford was going to take the plunge, he would have to decide quickly. Filing deadlines were looming in many states, fundraising was imperative, and there was the matter of staffing such an operation. Not to mention bank accounts, phones, stationery, office equipment, scheduling, babysitting the media, chartering a plane, food, coffee, liquor. It was akin to building a major corporation over a weekend.

Ford aides began drawing a campaign plan. In early March, a group led by Thomas C. Reed, Ford's former secretary of the air force, and Leonard Firestone, Ford's wealthy next-door neighbor in California, formally created the Draft Ford Committee. Reed, like Spencer, had once worked for Reagan. A young former Ford White House aide, Larry Speakes, was recruited as the committee's spokesman. Also working on the Ford campaign plan was none other than the Bush campaign's pollster, Bob Teeter.
⁴³
People were gossiping about that one, but one source later said that Teeter had only done so with Jim Baker's approval.
⁴⁴

Everyone in Ford's inner circle was convinced that the former president was running. Ford had already met once in secret with John Sears, and he scheduled a second, more public meeting with Sears to discuss his campaign.
⁴⁵
After the meeting, Sears and Ford held a press conference. Sears told the gathered media, “I believe Ford could be nominated. I don't think the timing is too late.”
⁴⁶
Sears was asked whether he thought Reagan was unelectable, but refused to answer.

More encouragement for Ford came from moderates in the GOP. Bob Dole, still not out of the race formally but out of the race in every measurable way, called Ford and urged him to jump in.
⁴⁷
Any way Dole could, he would twist the knife into his old enemy Bush. Republican governors Robert Ray of Iowa, William Milliken of Michigan, and Richard Snelling of Vermont came out for Ford as well.
⁴⁸

Finally, Henry Kissinger came out publicly and called on Ford to jump into the GOP contest. Kissinger had met with Ford for more than two hours at Rancho Mirage and emerged saying Ford had a “duty” to run. Of all Ford's men, Kissinger may have been the most ideologically opposed to Reagan's election, as it would
mean a repudiation of détente. He'd said for months that the only candidate running whom he could not work with was Reagan.
⁴⁹

Kissinger told the press that Ford was the only Republican of stature in whom foreign leaders had confidence. But he disavowed any knowledge of such earthly matters; the master Machiavellian infighter and political operator told reporters with a straight face, “I am not a politician.”
⁵⁰
Reporters giggled and smirked. It was nearly as disingenuous as Ford telling reporters that he was not “scheming and conniving” to get the nomination.
⁵¹
Newsweek
reported that the former president would reappoint Kissinger secretary of state if he once again occupied the Oval Office.
⁵²
Kissinger coveted a path back to power.

Ford went to New York City and met with a dozen prominent Republicans, all Reagan critics, all of whom encouraged him to run, including Senator Jacob Javits. They came away convinced that Ford would indeed make the race. Grass-roots efforts to file slates of Ford delegates in New York, Connecticut, and Michigan were moving forward.
⁵³

ABC's
World News Tonight
, anchored by Max Robinson, opened dramatically on March 7 with a report that “former President Ford, who four years ago went to the political mat with Ronald Reagan and won, is apparently very close to getting into this year's contest to try and head Reagan off once again.”
⁵⁴

Evans and Novak reported that Ford had made the decision to get in once and for all. He would become a formal candidate on March 20.
⁵⁵
That was it. The two columnists had the best sources in journalism, even though some critics referred to them as “Errors and No Facts.” Rowland Evans had spoken directly to Ford, who had expressed his concerns that the primary season had not produced a consensus candidate and said that he figured he could garner the entire Bush and Anderson vote while cutting into Reagan's base.

Howard Baker by this point had finally dropped out of the race after repeated weak performances, and two of his now unemployed aides, Doug Bailey and John Deardourff, told reporters they were signing on to the Ford campaign. Lowell Weicker endorsed the Ford candidacy, but most in the GOP viewed this as a mixed blessing at best.
⁵⁶

In mid-March, Bob Mosbacher, a Bush confidant and fundraiser who nonetheless worshiped Ford, went into Dave Keene's office at Bush's headquarters. Mosbacher shut the door and said to Bush's political director, “While we have done a great job thus far, it is clear that only the president [Ford] is in a position to stop Reagan and that we must therefore figure out how to get Bush to step aside so that Ford can be convinced to enter the race.” Keene was livid. As he recalled years later, “I told Mosbacher the idea was absurd, and if he thought there was a
chance in hell that I'd participate in such a scheme or support Ford over Reagan, he was nuts.” Keene, who had a temper like few men in politics, didn't stop there. His voice rising, he told Bush's fair-weather friend, “There are few times in life when one can say he made a real difference, but I could always look back on '76 and the fact that I'd played a role in ridding the nation and the GOP of Ford.” Keene followed with a string of obscenities about Ford and Bush's betrayer sitting there in front of him. Mosbacher left Keene's office and they never spoke again.
⁵⁷

Keene later reflected, “The Bush campaign consisted of those who really thought Bush would make a good president and were supporting him for that reason; those who thought he'd make a stronger general election candidate than Reagan; and those who were simply using him because they hated and/or feared Reagan. Bush sometimes couldn't tell these folks apart.”
⁵⁸

All the Republican candidates were forced to address the growing Ford rumors. Bush said Ford's entry would “complicate” things for him, but he kept telling people he didn't think Ford would get into the race. Anderson got off a good line when he said Ford should not “disturb his retirement.”
⁵⁹
Reagan kept his cool and showed off his wit. When reporters asked why Ford might be willing to give up the golf links for the campaign trail, Reagan quipped, “Maybe he's developed a slice.” Reporters laughed.
⁶⁰

The next day, though, Reagan toughened up his message. “Frankly, I thought it was very thoughtless of him to say anything that could give comfort and aid to the enemy,” referring to Ford's comments that Reagan could not win.
⁶¹

Within a matter of hours, word leaked that it was official: Ford would get into the race the following week.
⁶²

Ford went through a charade with the media, proclaiming that he was playing no role in the draft-Ford campaign. In fact, behind the scenes, he was taking and making phone calls and lining up support for his imminent entry.

Reagan, however, was holding all the cards and he knew it. If Ford got in, it would doom Bush and Anderson, especially with the southern primaries coming up. They would divide the moderate GOP vote, leaving the conservatives for him. Asked whether he thought he could beat Ford, Reagan smiled and said, “Yep.” When pressed as to whether Ford would tarnish his own image by joining the race, Reagan quipped, “It's a nice thing to think about.”
⁶³
Reagan was practically begging Ford to run.

R
ONALD
R
EAGAN WAS IN
Florida on the day of the South Carolina primary, but he still mangled both Bush and Connally in the Gamecock State. With help from his in-state organizer, an intense young man named Lee Atwater, Reagan took 54
percent of the GOP vote while Connally received 30 percent and Bush a paltry 15 percent. Reagan, helped by crossover Democrats, swept all six congressional districts and, with them, all twenty-five delegates.
⁶⁴

Democrats voting for Reagan did so at their peril. The state Democratic Party chairman, Donald Fowler, warned that they might not be allowed to vote in his party's caucuses the following week. Conservative Democrats in the state found Fowler repugnant. Turnout was five times as high as the record previously set in 1974. A furious Fowler threatened that he would force Democrats to sign a pledge of fidelity, but loyalty oaths had been out of fashion in the South since Reconstruction.
⁶⁵

If there had been a vote-buying scheme cooked up by either Bush or Connally, it had not produced. In one all-black precinct in Columbia, by 5
P.M.
only two voters had shown up to vote in the GOP primary.
⁶⁶

Connally failed even in his modest goal of keeping Reagan under 40 percent. He'd spent $500,000 out of his own pocket in South Carolina, but it was for naught. Big John put what was left of his campaign on hold and went home to Texas to “reassess.” He finally faced reality and referred to Reagan as “the champ.”
⁶⁷
Connally had been helped by one of the more creative media consultants, Roger Ailes, but even Ailes's powers could not stop the runaway train of Ronald Reagan. After thirteen months and millions spent, John Bowden Connally had nothing to show for his efforts save one lonely sixty-seven-year-old delegate from Arkansas, Ada Mills. She became known as the “$11 million delegate.”
⁶⁸
Toward the end of the road, Connally—who was all personal ambition—told a reporter, “I'm not consumed by personal ambition.”
⁶⁹

Reporters mourned the demise of Connally. From his Stetson right down to his silver inlaid cowboy boots, he was always entertaining, always good copy, he always had a good joke, and he was a terrific public speaker.

Prior to his withdrawal, Connally called Reagan to inform him of his decision. Reagan listened but wisely did not ask for his endorsement; instinctively, he knew this would not have been the proper time. There was no report of Connally's calling Bush.

In the end, there was just too much of Connally for voters to swallow: too much Texan, too much wheeler-dealer, too much rumor and scandal and bravado. His campaign also spent foolishly, including furnishing and renting a lavish apartment in Virginia for his campaign treasurer. They had chartered expensive planes and expensive hotel rooms. His first manager, Eddie Mahe, was paid almost $9,000 a month. Of the $12 million Connally spent, about $10 million went to operations, staff, and consultants. Only about $2 million went into media.
⁷⁰
But there was another reason why Connally never took off:

“What did us in?” lamented Connally's longtime aide Julian Read. “His name is Ronald Reagan. And he's been on the road and on television for years. He has a very solid, emotional constituency that we didn't penetrate. He just beat us.”
⁷¹
Losing consultants never blame themselves and losing candidates never blame themselves.

George Bush's foolish diversion into South Carolina—a decision motivated by his contempt of Connally—hurt his campaign badly. The original plan had been to bypass the state and let Reagan and Connally beat the tar out of each other and deplete their resources. Bush could then take on either a weakened Reagan or a resurgent Connally. Bush had unwisely gambled time, money, and people in an attempt to achieve an impossible win. The two Texans made the classic mistake of getting into an ugly spraying match with each other; GOP voters, repulsed by the brawl, went with Reagan.

Reagan might have won South Carolina in any event, but the fight between Bush and Connally—with the Bush campaign producing seedy tape recordings of conversations between Connally's in-state and Washington staffers plotting a scheme to “buy” African-American votes in the state—pushed Reagan well over the 40 percent his campaign thought he'd get.
⁷²
Reagan smilingly called himself “cautiously ecstatic.”
⁷³

B
EFORE THE
S
OUTH
C
AROLINA
primary, Bush had been competitive with Reagan in Alabama, behind just 45–39 percent, according to a Darden poll.
⁷⁴
He was shelling out several hundred thousand dollars, mailing the state heavily, and spending considerable time there. With Connally effectively out of the contest, Bush might have expected to reap some of the 10 percent support of his old antagonist. But when the ballots were counted on March 11, he was demolished in Alabama. Reagan, who had spent just a little over $30,000, took every county and received almost 69 percent of the GOP primary vote to Bush's 26 percent.
⁷⁵