The French Way (50 page)

Figure 13. “I thought they were in Central America!” U.S. military and financial power invading France. Courtesy Plantu, “Je les croyais en Amerique centrale!” In
C'est la goulag!
Paris: Editions la Decouverte/Le Monde, 1983, 140.

The French shared with other West Europeans a growing apprehension that the United States had too much influence in their affairs.
²²
If nine out of ten French people accused America of being domineering, so did the same proportion of Italians and the British. The Germans were far more restrained in attributing domination.
²³
In comparison to
other West European elites, however, the French proved the most nervous about U.S. hegemony. In general, French perceptions of America closely resembled those held by other West Europeans: they all characterized America as having a will to dominate.

French concern about transatlantic domination extended beyond international politics. More than other West Europeans the French believed that the United States practiced unfair trade.
²⁴
The irritant here was probably the host of disputes like trade sanctions against the Soviet Union, Iran, and Cuba; the quarrels over agricultural subsidies; and later troubles over the export of fruits, vegetables, and seeds grown via the use of genetically modified organisms (GMOs). Among French elites there was a noticeable increase in anxiety during the early Clinton years about excessive U.S. interference. A surge occurred in 1993 at the peak of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) controversy when those who complained jumped from about 50 percent to 70 percent; it remained at this elevated level for the rest of the 1990s.
²⁵
Globalization framed many of these trade problems. If a majority of the French approved of globalization, as did other West Europeans, they also accounted for the largest negative minority opinion of any wealthy nation.
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In general less than one of ten respondents in Western Europe linked globalization with American domination, but in France one in five made this connection and one in four thought globalization mainly benefited the United States.
²⁷
Thus the French proved more likely than their West European counterparts to see the greedy hand of Uncle Sam lurking behind globalization.

Closely related to the perception of American domination was the question of confidence in U.S. global leadership. The French were never satisfied with the U.S. government, particularly not during either the Reagan or the Clinton eras. The polls showed volatility on this question rather than long-term trends. There were ups and downs related to events, policies, and leadership. Confidence soared under the presidency of George H. W. Bush. This peak coincided with the reunification of Germany and the first war in the Persian Gulf. But this episode
was fleeting. Generally polls show that confidence in the United States fluctuated around a rather tepid 50 percent for most of these two decades.
²⁸
There was little change in this level after President Clinton succeeded his two Republican predecessors.

In the last two years of the Clinton administration, Washington's approval rating faded. At the end of the decade polls revealed acute anxiety about the U.S. superpower and widespread cynicism about what motivated policy makers. Doubts about Washington's altruism became commonplace. French elites singled out transatlantic trade as a major reason to distrust the U.S. government.
²⁹
The crisis over Kosovo exposed this deepening mistrust among the public. In a survey conducted during the bombing of Yugoslavia, two of three expressed concern about the superpower and also questioned its motives.
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Moreover, in this same 1999 survey 61 percent said the United States exercised too much influence over Europe and an even higher number expressed their distance from the American people.
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By the end of the Clinton administration few believed the United States was acting to promote peace or democracy. More common was the perception that the superpower's aims were principally to “protect and extend American interests and investments in the world” and to “impose the will of the U.S. on the rest of the world.”
³²

Even though perceptions of the United States had become much gloomier by 2000, once George W. Bush took office, and especially when the military campaign in Iraq seemed imminent, America's standing collapsed. Once the war began, favorable opinion of Americans plunged precipitously, but the president, not “America” or “Americans,” was the primary target of Gallic reproach. Given French cynicism about U.S. motives in world affairs, it was no surprise that the French, far more than the Germans or the British, believed that the U.S. government attacked out of self-interest, such as a desire for Iraqi oil.
³³

In general the French did not see the Americans cooperating with them in international affairs. On only a few issues did the majority think that the two nations were working in the same direction; and
in some cases substantial majorities perceived them working at cross-purposes—for example, in trade, the environment, and aid for developing nations.
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It follows that the French were not eager to endorse strong U.S. leadership in world affairs. Compared to the Germans, the British, the Italians, the Dutch, and the Poles, they were the least willing to do so—even if they were deeply divided.
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Indeed, a majority of the French at the end of the decade admitted that their country did not always act as a “faithful ally” toward the United States.
³⁶
But what was most distinctive about the French was that by 2002 they openly and in overwhelming numbers (91 percent) said they wanted the EU to become a “superpower like the U.S.” In this respect the Italians, the Germans, the Dutch, the British, and the Poles trailed far behind.
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At the end of the Clinton years almost half the French said they wanted a European defense policy without American involvement.
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And if slim majorities in Germany, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, and Poland accepted the “cook-dishwasher” division of labor—that is, that the United States specialized in fighting wars and the Europeans reconstituted societies afterward—a majority of the French rejected the lowly role of acting as America's dishwasher.
³⁹

The French, from the late 1980s to the first years of the new century, came to think of the United States as a domineering, self-interested nation that used its inordinate power to seek global hegemony. In this respect they may have surpassed other West Europeans, but their views were widely shared across the continent.

American Culture

If American hard power aroused Gallic apprehension, so did its soft power. Given the heated controversies that American mass culture generated and the efforts by the French government to curb American imports like television programs and censor use of the English language, a casual observer might have concluded that France was an unwelcome
site. Despite growing concern about Yankee popular culture, however, ambivalence and selectivity, rather than total rejection characterized French opinion.

Between 1984 and 2000 the number of those who found American mass culture excessive increased substantially. Television programming, the cinema, and food were the principal targets. Objections also rose, but less sharply, to the English language and American fashion. Concern about American-style advertising remained high, but unchanged, while pop music gained in approval.
⁴⁰
On a comparative basis the French generally recorded more unfavorable views of American popular culture than did the British, the Germans, or the Italians.
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In 1999, 33 percent called American culture a “very serious” or “serious” threat and another 44 percent labeled it a “minor” threat (and 22 percent “no threat at all”). The British, Germans, and Italians were less anxious.
⁴²
Fear of American domination via soft power rose from the 1980s on. At the political level France was notorious in the 1990s for taking state action to curb American imports like regulating radio programming or protecting the French language as a response to this presumed threat.

Which products, one might ask, most evoked America for the French in the mid-1990s? In descending order they were: hamburgers/ McDonald's, chewing gum, and blue jeans, followed at a distance by soda/Coca-Cola, video games, “light” cigarettes, and (Hollywood) cinema. Imports of mass consumption led the way in framing America's image. Yet in describing American products from a menu of adjectives the French gave a mixed assessment. In descending order these imports were assessed as
intrusive, modern, standardized, trivial, effective (performants)
, and
expensive;
only a handful thought they were
high-end, sturdy, aesthetic
, or
delicate
(i.e., stereotypical French attributes).
⁴³

Despite growing concern, a majority of the French consistently expressed a favorable opinion of American movies, television series, and popular music.
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The huge appetite displayed by French customers for these three imports as well as American fashions and fast food corroborates
such surveys. A positive reading of the data cited above would conclude that 66 percent of the French said American imports posed a minor threat or no threat at all.

Figure 14. Shady French businessman. “It's true: I have Swiss bank accounts; I've sold armaments; I've swindled the state; I've dined with Tapie [a convicted wheeler-dealer]….But I've never drunk Coca-Cola!” Courtesy Plantu, “Mais jamais je n'ai bu de Coca!” In
LAnniePlantu: 1999.
Paris: Editions le Seuil, 1999, 129.

There is a conundrum in these contradictory responses. A huge majority said the spread of something vaguely called “American ideas and customs” was bad.
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But this did not prevent almost the same number of those consulted from also declaring, in answer to other questions, that they liked American products, such as movies, that transmitted these ideas.
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Similarly, although majorities among the French and other West Europeans condemned fast food as a change for the worse, in these same countries, the Golden Arches were an enormous
commercial success.
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Of course, such data may describe different segments of the population, and people may say one thing and do another. What is clear is that at most a minority of the French objected strongly to American products like Hollywood films, and perhaps a majority, given the specific wording of a question, said that they disapproved of them. But substantial majorities regularly expressed their approval of most American cultural imports and whatever reservations they may have harbored did not hamper the mass consumption of these products. Compared to the issues posed by foreign policy or the American social model, the French were more ambivalent about popular culture. Nevertheless, they were, in the 1990s, increasingly bothered by American movies, television, and fast food (read: McDonald's) and, to a lesser extent, by the spread of American English.