6 M. Merdor, RAFAEL: Bi-netivei Ha-mechkar Ve-ha-pituach Le-bitchon Yisrael [Defense-Related Research and Development in Israel: The Story of RAFAEL] (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, 1981), p. 241 ff.
7 See his own account in S. Peres, Kela David (Jerusalem: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970), p. 98 ff.
8 E. Haber, Ha-yom Tifrots Milchama [Today War Will Break Out] (Tel Aviv: Idanim, 1987), p. 135.
9 M. Gilboa, Shesh Shanim Ve-shisha Yamim: Mekoroteah Ve-koroteah shel Michlemet Sheshet Ha-yamim [Six Years and Six Days: the Origins and Course of the Six Day War] (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1969), p. 65.
10 A. Klieman, Cherev Pipiyot: Ha-yetsu Ha-bitchoni shel Yisrael Ve-shuk Ha-neshek Ha-olami [Double-Edged Sword: Israel’s Defense Exports and the World Arms Bazaar] (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1992), p. 277.
12 Cf., e.g., G. Yakobi, Otsmatah shel Echut [The Power of Quality] (Haifa: Shikmona, 1972), p. 172, where a comparison is drawn between Israel and Sweden.
14 N. Blumenthal, “The Influence of Defense Industry Investment on Israel’s Economy,” in Ts. Lanir, ed., Israeli Security Planning in the 1980s: Its Politics and Economics (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center, 1986), p. 170, table 9.1.
15 N. Levi, “Memadim Optimaliyim shel Taasiyat Ha-bitachon” [Optimal Dimensions of the Defense Industry], Technologiyot 45 (September 1987): 21-23.
16 M. N. Barnett, Confronting the Costs of War: Military Power, State, and Society in Egypt and Israel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 236.
17 A. Mintz, “Military Industrial Linkage in Israel,” Armed Forces and Society 12:1 (Fall 1985): 14.
18 D. Kochav, “The Economics of Defense—Israel,” in L. Williams, ed., Military Aspects of the Israeli-Arab Conflict (Tel Aviv: University Publishing Projects, 1975), p. 183.
19 Cf. A. Klieman, Israel’s Global Reach: Arms Sales as Diplomacy (London: Brassey’s, 1985).
20 See Reiser, The Israeli Arms Industry , p. 216 ff., for details.
21 H. Goodman and W. Seth Carus, The Future Battlefield and the Arab-Israeli Conflict (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1990), p. 124.
22 Data from A. Klieman and R. Pedatzur, Rearming Israel: Defense and Procurement Through the 1990s (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), p. 79.
23 Aviation Week and Space Technology , August 16, 1976, p. 19.
24 Z. Klein et al., Ha-milchama Ba-terror U-mediniyut Ha-bitachon shel Yisrael [The War Against Terrorism and Israel’s Security Policy] (Tel Aviv: Ha-kibbuts Ha-meuchad, 1990), pp. 178-179.
25 For the Lavi’s fall see Reiser, The Israeli Arms Industry , p. 179 ff.; also Rabin, in Klein et al., Ha-milchama Ba-terror , pp. 174-175.
26 Cf. A. Kover, “Hachraa Tsvait Be-milchama” [Military Decision in War] (Ph.D. thesis, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1995), pp. 372-373.
27 For the case against Israeli miniaturization of their weapons see P. Pry, Israel’s Nuclear Arsenal (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), pp. 88-89.
29 For this episode see L. S. Spector, The Undeclared Bomb: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 1987-1988 (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1988), pp. 18, 166; also L. S. Spector and J. R. Smith, Nuclear Ambitions: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 1989-1990 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), p. 161 ff.
30 For the significance of the Vanunu revelations see above all F. Barnaby, The Invisible Bomb: The Nuclear Arms Race in the Middle East (London: Tauris, 1989), chap. 3.
31 For the relevant calculations see A. Cordesman, After the Storm: The Changing Military Balance in the Middle East (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), p. 242.
32 Cf. Y. Melman, “Ha-kesher Ha-garini shel Yisrael Ve-drom Africa” [The Israel-South Africa Nuclear Connection], Ha-arets , April 21, 1997, p. 4.
39 A. E. Levite and E. B. Landau, Be-einei Ha-aravim: Dimuya Ha-garini shel Yisrael [In Arab Eyes: Israel’s Nuclear Image] (Tel Aviv: Papyrus, 1994), p. 44.
42 Cf. Levite and Landau, Be-einei Ha-aravim , p. 76 ff.; M. van Creveld, Nuclear Proliferation and the Future of Conflict (New York: Free Press, 1993), p. 110 ff.; and S. Aronson, The Politics and Strategy of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East (New York: State University of New York, 1992), pp. 151-166; also E. Weizman, Ha-krav al Ha-shalom [The Battle for Peace] (Jerusalem: Idanim, 1981), p. 42.
43 The various Syrian analyses are discussed in Levite and Landau, Be-einei Ha-aravim , p. 98 ff.
44 Tishrin , November 3, 1982; Al Thwara , November 24, 1982.
46 For the sources, as well as an analysis of the Syrian concept of “strategic parity,” cf. O. Brosh, “Tfissot shel Ha-meimad Ha-garini Be-sichsuchim Ezoriyim Rav-Tsdadiyim Ve-emdot Be-inyanan” [Perceptions and Public Attitudes Toward the Nuclear Dimension in Multinational Regional Conflicts] (Ph.D. thesis, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1990), pp. 186-187.
47 Syrian Minister of Defense Mustafa Tlas, as quoted in Maariv , June 2, 1985; Hafez Assad interview in Al Najala , December 12, 1985. For the entire question see also E. Karsh, “A Marriage of Convenience: The Soviet Union and Assad’s Syria,” Jerusalem Journal of International Relations 11:4 (December 1989): 9 ff.
48 Cf. Aronson, The Politics and Strategy , p. 161.
49 M. Bar Kochba, “Ha-maaracha neged Ha-irakim Be-milchemet Yom Ha-kippurim,” Maarachot 258/259 (November 1977): 6.
50 M. Dayan, Ha-lanetsach Tochal Cherev [Will the Sword Bite Forever?] (Tel Aviv: Idanim, 1991), p. 36.
51 Cf. E. Sheffer, “The Economic Burden of the Arms Race Between the Confrontation States and Israel,” in Lanir, ed., Israeli Security Planning in the 1980s , p. 147, table 8.2.
52 A. Halperin, “Hitpatchut Melaei Ha-hon Ha-tsvaiyim shel Yisrael U-medinot Ha-imut” [The Development of Military Capital in Israel and the Confrontation States] (Jerusalem: Falk Institute for Economic Research, 1986), p. 23, table 15.
53 Y. Rabin, Pinkas Sherut [A Service Record] (Tel Aviv: Maariv), vol. 1, p. 83.
54 Z. Schiff, “Bar lev-Be-hamtana” [Bar Lev on the Sidelines], Ha-arets , April 24, 1981, p. 2; E. Weizman, Ha-krav al Ha-shalom [The Battle for Peace] (Tel Aviv: Idanim, 1982), p. 41.
1 For a blow-by-blow account see E. O’Ballance, Arab Guerrilla Power, 1968-1972 (London: Faber and Faber, 1974), chaps. 5 and 11.
2 Cf. his own account in S. Peres, Battling for Peace (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1995), p. 222.
3 Cf. statements by Peres, Rabin, and Allon, Maariv , November 8, 11, and 20, 1976.
4 The details of the agreement may be found in A. Yaniv, Dilemmas of Security: Politics, Strategy, and the Israeli Experience in Lebanon (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 60-61.
5 For PLO strength and dispositions see T. N. Dupuy and P. Martell, Flawed Victory: The Arab-Israeli Conflict and the 1982 War in Lebanon (Fairax, Va.: HERO Books, 1986), pp. 86-88.
6 For these contacts see Z. Schiff and Y. Yaari, Milchemet Sholal [The Vain War] (Tel Aviv: Schocken, 1984), p. 40 ff.
7 Ha-arets weekend magazine, January 2, 1997, pp. 6-7.
8 Schiff and Yaari, Milchemet Sholal , p. 22 ff.; Syria’s defense minister has described this episode in M. Tlas, Ha-plisha Ha-yisraelit Li-lebanon [Israel’s Invasion of Lebanon] (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, 1988), p. 69 ff.
9 A. Naor, Memshala Be-milchama [A Government at War] (Tel Aviv: Lahav, 1986), p. 47.
10 See M. Halperin and A. Lapidot, eds., Chalifat Lachats [Pressure Suit] (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, 1987), p. 144 ff., for the atmosphere of those days.
13 Cf. on this question Schiff and Yaari, Milchemet Sholal , pp. 115-116; A. Sharon, Warrior (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), p. 460 ff.; S. Feldman and H. Rechnits-Kizinger, “Ha-hahataya, Ha-kontsenzus Ve-ha-milchama: Lebanon, 1982” [Confidence Tricks, Consensus, and War: Lebanon, 1982], in Y. Alper, ed., Shnaton Astretegi [Strategic Annual] (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1986), pp. 23-25.
14 Z. Klein et al., Ha-milchama Ba-terror U-mediniyut Ha-bitachon shel Yisrael [The War Against Terrorism and Israel’s Security Policy] (Tel Aviv: Ha-kibbuts Ha-meuchad, 1990), p. 82.
15 T. Yair, Iti Mi-levanon [With Me from Lebanon] (Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 1990), p. 18.
16 M. Eldar, Shayetet 11 [Flotilla 11] (Tel Aviv: Zmora Bitan, 1996), p. 216.
17 Radio Lebanon announced the landing in advance; ibid., p. 222.
18 Cf. A. Kahalani, A Warrior’s Way (New York: Shaplovsky, 1994), p. 332 ff.
20 For the Syrian order of battle see Dupuy and Martell, Flawed Victory , p. 90.
21 One of the best accounts is W. S. Carus, “Military Lessons of the 1982 Israel-Syria Conflict,” in R. Harkaby and S. Neuman, eds., The Lessons of Recent Wars in the Third World (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1985), pp. 261-280.
22 Figures from Y. Rabin, Ha-milchama Be-levanon [The War in Lebanon] (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1983), p. 25.
23 E. Wald, The Wald Report: The Decline of Israeli National Security Since 1967 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), pp. 45-46.
24 Drori, quoted in Klein, et al., Ha-milchama Ba-terror , p. 81.
26 R. Eytan, Sippur shel Chayal [A Soldier’s Story] (Tel Aviv: Maariv, 1991), p. 275, mentions 1,350 trucks, 113 armored fighting vehicles including 87 tanks, 250 other vehicles, 22,000 small arms, 650 antitank weapons, 12,000 rockets, 43 artillery barrels, and fabulous amounts of ammunition. New York Times , October 12, 1982, listed 420 armored combat vehicles, 636 other vehicles, 34,321 small arms, 1,193 antitank rockets (RPG-7s), 1,193 mortars and rocket launchers, and 150 antiaircraft guns.
27 Klein et al., Ha-milchama Ba-terror , pp. 113-114.
28 Sharon testimony in New York, quoted in D. Aharoni, General Sharon’s War Against Time Magazine (New York: Shapolsy, 1985), pp. 165-166.