The Sword And The Olive (76 page)
Read The Sword And The Olive Online
Authors: Martin van Creveld
9
Perhaps the best analysis of the Israeli deployment is T. N. Dupuy,
Elusive Victory
:
The Arab-Israeli Wars, 1947-1974
(New York: Harper and Row, 1978), p. 338.
Perhaps the best analysis of the Israeli deployment is T. N. Dupuy,
Elusive Victory
:
The Arab-Israeli Wars, 1947-1974
(New York: Harper and Row, 1978), p. 338.
10
Dayan,
Avnei Derech
, p. 430. The actual quote is from N. Bar Tov,
Dado
:
Arbaim U-smoneh Shanim Ve-esrim Yom
[Dado: Forty-Eight Years and Twenty Days] (Tel Aviv: Maariv, 1978), vol. 1, p. 125.
Dayan,
Avnei Derech
, p. 430. The actual quote is from N. Bar Tov,
Dado
:
Arbaim U-smoneh Shanim Ve-esrim Yom
[Dado: Forty-Eight Years and Twenty Days] (Tel Aviv: Maariv, 1978), vol. 1, p. 125.
11
Rabin,
Pinkas Sherut
, vol. 1, pp. 156, 161, 169; Laqueur,
The Road to War
, p. 147.
Rabin,
Pinkas Sherut
, vol. 1, pp. 156, 161, 169; Laqueur,
The Road to War
, p. 147.
12
E. Haber,
Ha-yom Tifrots Milchama
[Today War Will Break Out] (Tel Aviv: Idanim, 1987), p. 203.
E. Haber,
Ha-yom Tifrots Milchama
[Today War Will Break Out] (Tel Aviv: Idanim, 1987), p. 203.
13
Rabin,
Pinkas Sherut
, vol. 1, pp. 142-143.
Rabin,
Pinkas Sherut
, vol. 1, pp. 142-143.
14
M. Gilboa,
Shesh Shanim Ve-shisha Yamim: Mekoroteah Ve-koroteah shel Michlemet Sheshet Ha-yamim
[Six Years and Six Days: The Origins and Course of the Six Day War] (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1969), p. 75.
M. Gilboa,
Shesh Shanim Ve-shisha Yamim: Mekoroteah Ve-koroteah shel Michlemet Sheshet Ha-yamim
[Six Years and Six Days: The Origins and Course of the Six Day War] (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1969), p. 75.
15
For these efforts cf. Zak,
Hussein Osse Shalom
, p. 112 ff.
For these efforts cf. Zak,
Hussein Osse Shalom
, p. 112 ff.
16
For the details cf. Laqueur,
The Road to War
, chap. 5.
For the details cf. Laqueur,
The Road to War
, chap. 5.
17
Dayan,
Avnei Derech
, pp. 426-430, and Haber,
Ha-yom Tifrots Milchama
, p. 216, describe the meeting that led to the decision.
Dayan,
Avnei Derech
, pp. 426-430, and Haber,
Ha-yom Tifrots Milchama
, p. 216, describe the meeting that led to the decision.
18
Haber,
Ha-yom Tifrots Milchama
, p. 207.
Haber,
Ha-yom Tifrots Milchama
, p. 207.
19
Apparently the departing Israeli squadrons were detected by one radar, stationed in Jordan, but defective communications prevented it from sounding the alarm; Gamasy,
The October War
, p. 58.
Apparently the departing Israeli squadrons were detected by one radar, stationed in Jordan, but defective communications prevented it from sounding the alarm; Gamasy,
The October War
, p. 58.
20
A list of Egyptian losses was given by Brigadier General Hod on Israel Radio, June 6, 1967.
A list of Egyptian losses was given by Brigadier General Hod on Israel Radio, June 6, 1967.
21
Ezer Weizman,
On Eagle’s Wings
(Tel Aviv: Steimatzky’s, 1979), p. 216.
Ezer Weizman,
On Eagle’s Wings
(Tel Aviv: Steimatzky’s, 1979), p. 216.
22
Cf. his own account in R. Eytan,
Sippur shel Chayal
[A Soldier’s Story] (Tel Aviv: Maariv, 1991), p. 92 ff.
Cf. his own account in R. Eytan,
Sippur shel Chayal
[A Soldier’s Story] (Tel Aviv: Maariv, 1991), p. 92 ff.
23
The best analysis of the Egyptian dispositions is G. W. Gawrych,
Key to the Sinai: The Battles for Abu Ageila in the 1956 and 1967 Arab-Israeli Wars
(Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1990), pp. 82-86.
The best analysis of the Egyptian dispositions is G. W. Gawrych,
Key to the Sinai: The Battles for Abu Ageila in the 1956 and 1967 Arab-Israeli Wars
(Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1990), pp. 82-86.
24
See Sharon’s own account in A. Sharon,
Warrior
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), p. 188 ff.
See Sharon’s own account in A. Sharon,
Warrior
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), p. 188 ff.
25
Gawrych,
Key to the Sinai
, p. 116.
Gawrych,
Key to the Sinai
, p. 116.
26
Y. Dayan,
Israel Journal: June 1967
(New York: McGraw Hill, 1967), pp. 65-70.
Y. Dayan,
Israel Journal: June 1967
(New York: McGraw Hill, 1967), pp. 65-70.
27
See the account in M. van Creveld,
Command in War
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 201, which is based on an interview with General Gavish.
See the account in M. van Creveld,
Command in War
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 201, which is based on an interview with General Gavish.
28
The battle is described in M. Naor and Z. Enar, eds.,
Yemei Yuni: Teurim min Ha-milchama, 1967
[June Days: Episodes from the 1967 War] (Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 1967), p. 132 ff.
The battle is described in M. Naor and Z. Enar, eds.,
Yemei Yuni: Teurim min Ha-milchama, 1967
[June Days: Episodes from the 1967 War] (Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 1967), p. 132 ff.
29
S. Ali El-Edroos,
The Hassemite Arab Army, 1909-1979
(Amman: The Publishing Committee, 1980), p. 374. For Hussein’s reasons for entering the war see also Zak,
Hussein Osse Shalom
, p. 111; Hussein of Jordan,
My “War” with Israel
(London: Owen, 1969), pp. 125-126; and J. Lunt,
Hussein of Jordan
(London: MacMillan, 1989), p. 143.
S. Ali El-Edroos,
The Hassemite Arab Army, 1909-1979
(Amman: The Publishing Committee, 1980), p. 374. For Hussein’s reasons for entering the war see also Zak,
Hussein Osse Shalom
, p. 111; Hussein of Jordan,
My “War” with Israel
(London: Owen, 1969), pp. 125-126; and J. Lunt,
Hussein of Jordan
(London: MacMillan, 1989), p. 143.
30
For a blow-by-blow account of these battles see U. Narkis,
Achat Yerusahalayim
[Jerusalem Is One] (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1975); also M. Gur,
Har Ha-bayit Be-yadenu
[Mount Temple Is in Our Hands] (Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 1974).
For a blow-by-blow account of these battles see U. Narkis,
Achat Yerusahalayim
[Jerusalem Is One] (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1975); also M. Gur,
Har Ha-bayit Be-yadenu
[Mount Temple Is in Our Hands] (Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 1974).
31
Rooshdi,
The Hassemite Arab Army
, p. 366
.
Rooshdi,
The Hassemite Arab Army
, p. 366
.
32
E. N. Luttwak and D. Horowitz,
The Israeli Army
(London: Allen Lane, 1975), p. 267; Bar Tov,
Dado
, vol. 1, p. 128; M. Bar Kochva,
Merkevot Ha-plada
[Steel Chariots] (Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 1989), p. 170.
E. N. Luttwak and D. Horowitz,
The Israeli Army
(London: Allen Lane, 1975), p. 267; Bar Tov,
Dado
, vol. 1, p. 128; M. Bar Kochva,
Merkevot Ha-plada
[Steel Chariots] (Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 1989), p. 170.
33
Rooshdi,
The Hassemite Arab Army
, p. 386.
Rooshdi,
The Hassemite Arab Army
, p. 386.
34
For this episode see U. Narkis,
Chayal shel Yerushalayim
[A Soldier for Jerusalem] (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, 1991), pp. 330-33 1.
For this episode see U. Narkis,
Chayal shel Yerushalayim
[A Soldier for Jerusalem] (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, 1991), pp. 330-33 1.
35
Rabin,
Pinkas Sherut
, vol. 1, p. 203.
Rabin,
Pinkas Sherut
, vol. 1, p. 203.
36
Bar Tov,
Dado
, vol. 1, p. 131.
Bar Tov,
Dado
, vol. 1, p. 131.
37
Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 131-136.
Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 131-136.
38
Dayan,
Avnei Derech
, p. 474; see also the recent account by S. Nakdimon in
Yediot Acharonot
, May 30, 1997, pp. 16-27
.
Dayan,
Avnei Derech
, p. 474; see also the recent account by S. Nakdimon in
Yediot Acharonot
, May 30, 1997, pp. 16-27
.
39
Bar Kochva,
Merkevot Ha-plada
, p. 221.
Bar Kochva,
Merkevot Ha-plada
, p. 221.
40
Quoted in Bar Tov,
Dado
, vol. 1, p. 145.
Quoted in Bar Tov,
Dado
, vol. 1, p. 145.
41
Cf. M. Eldar,
Shayetet 11
[Flotilla 11] (Tel Aviv: Zmora Bitan, 1996), p. 40.
Cf. M. Eldar,
Shayetet 11
[Flotilla 11] (Tel Aviv: Zmora Bitan, 1996), p. 40.
42
Dupuy,
Elusive Victory
, p. 331.
Dupuy,
Elusive Victory
, p. 331.
43
B. H. Liddell Hart, “The Strategy of a War,”
Encounter
(February 1968): 18.
B. H. Liddell Hart, “The Strategy of a War,”
Encounter
(February 1968): 18.
44
Figure from Dupuy,
Elusive Victory
, p. 40.
Figure from Dupuy,
Elusive Victory
, p. 40.
45
Haber,
Ha-yom Tifrots Milchama
, p. 208.
Haber,
Ha-yom Tifrots Milchama
, p. 208.
46
E. Shor, ed.,
Derech Ha-mitla
[By Way of the Mitla] (Ramat Gan: Massada, 1967), p. 127, recounts the experiences of Yoffe’s brigade; Bar Kochva,
Merkevot Ha-plada
, p. 219, recounts the experiences of his armored brigade against the Syrians.
E. Shor, ed.,
Derech Ha-mitla
[By Way of the Mitla] (Ramat Gan: Massada, 1967), p. 127, recounts the experiences of Yoffe’s brigade; Bar Kochva,
Merkevot Ha-plada
, p. 219, recounts the experiences of his armored brigade against the Syrians.
47
Bar Kochva,
Merkevot Ha-plada
, p. 225.
Bar Kochva,
Merkevot Ha-plada
, p. 225.
48
Cf. the analysis of “war for existence” in M. van Creveld,
The Transformation of War
(New York: Free Press, 1991), pp. 142-149.
Cf. the analysis of “war for existence” in M. van Creveld,
The Transformation of War
(New York: Free Press, 1991), pp. 142-149.
49
S. Peres,
Battling for Peace
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1995), p. 167.
S. Peres,
Battling for Peace
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1995), p. 167.
50
For an analysis of American press attitudes in particular see M. W. Suleiman, “American Mass Media and the June Conflict,” in I. Abu Lughod, ed.,
The Arab-Israeli Confrontation of June 1967: An Arab Perspective
(Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1970), pp. 146-147, table 4.
For an analysis of American press attitudes in particular see M. W. Suleiman, “American Mass Media and the June Conflict,” in I. Abu Lughod, ed.,
The Arab-Israeli Confrontation of June 1967: An Arab Perspective
(Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1970), pp. 146-147, table 4.
51
Number for June 10-16, cover.
Number for June 10-16, cover.
52
F. Nietzsche,
The Twilight of the Idol
s (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1968), pp. 62-63.
F. Nietzsche,
The Twilight of the Idol
s (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1968), pp. 62-63.
53
G. Yakobi,
Otsmatah shel Echut
[The Power of Quality] (Haifa: Shikmona, 1972).
G. Yakobi,
Otsmatah shel Echut
[The Power of Quality] (Haifa: Shikmona, 1972).
54
E.g., S. Peres,
Ha-shalav Ha-ba
[The Next Stage] (Tel Aviv: Am Ha-sefer, 1965), p. 181.
E.g., S. Peres,
Ha-shalav Ha-ba
[The Next Stage] (Tel Aviv: Am Ha-sefer, 1965), p. 181.
55
Y. Harkavi, “Basic Factors in the Arab Collapse During the Six Day War,”
Orbis
2 (1967): 677-691.
Y. Harkavi, “Basic Factors in the Arab Collapse During the Six Day War,”
Orbis
2 (1967): 677-691.
56
J. Larteguy,
The Walls of Israel
(New York: Evans, 1969), pp. 87 (interview with Yariv) and 146 (interview with Gonen).
J. Larteguy,
The Walls of Israel
(New York: Evans, 1969), pp. 87 (interview with Yariv) and 146 (interview with Gonen).
57
F. Nietzsche,
Human, All Too Human
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 163.
F. Nietzsche,
Human, All Too Human
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 163.
58
Cf. Dayan,
Avnei Derech
, p. 436.
Cf. Dayan,
Avnei Derech
, p. 436.
59
R. S. and W. S. Churchill,
The Six Day War
, p. 191.
CHAPTER 12R. S. and W. S. Churchill,
The Six Day War
, p. 191.
1
For this and the following paragraphs see R. Pedatsur,
Nitschon Ha-mevucha: Mediniyut Memshelet Eshkol Ba-sthachim Le-achar Milchemet Sheshet Ha-yamim
[The Triumph of Embarrassment: The Eshkol Government and the Territories After the Six Days’ War] (Tel Aviv: Zmora Bitan, 1996), p. 30 ff.
For this and the following paragraphs see R. Pedatsur,
Nitschon Ha-mevucha: Mediniyut Memshelet Eshkol Ba-sthachim Le-achar Milchemet Sheshet Ha-yamim
[The Triumph of Embarrassment: The Eshkol Government and the Territories After the Six Days’ War] (Tel Aviv: Zmora Bitan, 1996), p. 30 ff.
2
For some figures on the distances between Israel’s major centers and the new and old borders see A. Levite,
Offense and Defense in Israeli Military Doctrine
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), p. 71.
For some figures on the distances between Israel’s major centers and the new and old borders see A. Levite,
Offense and Defense in Israeli Military Doctrine
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), p. 71.
3
For the complex processes that were involved in the decisionmaking process see Pedatsur,
Nitschon Ha-mevucha
, esp. pp. 145 ff., 177 ff., and 221 ff.
For the complex processes that were involved in the decisionmaking process see Pedatsur,
Nitschon Ha-mevucha
, esp. pp. 145 ff., 177 ff., and 221 ff.
4
A later version of the so-called Allon Plan is Y. Allon, “The Case for Defensible Borders,”
Foreign Affairs
55:1 (October 1976): 38-55. A full-length discussion is Y. Cohen,
Tochnit Allon
[The Allon Plan] (Efal: Ha-kibbuts Ha-meuchad, 1973).
A later version of the so-called Allon Plan is Y. Allon, “The Case for Defensible Borders,”
Foreign Affairs
55:1 (October 1976): 38-55. A full-length discussion is Y. Cohen,
Tochnit Allon
[The Allon Plan] (Efal: Ha-kibbuts Ha-meuchad, 1973).
5
Cf. M. Brecher,
The Foreign Policy System of Israel
(London: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 213 ff.
Cf. M. Brecher,
The Foreign Policy System of Israel
(London: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 213 ff.
6
N. Safran,
From War to War: The Arab-Israeli Confrontation, 1948-1967
(New York: Pegasus, 1969), p. 158.
N. Safran,
From War to War: The Arab-Israeli Confrontation, 1948-1967
(New York: Pegasus, 1969), p. 158.
7
Figures from G. Yaakobi,
Otsmatah shel Echut
(Haifa: Shikmon, 1972), p. 120.
Figures from G. Yaakobi,
Otsmatah shel Echut
(Haifa: Shikmon, 1972), p. 120.
8
According to the order of battle in T. N. Dupuy,
Elusive Victory
:
The Arab-Israeli Wars, 1947-1974
(New York: Harper and Row, 1978), pp. 181., 612-613.
According to the order of battle in T. N. Dupuy,
Elusive Victory
:
The Arab-Israeli Wars, 1947-1974
(New York: Harper and Row, 1978), pp. 181., 612-613.
9
Cf. Y. Greenberg, “Ha-hachlata al Kitsur Sherut Ha-chova Be-TSAHAL Bi-shnat 1963” [The Decision to Cut Conscript Service in 1963],
Medina, Minhal Ve-yechasim Ben-leumiyim
40 (Summer 1995): 67-77.
Cf. Y. Greenberg, “Ha-hachlata al Kitsur Sherut Ha-chova Be-TSAHAL Bi-shnat 1963” [The Decision to Cut Conscript Service in 1963],
Medina, Minhal Ve-yechasim Ben-leumiyim
40 (Summer 1995): 67-77.
10
E. Haber,
Ha-yom Tifrots Milchama
[Today War Will Break Out] (Tel Aviv: Idanim, 1987), p. 125.
E. Haber,
Ha-yom Tifrots Milchama
[Today War Will Break Out] (Tel Aviv: Idanim, 1987), p. 125.
11
Ibid., p. 138. In contrast, Major General Meron once told this author that the decision resulted from the fact that the Chieftain’s suspension system was too delicate for the rough terrain of the Middle East.
Ibid., p. 138. In contrast, Major General Meron once told this author that the decision resulted from the fact that the Chieftain’s suspension system was too delicate for the rough terrain of the Middle East.
12
M. Dayan,
Avnei Derech
[Memoirs] (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1976), p. 563.
M. Dayan,
Avnei Derech
[Memoirs] (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1976), p. 563.
13
Z. Levkovits, “Hebetim Be-logistika” [Logistic Aspects],
Maarachot
332 (September-October 1992): 36.
Z. Levkovits, “Hebetim Be-logistika” [Logistic Aspects],
Maarachot
332 (September-October 1992): 36.
14
S. Rolbant,
The Israeli Soldier: Profile of an Army
(New York: Barnes, 1970), p. 172.
S. Rolbant,
The Israeli Soldier: Profile of an Army
(New York: Barnes, 1970), p. 172.
15
Between 1976 and 1973 there were only nine, of whom four later changed their mind: R. Gal,
A Portrait of the Israeli Soldier
(Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1986), p. 256, n. 4.
Between 1976 and 1973 there were only nine, of whom four later changed their mind: R. Gal,
A Portrait of the Israeli Soldier
(Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1986), p. 256, n. 4.
16
On the link between unit cohesion and psychiatric casualties see M. van Creveld,
Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939-1945
(Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982), pp. 91-97.
On the link between unit cohesion and psychiatric casualties see M. van Creveld,
Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939-1945
(Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982), pp. 91-97.
17
Haber,
Ha-yom Tifrots Milchama
, p. 48 ff.
Haber,
Ha-yom Tifrots Milchama
, p. 48 ff.
18
The raid is described in detail in R. Eytan,
Sippur shel Chayal
[A Soldier’s Story] (Tel Aviv: Maariv, 1991), pp. 114-117; also Haber,
Ha-yom Tifrots Milchama
, pp. 322-334.
The raid is described in detail in R. Eytan,
Sippur shel Chayal
[A Soldier’s Story] (Tel Aviv: Maariv, 1991), pp. 114-117; also Haber,
Ha-yom Tifrots Milchama
, pp. 322-334.
19
Dayan,
Avnei Derech
, pp. 531-532.
Dayan,
Avnei Derech
, pp. 531-532.
20
According to Eytan,
Sippur shel Chayal
, p. 108, the guerrillas’ escape was due to the fact that the IDF had dropped leaflets to warn the civilian population.
According to Eytan,
Sippur shel Chayal
, p. 108, the guerrillas’ escape was due to the fact that the IDF had dropped leaflets to warn the civilian population.
21
Different, and much larger, figures are given by S. Ali El-Edroos,
The Hassemite Arab Army, 1909-1979
(Amman: The Publishing Committee, 1980), p. 440.
Different, and much larger, figures are given by S. Ali El-Edroos,
The Hassemite Arab Army, 1909-1979
(Amman: The Publishing Committee, 1980), p. 440.
22
The Jordanian-Syrian clash, as well as Hussein’s operations agaisnt the Palestinians, is analyzed in some detail by Rooshdi,
The Hassemite Arab Army
, pp. 449-460.
The Jordanian-Syrian clash, as well as Hussein’s operations agaisnt the Palestinians, is analyzed in some detail by Rooshdi,
The Hassemite Arab Army
, pp. 449-460.
23
For the details see M. Zak,
Hussein Osse Shalom
[Hussein Makes Peace] (Ramat Gan: Bar Illan University Press), pp. 141-142, n. 2.
For the details see M. Zak,
Hussein Osse Shalom
[Hussein Makes Peace] (Ramat Gan: Bar Illan University Press), pp. 141-142, n. 2.
24
P. Seale,
Assad: The Struggle for the Middle East
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), p. 166.
P. Seale,
Assad: The Struggle for the Middle East
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), p. 166.
25
Dayan,
Avnei Derech
, p. 422.
Dayan,
Avnei Derech
, p. 422.
26
For figures see International Institute for Strategic Studies,
The Military Balance, 1968-1969
(London: IISS, 1968), pp. 33-37.
For figures see International Institute for Strategic Studies,
The Military Balance, 1968-1969
(London: IISS, 1968), pp. 33-37.
27
See on this subject the Egyptian minister of defense, Muhammad Fawzi, as discussed in D. Schueftan,
Hatasha: Ha-astretegia Ha-medinit shel Mitsrayim Ha-natserit Be-ikvot Milchemet 1967
[Attrition: Egypt’s Post-1967 Political Strategy] (Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 1989), pp. 107-109.
See on this subject the Egyptian minister of defense, Muhammad Fawzi, as discussed in D. Schueftan,
Hatasha: Ha-astretegia Ha-medinit shel Mitsrayim Ha-natserit Be-ikvot Milchemet 1967
[Attrition: Egypt’s Post-1967 Political Strategy] (Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 1989), pp. 107-109.
28
This episode has been analyzed at length in Y. Shoshan,
Ha-krav Ha-acharon shel Hamaschetet Elat
[The Last Battle of the Destroyer Elat] (Tel Aviv: Maariv, 1984).
This episode has been analyzed at length in Y. Shoshan,
Ha-krav Ha-acharon shel Hamaschetet Elat
[The Last Battle of the Destroyer Elat] (Tel Aviv: Maariv, 1984).
29
Cf. A. Sadat,
In Search of Identity
(New York: Harper and Row, 1978), p. 197.
Cf. A. Sadat,
In Search of Identity
(New York: Harper and Row, 1978), p. 197.
30
Dayan,
Avnei Derech
, p. 515; A. Sharon,
Warrior
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), pp. 220-221.
Dayan,
Avnei Derech
, p. 515; A. Sharon,
Warrior
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), pp. 220-221.
31
For Egypt’s war aims see Schueftan,
Hatasha
, p. 201 ff.; also Y. Bar-Siman Tov,
The Israeli-Egyptian War of Attrition, 1969-1970
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), p. 47 ff.
For Egypt’s war aims see Schueftan,
Hatasha
, p. 201 ff.; also Y. Bar-Siman Tov,
The Israeli-Egyptian War of Attrition, 1969-1970
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), p. 47 ff.
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