The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (101 page)

On the East German nuclear report, “Information for the Politburo,” June 12, 1981,
SED Archives
. For key figures in the DPRK nuclear program, Tai Sung An, “The Rise and Decline of North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program,”
Korea and World Affairs
(Winter 1992): 674–675. On Kim’s requests to Chernenko, “On the Visit of DPRK’s Party and State Delegation Led by Kim Il Sung to the USSR,” memorandum dated May 29, 1984,
SED Archives
, Confidential, in Russian and German. Also see Pollack,
No Exit
, 93–94.

For US urging to the Soviets on the NPT, Paul Wolfowitz interview, July 14, 1994. On NPT and the power reactor deal, Mansourov, “Origins, Evolution,” 37.

Nuclear Diplomacy: The American Weapons
:
Baker on the diplomatic strategy in Baker’s memoir,
The Politics of Diplomacy
(Putnam, 1995), 595. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency concerns quote, Kathleen C. Bailey, Memorandum to Solomon on Intelligence Briefings Concerning North Korea, June 23, 1989, Secret (declassified 1994). My report and the DPRK reaction, Don Oberdorfer, “North Koreans Pursue Nuclear Arms,”
WP
, July 29, 1989; “Preposterous Fabrication by
Washington Post
,” Press Release of DPRK Permanent Observer Mission to the UN, August 9, 1989. On Eisenhower’s nuclear deployments, “U.S. Nuclear Warheads First Deployed to Korea in 1957,”
Dong-Á Ilbo
(April 29, 1993).

William Arkin data, Arkin interview, March 24, 1995, citing National Security Decision Memorandum 178 of July 18, 1972. My report on DMZ vicinity weapons, Don Oberdorfer, “U.S. Weighs Risk of Keeping A-Arms in Korea,”
WP
, September 20, 1974. Schlesinger quote is from AP, “Schlesinger Warns N. Korea U.S. May Use Nuclear Arms,”
St. Louis Post-Dispatch
, June 22, 1975. On reduced deployments, Arkin interview. Gregg recommendation, Gregg interview, June 21, 1993. Crowe’s views, Crowe and Alan D. Romberg, “Rethinking Security in the Pacific,”
Foreign Affairs
(Spring 1991): 34. Scowcroft’s objections, Scowcroft interview, March 29, 1995. Solomon’s “hook a ride” quote, Solomon interview, March 22, 1996.

The December Accords
:
Chinese advice to Kim Il Sung, Lim Dong Won interview, May 2, 1994. Roh’s 1991 exchange with Kim Il Sung, Roh Tae Woo luncheon conversation, July 22, 1993. The seal quote from “Two Koreas Celebrate New Era of Rapprochement,”
Korea Annual, 1992
(Yonhap News Agency, 1992), 88. For North Korean reaction to accords, Don Oberdorfer, “U.S. Welcomes Koreas’ Nuclear Accord,”
WP
, January 1, 1992. Harrison on “conditional victory,” Selig Harrison, “North Korea and Nuclear Weapons: Next Steps in American Policy,” testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, May 26, 1993.

Kim Il Sung’s denial of reprocessing, Stephen Solarz, “Interview with DPRK President Kim Il Sung,” December 18, 1991, transcript in my possession. Kim Yong Chul quote from Park Yong Ok interview, November 29, 1996. Kim’s enthusiasm about
accord, Han Yong Sup interview, November 29, 1995.
Economist
quote from “The Koreas: Look, No Bomb,”
Economist
, January 4, 1992.

Meeting in New York
:
This section is based on my reporting at the time and a subsequent interview with Kanter, February 25, 1994.

The Coming of the Inspectors
:
Gates quote, Don Oberdorfer, “N. Korea Is Far from A-bomb, Video Indicates,”
WP
, June 4, 1992. Olli Heinonen quote on early inspections, Heinonen interview, June 21, 1994. An excellent description of the IAEA’s sleuthing and the US role, from which some of these details are taken, is R. Jeffrey Smith’s “N. Korea and the Bomb: High-Tech Hide-and-Seek,”
WP
, April 27, 1993. Blix quote from Blix interview, June 22, 1994.Theis quote from Theis interview, June 21, 1994.

From Accommodation to Crisis
:
Gregg on Team Spirit “mistake,” Gregg interview, March 12, 1995. Kim anger in Ackerman meeting, State Department official, interview, May 15, 1995. Kim Hak joon on spy case, Kim interview, January 5, 1994. Gates on imagery, Gates interview, May 16, 1994. Choi quote to IAEA, Heinonen interview, June 22, 1994. DPRK war alert, Lee Chung Kuk,
The Nuclear Weapons and Army of Kim Jong Il
(Kodansha, 1994), in Japanese. Also Colonel Chjoi Ju Hwal (a high-ranking North Korean defector who experienced the alert), interview, June 24, 1996.

C
HAPTER
12: W
ITHDRAWAL AND
E
NGAGEMENT

Han Sung Joo on repercussions of withdrawal, Han interview, April 12, 1995. Han’s “stick and carrot” approach was outlined in a meeting with
Washington Post
editors and reporters, which was so close to all that he was saying privately that he was admonished to be less candid by some State Department officials. See Don Oberdorfer, “South Korean: U.S. Agrees to Plan to Pressure North,”
WP
, March 30, 1993. JCS on “punishing” North Korea, State Department official, interview, May 15, 1995. Burkhardt on ROK “suggestion,” Burkhardt interview, September 29, 1993.

Gallucci’s initial impressions of Kang, Gallucci interviews, June 21, 1993, and August 10, 1995.

The Light-Water-Reactor Plan
:
On Kim Young Sam’s objections to negotiations, David Sanger, “Seoul’s Leader Says North Is Manipulating U.S. on Nuclear Issues,”
NYT
, July 1, 1993. White House official on Kim’s references to politics and polls, interview, May 3, 1995. Gallucci retort to Clinton threat, Gallucci interview, September 1, 1993.

Contrast between US and DPRK hospitality, Daniel Russel interview, November 7, 1996. Carlin quote on “they want out” from an excellent case study by Susan Rosegrant, for the Kennedy School, Harvard University, “Carrots, Sticks, and Question Marks: Negotiating the North Korean Nuclear Crisis,” 30. Gallucci’s reaction to the LWR offer, Gallucci interview, August 10, 1995. Request to Blix for LWRs, “IAEA Director General Completes Official Visit to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,”
IAEA Press Release
, May 15, 1992. See also R.Jeffrey Smith, “N. Korea May Consider Reducing Atom Program,”
WP
, June 20, 1992.

DPRK plan for reactors in DMZ, Lim Dong Won interview, June 25, 1996. Warning to Gallucci, Gallucci interview, August 10, 1995.

Kim Young Sam Blows the Whistle
:
Gallucci “seven times removed” and “box of oranges” quotes, Rosegrant, Harvard study, 30, 27. Aspin quote on “ball in their court,” Michael J. Mazarr,
North Korea and the Bomb
(St. Martin’s Press, 1995), 133. Smith report on package deal, R.Jeffrey Smith, “U.S. Weighs N. Korean Incentives: New Approach Taken on Nuclear Inspection,”
WP
, November 17, 1993.

On Kim Young Sam in Oval Office, senior Clinton administration official, interview, January 13, 1994.

The Season of Crisis Begins
:
North-South economic disparity, “N. Korea’s Per-Capita GNP at $904, Eight Times Lower than South’s $7,466,”
KH
, June 11, 1994. The US interpretation of Kim Il Sung’s reemergence, State Department official, interview, April 14, 1995. Kim Il Sung on Kim Jong Il activity, “Q&A: ‘We Don’t Need Nuclear Weapons,’”
Washington Times
, April 15, 1992. Kang Myung Do on Kang Song San’s role in reemergence, Kang Myung Do interview, April 11, 1995.

The report on the Graham mission is based on interviews with Graham’s aide Stephen Linton, March 30, 1994, and (by telephone) August 10, 1996, and several published reports including that in Mazarr,
North Korea and the Bomb
, 123–125. On Michael Gordon and the Pershings, Gordon interview, November 20, 1995. Laney quote on body bags, Laney interview, November 22, 1994. IAEA on purpose of DPRK refusal to permit full inspections, David Kyd (IAEA spokesman) interview, April 6, 1994. Hubbard quote, Hubbard interview, March 31, 1994.

C
HAPTER
13: S
HOWDOWN
OVER
N
UCLEAR
W
EAPONS

Gallucci on “guns of August,” Gallucci interview, March 11, 1995. Perry quote on “risk of war,” Perry address to World Affairs Council, Philadelphia, November 3, 1994. Estes quote, Estes interview, April 4, 1995. CIA reevaluation of reactor downtime, US intelligence officials, interview, November 1, 1996. “Scare-nario” quote, David Albright, “North Korea and the ‘Worst-Case’ Scare-nario,”
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
(January–February 1994). Lake on disparate intelligence findings, Lake interview, April 5, 1994.

The Defueling Crisis
:
For the unclassified CIA report, see
www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/nuke/cia111902.html
. “Not a drop dead issue,” senior US official, interview, November 14, 1994. Perricos on the DPRK “poker game,” Perricos interview, June 16, 1995. Gallucci on the “medieval” IAEA, Gallucci interview, May 19, 1994. Gregg “proctologists” quote, Gregg interview, March 12, 1995. Kim Il Sung “naked man” quote to Sihanouk,
Far East Economic Review
(June 23, 1994).

The Military Track
:
O’Hanlon estimates, O’Hanlon telephone interview, February 20, 1997. On the war plan, “US.-Seoul ‘Strategic Concept’ on DPRK Noted,”
Joong-ang Ilbo
, March 24, 1994, in
FBIS-EAS
, March 24, 1994. See also the war-plan description by Michael Gordon with David Sanger in “North Korea’s Huge Military Spurs New Strategy in South,”
NYT
, February 6, 1994. ROK “nervous as a cat” quote, senior US military officer, interview, April 4, 1995. US military preparations from various news reports and Perry’s testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, January 24, 1995. Luck comments, Luck interview, May 3, 1994. Flanigan on Pentagon preparatory meeting, Flanigan interview, August 11, 1995. Flanigan “extremely sobering” quote from Rosegrant, Harvard study, 51.

Estimates given to Clinton, Captain Thomas Flanigan, letter to author, September 20, 1995. Perry “even more dangerous” quote, Perry speech before the World Affairs Council, Philadelphia, November 3, 1994.

The Deepening Conflict
:
On the Aspin appeal for direct negotiations with Kim Il Sung, Mazarr,
North Korea and the Bomb
, 102–103. Estimates of remittances to the DPRK by Koreans in Japan are very uncertain, but $600 million was the figure used in governmental circles. A serious study by Nicholas Eberstadt of the American Enterprise Institute concluded from financial data that the transfers to North Korea from private groups in Japan have not exceeded $100 million yearly since 1990. On Japan’s difficulty in cutting off remittances, former White
House official, interview, October 28, 1996. Secret Japanese report on effect of sanctions, Asao Iku, “North Korea Will Act This Way,”
Bungei Shunju
, July 1994, in Japanese. Japanese preparations for assistance to United States, “Government Was Preparing Limited Legislation in 1994,”
Asahi Shimbun
, September 16, 1996, in Japanese. “Nightmare” quote from Japanese diplomat, interview, November 6, 1996.

Selig Harrison’s trip to Pyongyang, from interview with Harrison, July 14, 1994; a Carnegie Endowment press release with details of the Harrison trip published June 16, 1994; and Harrison’s “The North Korean Nuclear Crisis: From Stalemate to Breakthrough,” in
Arms Control Today
(November 1994). Kim Young Sam’s criticism of Carter mission, “Seoul Denounces Carter Trip as ‘Ill-Timed,’” DPA (German Press Agency), June 11, 1994. Poll data on opinion toward North Korea,
American Enterprise
(July 8, 1994): 83. Scowcroft and Kanter views, “Korea: Time for Action,”
WP
, June 15, 1994.

The section on US military preparations is based largely on an interview with William Perry, April 25, 1995, as well as his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, January 24, 1995, and the Senate Armed Services Committee, January 26, 1995, and on news reports and a variety of other sources. For Luck on casualties and the costs of war, testimony of Luck before Senate Armed Services Committee, January 26, 1995. DPRK lessons from Gulf War, senior US officer, interview, April 4, 1995.

Carter in Pyongyang
:
Jimmy Carter, “Report of Our Trip to Korea, June 1994,” unpublished manuscript from the Carter Center. The account of the Carter mission is also based on Marion Creekmore interview, August 1, 1994; input from Carter to the author via his aides; and a variety of other published and unpublished sources. Carter’s “chances are minimal” quote, Elizabeth Kurylo, “Revisiting a Mission to Korea,”
Atlanta Journal-Constitution
, July 3, 1994.

My report of the crucial White House meeting is based on interviews with four of the participants. Carter clarified for me in October 1996 that it was he who brought up the topic of a potential summit in the conversation with Kim Il Sung.

C
HAPTER
14: D
EATH AND
A
CCORD

A video of Kim’s last year taken from official footage, containing good coverage of the final economic meeting, was broadcast on North Korean television and shown to me at my request during my January 1995 visit to Pyongyang. I also spoke about the meeting with Kim Jong U, one of the senior officials who were present. Other details, including Kim’s intervention in summit planning, are from the North Korean official version of his final meetings in
KIS Work
(the Korean-language edition), vol. 44, published June 21, 1996. For Kim’s recent appearances, “Seoul Speculates Kim’s Death May Be Result of Power Struggle,”
KH
, July 10, 1994. Kim Young Sam discussed his plans for his summit meeting with Kim Il Sung with me in an interview in the Blue House, April 14, 1995. Other than the official autopsy report, the details and circumstances of Kim Il Sung’s death have never been made public by North Korea. My account relies on the reporting of Julie Moon, who was given special access to senior North Korean officials at the time of Kim’s funeral. A senior North Korean official confirmed the authenticity of her account in a conversation with me in Pyongyang in January 1995.