The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (97 page)

The Struggle with Japan
:
Mun as a “jackal,” interview with former Korean prosecutor, October 23, 1992. On the plight of Koreans in Japan, see Don Oberdorfer, “An Assassin Comes ‘Home’ to Korea,”
WP
, September 3, 1974, my investigation of Mun Se Kwang’s life and background in Osaka. The Chung Il Kwon quote is from Ericson interview, February 16, 1994. Park’s diary quotes from “Blue House Diary,”
Minju Ilbo
, November 24, 1989, in Korean, translation by Carter Eckert.

The Underground War
:
Material on the tunnels is based primarily on the tunnels sections of
USFK Hist. 1972–87
, which were declassified and released to me in 1995 under the Freedom of Information Act. See also Don Oberdorfer, “Korea’s DMZ-Security Undermined?,”
WP
, May 27, 1975. The “needle in haystack” quote is from
USFK Hist. 1979
, 44, Secret (declassified 1995). For the psychics, see “US Spy Agencies Field Psychics to Pinpoint North Korean Tunnels Under DMZ,”
KT
, December 2, 1995. Nathanial Thayer quote, Thayer interview, August 1, 1995.

Challenge from the North
:
Retrospective US military analysis,
USFK Hist. 1982
, 30, Secret (declassified 1995). Chinese officer quote, Xu Xian Zhang interview, July 8, 1993. Gates on “black hole,” interview, May 16, 1994. Gregg on intelligence failure, Gregg interview, March 12, 1995. On JCS reduction of resources, see
USFK Hist. 1972
, 14, Secret (declassified 1995).

Kim Il Sung on preparations for war, “Excerpts from Interview with North Korean Premier on Policy Toward the U.S.,”
NYT
, May 31, 1972; 1974 US intelligence
estimate,
USFK Hist. 1974
, Secret (declassified 1995). Hollingsworth section is based on a telephone interview with Hollingsworth, August 26, 1995, as well as an interview with Gregg, June 21, 1993. See also John Saar, “The Army’s Defiant Anachronism,”
WP
, February 15, 1976. NSC objections, Thomas J. Barnes, “Secretary Schlesinger’s Discussions in Seoul,” National Security Council Memorandum, September 29, 1975, Secret (declassified 1995).

For the US Command’s estimate of Soviet/Chinese intentions,
USFK Hist. 1974
, 21, Secret (declassified 1995). For Kim Il Sung’s speech,
FBIS
, PRC International Affairs, April 21, 1975, A17. Kim had also used the formulation that there was nothing to lose but the DMZ on the eve of his Beijing journey, in a talk to the secretary of the Panama-Korea Association of Friendship and Culture. See
KIS Works
, 30:2. For the internal leadership situation in Beijing at the time, see Ezra F Vogel,
Deng Xiaoping
(Harvard University Press, 2011), 116. Kim Il Sung’s views on Vietnam are in CWIHP, Working Paper 53, 13. Chinese reaction, interview, former Chinese official, July 5, 1993. According to South Korean data, Chinese military assistance to North Korea diminished sharply following Kim’s 1975 trip. On the Soviet reaction, Russian Foreign Ministry official, interview, April 15, 1994. For Kim’s roundabout flight avoiding Soviet airspace, see Don Oberdorfer, “Korea: Progress and Danger,”
WP
, June 29, 1975.

Echoes of Saigon
:
For Sneider on the review,
Emb. cable
, “Review of U.S. Policies Toward Korea,” April 22, 1975, Secret (declassified 1996). His more considered judgment,
Emb. cable
, “U.S. Policy Towards Korea,” June 24, 1975, Secret (declassified 1996). On the NSC interpretation of Ford’s promise and objections to Schlesinger’s statements, see Thomas J. Barnes, “Secretary Schlesinger’s Discussions in Seoul,” National Security Council Memorandum, November 29, 1975, Secret (declassified 1995). For Schlesinger comments to Park, Memorandum of Conversation Between President Park Chung Hee and Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, August 27, 1975, Secret (declassified 1996).

For Park’s actions in 1975,
USFK Hist. 1975
, 45, Confidential (declassified 1995). For defense budget impact,
The Military Balance
(International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1975–1976 through 1979–1980). The South Korean military buildup data are from the Institute of International Strategic Studies’
Military Balance
, 1975–1980.

The South Korean Nuclear Weapons Program
:
Oh Won Choi’s comments, interview, June 24, 1996. See also his article “Blood Battle Between Park Chung Hee and Carter on Nuclear Development,”
Shin Dong-Á
(November 1994), in Korean. See also Robert Gillette, “U.S. Squelched Apparent S. Korean A-Bomb Drive,”
Los Angeles Times
, November 4, 1978. For many years, this well-researched article, based in part on congressional testimony, has been a key source on the South Korean nuclear program. On the South Korean reprocessing effort, the best source is Cho Kap Che, “Nuclear Game on the Korean Peninsula,”
Monthly Chosun
(June 1993), from which these details were taken. For the quote on “snapped into place,” see Gillette,
Los Angeles Times
, November 4, 1978 (as above). Cleveland quote from Cleveland interview, March 8, 1994.

Embassy intelligence and Washington instructions,
DOS cable
, “ROK Plans to Develop Nuclear Weapons and Missiles,” March 4, 1975, Secret/Nodis (declassified 1997).

The French ambassador’s quote is from Steve Weissman and Herbert Krosney,
The Islamic Bomb
(Times Books, 1981), 252. Park’s quote on nuclear capability is from Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, “Korea: Park’s Inflexibility . . . ,”
WP
, June 12, 1975. The National Security Council Memorandum on persuading Seoul,
Memorandum for Secretary Kissinger from Jan M. Lodal and Dave Elliott, July 24, 1975, Secret (declassified 1995).

Schlesinger’s meeting with Park, Schlesinger interview, July 6, 1995. For Sneider’s “real consideration” statement,
Emb. cable
, December 16, 1975, Nodis (declassified 1996). On the Rumsfeld threat against the ROK, Cho Kap Che, “Interview with Jae Nae Sohn,”
Monthly Chosun
(August 1995). For Sneider’s postcrisis views, Memorandum of Conversation of Brent Scowcroft, Richard Sneider, William Gleysteen, September 15, 1976, Secret/Sensitive (declassified 1995). On Carter-Giscard diplomacy, see Zbigniew Brzezinski,
Power and Principle
(Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1983), 134.

On Park’s plan to unveil the A-bomb, Son U Ryun, “Voice Testimony of Park Chung Hee,”
Monthly Chosun
(March 1993), in Korean. For continuing development, “95 Percent Development of Nuclear Weapons as of 1978,”
Joong-ang Ilbo
, October 2, 1993, in Korean; “Korea Close to N-bomb Development in Late 1970s,”
KH
, October 6, 1995.

Murder in the Demilitarized Zone
:
For this section, I relied heavily on materials obtained under mandatory declassification review from the Gerald Ford Presidential Library and from the Department of State under the Freedom of Information Act, as well as interviews with a number of former officials who were on the scene in Korea or Washington. Three books were also of great value: Richard G. Head, Frisco W. Short, and Robert C. McFarlane (the last a future White House national security adviser),
Crisis Resolution: Presidential Decision Making in the Mayaguez and Korean Confrontations
(Westview Press, 1978), which covers Washington policy making; Colonel Conrad DeLateur,
Murder at Panmunjom: The Role of the Theater Commander in Crisis Resolution
, research paper for the Senior Seminar, Foreign Service Institute, 1987, dealing primarily with General Stilwell’s role; and Major Wayne A. Kirkbride,
DMZ: A Story of the Panmunjom Axe Murder
(Holly, 1984), which deals with the episode as seen by US officers and men at the DMZ.

The CIA report, titled
DMZ Incident
, was dated August 18, 1976, Top Secret (declassified 1996). The discussion at the WASAG meeting was taken from the minutes of the meeting obtained through the Ford Presidential Library, Secret (declassified 1995). For the historical buildup cable, ComUSKorea to AIG Washington, August 18, 1976, Confidential (declassified 1996). For the warning effort by intelligence analysts, see Head, Short, and McFarlane,
Crisis Resolution
, 155. For Hyland’s recommendation and discussion of punitive measures, see Memorandum for Brent Scowcroft from W.G. Hyland, August 18, 1976, Top Secret/Exclusively Eyes Only (declassified 1994).

On military views of punitive actions, see JCS Assessment and Addendum, Top Secret (declassified 1994). Scowcroft’s “wimpish” quote is from Scowcroft interview, March 29, 1995. For military “handwringing,” William Hyland interview, May 15, 1995. Ford’s summary quote is from Head, Short, and McFarlane,
Crisis Resolution
, 193.

For the Pyongyang radio programming and blackout, US Liaison Office Beijing to SecState Washington, “Panmunjom Incident and Situation in Pyongyang,” August 21, 1976, Confidential (declassified 1994). See also
South-North Dialogue in Korea
(International Cultural Society, November 1976), 64. On the military precautions in the DPRK, Colonel Choi Ju Hwal, a high-ranking DPRK defector, interview, June 24, 1996. For Ho Dam quote, AmEmbassy Colombo to SecState Washington, August 20, 1976, Unclassified.

Stilwell’s reaction, cable from Stilwell to JCS, August 19, 1976, Secret (declassified 1995). Park’s quotes are from Park Chung Hee, “Blue House Diary,”
Minju Ilbo
, November 24, 1989, in Korean. Stilwell quote on Park, cable from CINCUNC Korea (Stilwell) to JCS, August 19, 1976, Secret (declassified 1995). On the arms of the tae kwon do group, Lieutenant General John Cushman telephone interview, May 4, 1995. Park quote on retaliation,
Emb. cable
, August 20, 1976, Secret (declassified 1994).

Stilwell’s battle plan is set out in his cable to the JCS, August 19, 1976, Secret (declassified 1995). On North Korean notification, see DeLateur,
Murder at Panmunjom
, 20. Peter Hayes,
Pacific Powderkeg
(Lexington Books, 1991), 60, on “blew their minds.”

Kim quote about North Korea not resisting, “Talk to a Professor of SOKA University in Japan,” November 13, 1976, in
KIS Works
, 31:401. Scowcroft quote on the impact on US election, Scowcroft interview, March 29, 1995. Lee’s comments on North Koreans, Jimmy Lee interview, July 8, 1995.

C
HAPTER
4: T
HE
C
ARTER
C
HILL

For Carter on the origin of his position, letter from Carter to me, March 12, 1994. Brzezinski quote from “President Carter’s Troop Withdrawal from Korea,” Harvard University case study by Major Joseph Wood, 1990.

Carter’s Withdrawal: Origins and Implementation
:
For Ford review, National Security Study Memorandum 226, “Review of U. S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula,” May 27, 1975, Secret/Nodis (declassified 1994). A notation in the Ford Presidential Library file says that Scowcroft approved suspension of work on the study on May 29, with no reason given. For Powell quote and other details of my 1977 research on the origins of Carter’s ideas, Don Oberdorfer, “Carter’s Decision on Korea Traced to Early 1975,”
WP
, June 12, 1977. For Carter’s views on stationing troops and his recollection of poll data, Carter letter to me, March 12, 1994. For priority given Korea, see Zbigniew Brzezinski,
Power and Principle
(Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1983), 51. Quotes from PRM-13 from “Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC 13,” February 26, 1977, Secret (declassified 1991).

Abramowitz quote from interview, April 22, 1995. For Sneider and Vessey meeting with Park,
Emb. cable
, “Meeting with President Park,” March 1, 1977, Secret (declassified 1996). Carter’s informal instructions are on a handwritten memo from “J. C.” to “Zbig and Cy,” March 5, 1977, in the Carter Presidential Library, Secret (declassified 1996).

Talking points from “Meeting with South Korean Foreign Minister Pak Tong-Chin,” Memo from Brzezinski to Carter, March 8, 1977, Secret (declassified 1996). Foreign Minister Park’s version is from his memoir,
One Will on a Long Road
(Seoul Dong-A Publishing, 1992), in Korean. Failure to approach Soviets and Chinese, “Approach to Soviets and Chinese on Our Troop Withdrawals from Korea,” Department of State Action Memorandum, June 10, 1977, Confidential (declassified 1996).

Quote on “missing dimension,” “Talks Between South Korea and North Korea With or Without PRC Participation,” Memorandum for the President (believed to be from Vance, about July 25, 1977), Secret (declassified 1996). For Carter’s response, see Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Talks Between North Korea and South Korea,” Memorandum for the Secretary of State, August 5, 1977, Secret (declassified 1996).

For Vance efforts in China, David Anderson for Peter Tarnoff, “Efforts to Promote a Dialogue Between South and North,” Memorandum for Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski,
September 2, 1977, Top Secret (declassified 1996). This was amplified by a telephone interview with William Gleysteen, who accompanied Vance to China, November 19, 1996. Carter atomic weapons quote,
WP
, March 21, 1976. For numbers of weapons at the time, William Arkin telephone interview, March 4, 1995. For Harold Brown’s view on nuclear weapons, Brown interview, July 12, 1995.

“Rebellion” against the president, Richard Holbrooke interview, August 10, 1993. Harold Brown on limits of loyalty, interview, July 12, 1995. Cyrus Vance view, Vance interview, February 4, 1994. Zbigniew Brzezinski on Carter’s beliefs, Brzezinski interview, March 1, 1994. Carter’s withdrawal order, Presidential Directive/NSC-12, May 5, 1977, Top Secret/Sensitive/Eyes Only (declassified 1991). The nuclear aspects of the decision remain classified.

For Park’s comment to reporters, Sunwoo Ryun, “Voice Testimony of Park Chung Hee,”
Monthly Chosun
(March 1993), in Korean. For Park’s position on withdrawal, former Korean official, interview, July 20, 1993. Brzezinski comments on “uphill battle” in Congress, Memorandum for the President from Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Congressional Reactions to Our Korean Policy,” July 21, 1977, Confidential (declassified 1996).