Triumph and Tragedy (The Second World War) (60 page)

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19

Christmas at Athens

Street Fighting in Athens — Grave Correspondence with Field-Marshal Alexander — My
Telegram to Smuts, December
22
—My Doubts
about a Regency —I Fly to Athens with Mr. Eden,
December
24
— Christmas Night on Board H.M.S.

“Ajax”— I Report to Mr. Atlee — And to the
President — We Meet the Communists in the
Greek Foreign Office, December
26
— A
Telegram to Mrs. Churchill — We Agree to Ask
the King of Greece to Appoint Archbishop
Damaskinos as his Regent — The Flight Home,
December
28
— Telegrams to the President — A
Painful Task — The Royal Announcement — A
Comment by Sir Reginald Leeper — General
Plastiras Becomes Prime Minister, January
4
—

Wise Advice from Field-Marshal Smuts — A Truce
is Signed, January
11
— E.L.A.S. Expelled from
Athens — The End of the Struggle.

I
N ATHENSthe street fighting swayed to and fro on an enlarging scale. On December 15 Field-Marshal Alexander warned me that it was most important to get a settlement quickly, and the best chance was through the Archbishop.

“Otherwise,” he telegraphed, “I fear if rebel resistance continues at the same intensity as at present I shall have to send further large reinforcements from the Italian front to make sure of clearing the whole of Piraeus-Athens, which is fifty square miles of houses.”

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Prime Minister to

17 Dec. 44

Field-Marshal

Alexander (Italy)

The E.L.A.S. advance towards the centre of Athens
seems to me a very serious feature, and I should like
yourappreciation of whether, with the reinforcements
now arriving, we are likely to

hold our own in the centre of the city and defeat the
enemy. Have you any other reinforcements in view
besides the 4th Division, the Tank Regiment, and the
two remaining brigades of the 46th Division? Is there
now any danger of a mass surrender of British troops
cooped up in the city of Athens, followed by a massacre
of Greeks who sided with us? The War Cabinet desire
your report on the military situation in this respect.

2. We have no intention of subduing or occupying
Greece. Our object is to afford a foundation upon which
a broad-based Greek Government can function and
raise a national force to preserve itself in Attica. After
this we go, as we have no interests in Greece except
those of sentiment and honour.

3. The King of Greece has refused categorically in a
long and powerfully reasoned letter to appoint a
Regent, and especially to appoint the Archbishop, of
whom he has personal distrust. I have heard mixed
accounts of the Archbishop, who is said to be very
much in touch with E.A.M. and to have keen personal
ambitions. We have not yet decided whether or in what
way to overcome the King’s resistance. If this cannot be
overcome there will be no constitutional foundation
other than an act of violence, to which we must become
parties. The matter would be rendered more complicated if, as it may prove and as the King asserts, he is
advised not to appoint a Regency by his Prime Minister
and Government. In this case we should be punishing
the King for obeying his constitutional oath and be
ourselves setting up a dictator. The Cabinet have
therefore decided to await further developments of the
military situation before taking final and fateful
decisions.

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4. Personally I feel that our military predominance
should be plainly established before we make terms,
and in any case I should not like to make terms on
grounds of weakness rather than of strength. Of course
if you tell me it is impossible for us to be in control of
Attica within a reasonable time the situation presents
difficulties, but not such as should daunt us after all the
others we have overcome.

And two days later:

Prime Minister to

19 Dec. 44

Field-Marshal

Alexander (Italy)

The Cabinet feel it better to let the military operations to clear Athens and Attica run for a while rather
than embark all our fortunes on the character of the
Archbishop. Have you looked up his full record? It is a
hard thing to ask me to throw over a constitutional King
acting on the true advice of his Ministers, apart from
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British pressure, in order to install a dictator who may
very likely become the champion of the extreme Left.

We are waiting here till the scene clears a little
more, after which we shall give all the necessary
directions.

Alexander’s reply was grave. He had now succeeded General Wilson in the Supreme Command.

Field-Marshal

21 Dec. 44

Alexander to Prime

Minister

In answer to your signal of December 19, I am most
concerned that you should know exactly what true
situation is and what we can do and cannot do. This is
my duty. You would know the strength of British forces
in Greece, and what additions I can send from Italian
front if forced by circumstances to do so.

Assuming that E.L.A.S. continue to fight, I estimate
that it will be possible to clear the Athens-Piraeus area
and thereafter to hold it securely, but this will not defeat
E.L.A.S. and force them to surrender. We are not
strong enough to go beyond this and undertake
operations on the Greek mainland. During the German
occupation they maintained between six and seven
divisions on the mainland, in addition to the equivalent
of four in the Greek islands. Even so they were unable
to keep their communications open all the time, and I
doubt if we will meet less strength and determination
than they encountered.

The German intentions on the Italian Front require
careful watching. Recent events in the West and the
disappearance and silence of 16th S.S. Division
opposite Fifth U.S. Army indicates some surprise move
which we must guard against. I mention these factors to
make the military situation clear to you, and to
emphasise that it is my opinion that the Greek problem
cannot be solved by military measures. The answer
must be found in the political field.

Finally, I think you know that you can always rely on
me to do everything in my power to carry out your
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wishes, but I earnestly hope that you will be able to find
a political solution to the Greek problem, as I am
convinced that further military action after we have
cleared the Athens-Piraeus area is beyond our present
strength.

I replied:

Prime Minister to

22 Dec. 44

Field-Marshal

Alexander (Italy)

There is no question of our embarking in any military
operations away from the Athens-Piraeus area. We
must however have a military foundation there on which
a Greek Government of some kind or other can
function. I have personally great doubts about the
Archbishop, who might quite conceivably make himself
into a dictator supported by the Left Wing. However,
these doubts may be removed in the next few days,
and I am hopeful that in these days we shall achieve
the mastery in Attica and cleanse Athens.

2. Thereafter we do not intend to stay in Greece
except for such reasonable period as may be
necessary to let the new Government, whatever it is,
gain for itself a National Army or Militia, in the hope that
these may be able to conduct elections, plebiscites, etc.

We can achieve no political solution while negotiating
from a basis of weakness and frustration. The political
field in the present circumstances can only be entered
by the gate of success.

I sent Field-Marshal Smuts my reactions on Greek affairs.

Prime Minister to

22 Dec. 44

Field-Marshal Smuts

Greece has proved a source of endless trouble to
me, and we have indeed been wounded in the house of
our friends. With this new chance, Communist and Left
Wing forces throughout the world have stirred in
sympathy, and our prestige and authority in Greece has

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to some extent been undermined by the American
Press, reporting back. The return of the Greek King
would provide no basis for a British policy. We must at
all costs avoid giving the impression of forcing him on
them by our bayonets.

I have serious doubts about the Regency, which
may well assume the form of a dictatorship. I am
unable to say whether it would be a dictatorship of the
Left as I do not know enough about the Archbishop. All
Leftist forces and our people on the spot have certainly
given their support to it. Alexander of course has his
heart in the North and strongly dislikes the whole Greek
business. But if the powers of evil prevail in Greece, as
is quite likely, we must be prepared for a quasi-Bolshevised Russian-led Balkans peninsula, and this
may spread to Italy and Hungary. I therefore foresee
great perils to the world in these quarters, but am
powerless to do anything effective without subjecting
the Government to great stresses and quarrelling with
America. I am hoping that the next few days may see
an improvement in the progress of military operations in
Attica, and thus induce a more healthy atmosphere. In
the meantime our reinforcements are coming in, and of
course in numbers we are already greatly superior to E.

L.A.S. The situation is not however very pleasant.

Two days later I resolved to go and see for myself.

It was December 24, and we had a family and children’s party for Christmas Eve. We had a Christmas tree — one sent from the President — and were all looking forward to a pleasant evening, the brighter perhaps because surrounded by dark shadows. But when I had finished reading my telegrams I felt sure I ought to fly to Athens, see the situation on the spot, and especially make the acquaintance of the Archbishop, around whom so much was turning. I therefore set the telephone working and arranged for an aeroplane to be ready at Northolt that night. I also spoilt Mr.

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Eden’s Christmas by the proposal, which he immediately accepted, that he should come too. After having been much reproached by the family for deserting the party, I motored to meet Eden at Northolt, where the Skymaster which General Arnold had recently sent me waited, attentive and efficient. We slept soundly until about eight o’clock Christmas morning, when we landed to refuel at Naples.